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
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STATEMENT

OF

PRINCE FREDERICK OF SCHLESWIG
HOLSTEIN NOER,

RELATIVE TO

HIS PERSONAL CONNECTION

WITH THE

POLITICAL EVENTS IN THE DUCHIES
IN THE YEAR 1848.

[PRINTED FOR PRIVATE DISTRIBUTION.]

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I HAVE been uniformly reluctant to notice attacks from whatever quarter levelled against me through the press, and, in consequence, have abstained from publishing anything in defence or explanation against the various accusations so freely preferred from both extremes of party, whether Radical-German, or ultra-Danish, trusting all along that a perfect tranquillity of conscience would support me, until a fitting occasion presented itself to refute attacks originating either in prejudice or ignorance. An opportunity has been, however, at length afforded; and, I may say, pressed upon me by the nature of the personal allusions of which I was made the subject in the discussion which took place in the House of Lords, on Friday the 3rd inst., in reference to the affairs of Denmark; for, notwithstanding the explanation rendered in the recently published letter of the Earl of Malmesbury, I feel it is still requisite that the public should understand the motives under which I was prevailed upon to assume a position, which placed it in the power of Lord Malmesbury to describe me as one who had taken arms against my Sovereign. I shall therefore confine myself to a simple statement of facts, leaving others to form their own judgment as to the part I acted under the pressure of events, and the necessity of the time.

FREDERICK,
PRINCE OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOIR.

London, 25th June, 1853:

Having joined the Danish army in the year 1824, I had the good fortune to earn and enjoy the favorable opinion of the Sovereign and his Government, by whom I was frequently employed in situations of authority and confidence. In the year 1834, I was unanimously elected a member of the Schleswic Diet, and in 1842 named by the then king, Christian VIII., his Statholder in the Duchies. In which latter position I acquitted myself in such a manner as to elicit from his Majesty the most cordial acknowledgment of my services ; whilst, at the same time, I think I may state, without fear of contradiction, that I was no less popular with those over whom I was appointed to govern. When, in 1846, the King issued his letters patent, in which he expressed the conclusion at which he had arrived with reference to the question of succession in the Duchies, and which was then placed upon a new footing, and one entirely different from the settlement hitherto so prevalent and popular in the mind of the country, I thought it my duty to tender my resignation to his Majesty of the offices I held, as Statholder and General-in-command of the Troops, under a painful sense that I could not conscientiously adopt or give effect to his Majesty's expressed views. The King accordingly notified his acceptance of my resignation, accompanying the same with the warmest testimony of my conduct, as will be found in the letter, marked A in Appendix. The private letter in question will show, more than any official expression, in what light the King regarded me ; and it was his constant object, up to the period of his death, as his correspondence would prove, to maintain the ties of friendship between us unbroken, as he reiterated to the last, from time to time, his desire to be acquainted with my views on public affairs, as well as the state of public opinion in the Duchies. My resignation was followed by warm discussions in the Diet, strongly censuring the Government ; but in these, considering the position I had held, I declined taking any

part, and retired at once into private life, and so remained until the King's death. In the mean time, the animosity between Denmark and the Duchies grew every day more and more apparent; and the conviction had impressed itself upon the minds of the people in the latter, that the Government had taken a position hostile to their constitutional rights.

Alarmed at the excitement which I saw prevailing, and which portended serious consequences, I felt it my duty to impress these circumstances upon the King, and to warn him against the coming danger, in the letter which is given herewith, marked B.

Shortly after, however, his Majesty died; and the letters patent of the 28th January, 1848, promulgated by the present King, kindled more fiercely the passion of mutual distrust between the different portions of the Danish monarchy. The decease of the late King and the events which immediately succeeded, only operated in inducing me to maintain a still more strict seclusion; and I contented myself with exercising the personal influence I possessed, to urge upon my friends the necessity, whilst contending for their ancient privileges, carefully to avoid giving the world an opportunity of reproaching them with disloyalty, or seeking to attain their ends by unlawful means. The results of the King's letter were however soon exhibited in all quarters, by provoking the most exciting language at Copenhagen, in almost daily meetings, as well as at Kiel and Rendsburg, whilst the individual who temporarily filled the office of Statholder was disregarded, and unfortunately failed in manifesting that moral courage then so much required. Under such circumstances I thought it my duty to address a letter to the King Frederick VII. (Appendix C.) humbly cautioning his Majesty against the evils which I saw approaching, and offering him my best assistance, upon such conditions as would enable me to provide for the preservation of order. And here, it must be borne in

mind, that whilst these occurrences were taking place, a Republic had been established in France, the whole of Italy was one volcano, that almost every German Court had surrendered its prerogative to the mob, and that a Republican epidemic had spread over Europe.

Things were in this state when on the 23rd March, 1848, I was sitting quietly at dinner with my family at my country residence, when a note was brought to me by a special messenger from a friend at Kiel, mentioning the non-arrival of the steamer due that morning from Copenhagen, the growing agitation in the public mind, and the rumours of a Danish fleet with troops on board having been seen steering towards the coast, &c. I had scarcely time to make some remarks on the power of imagination exhibited by the inhabitants of Kiel, when another letter sent us by express from Eckernförde gave us notice of the movements at Copenhagen, and the change of Ministry which followed.

Having ascertained by the intelligence thus communicated, that those individuals who had for the last four weeks agitated the public mind at Copenhagen, against the Duchies, were in possession of the Governmental power, I saw at once the effect, which this event would produce upon the public, and accordingly did not hesitate to hasten to Kiel, from whence in the course of a few moments three messengers from different quarters sent by the Conservative party, arrived, requesting my assistance in preventing a democratic outbreak. To prevent any demonstration which my arrival might occasion, I took the precaution of entering the town on foot after sunset.

I soon, however, became convinced of the impossibility of averting a violent demonstration. The battalion in garrison had been abandoned by its Danish Commander in despair of its obedience to his orders, and the soldiers unanimously declared their adherence to the common cause. At the Town Hall a number of

the most violent democrats were assembled concerting the measures they should take, and which of them should fill posts in a Provisional Government. It therefore required no great astuteness to perceive that every thing was at stake at this moment.—The democratic party if left to itself were likely to follow the example of Paris by overthrowing every authority and declaring a republic, a movement which at that period of revolution and weakness in most of the States of Europe, might have spread with lightning speed, and destroyed every stable institution, or if confined within the bounds of the Duchies, would have given a pretext to the ultra-Danish party to assume a conquest, and to treat the Duchies as subdued provinces which had forfeited all rights and privileges—such objects I saw could only be defeated by taking the responsibility of action upon myself, and by joining with those individuals whom I had named in my letter (C.) to the King as men of popular standing and moderate views. In establishing a Provisional Government to execute authority on behalf the King; I felt that I also retained full power in the event of His Majesty adopting the proposals named in that letter, of carrying them out with full effect. My reply therefore to a deputation from the Town Hall inviting me to take part in their proceedings, was, that I should quit the town immediately if those individuals persisted in their pretensions and absurdities. Having come to this resolute understanding, and finding ourselves supported by the whole Conservative community, we were enabled to preserve order and at length prevailed upon the extreme party to abandon their objects by associating one of the most moderate of their number with my colleagues and myself in the provisional body. This the most important step having been taken, it became necessary with a view to allay popular excitement that our measures should be carried out without delay. I accordingly set out by the first train for Rendsburg, in

which garrison nearly the whole of the troops of the Duchies were stationed, and where the General-in-command had his head-quarters. On entering the place I notified my purpose to this officer, and willingly acceded to his proposal that we should call the troops out, and ascertain their feelings as to the change that had taken place.

The result was that with the exception of about twenty officers (natives of Denmark) the whole of the troops declared in favor of the Provisional Government.

By this act which conferred strength upon that Government, public tranquillity was at once restored, and manifestations in its support were exhibited in all quarters. This consummation having been achieved, we felt from a sense of our obligation towards the King, that it became our duty humbly to acquaint His Majesty with the proceedings which had taken place, explaining to him the motives by which we were actuated and praying him to recognize those rights, guaranteed to us by ancient prescription, in which event we expressed our readiness to surrender the authority we had assumed into his Majesty's hands. Holstein being a part of the Germanic confederation, we lost no time in communicating the nature of our proceedings to "Bundestag," at Frankfort, by whom the Provisional Government was approved and acknowledged, and upon the requisition of the former, the King of Prussia sent his troops in our support. From that moment I became in a less independent position as regarded the direction of civil and military affairs, and the only real power I possessed was that of personal influence, which I exercised to the utmost in the maintenance of Conservative principles. Thus it was that when the Prussian Commander-in-chief, deciding upon active military measures, contrary to my reiterated remonstrances, entered the Danish territory, I could do no more than discountenance a proceeding which gave a new feature to our movement, and was totally at variance with the

purely defensive principle upon which it had been commenced.

When the proceedings to which I refer were terminated by the armistice a few months later I felt too happy in surrendering the exercise of my functions, and retired once more into seclusion on my own estate, a course which was the more consonant to my feelings, as the authority appointed over the Duchies became invested in individuals nominated alike by the Sovereign himself in conjunction with the German powers.

I trust that this short and plain narration of events will sufficiently exhibit the motives by which I was actuated under circumstances of extreme difficulty and public danger, and also shew, however appearances for the time may have placed my conduct in an equivocal light, that my whole aim and earnest efforts were directed with a view to maintain strictly monarchical principles and authority, an object with which I felt the constitutional rights of my country and public tranquillity at a period of general disturbance were inseparably connected.

With the recital of the above particulars, I might probably conclude, but more recent transactions of a nature no less personally important, demand some notice, more especially as it is my object that every act in which I have been concerned, either in this country or elsewhere, should be made plainly apparent, not only to my friends, but to all who have taken an interest in my proceedings.

From the month of September, 1848, until the spring of 1852, no circumstance occurred to interrupt that position of retirement which I felt a desire as long as it was possible to maintain, but when rumours and articles apparently from authority in the newspapers communicated that negotiations affecting the succession to the Crown of Denmark were approaching a termination, whilst I had neither been personally consulted, nor in any manner made officially acquainted with their precise nature, I felt

called upon to appeal to the proper quarters, in order, if possible, to prevent a compromise of my rights ; I accordingly applied in the first instance, through a mutual friend, to the Earl of Derby, then Prime Minister, but his Lordship declined to afford me an interview. I next sought a specific explanation of my brother, the Duke of Augustenburg, but was unsuccessful ; at the same time, feeling that as head of our House, the protection of its interests lay with him, I took no further step, and remained entirely passive, until startled by a formal official announcement that the Duke of Augustenburg had concluded an arrangement with the King of Denmark, by which not only the succession to the throne, but our family property were alike diverted. No course, therefore, remained open to me, except that of which I feel assured every right-minded Englishman will approve, namely, solemnly to disclaim any participation in such transactions ; I accordingly addressed a protest to Her Majesty's Government as a non-consenting party to a treaty which I considered arbitrarily disposed of my rights, and likewise in a letter to the President of the Danish Diet, communicated my dissent from the arrangements between my brother and the King of Denmark, respecting which I had been kept in utter ignorance. (*Vide* Letter D.)

In adopting this proceeding, I hope it will be admitted that I did no more than a sense of honor dictated, as well as fulfilled a duty imposed upon me by my position as a Member of the House of Schleswig Holstein, whose rights, I felt ought not in justice to be sacrificed to suit the purposes of political expediency.

My acts and my motives have, however, been alike misrepresented, and it has suited the ends of certain parties to endeavour to construe plain dealing into intrigue, and the legitimate assertion of personal and public rights into a desire to overthrow peaceful institutions. How far my proceedings will bear such a character I leave every candid and unprejudiced man to judge.

APPENDIX.

(Letters and Extracts translated from the Danish originals.)

A.

LETTER FROM KING CHRISTIAN VIII.

DEAR BROTHER-IN-LAW,

I have received your letter of 13th inst., expressing the wish to resign your position as Statholder and General-in-command in the Duchies. No one more than myself can lament that you think such a step unavoidable. It was my intention to address a letter to you, according to our last conversation, to ascertain your opinion on this behalf, and you would have taken it as a renewed token of the confidence I put in your honourable behaviour towards myself. Now however you have expressed your views on the matter, which I cannot but approve under the circumstances.

I will officially communicate to you who is to be charged with the official occupation, etc.

We part as friends, and it gives me pleasure to thank you for those services you, by honest endeavours, have rendered me. * *

CH. R.

Wick, 15th Aug. 1846.

H. S. H. Prince Fred. of Schleswig Holstein Noir.

B.

LETTER TO HIS MAJESTY KING CHRISTIAN VIII.

DEAR BROTHER-IN-LAW,

At the beginning of the new year I can't neglect to express to yourself my sincerest wishes for your welfare

and happiness. Both of us are grown one year older, and I dare say not without having gained in experience. I will therefore follow my former habit, at the close of each year to lay before you the result of my observations, and herein comply with the wish you, at different times expressed to me, that I should do so. * *

As to policy, the cloud darkens more and more which threatens with an unavoidable storm the whole Continent, and even our own country has a gloomy aspect. No public event has occurred since 1846 in the Duchies, but the feeling has been that the people ought to know their rights, as they consider they are not protected by the Government, but on the contrary aggressed upon,—this is indeed a sad conviction. Should you be otherwise informed, which I have my reasons to suspect, truth has been withheld, and I feel so much more justified in telling you that which long since would have reached you, had the press not been gagged and public meetings prohibited by the police. But the Diet as soon as it meets will confirm the validity of my apprehension. * *

On the other hand are you certain that you are supported by the Foreign Powers in your intended scheme? I know that this is not the case in Germany, and further that the whole forty millions of German population will not approve if their Governments should do so. And at the present moment the voice of the people is very predominant. Your expressed plan is regarded as a mere dynastic measure without any advantage for the country, which would be much easier obtained by putting the Agnatic lines in possession of their former rights. Such a step would involve no discord, no uncertainty, but it would meet with approbation at the Foreign Courts, and in place of putting us in danger of political disturbances and throwing a gloomy shade over all persons connected with it, will re-open the hearts of your subjects in loyal affection and future happiness.

Illinois State Library.
Dec. 30, 1884.

To prevail upon you to consider these observations is my principal object in addressing you thus at the beginning of the new year, and I feel no doubt that you will accept it as proceeding from regard for yourself, and from my individual conviction, distinct from every party interest or influence, to mix which with this plain expression of my sentiments, would deprive them of all value, etc.

FREDERICK,
PRINCE OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOIR.

Noir, 6th Jan. 1848.

C.

LETTER TO KING FREDERICK VII. OF DENMARK.

SIRE,

The great and hardly conceivable events which in the last three weeks have shaken Europe to its foundation, have, of course, not been without impression upon our country. I may well presume that the minutest reports on this account must have been laid before your Majesty, to put you in possession of everything relating thereto. We are standing on the threshold of a frightful outbreak which threatens to become the more violent as the character of our nation is quiet and prudent. From different parts I have been requested to put myself at the head of a movement which would carry to a prosperous end the claims of the country before the anarchical spirit get the better. Repeatedly have I rejected such proposals upon the principle, that I never have, nor ever will follow an unlawful path. But the danger has actually grown to such an extent I feel myself not only sanctioned but bound to

suggest to your Majesty the means to prevent it. Things had been chiefly brought to this pitch by reason that the individual at the head of the administration in the Duchies neither commands confidence nor respect. There is consequently no rallying point for prudent and loyal men so as to oppose the approaching storm, unless a change of persons be made. A man is required who possesses the confidence of the people, and who knows how to make use of the strength such confidence will afford him. Far be it from me to intrude myself on your Majesty, but I have under every circumstance followed my rightful sovereign, and believe, therefore, that in this instance I not only ought, but must in duty bound to your Majesty and my country propose the following suggestions for keeping order and tranquillity as heretofore.

The first measure required will be that your Majesty temporarily instal an administrative authority under my direction, and with power to act on our own responsibility in cases not admitting of delay. (A general instruction for its mode of acting I take the liberty to inclose, which will fully explain to your Majesty the bearing of my proposal.)

That your Majesty would be pleased to name as members of this Board, myself as Statholder and President, Count Raventlouw of Preetz; M. Bargumeat, Kiel; and M. Beseler at Schleswic. The confidence which the whole population of the Duchies places in those individuals named will instantaneously restore tranquillity in the public mind, and with full confidence I may assert that every attempt to disturb order will disappear. But neither I, nor I may presume to say those other three gentlemen, can accept such official position except your Majesty will feel disposed to make the following concessions as inevitable under the exigency of the times.

1st. The carrying out to its full extent, even including

the finances, the already existing separate administration of the Duchies from the Kingdom.

2ndly. The united consultation of the two Provincial Diets in one Chamber upon those necessary alterations in the constitution, subject to your Majesty's final approbation.

3rdly. Liberty of the press, and of public meetings.

4thly. Removal of the present chief of the administration, Mr. D. Scheel, and his counsellor, Mr. Hoepfener; as likewise the native Danes, who serve as officers of the troops in the Duchies, on behalf of whose safety I am alarmed in consequence of their provoking behaviour to the public feeling.

Everywhere the adoption of half measures has created still higher demands from the people. It is, therefore, my inflexible determination neither to enter upon any official duty, nor take any responsibility upon myself, should these proposals not meet with the approbation and sanction of your Majesty, and even then I dare not pledge myself any longer than Friday, the 24th instant, that these concessions would satisfy so far as to enable me to maintain that order which the pressure of daily events is loosening more and more every moment. As to the command of the troops in the Duchies, it, of course, can only be put into my hands alone under the responsibility to your Majesty.

Sire, in making these proposals to your Majesty, I have presumed respectfully that you put an undoubted trust in me, and which I feel I am not unworthy to have reposed in me, and hope to prove that it is not misplaced by preserving the Duchies to your Majesty, and through that means affording you the required strength to maintain unfringed the prerogatives of the Danish throne.

Whatever resolutions your Majesty may feel disposed to adopt, I fully trust that you will regard this step taken by me as originating from a patriotic and loyal heart, and

not ascribe it to either vanity, forwardness, or any other unworthy motive.

I have the honour to be,
Sire, &c. &c.

FREDERICK,
PRINCE OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOIR.

Noir, 20th March, 1848.

D.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE DANISH DIET.

SIR,

I beg your permission to transmit through your hands the following communication to the Diet.

Through the "Altona Mercury" of the 10th inst., a document for the first time has come to my knowledge, dated Dec. 30th, 1852, and purporting to refer to a transaction concluded between His Majesty the King of Denmark on the one side, and my brother the Duke Christian August of Schleswig-Holstein-Sondenburg-Augustenburg on the other, by which the latter, in consideration of a specified sum of money, promises for himself and his "family," neither now nor in future to raise any difficulty for His Majesty the King in any alteration of the succession in his dominions.

Fearing that the (in such a document) unusual expression of the word "family" might make it appear as if I were one of the contracting parties, I feel the necessity of hereby formally declaring that the existence of said document and the arrangement to which it relates were totally

unknown to me until published in the above-named newspaper, and that therefore I now feel bound by its promulgation to use every lawful means to preserve rights, the object of which is not merely to give a political position to particular families, but to secure the internal peace and external strength of states. Seldom have the wisdom and utility of those stipulations been proved more strikingly than on the present occasion, when their abrogation will expose the integrity of Denmark to sacrifice.

Mutual respect for the national institutions and historic rights of the special portions of the Danish Monarchy were the basis of her strength and prosperity. By impairing their stability, the common tie which held it together is loosened, and mutual confidence destroyed.

To maintain institutions and laws which were the foundation of the flourishing state of the Duchies, I joined the movement in 1848. But when those same institutions were invaded by the representatives of the people, I retired into private life, and left the country altogether when the dissensions of the parties assumed an aspect of hostility between sovereign and subjects. I have always in the same degree endeavoured to support the monarchical principle as I respect the rights of the country and the people. Never will I therefore consent to the abolition of those relations by which time and history have bound the Duchies together.

The Treaty of London of the 8th of May, 1852, against which I this day have lodged my protest with the English Government, has by its informality no legal force, and its only conceivable object can be found in the exclusion of those different Lines which formed a bar to a contingency which the Danish nation contemplate with horror, namely, the incorporation of Denmark in the Russian empire.

To prevent such a disaster, a stipulation in conformity with that relative to France and Spain in the Treaty of

Utrecht should be enforced, so that the Crowns of Denmark and Russia may never cover the same head.

If such a provision be made, and the hitherto common administrative relations restored to the Duchies, I am ready to withdraw my protest.

With great consideration, etc. etc.

FR. PR. OF SCH.-HOLST.-NOIR.

London, 24th March, 1853.

To the President of the Rigsdag Copenhag.

PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

May, 1852.

THE subjoined exposure of the scheme to set aside the Danish succession, was drawn up sixteen months ago in, as it will be seen, the full anticipation of such an event as that announced in the astounding article of the Times of the 11th. On the perusal of that article, I perceived, to my surprise, that account is taken of the opinion of this country; so I take to myself shame for the hopelessness through which these pages have hitherto lain dormant, and send them at once, and without the revision of a line, to press.

I have to make now but one remark, and it sums up the whole. The Emperor of Russia comes in, after all the Agnatic and Cognatic Lines, as HEIR GENERAL alike to Denmark and the Duchies. This no one has perceived. In the disquisitions, historical, legal, diplomatic and popular of six years, it is never once hinted at.

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THE
CROWN OF DENMARK

DISPOSED OF BY

A RELIGIOUS MINISTER

THROUGH

A FRAUDULENT TREATY.


WITH REPRINT OF

DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.


“ If you cannot save your country at least drop not your protest against the
men and measures by which it is ruined.”—SHAFTESBURY.

LONDON, MARCH, 1853.


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Key to the Genealogical Table.



A CROWN DISPOSED OF, &c.

Spectatum admissi, risum teneatis amici?

THE hereditary principle has ceased to be considered an element of political power; or rather is esteemed one of convulsion; we are a practical nation and draw maxims from events. A consequence of this philosophical habit is an utter indifference to the means by which these are brought about. Whether then an infuriated mob fires a cathedral, or a placid diplomatist upsets a throne, nothing is observed beyond the law of progress, or the habit of office.

It is to be hoped at least, that, in the hands of historians, mankind would be instructed in the conduct of those who have the management of public affairs; but again the spirit of generalisation interposes, both explanations are admitted, but interchangeably, the one passing into the other like dissolving views. The Gorgon head of Demo-

cracy is presented; and while you are busy tracing its features, each snake transforms itself to a quill. A gorgeous hall arises with an assembled conclave, and while you are recognising the lofty brow of a Metternich, or detecting the flattened cranium of a Thiers, the damask curtains roll into sulphurous clouds, and reveal a captured bastile; either way we have the same result, and secrecy in diplomacy converts history into fable.

There arises consequently a craving after dramatic effects: but should foreign states be languid in furnishing them, our Government busies itself in supplying the deficiency: its performances acquire a higher zest by that effectual concealment of the springs and wires, which results from ignorance in the spectators of the very existence of machinery. It is something to see a Queen of Hearts spring out of a bottle; but what is that to witnessing a crown flung into the mud, or a people sprung into the air, while the conjuror is sitting on the other side of the Channel?

In a country like England the opinion of the nation may have no action on the Government, but the fallacies of the people are accurately represented in its policy; the people of England confounding its Government's action upon a foreign people, with that people's voluntary convulsions,—that Government will reason in the same manner and act accordingly.

There might be a difficulty were the plan an original conception, but this objection is purely speculative;

a cup of coffee in the recess of a window, at the close of a dinner party, does it all.

Yet it must be said that we have done our best, and would have done otherwise had it been in us. In little more than a year, we have tried no less than five foreign secretaries; we have sought for them by beat of drum through alley and market-place—demagogue, novice, old stager, the men of safe routine, of unbiassed inexperience, have been tried in turn; we have not only sought wisdom in multitude but in discord; nevertheless, amidst the strife of faction, and the revolution of men and ideas, “Foreign policy” pursues its one undeviating course; the fictitious chaos which we have laboured to create, again and again pertinaciously resolves itself into exasperating order.

Whilst throughout the rest of Europe the foundations of society have been shaken, there is one country standing next after Poland as the barrier against Russia, and as regards maritime power, even before that State, where fortunately, up to the present time, abstract questions have never, or slightly, been mooted: consequently it afforded no opening for dissolving intrigue, and no field for insolent aggression. The Danish people, and the Danish Duchies were attached to their institutions, and preferred maintaining them against illegal usurpation, to barricading their streets or decapitating their king.

This is the country on which England is experimenting in a manner which evinces unparalleled nerve, and with an effect which cannot fail to prove highly

dramatic. The case is nothing less, if not a great deal more, than the fabrication of such a revolution as that of France, which then filled her with horror, and engaged her in a thirty years' war to put it down,—for what else, in the combustible state of the present Germany and Europe, can be the result of a foreigner attempting, and several foreigners combining, to subvert the primordial law of a State—that of its succession? There is this difference, however, as contrasted with the events in France, that Denmark is to be cast to one, or to be contended for by several of the contracting powers. England does not propose to be the acquirer, and if called upon the field of battle, can only appear there, to assert the rights which she commences by subverting.

The English Government, it is true, has indeed no evil purpose; but is consequence a necessary or an ordinary feature in the conduct of man? To plead good intentions is to plead ignorance. Abdicate then dominion. The honesty of a private man consists in a justifiable reliance on his own conscience; the honesty of an agent in the knowledge and capacity requisite to deal with the matters entrusted to his care. No minister of a State is honest, who is not conscious to himself of faculties which enable him to cope with his antagonists;—if not, let him be still. The late Foreign Secretary and present Leader of the House of Commons, in a recent debate, after speaking of counsels which this Government had urged on the Ottoman Empire—counsels to the last degree noxious

and revolutionary, but to his mind beneficial and sane—recommends them by the assertion of England's disinterestedness. "She," he says, "has no plans hostile to Turkey—entertains no project for her dismemberment." His maxim therefore is, that good intentions promote perspicuous conclusions; but the experience of mankind bears hard the other way: it is evil purposes that render the eye penetrating, and the brain clear. However fortunate the Ottoman Empire may be in possessing the disinterested friendship of the British Cabinet, it is luckily enabled to dispense with its advice. But if the English Cabinet has no projects, it has notions: these, in Turkey limited to counsel, assume in Denmark the shape of coercion.

Evidently the English Cabinet is troubled in spirit. It is filled with some secret alarm, which bursts forth in this tumultuous manner at the opposite extremities of Europe. This it is essential to fathom; and the debate to which I have referred shortens the labour of the task. They are possessed—and they avow it, with a profound suspicion of Russia. This it is which prompts them to advise Turkey to arm its disaffected subjects, and to abstain from reducing its insurgent provinces; this it is which impels them to plunge into the intricacies of Danish and German heraldry, on which propitious field they are happy in the thought, that by a stroke of the pen they have frustrated her designs, and mastered her intelligence.

It is the afflicting reality, that every great achieve-

ment of Russian diplomacy has been accomplished by activity, prompted by fear; and each successive minister is perfidiously and cunningly planning schemes against her, whilst he dare not look her representative in the face. She acts not alone by her own agents, but through those of the various governments of Europe, thus she surrounds the Foreign Office with a commissioned atmosphere, impenetrable alike from within and from without; the helpless occupant of that perilous post is thus over-reached in proportion to his activity and discrimination; whichever way he turns, he is driven back into the net from which he had endeavoured to escape, cowed before the array of concerted power, or bamboozled by the show of simulated hostility.

It has been necessary to enter into these preliminary observations, because it would be in vain to look for the explanation of the Treaty of the 8th of May in the transaction itself.

Europe has been made to believe that the succession of the Crown of Denmark presented difficulties: the reverse will appear if we look at the case as it stood when they commenced to embroil it.

In the annexed domain, that is, the Duchies, the Female Line does not succeed; in Denmark Proper, originally elective, and consequently Male, the Female Line has, by a Royal Ordinance, been introduced; either was thus legitimate and optional: there were Princes of the ancient House in large numbers, fulfilling the one or the other condition, and

available for the succession ; whether by a separation of the Dependencies, as Hanover has recently been separated from England ; or by a union of the two. The Diets in concurrence with the Crown were possessed of the faculty of removing every obstacle. It was purely a domestic concern, and could only be dealt with by constitutional means. The Crown had been, by a national act, rendered despotic ; the plenitude of that despotism had restored the constitutional form.

But Denmark presented this peculiarity—that the Hereditary Principle led ultimately to its incorporation with Russia, the descendant of Peter III. being Heir-general to the Kingdom and the Duchies on the failure of the Royal Agnatic and Cognatic Lines. This was the point by which the succession touched Europe. The other Powers had, therefore, the deepest interest in the maintenance of the intermediary lines ; and they must above all things have desired to see an internal accommodation effected, which should alike unite the Duchies and the Kingdom, the People and the Crown. If they acted at all, their course was as easy as it was plain. It was to urge upon the King of Denmark an appeal to the Diets to settle the common succession in either the Agnatic or the Cognatic Line ; and in the latter case to obtain renunciation of the excluded branch, which for such a purpose, and so proposed, there would have been no difficulty in obtaining. The recommendation

to consult the Estates was besides one to be expected from the Governments of the West, if only in consequence of their professed constitutional opinions.

From the war between the Duchies and Denmark Europe has drawn the inference of a profound animosity existing between them, and of their mutual desire of separation. This war really arose out of the anxiety of the two people to continue to form one kingdom. Dread of Russia was in fact the impelling motive, and it will be seen in the subsequent pages how she used it to produce first the mutual schism, and then the diplomatic maxim of maintaining the integrity of the Danish Crown by its transfer to herself.

Let it be remembered that these Hereditary claims of Russia flow from an *illegitimate* daughter of Peter I. married to the heir of the line of Gottorp, whose son ascended the Russian throne by a revolution.

It is not often in the lifetime of a man, or in that of a nation, that an event of similar magnitude occurs. The great wars of Europe have, directly or indirectly, arisen from the conflict of rights dependent on territorial configuration, and those resulting from the intermarriages of regal Lines. The nations declined to be disposed of by genealogists, but their opposition was blind, and revolutionary : legislators did not arise to rectify, but armies marched against rights which they did not contest, to resist consequences they would not brook, and the plains of Europe were ensanguined and manured to bar heraldic claims, affecting a German fortress or an Italian dukedom ; the case

never arose of a union of great and independent kingdoms. Since the time of Charlemagne, (that is to say, in the course of a thousand years,) the prospect of such an event has presented itself but once, and that prospect, centuries before the contingency could occur, moved all Europe as by a present danger.

The testament of Charles III. disposing of Spain to a grandson of Louis XIV., would have aroused the indignation of that country had not the revelation of the Treaty of Partition planned by William III. presented England and her allies in a still more atrocious light than France. England, though discomfited in the war which ensued, and forced to recognise Philip V., still refused to lay down arms until he on his side, and the King of France upon the other, in their own name and that of their successors, severally renounced every claim which the descendants of either might have to inherit simultaneously the two crowns. This was carried into effect, not by a Treaty between England, Holland and Austria, but by *legal instruments executed by these Monarchs*, and recorded in the Treaty of Utrecht: although that Treaty has lost its effect, having been broken by war, and not restored at the subsequent treaties of peace, these Renunciations are no less valid and binding than on the day on which
were signed.

Judging by events, so far from concluding the connections of Europe in this respect weakened within a century and a half, we must infer them to have been strengthened. Only seven years ago when the

power of Spain had ceased to be alarming, and after the hereditary principle in France had been swept away, Europe was all but plunged in a war, (the dynasty in France was upset) by the marriage of a princess of Spain to a junior son of Louis Philippe; yet it was at the moment of this excitement and indignation respecting the future liberties of Europe, that the first steps were taken in that scheme which was to unite the crown of Denmark to that crown by which Europe was actually menaced, and that the weak prince, then seated on the Danish throne, was persuaded that the suppression of the ancient rights of a portion of his country was necessary to preserve the integrity of his succession.

In the case of Spain the rights of Legitimacy underwent a legal modification to avert a common danger. In the case of Denmark these rights were illegally destroyed to bring that danger. They were destroyed to place another realm in the hand of a monarch who has broken through every restraint which Europe has attempted to place on his ambition—has violated the great European settlement, constituting the body of public law—whose actual realised power threatens the East as well as the West; and who by suborning the intelligence of the cabinets, and dividing the nations of Europe into hostile camps, leaves it without the means to resist any violence he may commit, or the faculty to conceive any purpose he may pursue.

Yet, after all, the issue has depended solely on the

manner of presenting the case. If instead of twenty-three heirs between the Crown of Denmark and the Emperor of Russia there had been but *one*—then most certainly measures would have been taken, in the uncertainty of the Line of Romanoff, to force the Danish heir to make an option between the two crowns. There could have been then no discussion; the matter would have been one simply of concert; Sweden, if icy and unimpassioned, would have been warmed into zeal; Prussia, if mean and subservient, startled into dignity; France, if wavering and suspicious, would have expanded into cordiality; if England appeared at the time to be preoccupied with schedule D. or the Beer Tax, impatient knockings at the Foreign Office, and echoes from the banks of the Bosphorus to those of the Tagus, must have forced an hour of reflection, and at least a whisper of assent. Then should we have seen issue to the world a London protocol, not a hoax, or a perfidy. Ay, that dreaded War—dreaded for any just, or honourable purpose, would be ready with his leash, had the heir of Gottorp (Russia) dared to show himself less tractable than the successor of Oldenburg. But unfortunately, there are twenty-two heirs too many, Russia being far off, we may cut out as many of them as we please. It is a French proverb, that nothing is more difficult than to give an answer to an unreasonable question; how then explain an incredible act?

It is not to be expected that any transaction of a diplomatic nature should be comprehensible

to an insular people; it has no charms for the agricultural, no attractions for the commercial mind; but there is an aspect of the case which an Englishman would be insulted, if supposed not to apprehend and feel. Where, in all this, is the WILL of the people of Denmark? To be ruled by our own devices is to-day the science of politics, and the test of independence. The antiquated notions of curbing rebellious passions, of guiding fallacious reason,—the visionary standard of an impracticable rule of right,—the exploded theory of laws of nature, of nations, or of God, have given place to the benigner influences of Progress, expressed in a formula, which is alike our maxim at home, and our policy abroad—"A free state is that which is governed by laws which itself has made." Reflect, judge, and answer, if it be not so. What then have you done with Denmark? Is it on this maxim that you found your right to make laws for her? If she arises in arms to resist you, will you honour her worth, or punish her rebellion? To be even wrong, a man must be consistent: you are insane.

It was recently remarked by a statesman retired from forensic perturbation, in reference to transactions in the far East, that "England is not behind the chiefest of the Russians, whenever there is a prospect of gain to be obtained by the sacrifice of principle." Is Queen Victoria, Heir-General to Denmark and the Duchies? Is it to tame that kingdom to your yoke that you are engaged in fracturing her Constitution, and in trampling down her people? Is it to qualify

her to send, at a future day, enlightened representatives to St. Stephen's, that you are protocolising the Danes into beasts of burden, and civilising with Austrian dragoons the Duchies into serfs? At least, if an English Minister in the pursuit of unlawful gain had planned a civil war in a foreign country, England would know the fact, and have it in her option to accept the acquisition, or to send the criminal to the block; but these deplorable good intentions plunges it in a gulf of hopelessness, rendering it the ready tool of every knave, and the screen of every villany.

Seek not to escape from the spectacle by adducing "France," "Austria," "Russia," &c.; the deed was signed in London,—the Civil war fomented from London—the "moral influence" was England's ships of the line: unless London had been safe, nothing could have been attempted. Austria and France are your dupes, just as you are Russia's; they are not heedless—you are: your power exerted through that heedlessness, constrains their will. The words of Prokesch have been "published and not published." "France follows England, and England is in understanding with Russia."

But after all, the matter lies in a nutshell. Let any man make the case his own. Say the succession to the *English* instead of the Danish Crown, and every ambiguity vanishes. If told that foreign Diplomats had met in a room in Paris to upset the Act of Settlement; even if with the concurrence of the

Queen, would not one burst of indignation arise from Land's End to John o'Groats? But is not your submission to such an outrage the necessary consequence of the course which you now adopt towards Denmark? Were a man of the dignity and gravity of Lord Aberdeen to assert that in such a case England must submit, would the prematurely obsolete process of impeachment not be recalled to the thoughts of this nation? If Lord Aberdeen would repudiate an act of domestic treason, he must abjure the Treaty of the 8th of May.

But, independently of the reacting of these subversive doctrines, may they not directly affect the Minister as regards Denmark? Disposing of that Crown by means of a Treaty which is not legal, does he not do the same thing as if he levied private war, and with the effect of giving an advantage to an extrinsic power, at the cost of an ally of her Majesty? This definition, if correct, is of serious import, and on both grounds exposes to the pains and penalties of High Treason.

But he may plead that the Treaty of the 8th of May was the act of his predecessors, and that if he attempted to shake it, it would be supported by the full power of the Opposition, and that he has to respect it, not merely as the act of his predecessor, but also "as the engagement of his Sovereign," whose faith is pledged to it no less solemnly than to the Treaties of 1815. I reply that the Treaty, not being a legal one, cannot be executed without incurring fresh

guilt ; and having regard to contingent and prospective events, even if legal, it would be open to modification. But does the existence and execution of this Treaty prevent the negotiation of another, the necessity of which is imposed by its existence. When it was signed, attention had not been called to the position of the Emperor of Russia as Heir-General. That point of the case had, up to that moment, been kept sedulously out of view ; the danger has been brought into evidence by the fact, and, indeed, may be said to have been created by it. Instead, therefore, of the Treaty of the 8th of May being a bar to farther and reparatory measures, it furnishes at once the reason, the occasion, and the necessity for taking the only course which it is open in law for foreign powers to take, namely, to prevent the union of the sceptres of Russia and Denmark in one grasp.

It is now not too much to say that the Treaty of the 8th of May was a thoughtless act obtained by an imposition* of which the then Government are now ashamed of being the dupes, or at least would have been so, had the subject not been rendered diverting, by the awkward and damaging contortions of their successors. On obtaining the signatures, M. Brunow immediately launches the article in the "Times" of the 11th May. The article is everything

* Lord Derby was led to ask—"Who is to come in *after* this new line?" The Russian diplomatist replied, "Time will show." On this Lord Derby relapsed into the normal condition of an English minister.

—the Treaty nothing; the article would have accomplished the Treaty, but for circumstances—which history will never relate—what does it ever relate?

If there is any transaction in which notoriety is requisite and obtained, it is a Treaty. This one was announced to the world with a pomp which no such transaction, at least no one arising unexpectedly and from no understood cause, has ever obtained. Whoever at present may send to No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, or No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, to purchase the Treaty, at the cost of a penny, would ever suspect or imagine that that Treaty remained not only an absolute secret for nearly a year, but a thing the very existence of which was denied by members of the Government by whom it had been signed. Its conditions were never published in any newspaper. The article in the "Times" (the only statement on the subject) not only misrepresents the Treaty, but falsifies the whole subject from end to end. No doubt it was the business of the interested parties to ascertain the facts and to read the Treaty: surely it was not less so for the members of the English Cabinet, or for the instructors of public opinion. It is not here a charge which I make, but a habit to which I point, the habit of ignorance on practical matters, that is to say, matters carried into practice, in other words, Russian purposes. And, indeed, it is alone out of the habit of ignorance that the habit of scheming has arisen; or, according to the Spanish proverb, "If there were no dupes, there would be no knaves."

I take to myself my full share of blame in this case. When the article in the "Times" appeared, I made inquiry for the Treaty, but could not obtain a copy. These inquiries were repeated several times and with the same result. In the mean time, however, it had been sent to the offices already mentioned in Great Turnstile, Lincoln's Inn Fields, and Abingdon Street, Westminster, the numbers of which I have already given ; but I positively remained ignorant of the fact during ten months, until I learnt it from a communication to that effect made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to one of the excluded Princes, who, begging to be informed regarding the nature and conditions of the instrument by which the ancestral rights and honours of his House, the independence of his country, and his private property and possessions were disposed of, was referred to the two said offices, the henceforward memorable shops, No. 6, Great Turnstile, Lincoln's-Inn Fields, and No. 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, for the requisite information. English diplomatic correspondence is generally of a heavy description, but there are occasions upon which an English Minister can become lively, that is, when it happens that in "making up the policy of the Cabinet," there is incidentally a nation to crush, or an individual to insult.

The article in the "Times" proceeded from "authority ;" the Treaty was signed on the 8th ; it appeared on the 11th, and required at least two days for composition ; it did not proceed from an *English*

authority; for while stamping the responsibility on Lord Malmesbury it refers all the honour and credit to others. It contains, moreover, details with which the English Government could not have been acquainted; and is conscious and urgent in matters to which that Government had only conceded a faltering and reluctant consent.

Turning from the "Times" article to the Treaty one is struck by the contrast of the premeditated and conscious point and coherence of the one, and the incoherent contradictions and studied vagueness of the other: such a composition was never before dignified with the name of Treaty, and did we not know the reverse it must have been assumed to be the production of anything save art and dexterity. It is intituled a Treaty *between* certain Powers "on the one part" and the King of Denmark "on the other part," being bipartite, it must include reciprocal obligations and stipulations; there is nothing of the sort. It limits its own character and binding power by these express terms, "an additional pledge of stability," given at the invitation "of his Danish Majesty" to the arrangements relating to the order of succession established by his said Majesty.

The arrangement to which this "additional pledge of stability" is given is stated in the preamble to be the devolution of the succession to the whole of the dominions "UPON THE MALE LINE TO THE EXCLUSION OF FEMALES;" whilst in Article First, it is stipulated that the crown shall devolve upon Prince

Christian of Glucksburg and his issue by the Princess Louisa of Hesse, the Prince being of the Cognatic* or female line, and the Princess Louisa not being a male!

The preamble states, that "the additional pledge" is given for the purpose of "the preservation of peace and the balance of power in Europe." Article First excludes the Agnates, the first on the Line, constituting the succession of Denmark an inheritance of trouble and danger to Europe. Article Second leaves the ulterior succession, after the Line of Glucksburg, to the "*further propositions* which his Majesty the King of Denmark" (what King of Denmark?) "may deem it expedient to address to them," (the high contracting parties.) And Article Third positively refers to the rights of the Germanic Confederation regarding Holstein and Lauenburg, asserting that these rights "shall not be affected by the present Treaty," a Treaty which disposes of those rights independently of the Germanic Confederation. If this be a Treaty, let the name at least be recognised as a novel invention, and as having no connection with the instruments hitherto so called, which may at times have borne the impress of perversity, but have never before exhibited those of contradiction and fatuity.

The title presents us with the Emperor of all the Russias as one of the contracting parties on the one side, as opposed to the King of Denmark on the other. The same monarch is exhibited in Article First "in concert" with the King of Denmark as a member of

* He is also of the Agnatic but a junior.

his family. While in this frame of confidence why does the document stop here : why do we not see the Emperor of all the Russias equally “in concert” with the Prince President of France, with the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, the King of Sweden and Norway, and the Foreign Office in London? Treaty! it is Personation. Puppets are called up, and signatures appended, but it is everywhere one and the same spring.*

However, the “Times” endorses the document,† and, therefore, it is a Treaty, sound, valid, and conclusive. Inquiring one day in a shop for a travelling bag of Russian leather, some domestic calf skin, slightly perfumed, was offered for my admiration and acceptance : demurring somewhat, the shopman haughtily replied : “Sir, I warrant it!” Thus it is with the British public ; it must accept as the occasion may be, a “warranted” bag, or a “warranted” Treaty, from the tradesman of Bond Street, or Printing House Square. There is however this difference, that it is equally difficult to obtain a bag that is Russian and a Treaty that is not.

The pamphlet herewith reprinted was forced into type by that Article. It was of course folly and ab-

* “Since a power still barbarous commenced to take a part in the affairs of Europe and of Asia, the Cabinets and the Statesmen Europe have become the tools with which she works.”

Sir John McNeill.

† The “Times” is the sole informant of England and Europe in respect to the Danish succession ; alone, of all the London press, it suppresses the protest of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein.

surdity for a single voice to raise itself against Europe's act. Do not however believe that even in this age Right has lost its power, though its strength may now reside in the manner of its use ; an Emperor of Russia may still be beaten back with a pen from the Sound as he has already been with a reed from the Bosphorus.

But it will be said that the Treaty has already borne its fruits, for the Duke of Augustenburg has made surrender. That astute individual has by a life of statesmanship,* lost two crowns, and pocketed—nothing.† I pause to ask, “ Was Lord Malmesbury worth nothing?” Some little compensation might have been made to the British Exchequer. A practical nation ought to be paid for its work ; Denmark and the Sound were surely worth more than the bare honour of scaring out of his small wits the Duke of Augustenburg and terrifying the Grand Duke of Oldenburg to death.

But what is the value of a Treaty that depends for execution on an optional bargain? And this bargain, too, a secret one ! The Duke merely sells land : and binds himself not to interfere with any dispositions which the King of Denmark might choose to make with reference to the succession to the crown—in a secret article.

All this merited success : success is, however, not a result which merit can on all occasions command. The King of Denmark fancied he had lassoed in one neck

* His daily newspaper task alone amounted to the perusal of forty-one journals, French, English, German, and Scandinavian

† The money he has got is no more than an equivalent for the magnificent ancestral property which he has surrendered.

the whole race of Oldenburg ; the Duke of Augustenburg that he had got the compensation in one bag ; it therefore was arranged that his renunciation should be *Danishwise*, effectual and complete, but *Familyward*, vague and ambiguous. That family is impressed with a just sense of the superior diplomatic talents of the Duke, no less than with a firm reliance on his often proved courage and loyalty, and would never dare to penetrate the mystery of arrangements entered into by him with the " Great Powers ;" never would they call *him* to account, far less the Great Powers. Not knowing the facts, what could they do ? Suspended like the corpse of Mahomet between confidence and expectation, they could only discover their infatuation when time and chances had alike slipped away, and they had no longer rights to stand upon, or compensation to haggle for. It is an instructive fact that even the Duke got his money only after he had made himself acceptable to the Court of St. Petersburg.

It would be awkward for the English Minister should the measures of the Duke of Augustenburg prove not to have been effectually taken. Let us suppose one of the claimants refractory, could that Minister pretend that the—let us gratify Lord Aberdeen with the word—*Treaty* of London could abrogate the rights of any individuals, or supersede the laws of any country, whether Schleswig or Kamschatka, Holstein or Timbuctoo ? How then would he deal with a protest against it ? English

Ministers are not, indeed, diplomatists, but they are gentlemen.

But this is not all, means might be adopted to coerce the intractable claimant ; I refer to something more than the opening of his letters at the English post, the tracking of his steps by British policemen, insolent communications from the Foreign Office, and railing articles in the "Times." Princes like all men must live, and unlike most others will not sweep crossings, and cannot write leaders. A Prince requires a revenue, a revenue not vested in cotton mills, or puddling furnaces, but like Senators of Britain, in lands ; lands of princes without armies are tangible possessions in more ways than one. So that these personages may be effectually broken down with milder anguish than the weak cry of "food," from a fainting wife or a pining child. Were such a case (not an unsupposeable one) to arise, where would redress be sought, if not at the hands of the Queen of England, at once the holder of the scales of justice, and their own natural protector by the ties of blood ? She seeks explanation from the Minister : will he then attempt to play off House of Commons against Crown as he plays off Crown against House of Commons ? Will he tell Her Majesty that the affair is pending, and that she cannot yet be informed ; or, that it is concluded, and that information is too late ? Will he deplore the perverse self-will of mankind in general, and of Denmark in particular ? After all, slippery as may be the ground, and with resignation or expulsion at the

end of the lane, still this is better than facing—a crushing invective, or a hostile majority? no!—a Russian ambassador.

We have not exhausted possibilities. The persuasive process having failed with lands, may be carried a step further. A crown is at stake. That circlet, even when not exposed as a prize to ambition, has caused rivers of human blood to flow; how many streams have those mute emblems cost which the Kremlin already holds;—which of them can weigh against that of Denmark? Seven individuals of that Line, preparatory victims, have either drained the bowl, or felt the knife. Will one life now interpose between the monster and his prey? Should that blow be struck, will Lord Aberdeen, on his dying pillow, find breath to shriek: “I am no assassin!”

“A first crime inoculates,” says Machiavelli, “an endless series of uncontemplated crimes.” A first heedlessness in responsible station, instils in like manner a virus, which will break out on all the members, and finally settle on the heart;—it may show itself, too, in morbid fortunes, and in putrid fame. This is the least deplorable of its consequences; should the secret disease invest itself with the halo of hectic health, then the very air is polluted; and nations breathe the infection.

The game is Russian: the play, English: being upon the same line, both must equally cultivate perfidy and cowardice in the members of these devoted families; the interest is indeed more immediately

English, it being the British minister who would be incommoded by their possessing honour, or evincing character. It is not to St. Petersburg that the victims of persecution will rush: it is not the Nestor of Russian diplomacy whose equanimity will be shipwrecked between the rocks of conscience and the shoals of office; it is not from his lips that will distil the milk of sourness, or the honey of insanity;* it is not the chief of the House of Romanoff who will have to writhe under a family insult, or to cower under a Cabinet incubus. On the banks of the gelid Neva no scandalous exhibition will be made of heretical honesty, and insolent worth. In the great temple of the Sarmatian Moloch nothing disturbs the absorption of faith or the solemnity of worship: secular cares devolve on the ministering priests of the subsidiary chapel of Downing Street.

The experience of the English Government may have rendered it fool-hardy; the constitutional practice of brow-beating having hitherto entailed but small domestic inconvenience. An Italian, a German, or a Spaniard, though a king, a queen, or an emperor, was after all a mere foreigner, and could always be disposed of by an Admiral, if not by a despatch. Could it enter into the mind of any visionary that the little personages on the Baltic should dare not to be crushed. They had not even a territory to confiscate like a Rajah of Sattara, or a treasury to plunder like an Ameer of Scinde. One element, however, has been neglected.

* II. i. v. 450.

They were not vague and outlandish existences. We have heard much that was nonsensical about Anglo-Saxon blood. Here it has value, and is overlooked : yet it will be proved that a minister that can with impunity bully an imperial sceptre, and strip an oriental monarch, will, with all Europe at his back, find it a hard matter to deal atrociously with persons who can familiarly knock at doors in certain streets, squares, and lanes, and narrate the daily incidents of his insolence or fatuity in the English tongue. If a Russian ambassadress could rule the society of London and Paris, during a quarter of a century, surely a couple of English ladies could upset the Czar and all his myrmidons, whether cabinet ministers or Baskirs, if they had an end in doing so. The Treaty of the 8th of May, the most audacious imposition which she has ever practised, may turn out to be the worst morning's work she has ever performed ; for it is of all events that have ever occurred, the one most likely to awaken sympathy, and to furnish the occasion for developing that feeling new and delightful of political action.

The Government, however, considering only its broadsides and moral influence, proceeded loftily on its lordly course, withdrew its habitual and commonplace agents at Copenhagen, and appointed new ones possessed of vigour and dexterity sufficient in their judgment to put a finishing hand to the matter, and stop the inconvenient rappings at Argyll House.

But it may well be asked what there was further

to do at Copenhagen? EVERYTHING. The Treaty indeed tells you that the dispositions of the King of Denmark have already been taken, but the King of Denmark has no power to dispose of the succession of the Duchies, no more than he has of the territorial rights of those fractions exchanged for the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, constituting the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and which revert to the Agnatic Line, on the failure of the male successors of Frederick III. Nor has he the faculty of disposing of the Crown of Denmark, for he has surrendered his absolute power, and consequently the intervention of the Diet is required to give colour to any disturbance of the order of succession. This Treaty therefore commenced with the statement of a falsehood, by which indeed the late administration in England was deceived, but regarding which the present Administration are fully informed. Their object is now to obtain a measure to cover the flaw of the Treaty, and the means employed to force this act on the Diet is—the existence of the Treaty. The Danish Minister in proposing it on the 10th of March represented it as *imposed* upon them by a “*European Necessity*.”*

* “At the opening of the Reichstag at Copenhagen on the 10th March, the Prime Minister read the Royal Address of the 8th October last, respecting the regulation of the succession. As the Ministry presumed that the proposed succession was the right one, it would not admit of any alteration, as that would appear as if the king intended to break the engagements he had contracted with the Great Powers. To show to the Diet the opinion of Foreign Cabinets

If the measure be carried, let me ask what validity can attach to an act thus surreptitiously obtained? The Powers concur in a Treaty which is to be a pledge of security for an internal arrangement stated to have been already entered into; and then this Treaty is produced as a menace to constrain the adoption of this arrangement. Meanwhile, the secret renunciation obtained from the Duke of Augustenburg is published and under the form of a "family renunciation" on the part of the Agnates. The Treaty announces that the concurrence of the nearest Cognates has been obtained, so that the opposition of the Diet is handed over to the hopelessness of finding representatives to assert and to maintain the rights of the nation.

But this measure is not new; it has been once already presented and *rejected*. The Diet was thereupon dissolved. The eyes of Denmark are beginning to be unsealed. The mystification of Russian "renunciation" is being replaced by the suspicion of "Russian reservations," and, consequently the furor of "Denmark to the Eyder," gives place to the terror of "Russia to the Sound." But resources analagous are evolved. One refractory Diet has been dissolved, now if necessary an impracticable constitution *will be abrogated*. Splendid results of constitutional diplomacy!

But it required not many months' experience of office for the veteran instinct of Lord Aberdeen to

of the former discussions, he would lay all the correspondence on the table by which it would be seen that the unconditional approval of the motion was a European Necessity."—*Altona Mercury*.

detect the embarrassments that would arise from carrying out, in defiance of the heirs, a Treaty in which the concurrence of the heirs was positively assumed, and without which it could have no legal value ; consequently, scarcely a week elapsed before he attempted (they being still in ignorance of the deeds and the arrangements) to compromise them into a virtual surrender, by proffering the honour of a presentation to the Queen ; by means of which they were to be represented as adhering to the still secret compact made with the Duke of Augustenburg.

Ere Russia was bold, and Prince Christian of Glucksburg had become the happy object of selection, it was proposed that the succession should fall on a Prince of another Line, who held in precarious tenure a Duchy provisionally ceded to Russia by the King of Denmark, in exchange for her generously resigned claims on the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, namely, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. But this helpless dependent had positively the courage to say, that he would not allow himself to be made an object of preference at the expense of the rights of others. The moderation of Russia was excessive, to a fable ; for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg is a *junior* branch of the Gottorp Line. Still it is surpassed by her modesty, for the circumstance lies buried in oblivion. The solution of the enigma it is not my province to attempt ; the fact, however, proves that there may be Oldenburgs who are not Augustenburgs. It does not however stand alone.

Next to the Duke of Augustenburg stands his brother, having the same Agnatic claims on the Duchies, and Cognatic claims on the Crown. He has signed no compact. That with the Duke of Augustenburg has therefore the sole effect of transferring to him the representative rights of the family, placed in the utmost evidence of which the transaction is capable by the arrangement come to with him. If he had allowed himself to be included in this agreement, or had been so easily disposed of as the Duke imagined, the Treaty would have been carried into effect quietly, and unobtrusively; never would a voice have been raised until the catastrophe came. On the hoisting of the Russian standard at Elsinore, there might have been an explosion of impotent rage, but the fault would have been laid on the stars, and on those obsolete and antiquated feudal rights, so incompatible with the spirit of our age, and the genius of our institutions. The English Ministry till then would have reposed on their couch of down, and they and England would have been equally unconscious that they ever had had any thing to do in the matter. If any querulous opponent got up in the House,—if a successor of peculiar and fervid idiosyncrasy had dreamt of inscribing a tablet to immortality on the rescued portals of the Sound, after setting up a dynasty and liberating an ocean—what would have been the fate of the criticism or the design? Splendid materials, indeed, to work with—a compact of empires to be shattered; a broil of brothers to be composed; a falling State to be propped up; a

Muscovite Czar to be beaten, by means of rights of which the representatives had hastened to despoil themselves, so soon as they were assailed, and to dispose of like a musty wardrobe,—a cheap bargain in a dirty alley. It requires, not only pretensions unresigned, but pretenders irreproachable; we want the men as well as the cause—men fit to succeed, and worthy of success, and this we owe no less to the surrender of the one brother than to the protest of the other.

The Duke of Augustenburg, however, has sons. They are young. They may have derived advantage from the tortuous experience they have already passed through, and its consequences. In the meantime, their existence is not one of the smallest elements of success. Had the Prince of Schleswig-Holstein Noer stood next in succession, his conduct might have been noble and generous, courageous and self-devoted—but that would not then have appeared. Many lives of boundless disinterestedness have worn, through circumstances deemed happy by the world, the cloak of calculating interest, and the mask of cunning ambition. It belongs to but few amongst those called upon to play a great part in which they are themselves sharers, to stand so fair with fortune and with fame, as that no taint can be affixed to their purposes; but, how great is the advantage to the interests, and in this case the nations, at stake on the result, to possess an advocate combining by station and descent the right to be heard, and equally excluded thereby from the temptation to be

ambitious. Here is the lever, the point of which is now inserted into that parchment bond defiled with the ink of many nations, and loaded with the dishonour of the statesmen of Europe; and it will not break. Its fulcrum is the heart of every honest man, whatever his capacity; for, thank God, as yet the faculty subsists of appreciating courage that is not wild, and firmness that is not interested.

Thus the honour of the Line is retrieved, and a standing place of public right secured. Now just ambition and justifiable hope may mature its plans, or indulge in its expectations. At all events, for the English Cabinet perseverance is no longer blind or excusable—it is no longer easy or safe: if they do persevere, it must be by a deliberate and a strong conviction worthy of a better cause.

But who are your allies in this compact; or how do you stand with them as to matters of business? You have protested against the violation of the Treaty of Vienna in Cracow. Your Minister has authoritatively announced another violation of the Treaty of Vienna, by the establishment of the Russian quarantine at the mouths of the Danube. The same power has violated the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, by forcing from Turkey the surrender of that island upon which the quarantine is established. I restrict myself to these three infractions of public law by the Government who has proposed to you this Treaty and is to profit by it; and I ask if this and similar acts are not the legitimate consequence of holding any relations whatsoever with that Government? If no Treaty can or

does in law or right exist between Russia and England, in consequence of her past acts, can any Treaty which you now enter into with her be more valid than these violated compacts? And what is to be said of the men who continue under such circumstances to treat with her? When Catherine II. proposed a new Treaty to Kien Lung, his Mantchu Majesty replied, "Let her learn first to observe the old." But, alas, when she turns her face to the setting sun, she catches no Tartars.

But there is still one hope—a lingering hope which has clung to me through disheartening vicissitudes. Every constitution in its foundation has possessed an original germ and fibre; and decay of its equivalent,—mismanagement, results not so much from the introduction of evil novelties as from the obscuration of its inherent light, and the disturbance of its severally balancing and compensating functions. The suppressed element in our present state is the Regal one; still it subsists; it may be evoked. This is no hypothesis. On two signal occasions within a couple of years, we have seen the Prerogative exerted; once in the appointment of a Ministry; once by the coercion of the Foreign Department.

In the first case (the second in point of time), the Minister to whom the important experiment was entrusted, failed to perceive its bearing, and consequently the means of its execution. I refer, however, to the fact, not to the failure. In the second, something more was revealed than power latent in the Crown; there was also manifested ability and *courage* in the Sove-

reign. The Queen had detected, even in matters within her own knowledge, that she had been overreached by the Minister, up to that time her sole guide and instructor.

On this she negotiated with the Chief Minister to obtain that she should no longer be exposed to deception by his subordinate. On the repetition of the offence, that subordinate was excluded from the Cabinet, and the Queen required (for the fact could not otherwise have occurred) the Prime Minister to produce in Parliament, the document consigning the previous compact. The people of this country might then have learned that in the Crown they possessed a check upon faction, and in the Queen a defence against malversation. The experiment again failed; again has that Minister been forced upon the Crown by colleagues who, in excluding him from the Foreign Department, avow their concurrence with the Queen in their judgment of his character.* But again I refer to the fact and not to the experiment.

Now, this Minister is the man who planned the Treaty of the 8th of May, without whose concerted activity or measured inaction, neither could Denmark have been compromised against the Duchies, nor the Duchies against Denmark, Prussia and Germany involved in the war, or the war itself prolonged until the

* "Where he is, he can do no harm;" such is the consolation of his colleagues, when they have resigned to him the Post Office, through the instrumentality of which, even when not directly under his control, he obtained in former years the exclusion or "descent" of Lord Grey from office. But wherever that minister is, he must of necessity become every thing.

occasion was afforded for that restoration of the integrity of the Monarchy which we have before us. Is it to be supposed that these transactions had no share in the judgment and act of the Queen? is it safe for a subsequent Minister to pursue a scheme planned under such auspices, to the persecution and downfall of Princes of the House of Guelph, and no less connected with her Majesty by the ties of blood, than England is connected with them by those of interest?

What, if it did apply, would be the value of the argument—"Sanctity of Treaties." With what wonder would such words, issuing from the lips of an English Minister, be listened to by the Rajahs of India, the Ameers of Scinde, the chieftains of Affghanistan, the Shahs of Persia, the nobles of Poland, and the burghers of Cracow. Shall the Dukes and Princes of the Baltic receive as a holy word that which the rest of the world knows to be a lie? Or are they treated exceptionally, not being barbarians. Yes! there barbarism—here civilization, justifies perfidy. England is equally dexterous at keeping and at breaking words—breaking that fairly pledged in honour, keeping that filched from her by fraud; but true in both to a simple rule—the service of the Czar.*

A word of advice now, not to the wise, but

* When there is difficulty in higher quarters, the Emperor himself is brought forward; and it is understood that rising suspicions in the Queen's mind in respect to the Eastern objects of Russia were on the occasion referred to, set at rest, by a *revelation*, illustrated by the effect on the Roman Empire of the removal by Constantine of the capital to the seat of central dominion.

to the simple. Russia is a monster that devours; but it is one also which exists only by its voracity. Around its den it has thinned the hunting grounds, and it has long remained with spring too short to reach, and growl too fierce to allure. It then got keepers, who, in dread of being devoured themselves, began to foray for its wants. Of those keepers, the individuals called "Foreign Ministers" in England have been the most venturesome and persevering. "What now is to be done with the monster?" exclaims the simple and agitated mind. The answer is easy: Starve it; cease to heap its trough with lacerated laws—cease to cast fractured sceptres and diadems into its sty, and like the wolf, it will die in silence, nor startle even an abigail with a growl.

I make a last appeal to the Minister. I will not do so on the grounds of the interests of England, because his public life is before me; I will not do so on those of fame, for judicial blindness overspreads the land; I will not do so on those of expediency, for he is a man above considerations of private interest. I believe him to be sincere; I believe him to be patriotic; but I have no hopes from his sincerity, or his patriotism. My appeal is to his heart—for he has a heart—and the occasion is one where brain is not required.

At length a religious man is Minister in England. A religious man does not "do evil that good may come." Assume that the Treaty is to strengthen Denmark against Russia, then I ask—"Will you spoliate and coerce, even to save the Sound?"

We are told to "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's;" but surely a religious man's conscience belongs, not to his office but to his Maker.

I resume :—The Treaty cuts out the heirs to such an extent, and in such a manner, that the prospective inheritance of Russia will give her, from the moment of its execution, an influence amounting almost to possession. With Denmark she acquires the Sound and the Baltic, and Sweden can no longer stand as a substantive power.

But to the Crown of Denmark is now added, by an assumed principle of the Treaty of the 8th of May, the Duchies forming the base of the Scandinavian peninsula, and cutting into Germany, one of them being an ancient fief of the Empire, and an actual member of the Germanic Confederation; so that she simultaneously acquires the old battlefield of Northmen and Germans, the passage through the Eyder from the Baltic to the North Sea, the mouths of the Elbe, the position of Rensburg, linked with all the railways of Germany, whence she can pour and distribute her troops at pleasure throughout the central portions of Europe.*

These positions contained, like those of the Dardanelles, a latent aggressive power of which Europe has remained unconscious, because in the hands of an inoffensive State. They are now about to be acquired

* The effect of Railway communication in a military point of view, and the consequent control obtained by Russia over Germany, has already begun to excite attention. See appended note from the *Wehr Zeitung*.

by her without the cost of one drop of blood, and as far as Europe is concerned, they are resigned to her without the labour of one moment's thought.

She has achieved this success in London. One Ministry, uninformed, rashly acceded to her proposal; another has come into office, which, perfectly informed, deliberately purposes to carry it out by urging the Danish Diet to pass an act to give colour of validity to an inoperative Treaty.

I will not conclude without stepping beyond the limits of mere criticism, nor leave to inference the means of rectification. There are two courses now open to the English Government;—the first, (the only fair and honourable one,) that of revising an act obtained by fraud, concluded under misapprehension, and invalid in its terms. Nothing has been ostensibly done under it, it professes to be nothing more than a pledge to the stability of arrangements made by the King of Denmark in reference to the succession to the Crown, and so excludes in its own terms all binding power.

The second course is but an expedient. It is to pass by the Treaty of the 8th of May, leaving it to take its course; and to proceed to a negotiation, with the object of obtaining mutual renunciations on the part of Denmark and of Russia, so as to prevent the union of the two crowns upon the same head.

Both courses, however, equally involve the presence in the Government of England of faculties and character which shall put an end to her subserviency. With less than this, nothing can be obtained.

(Note to page 39.)

ON THE MILITARY RAILWAYS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

From the *Wehr Zeitung*.

“The construction of the lines of railway from Moscow to St. Petersburg, and from Odessa to Warsaw, has totally altered the conditions upon which the Russian army has hitherto been dependent, and must henceforth exercise an all powerful influence upon our preparation for extensive military campaigns. The active army, consisting of four great corps of Infantry, is garrisoned in Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia. Between these forces and St. Petersburg is placed, at Novgorod, the great Grenadier Corps, while the famous guard is stationed at the capital itself. The Fifth Infantry Corps is spread in the south-west, leaning upon the extreme garrison of Pruth. The Sixth Infantry Corps occupies Moscow and its environs. Hitherto in case of a western war the active army alone could have taken an early part in the campaign, since it required months to move up the more distant troops. The completion of the railway from St. Petersburg to Warsaw will enable this movement to be effectually performed within eight days! Before one single line of the Russian railways was decided upon, the routes that would be preferable were chosen from the consideration of their relative importance in the transport of great masses of our army and its *matériel*. Some thousands of cars, specially constructed for military uses, have already been completed; a portion of them are being distributed, and the accommodation which they offer might serve as a model. Care has been taken to provide stowage for baggage, arms, saddlery, &c. With the assistance of these new appliances, one half the corps of Grenadiers and Guards could be transported to Poland in three days, and the entire corps within eight, while at the same moment the reserves would be rolling to St. Petersburg from Moscow, and the Sixth Corps of Infantry could follow if the necessity should arise. Whether the Fifth Army Corps should approach from the west would be decided by the political situation of Turkey. Whatever circumstances might arise, the army, detached, so to say, from the soil, would be enabled to act freely.

“The whole bearing, political and military, of our railway distribution consists in the possibility of transporting in a few days bodies of troops for whose transit months were previously necessary.

“With St. Petersburg and Moscow united to Warsaw, and Warsaw to Odessa, Russia immediately approaches the politics of Europe, and she will have no cause to fear in future the hesitations and delays which caused such loss of ground during the earlier portion of the war in 1831.”

THE DIPLOMATIC CYCLE.

THE golden cycle, which gives us the recurrence of the obscurations and occultations of the moon, consists of eighteen years and a half; the diplomatic cycle bringing back the periods of nodes and eclipses, seems to range to four-and-twenty, judging by the apparent time at the meridians of Copenhagen and Constantinople. The conjunction actually exhibited from the former, was visible from the latter in June 1829, as will appear from the following extracts from the tables of the astrologers, dated House of Lords, 19th June 1829:—

“ Marquis of Clanricarde—The noble Earl (Aberdeen) laid great stress upon the fact of the Emperor of Russia having waived his rights as a belligerent in the Mediterranean, *as affording facilities for the execution of the Treaty of London* (6th June, 1827). All that we are yet acquainted with is, that Turkey is in danger, and that the Emperor of Russia has broken his engagements with impunity,” &c. &c. &c.

“ Lord Aberdeen—It is quite enough for Government to have it on their hands *to execute the Treaty*, without being obliged to *prophecy how it is to be executed*. *I have never given any opinion as to this Treaty.*”

TREASON OF THE HOUSE OF AUGUSTENBURG.

Since the English Government have ascertained that the Prince of Schleswig Holstein will not yield, an expedient has been resorted to to close the door against his appeal for justice and protection. He is represented as a traitor. In other times such an insinuation would have been weak, but in our days when an insinuation is better than a charge, it is a clever device.

His late Danish Majesty before his accession to the throne bore arms against his sovereign. He erected himself into an independent monarch; and so breaking the allegiance of Norway defied even a European Treaty. The then king conceived that the act justified his exclusion from the succession, and he therefore submitted the case to the Privy Council; the objection was there overruled by a formal decision, and he ascended the throne as Christian VIII.

Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein took a leading part on the outbreak in the Duchies, but did not, as the Duchies did not, either abjure his allegiance or attempt measures hostile to the authority of the crown. He communicated directly with the king, (then in the hands of a mob faction at Copenhagen,) proposing to concert measures with him to preserve his authority without violating the rights of the Duchies, and to rescue them from the German dema-

gogues. Whether his conduct was judicious or the reverse is here immaterial; he acted in the midst of alarms and misjudgments of which we can to-day form no due estimate.

The collision between Denmark and the Duchies was not put down as a rebellion but concluded by Treaty; consequently no character of rebellion can attach to the parties concerned.

In that Treaty Foreign Powers are parties. To treat any of the individuals taking part in those hostilities as guilty of treason is to imply a similar quality in the crowns of Great Britain, Prussia, and Austria.

The Duke of Augustenburg is similarly situated as regards these transactions to his brother.* The Duke of Augustenburg has been paid a million and a half of dollars, whether in compensation for his property or for the surrender of his rights. This money would certainly not have been paid if the cheaper process of a legal procedure, whether by impeachment or attainder, could have been attempted. This money was according to German practice invested (though in funds) as a hereditary fief, following consequently the line of succession to his male heirs, and after them to his brother and his heirs, and therefore the surrender is made in the name of the "family," no distinction being drawn between the Elder and the Junior branch;

* With this distinction, that the Duke of Augustenburg adhered to the cause after, under the commissioners sent from Frankfort, the rights of the Crown were assailed.

and in like manner the compensation is made to both branches.*

The resistance made in the Duchies was to the revolutionary movement in Copenhagen, and not to the king, and it was mainly determined by an autograph letter of the King of Prussia to the Duke of Augustenburg, urging him to that course, and assuring him of the energetic support of Prussia and the Princes of Germany in the maintenance of his undoubted rights. Subsequently a similar autograph letter was addressed to Prince Frederick of Schleswig Holstein, conveying the insignia of the highest military order of the Prussian Monarchy.

Finally, the penalties consequent on the commission of any crime can take effect only after arraignment and condemnation.

On these various grounds, too strong to require comment, it must be evident that the object of the insinuation was to poison the ear that might otherwise have been open to reason and to justice. I do not deal with it as defending the Prince, but as exposing the heinous means which this confederacy does not shrink from using; and its contempt for those upon

* This settlement has subsequently been broken through by an ordinance of the King of Denmark of the 13th of January, which takes off the entail, and, therefore, leaves unreservedly the disposal of the whole sum to the present Duke; so that he may cut off his own sons. The date of the transaction shows, however, that it was decided upon after the views of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein were known.

whom it acts, as shown in the absurdities it can rely on for effecting its essential ends.

Nothing is changed, and no new discovery has been made since it was proposed to present to Her Majesty, together with the Duke of Augustenburg, the son of the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, except indeed that the honour proffered in this fashion was declined ; so that those whom it is proposed to-day that Her Majesty should honour, by admitting to her presence, are next day denounced to Her Majesty as traitors because they have refused.*

* The presentation was to have been together with the Duke of Augustenburg, publicly received by Her Majesty after he had made surrender ; and the conjoint presentation was to have involved that surrender of his brother which they had apprehended directly to propose.

TREATY
RELATIVE TO THE SUCCESSION
TO THE
CROWN OF DENMARK.

Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Prince President of the French Republic, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Sweden and Norway, on the one part, and the King of Denmark on the other part, relative to the Succession to the Crown of Denmark.

Signed at London, May 8, 1852.

[Ratifications exchanged at London, June 19, 1852.]

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND INDIVISIBLE TRINITY.

PREAMBLE. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Prince President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, taking into consideration that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the balance of power in Europe, is of high importance to the preservation of peace, and that an arrangement by which

the succession to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark, should devolve upon the male line, to the exclusion of females, would be the best means of securing the integrity of that Monarchy, have resolved, at the invitation of His Danish Majesty, to conclude a Treaty, in order to give to the arrangements relating to such order of succession, an additional pledge of stability by an act of European acknowledgment.

ARTICLE I. After having taken into serious consideration the interests of his Monarchy, His Majesty the King of Denmark, with the assent of His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, and of his nearest Cognates, entitled to the succession by the Royal Law of Denmark, as well as in concert with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Head of the elder branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, having declared his wish to regulate the order of succession in his dominions, in such manner that, in default of issue male in a direct line from King Frederick III. of Denmark, his Crown should devolve upon His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and upon the issue of the marriage of that Prince with Her Highness the princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, by order of Primogeniture, from male to male; the High Contracting Parties, appreciating the wisdom of the views which have determined the eventual adoption of that arrangement, engage by common consent, in case the contemplated contingency should be realized, to acknowledge in His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and his issue male in the direct line by his marriage with the said Princess, the right of succeeding to the whole of the dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark.

ARTICLE II. The High Contracting Parties, acknowledging as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, engage to take into consideration the further propositions which His Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them, in case (which God forbid) the extinction of the issue male, in the direct line, of His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, by his marriage with Her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, should become imminent.

ARTICLE III. It is expressly understood that the reciprocal rights and obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark, and of the Germanic Confederation, concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, rights and obligations established by the Federal Act of 1815, and by the existing Federal right, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE IV. The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the other Powers, and to invite them to accede to it.

ARTICLE V. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of six weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the eighth day of May, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-two.

(L.S.)	MALMESBURY.	(L.S.)	BILLE.
(L.S.)	KUBECK.		
(L.S.)	A. WALEWSKI.		
(L.S.)	BUNSEN.		
(L.S.)	BRUNNOW.		
(L.S.)	REHAUSEN.		

ARTICLE OF THE TIMES.

MAY 11th, 1852.

IT is a fortunate circumstance for the Earl of Malmesbury that, within the short period that he has held the seals of the Foreign Office, he has already had the opportunity of signing a Treaty with all the great Powers which *restores peace* to an important part of Northern Europe, *secures the integrity* of the Danish monarchy, and *provides* upon a safe basis and by an equitable compromise *for the eventual succession to that Crown*. But, in fact, this question had been so fully considered for the last few years, and the negotiations had already been so actively carried on in all parts of Europe, that, upon the arrival of M. de Bille, the Danish Plenipotentiary, in London, *nothing remained to be done BY THE CONFERENCE but to complete its work by signing the instruments already agreed upon*. This act was concluded on Saturday, the 8th of May, at the Foreign Office, and, as the Treaty was immediately forwarded to Copenhagen for ratification, it may now be considered that every part of this *harassing controversy* is brought to a close, and that the future peace of the country is secured, while the causes of past irritation and hostility are removed. For nearly six years the question of the Danish succession in the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein has disturbed the tranquillity of Northern Europe, for it was in 1846 that the late King of Denmark published his letters patent on the order of inheritance in the Duchies. But the *train had long before been laid* by the intrigues of the Augustenburg family, and the explosion was *greatly assisted* by the convulsions which soon afterwards took place in Germany, followed by the temporary ascendancy of revolutionary principles at Frankfort and Berlin. We need scarcely remind our readers, that throughout the chances and perils of this difficult period, *WE never despaired* for an instant of a cause which was supported by the whole authority of public law, and defended by

the spirit of the Danish people. The odds against them were overwhelming, but right has prevailed. Denmark owes her success to no Foreign Power, for throughout the contest she received no active military or naval succour. But she had the goodwill and the respect of Europe ; she was upheld by public opinion, to which, we trust, we may have in some degree contributed ; and *when* at length Lord Palmerston *was induced to lay down* the principles which were established on the 2nd of August, 1850, by the Protocol of London, the rights of Denmark were saved.

It will be remembered that the cause of this dispute was, that in the probable event of the failure of issue to the eldest male line now reigning in Denmark, the several dominions of that Crown *would pass*, according to different laws of succession, and the monarchy *would consequently* have been divided. Denmark Proper would have descended through a female branch to the Princes of Hesse Cassel ; Holstein would have followed the strict line of male succession, because it was a fief of the German Empire ; and the succession of Schleswig was disputed, one party contending that it followed the descent of the Crown of Denmark, the other that it was indissolubly united to Holstein. *To meet these difficulties, the course which has now been successfully adopted was to select one scion of the Royal family as its common heir ; to obtain renunciations of the conflicting and collateral interests of all other parties, and to place the whole of these arrangements under the collective sanction of Europe.* The next heir to the Crown of Denmark, in the event of the King's demise without issue, is His Majesty's uncle, Ferdinand, a Prince of sixty years of age, married, and likewise without issue. On his death it is presumed that the reigning line will become extinct. The present treaty, therefore, recognises as the next heir after him *Prince Christian*, of the line of Sonderburg Glucksbourg, who is married to Princess Louise of Hesse Cassel, a grand-daughter

of King Frederick VI. of Denmark, by the eldest daughter of that Sovereign, who became the wife of Landgrave William of Hesse. The issue of the marriage of Prince Christian and the Princess Louise of Hesse consists of four children, the eldest a boy about nine years old; *and this young Prince, therefore, represents both the male and the female line of succession to the Kingdom and the Duchies, THOUGH not in the first degree.* The line of Augustenburg is senior to the line of Sonderburg Glucksbourg, *but it is attained for the part it took in the late contest, which was mainly fomented by those Princes in order to secure and extend their own exclusive pretensions by the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy.* The Duke of Augustenburg has, therefore, forfeited his rights, *and stands excluded from the amnesty; BUT* an arrangement has now, *we believe, been concluded* between him and the King of Denmark, by which his estates in the Duchy of Schleswig *are to be purchased at a high valuation, and the proceeds will suffice to provide liberally for his subsistence and station.* No further difficulty is, therefore, to be apprehended in that quarter, and it is *comparatively immaterial whether his renunciation has taken place.* But the elder members of the Hessian branch *had undoubted rights to the Crown of Denmark, which they have honourably renounced in favour of the husband and children of the Princess Louise, without exacting any compensation.* The Emperor of Russia, as representative of the line of Holstein Gottorp, had rights on one portion of the Duchy of Holstein; for the act of cession, confirmed and executed by the Grand Duke Paul, on his coming of age, in 1773, was exclusively in favour of the *male line reigning in Denmark, and in the event of the extinction of the male line that renunciation so made by the father of the present Emperor Nicholas would have become null and void.* *Far from shewing any eagerness to avail himself of this circumstance to acquire a preponderating influence in that part*

of *Europe*, IT IS DUE to the Court of Russia TO STATE *that they have never attempted to sacrifice the general welfare of the Danish monarchy to any petty interest*, and that the Emperor has been constantly foremost in promoting this negotiation, of which a renewal of his father's cession of all claims on Holstein *forms an essential part*. Throughout this transaction Russia has acted with *great judgment (!)* and good faith, and, although her own interests are deeply involved in all that concerns the entrance to the Baltic, she has sought to gain no advantage for herself, but simply to strengthen and preserve the independent rights of Denmark. In like manner France, under the successive Governments of Louis Philippe, Lamartine, Cavaignac, and Louis Napoleon, has pursued the same frank and consistent line of conduct towards Denmark. The difficulties came, as is well known, from the side of Germany, for this question was curiously intermingled with the political passions of the time, and the song of "*Schleswig-Holstein mecrumschlungen*" was for many months the *Ca ira* of the German revolution. At length, however, *the restoration of the legitimate federal authority in Frankfort terminated the hostilities in the Duchies*; and, in spite of the scorn and resentment with which our announcement of the Danish Protocol of 1850 was received in Germany, when the Prussian Envoy in London declined to sign that document, we have now great satisfaction in recording the fact, that all differences of opinion between the great Powers *have disappeared*, and that Chevalier Bunsen *himself* has placed his name by the side of the Plenipotentiaries of all the other Powers in this final arrangement! We may, therefore, now invoke *his high testimony* to the soundness of the policy which that Protocol was intended to establish; and if any sacrifices have been made by Prussia before she arrived at that conclusion, we sincerely hope she may be rewarded for them by the establishment of *a cordial alliance between herself and Denmark*

whose geographical position and maritime power make her a neighbour of the *utmost value to the Prussian dominions*. Upon the whole, this Treaty is another proof that in spite of the *most serious obstacles* and *the most violent passions*, the active, intelligent, and pacific diplomacy of our day does contrive to avert the calamities of general war, and even when hostilities are raging, to confine them, as far as possible, within a narrow compass! In any other age, it is highly probable that the Danish struggle would have led to far more formidable results (!) and, although it was too long protracted, *because vigorous means were not early employed to check it*, the termination of the whole negotiation proves that the great Powers will see justice done and peace preserved.

ACT OF RENUNCIATION OF THE DUKE OF
AUGUSTENBURG,

SIGNED AT FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAINE, DECEMBER 30TH, 1852.

“§ 2. We hereby bind ourselves for our own person and family to take up our abode in future beyond the dominions and possessions of his Majesty, in which country we and our issue are neither permitted, nor desirous, to acquire any landed property.”

“§ 3. We hereby engage our princely word and honour to do nothing which might interfere with the tranquillity of your Majesty's dominions and countries, or which might endanger them. Likewise in noways willingly to counteract any arrangement your Majesty may be pleased to make for the succession in the dominions subject to your sceptre, or the eventual organization of your monarchy, in reference to which measures have been taken, or may be taken.”

“§ 4. Whatever rights and titles belonging to us and our descendants pertaining to the Ducal possessions and station of Augustenburg, we hereby resign.”

“§ 10. We hereby promise for ourselves and our heirs and descendants, that we on our part bind ourselves faithfully to accomplish what has been settled in the above document, and that we never will permit that any of ours shall in any way act in a contrary sense. This act we have signed in our own handwriting, and sealed with our own seal.”

P R O T E S T
OF THE
PRINCE OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOER.

(To the President of the Danish Diet.)

United Service Club, London,
March 24, 1853.

SIR,

I BEG, through you, to lay before the Diet the subjoined statement.

I have perused in the "Altona Mercury" of the 10th of March, a document purporting to be an engagement between the King of Denmark on the one side, and my brother, the Duke of Schleswig Holstein Augustenburg, on the other; in which the latter, in consideration of a sum of money, surrenders, in his own name and in that of his "family," all rights and claims which may interfere with any disposition which the King of Denmark may make in reference to the Succession.

Apprehending lest by the use of the unwonted word "family," that it may be supposed that I am an included, or consenting, party to any such arrangements, I here make the formal declaration, that I had no knowledge of them until I perused them in the papers, and that I conceive myself to be bound now by every lawful means to preserve rights which are not mere distinctions of a family, but which have arisen out of public necessities and for public use; and of which the wisdom and the value have never been more signally exhibited than on the present occasion, when on their maintenance depends the maintenance of the independence of a crown and the existence of a people.

Mutual confidence and respect for the historic institu-

tions and laws of the different portions of the Danish monarchy, was the bond by which that kingdom was held together; so soon as the idea arose of abolishing them confidence was destroyed and strength faded away. The part I took in the movement of 1848, was to support those ancient laws; when the representatives of the people innovated, and thereby attacked those institutions, I withdrew and so soon as a hostile spirit sprung up between the King and the people, I quitted the country. While resolved to defend the monarchical prerogative, I am equally so to maintain historical popular rights; and never will I submit to any arrangement by which the latter should be sacrificed.

The Treaty of the 8th of May, against which I have lodged this day my protest with the English Government I hold to be one of coercion and spoliation; nevertheless, there is one condition, to obtain which I would make every sacrifice. It is, that an arrangement shall be come to similar to that which was made in respect to the crowns of Spain and France at the Treaty of Utrecht, so that the crowns of Denmark and of Russia shall never be united on the same head; and Denmark and the Duchies be thereby incorporated in the Russian Empire.


I have the honour to remain, &c.

(Signed) F. OF SCHLESWIG HOLSTEIN NOER.

DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

SECOND EDITION.

A GENERAL SCHEME OF THE LINES.



Christian I.

Frederic I.

57.)

Adolph, (Duke, Co-Regent,) Founder of Gottorp Line

Christian Albert.

John the Younger, Duke, Co-Regent, Founder of the Younger Royal Line.

Duke Frederic IV.

Christian Auguste, Bp. of Lubeck.

Alexander Duke of Sonderburg.

Adolph Frederic, Bp. of Lubeck, King of Sweden.

George Frederic, ob. 1763.

Paul Frederic, Gr. Duke of Oldenburg, b. 1783.

Nicholas I. Emperor of Russia, b. 1796.

Gustav. Prince of Wasa, b. 1799.

Ernest Gunthor, 1st Duke of Augustenburg.

Auguste Philippe, 1st Duke of Becke.

Christian Auguste, Duke of Augustenburg.

Charles, Duke of Glücksburg.

A

(issue.)

(issue.)

DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

THE SOUND AND THE BOSPHORUS.*

THERE are in Europe so many means of disguise and concealment that the acting hand is never seen and rarely suspected, but the east affords the key to the north and west. Thus the affair of the Danish Duchies, which is taken in Europe for a real quarrel, affecting other countries only by the anxieties and embarrassments it caused them, is to those conversant with the events of the east, a mere contrivance of which both parties are the victims, and having nothing real, save the faculty possessed by a barbarous power, to use the statesmen and the nations, the measures of the one and the passions of the other, for her own ends.

A similar transaction has been simultaneously in progress in the south; the two may be advantageously brought together as mutually elucidating each other.

“It was quite enough in delivering Finland to the Russians to have afforded them the means of a step in advance towards the Sound, as a point from which they will not be less menacing at a

* Written at Constantinople in January 1851.

“future day, when, the Russian Colossus with one
“foot on the Dardanelles and another on the Sound,
“will make the whole world his slave, and liberty
“will have fled to America. However chimerical
“all this may seem now to narrow minds, it will
“one day be a cruel reality: for Europe, unwisely
“divided like the towns of Greece in presence of
“the Kings of Macedonia, will have probably the
“same lot.”

The recorder of these ominous words (M. Thiers) may have reconciled himself to this fate, which he has contributed no less to accomplish than foretel; but the prophecy is not therefore the less impressive. To the pursuit of the means which shall bring its accomplishment, Russia is not less instigated by necessity than ambition, these channels are not portals only, but nooses; they are the keys of the house of the Czars, until they are possessed, the internal condition of Russia is exposed to the greatest hazard, and the prosperity of her provinces and the tranquillity of her state, are at the mercy of an order emanating from a Port-captain at Constantinople, or a Commandant at Elsineur. Strange exhibition of the triumph of mind over matter, that the possession of a strait which closes a vast expanse of sea, receiving the drainage and produce of extensive regions, and at pleasure closing against them the commerce of the world—instead of conferring strength and wealth on the possessor, should expose him to daily dread, to periodical convulsion, and to ultimate subjection! Strange that to be held by the throat should render a state mistress of

the spirit, faculties, or fate of those who so hold it ! If there be a political proposition self-evident it is the relationship of the Baltic and the Black Sea, and thereby of Denmark and Turkey,* of the Sound and the Bosphorus, of the Duchies and the Principalities ; and if it be undoubted that Russia does employ her power, physical and mental, to the acquisition of the latter, it follows that she is no less entirely engaged with the same purpose in the former.

Adjoining each Strait, there are two Provinces linked together, yet distinct ; in race and institutions separated from the Governments to which they belong ; having Constitutions established by Treaty and practice through a long course of time. This is what has in each afforded the opportunity to sow dissensions, and to establish a schism with the metropolis. The Porte has been for generations quarrelling with her Principalities, it is notorious that this is Russia's work : Denmark is now quarrelling with her Duchies—I propose to show that she has also done it.

The dates no less than the processes coincide. Peter bargained with Prince Cantemir for the occupation of Moldavia : he disposed of a daughter to secure the succession of Holstein. The circumstances in some respects differ. The Principalities adjoined her frontier—the Duchies were remote ; it was only by passing over the one that Eastern con-

* Russia is the eventual heir of Denmark, and is alleged to be about to succeed to an inheritance in Turkey.

“ Shall we go to war with Russia to prevent her from inheriting Constantinople ? ” — *Lamartine*.

quest could be achieved;—it was only by disguising her purpose as regards the other, that Western susceptibilities could be allayed: hence the difference, there maskless violence—here, careful management; in the one case armies, in the other, diplomacy: on the Black sea Occupation—Mediation on the Baltic.

But for either, internal dissensions were requisite, and for dissensions, grievances: whatever difficulty there might be in leading a Government like that of Copenhagen into such a course against dependencies of so great relative strength, there was none, in regard to the Principalities; between misrule, negligence and ferocity, the Porte seemed to have no care on her mind, or no task on her hand but to accomplish or anticipate the wishes of her rival; consequently we have seen Russia with periodical regularity marching into these Dependencies without contention or resistance. It has so happened, however, that she had with equal regularity to walk back again. It might be that the people, however disgusted with the Turks had still some disgust in reserve for the Kalmucks, and that at all events they preferred to liberating armies they had to feed, tyrants they never saw. In fact, the ill will of the people against the Turks was exaggerated. They could not misrule much, where they did not rule at all; nor be very ferocious when never present. Their haughty carelessness removed deep grounds of opposition, and their subjects could not suspect them of insidious designs, far less of theoretic views, against their independence. Their barbarism was sterling—a barbarism of gold, besides the

pinchbeck civilization of the Russians; it was a barbarism ignorant and stupid; it inflicted neither conscription nor serfage; warred with no peculiarity of tongue, opinion, or habit; and did not bless the nations with uniformity or centralization. Now, Russia's business was to teach the Porte this barbarism, and to quicken it into civilization; for the day that the Turks proposed to themselves to *unite the Principalities*, she became mistress on the Danube. Nay, her sway would extend if her flag was not there unfurled, to the heights of the Bosphorus and the fortresses of the Dardanelles. The Turks, though not ripe for so finished a scholarship, did make advances towards it: had Russia succeeded almost invariably in having administrative transformed into diplomatic questions, as elsewhere she transforms diplomatic into administrative ones. Thus the decision of all cases was transferred from Bucharest or Jassy to Constantinople, there to be managed by Dragomans, and finally to be settled by a *FIRMAN*: that is, by an imperial and arbitrary decree, such as the *Ordonnances* by which Algeria is ruled. Governing by Firman was, in fact, an "administrative union;" for it was a violation of the guaranteed privileges of the Principalities, subjecting them to the general administration of the empire, without the conditions or guarantees on which that administration rests. It had all the additional disadvantage of being provisional and incoherent. However, the people in that incoherence found at least food for future hope, and whatever the misery of their condition they referred

it not to the Turks, whom they knew to be stupid, but to the Russians, whom they believed to be artful. The Principalities often irritated, were never alienated, and the periodical successes of Russian craft, as regularly prepared for the returning preponderance of Turkish apathy.

At this moment in presence of a Russian army of occupation, so complete has been the ascendancy gained by the Porte, that while in one of the provincial capitals the Turkish Commissioner was received with every demonstration of enthusiasm by that class which Russia has, so to say, created, no one would visit or receive visits from the Russian Commander-in-Chief; yet the one is a distinguished general and writer, the other a young untried man, recently filling no higher post than that of a subordinate clerkship.

Were the dispositions of the Wallachians the other way, the empire would not hold together for six months, or would be handed over to the Czar in order to preserve its "integrity and independence." I may refer to what has recently passed before our eyes. There was a conspiracy organized throughout the empire, from north to south, and from east to west, the basis of which was the army of occupation in the Principalities. A revolution there was to justify its reinforcement by 50,000 men collected in Bessarabia; commotions prepared to the south, and a disputed succession, on the removal of the Sultan, would have enabled this body to advance on Adrianople, whilst the squadron from Sevastapol dropped down the Bosphorus to

protect the empire and fix the election of the new Sultan. Such was the plan, as credited by persons who had opportunities of knowledge; and it is difficult without some such purpose and agency, to account for the extraordinary circumstances which did occur, and which occurred simultaneously.

There can be no question that an extensive insurrection was concerted throughout Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Servia, though it was rendered abortive by the prompt measures of the Servian Government, which was represented up to the moment of the explosion as its source. There can be no doubt that, at that precise moment, a revolution was on the point of breaking out at Bucharest, though it was stopped by the activity of Achmet Effendi, and the influence which he had acquired. At the same moment the Admiral's ship is blown up in the Golden Horn, when the ministers might have been on board: the fact is explained,—but not denied: nor is it asserted, that it is a common thing for flag-ships to blow up. The sudden dismissal of the Sultan's Austrian physician (Dr. Spitzer)* is also explained; but still that also occurs at the same moment: and it also happens that a German newspaper reaches Constantinople accounting for this sudden removal, by a eunuch's having fallen a victim to a potion destined by him for the Sultan, and actually delivered into his own hands, when the same story was only beginning to ooze out through the entourage of the seraglio; a story believed because not contradicted by men in high office. His death would not, like that

* See note at the end of the Chapter.

of his father, have been followed simply by the investiture of his successor, but by a contested succession between his brother and his sons. At this time also took place the massacre and insurrection of Aleppo, although the accidental presence of General Bem arrested the incalculable disasters it might have entailed. This affair, the furthest removed, from the Principalities in point of distance touches them nearest in its effects, and requires a word of explanation.

A certain Armenian, named Yazmadji, implicated in the attempt to assassinate Kossuth*—publicly known here to be a secret agent of Austria, and as generally reputed to be a poisoner, arrived at Aleppo shortly before the disturbance, accompanied by eight Hungarian renegades, who were paraded about the public places in Mussulman costume. In a few days they abjured Mahomedanism, and reviled the faith, which is known to be the dreadliest offence to Mahomedans, and then took refuge at the different consulates. Other exasperating circumstances were not wanting, but this was the immediate cause of that sanguinary and alarming insurrection. It has been indeed attributed to a reaction of barbarian fanaticism against the new order of things,—but Europeans were not maltreated after Navarino: if it had been mere blind fanaticism, or Mussulman haughtiness, how should the Armenian, and the Jew, have been spared, when

* A case into which the English Embassy instituted an inquiry, and concluded for the reality of the charge; at least it allowed that belief to be entertained at Pera.

the Frank, the Catholic, and the Greek, were pursued with rancour and brutality ?

After the rage of the people had been exerted against the Franks and the Consuls, the Arabs of the Desert, with admirable instinct, arrived. No Yazmadji had been amongst them, but they had gone down to Egypt, and each man had returned, with gold in his sack, some ten, some twenty, some thirty thousand dollars.

The connection of Abbas Pasha might not have been so clear as that of the Austrian agent with the Czar, but the veil was raised. Within the shortest time that intelligence of the events of Aleppo could reach St. Petersburg, a leader appeared in the "Northern Bee," the effect of which on the society of that capital was not less great than if the Emperor had gone in person to pay a visit to a sub-lieutenant of dragoons. Nothing appears in any Russian journal save what is ordered by the Government, but this journal is specially the organ of the Emperor. There Abbas Pasha was vindicated against charges of treason—whilst at Constantinople everything was explained by the repugnance of the Arabs to the conscription !

The alertness of the Editor of the "Northern Bee" was not a solitary incident: the signal was watched for in London with as much eagerness as at St. Petersburg. The instant that the achievement of Yazmadji is known, the English Minister writes to Paris to suggest the necessity of measures against the Ottoman Empire ; and the French Government, which sees its safety only in the Cos-

sacks, was nothing loathe to render the service to its protector, of recommending a new phasis of diplomatic action, in its modern acceptance of fleets and broadsides. The English Ambassador at Paris hastens to the Foreign Office, General La Hitte listens with profound attention. The Representative of Russia happens to call at the same moment, and is waiting in an adjoining room. The Protocol is in the very act of parturition, when the door opens and a *chef de bureau* enters and places in the hands of the General-Minister the official report of General Bem, which had reached Paris in an unofficial manner.*

By this document the total loss of life at Aleppo was reduced to fifteen, and the explosion of fanaticism was explained as arising from obscure and foreign intriguers; the measures adopted by the Government were stated to have arrested the disorders, and its intention was declared to punish the delinquents. So fell, still-born, the Protocol, and the Representatives of England and Russia had to return to their respective hotel *re infectâ*. The French Government, which is sometimes given to oscillations, having desisted from smiting the Porte by a "coalition," raised it to the skies in an article in "La Patrie;" and the Government, against whom in the morning was to be evoked a crusade of revolution and Christianity was, in the evening, held up to the theatres and

* This statement was that circulated in high quarters at the time in Constantinople; I have no means of testing its accuracy; but it partly rested on a report of Callimachi.

clubs of Paris as a model of firmness and moderation, and pointed out as a hopeful prop to that civilization which was appearing to run many hazardous chances in the West. The *Chef de Bureau*, however, not being sufficiently Russian for the Foreign Department, was transferred to another ; and Bem, who had killed both insurrection and Protocol, was despatched to the other world.*

What consequences may not be anticipated from the presence of a hostile army in the midst of an empire ? The wonder is not that such schemes should be carried on, but that they have not long ago proved successful.

But what brought these armies there—was it conquest ? No—Revolution ! At Jassy and Bucharest, Russia, who had no ostensible connection with the incitation of those of Paris, Vienna, Berlin, &c., directly moved. The Princes, the Friends of the Porte, the Liberals, and the Russian Partizans, all conspired as it were together, against one another ; the impulse once given, the revolution directed itself with fury against her, and that was the pretext she awaited to bring in her troops ; and so she gained her entrance into Hungary.

* The English Ambassador at Constantinople interposed to prevent the Porte from conferring any mark of favour on General Bem. Into the circumstances of his death an enquiry was instituted by confidential agents, who reported that the treatment of his malady (intermittent fever) had been such as to insure a fatal issue. His medical attendant, as well as his Aides-de-Camp, had been recommended by a Hungarian General of Jewish origin, (General Stein), now known to have been throughout a traitor. These persons had apostatised ; on the death of Bem they fled.

We will now see how revolutions served her at Copenhagen.

This pamphlet reached Vienna at the end of June 1852; and on the 28th of August there appeared in the Angsburg Gazette the following communication, in the shape of a letter dated "Constantinople August 14th."

"We cannot make ourselves responsible for either the whole or the separate parts of what we are going to relate. A conspiracy has been discovered for removing by violence the present Sultan, and placing his brother on the throne, the object being to root out all Frankish novelties. The reactionary Party, crushed by Mahomed, seems to have gained new strength and courage, since the triumph of reactionary principles throughout Europe.

"The Sultan's physician, Dr. Spitzer has been suddenly removed, and appointed Councillor of the Turkish Legation at Vienna. There are many stories afloat, the most probable one is that Dr. Spitzer was offered an enormous sum by the reactionary party if he would poison the Sultan, and threatened with a speedy death if he refused. The Doctor showed the letter to the Sultan, and has been removed to save him from danger. Last time it was the Sultan's brother, whom it was attempted to gain over, but who made the Sultan aware of what was going on The journey of the Sultan to Chalki, to visit the new Marine School, was to be taken advantage of to carry out the views of the conspirators, when the Sultana Valide sent a steamer after the Sultan, to make known the conspiracy to him. Many persons have been arrested, and various Pashas have disappeared. People too have recollected that on that very day two years, when the Sultan was to have gone on board the Admiral's ship blew up."

The mystification here attempted will deceive no one. I had afforded to Dr. Spitzer the opportunity, if innocent, of clearing himself. I brought it forward, indeed, merely as the current rumour at Constantinople. Now it appears likely to stand as a matter of history.

THE SCHISM OF DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

THE AGNATIC AND COGNATIC LINES.

THE Duchies were heard of for the first time at the same period ; but the schism preceded the events of Europe, and has extended beyond their term. Elsewhere conflagrations have burst forth, and then subsided, country by country : a few months of agony, or at best an army of invasion, and all was over ; but this pitiable Denmark, and these miserable Duchies return again and again upon the surface like the bubbling of a quagmire. A matter which might have been settled in five minutes, and States which could have been devastated from end to end in a week, have kept Europe in suspense, Exchange in agitation, Commerce in alarm during three years, in which it might have been supposed that colossal events and frightful catastrophes had exhausted the susceptibility of men.

A member of the old Dynasty of Oldenburgh sits on the throne of Russia, and she of all the powers of Europe alone holds back ! The Government which has pursued this course of undisguised violence, as regards those remote dependencies of the Porte, is wholly careless of her own political and dynastic interests in a European kingdom of

such close neighbourhood and such vast importance! But has she not renounced her rights, and having given this proof of disinterestedness, is not her abstinence a delicacy which deserves respect? Let us see.

Charles Frederick, representative of the junior or Gottorp line, having during the Swedish war, lost Schleswig, and retaining only a portion of Holstein, but being according to the peculiar and anomalous practice of these Duchies co-regent with the king, sought in 1720 the support of Peter I. of Russia, who was not backward in securing the opening thus afforded into Germany, although unable at the moment to profit by it. He conferred on Duke Charles the hand of his eldest daughter Anna, and confided the issue to time and industry. Russia's maritime power was then no match for that of Denmark, and it appeared that difficulties was the only inheritance the alliance would bring to the Imperial House. However, the concession was small, of a daughter doubly illegitimate;* and this was the first alliance of the Czars with a Princely House. On his death and the accession of his widow, Catherine I., the matter of the Duchy was about to be raised, when she too was removed from the troubles of this earth. The King of Denmark now negotiated with the Emperor as head of the German Empire, of which Holstein was a fief, and a treaty

* The husband of Catherine and the wife of Peter, Eudocia Lapoukin, were both alive when she was born; and therefore she and her son and her sister Elizabeth, were not so much as mentioned on the accession of Anne.

was signed between them, by which the claims of the Duke of Holstein on the Duchies were set aside, and compensation of 1,000,000 crowns allowed (if claimed within a certain time). To this treaty* the Empress Anne of Russia acceded. Nevertheless, the Duke rejected with scorn the indemnity, and indignantly protested against this attempted interference with his rights. His son, afterwards raised to the Imperial Throne on renouncing Protestantism, under the name of Peter III., in like manner rejected the offered compensation, and refused to admit the validity of the treaty. So soon as this unhappy Prince obtained possession of the sceptre, he prepared to recover his paternal inheritance. His suspected Lutheranism, his paraded Germanism, had already rendered him obnoxious; however, he recovered suddenly by the first acts of his government the heart of the Russians, when these measures against Denmark afforded to his wife (afterwards Catherine II.) the means of casting him from a throne to a dungeon and tomb.†

That revolution which changed the face of Europe was thus owing to the Duchies. The Danish minister and party (for Denmark then had a party at

* The prototype and antitype of the Treaty of the 8th May, 1852.

† In a despatch (not published) from Mr. Keith to Lord Granville, July 12, 1762, giving an account of the dethronement of Peter III., it is stated that "the discontent among the guards was heightened by the resolution his Imperial Majesty had taken of carrying a great part of that corps into Germany, in his expedition against Denmark, which was a measure disagreeable to the whole nation, who stomached greatly their being drawn into new

St. Petersburg) lent, in common with those of Vienna and Versailles, their aid to Catherine, and were initiated into the conspiracy ; and on the moment of its triumph she conveyed to the Danish minister the assurance that he need be under no apprehension as to the Duchies ; but she carefully avoided concluding any thing, and sent her husband's uncle, Prince George of Holstein, as Governor of Kiel. "Though she employed neither fleets nor armies, she kept that court floating between the hope of obtaining the entire session of Schleswig and the fear of seeing itself dispossessed of that important province ;"* and so domineered as imperiously at Copenhagen as at Warsaw, for it was enough for the Russian minister to whisper the word "Holstein," to solve every difficulty, and to cause every obstacle to bend to his will.

This course had also its inconveniences and its limits. The other powers were seriously indisposed, and at times resentful. The incorporation of either Duchy was impracticable without war, and objectless in itself, and more was to be made by cession than even successful hostilities. So in 1767 Catherine bargained for a conditional surrender of her son's rights, which was ratified by her son, afterwards the Emperor Paul, in 1773,—eleven years after her accession and pledge. Great were the rejoicings at Copenhagen : the event was celebrated by fes-

expenses and new dangers for recovering the Duchy of Sleswick, which they considered as a trifling object, and entirely indifferent to Russia."

* Castèra, vol. 2, p. 239.

tivities and commemorated by a medal : the victory was attributed to the talents of Bernsdorff, but the honour was shared with the gold he had lavished at St. Petersburg. It soon, however, appeared that a price had been paid in another coin, that of a *secret alliance* : in consequence of which Denmark afterwards found herself compromised with Sweden, England, and Prussia ; and out of this combination Catherine was enabled to concert the coalition of the North against England, known as “ the Armed Neutrality.”*

But after all, to what did this settlement amount ? It consists in two acts : the one a *renunciation*, the other a *cession*. The renunciation regards Schleswig ; the cession, Holstein. The first is in favour of the King of Denmark, *his heirs* and *successors* generally ; the second is to his *male* descendants.

But an equivalent was received ; namely, the counties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, which the King of Denmark ceded under the conditions as regards succession, on which he held them himself. He surrendered all he could surrender, the possession by himself and his male line, after which they reverted to the line at present represented by the Duke of Augustenburg. “ Gunther, the last “ Count of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, died in “ 1667. The Duke Joachim Ernest of Plöen was “ the oldest member of the Oldenburg dynasty, entitled to succeed him. But the King of Denmark

* Which she was pleased to designate to Lord Malmesbury as “ the Armed Nullity.”

“ and the Duke of Gottorp opposed the succession,
“ and took possession of the counties. A complaint
“ was made before the tribunal of the Empire by the
“ Duke of Gottorp, and by his sons after him, and favourable judgment was obtained. The King, without taking part in the process, commenced a negotiation with the Dukes of Plöen, and came to terms with them. He paid them a handsome sum and several domains in Holstein, and they in their turn ceded the two counties to him and to the male line of his House, but providing, if the male line of the Royal House should become extinct, that the succession to the two counties should return to them and their male descendants, and likewise to the agnates of their princely house.”*

Paul, therefore, limited, in like manner, the tenure of the equivalent he gave in Holstein ; and, as on the extinction of the male descendants of the Royal line, the ceded counties would revert from Russia to the agnates, so the ceded property of Holstein would revert to Russia.

As to Schleswig, the position was different. The father of Peter had, on account of his dispossession and the events of war, been constrained to drop the title of Schleswig, and to restrict it to that of “Gottorp-Holstein.” In the contest between Sweden and Denmark, England and France had interposed, and had bound themselves to *guarantee* to the King of Denmark the possession of Schleswig against “any foreign power whatsoever who should come and attack it.” The claim of Paul was here of so

* Gruner, p. 109.

uncertain a character, and the combination of foreign powers so formidable against his pretensions, that it was necessary to surrender them before any negotiation could take place. No equivalent could have been demanded, none was demanded, and the cession was made absolutely.

Now though this distinction is thus accounted for by the circumstances of the times and case, it is not the less true that it presented to the Russian Government great contingent advantages, by which, the course it has adopted shows, that it intends to profit.

On the death of Frederick VII. and his uncle, her claims indeed, on one point only, revive ; but to be able to raise one point suffices ; until that period arrives her absolute renunciation on the other is accepted as general and conclusive. She gets credit for disinterestedness and magnanimity, remains an indifferent spectator, and may be appealed to as an impartial arbiter. She has sedulously held back on every occasion, and has found means to prevent any appeal from being made to her (at least, so as to become public) by those Governments who, in dealing with the subject, were bound first to ascertain her views. She has suffered foreign powers to invade with arms, and interpose by mediation in territories, and in respect to rights, where she was immediately and primarily concerned ; conduct incompatible with the idea of the possession of rights.

On any new settlement she can interpose in every point, and alone of the powers of Europe has a right to interpose in any. By reviving her claims on

Holstein, she breaks up the integrity of the succession, and has it at her option to preserve it by a new renunciation. She can displace the Dukes of Oldenburg, or suffer them to continue to exist. She can again, in the event of a separation between the Kingdom and the Duchies, share with the Augustenburgs, or purchase them by a concession which costs her nothing. She has it in her option, if she is so minded, to reanimate popular claims, and to defer to the Diets. Over each body and each individual she possesses an entire control, being able to fill them with hopes and fears. A prudent reserve has secured this wide field for her activity, and this magnificent harvest for her ambition.

On the failure of the male line, Denmark was to go to Prince Frederick of Hesse, and the Duchies to the Duke of Augustenburg. This was the source of the perturbation of the Danish Court, and of the whole Monarchy. When then the Emperor of Russia took Prince Frederick so entirely under his protection as to give him, nay, to force on him, one of his daughters in marriage, the Court of Copenhagen was scarcely less rejoiced than in 1773; and although on the condition of accepting an undisguised Russian Protectorate, they exulted in an alliance which secured the integrity of the kingdom. Russia would now resign her own claims on Holstein (of which the Court of Copenhagen at least was fully aware) and exert her influence to shut out the Augustenburgs from the succession of the Duchies. The Archduchess died, and that combination was frustrated; but if

the Czar did lose a daughter, he did not lose Denmark.*

At this time a remarkable diplomatic incident occurred. A person of no less note than the Duke De Cases was sent by Louis Philippe to Copenhagen on an extraordinary mission, the object of which was kept a profound secret. That it was successful and eminently satisfactory to the Danish King there could be no doubt: the Grand Cross of the order of the Elephant, an order then restricted to twelve persons, having been conferred on the Duke, whilst an Envoy Extraordinary, Count Daneskiold, being sent to Paris in response to the French mission to Copenhagen. Immediately followed the letters patent of the 8th of July, 1846, which attempted by an act of authority, to impose one and the same succession on the Duchies and the Kingdom.

The contents of a letter from the King of Denmark, dated a few days before this ordinance, and which has come to the knowledge of the writer, conveys to Louis Philippe thanks for his wise counsels, given in the "interest of the integrity and conservation" of Denmark.† The fruit of

* "Poor Emperor! he has lost by one blow a daughter and a kingdom."—*General Skrznecki*.

† At that moment the Spanish marriages were in preparation, and Louis Philippe was accused of seeking to gain Russia, to secure himself against the effects of his rupture with England. The *Times* said he was ready, in return for some show of countenance from a Russian ambassador, "to sacrifice everything from Cracow to Constantinople;" and the *Morning Chronicle*, the official organ, pointed to the scaffold as the consequence of his betrayal of the interests of France and Europe.

these "wise counsels" the world has since beheld at Paris as well as Copenhagen.

Let us consider whether there were not legal and constitutional, or at least practicable means of adjustment. Let us see whether the divergency of succession was unavoidable, and beyond the control of existing authorities and living men.

As to Denmark, the *Lex Regia* is taken as an immutable decree, and the succession under it as irrevocable. This fact can scarcely be explained save on the supposition that no one has read the document.

The Danish Crown was originally elective. Christian I. was elected; his second son, Frederick I., from whom have sprung the Royal and Ducal branches, was elected; and the Diets claiming the authority to withdraw the power which they conceded, displaced his nephew, to make way for the second founder of the Family, Frederick III., who enacted the *Lex Regia*: he himself had been elected.

In his reign a remarkable revolution took place against the aristocratic power, and the people and clergy selecting the Crown as their representative, vested in it the most uncontrolled authority to which expression has ever been given in a public Act, declaring it "independent upon earth," and acknowledging "no higher power than God alone." To effect their purpose, it became requisite to alter the succession, as an Elective Monarchy was of necessity a manorial one: and the power of the Diets was triply barred by rendering the Crown absolute, here-

ditary, and extending the succession to females—such, at least, appears to be the reason of this change. Henceforward each Sovereign of Denmark in succession (having attained his or her 14th year) was in his own person possessed of the right of laying taxes upon the inhabitants, of absolute authority in the affairs of the Church, and empowered “to make, alter, and repeal all laws, and to dispense with them as he shall think proper.”

Under this commission Frederick III. established an order of succession in the *Lex Regia*, in accordance, no doubt, with the then disposition of the nation, for the reasons above assigned, but still without any intervention on the part of the nation, and solely by the plenitude of his own despotic power. This succession he declares absolute and final, enacting that the descent shall so continue “to a thousand generations.”

Looking merely to the terms of the Law, and transferring to it the Constitutional Character of the Authority under which it was issued, modern disputants have agreed to accept it as final. What has been already said will show that it possessed no such character. Frederick III. was not empowered to limit the authority of his successors as to “making, altering, repealing, or dispensing” with existing laws, of ancient or of modern date. The authority he used he did transmit, and each and all of his successors could dispense with the *Lex Regia* by the same power by which he had enacted it.

Were it not so, the Law itself has been virtually repealed by being broken in two points, and these

its principal provisions. It settles conjointly the succession of Denmark and Norway, expressly stating, in section 19, that both kingdoms "shall remain undivided in the possession of one absolute and hereditary King of *Denmark and Norway*." In section 26 it is enacted that the Kings of Denmark and Norway enjoy "uncircumscribed and unlimited power and authority in the strongest sense that any other Christian hereditary and despotic King can be said to enjoy the same, * * * * and for the further strengthening of the same, we WILL and COMMAND that whosoever presumes to speak or act any thing which may be prejudicial to our absolute power and authority, be proceeded against as a traitor to our Crown and dignity, and be severely punished, as usual in cases of High Treason."

Thus then the *Lex Regia* has been extinguished by the Congress of Vienna, and there no longer exists the Potentate from whom it emanated, viz. a King of *Denmark and Norway*. If it did remain in force Christian VIII. would have been, and Frederick VII. would be, together with the ministers of both, liable to the pains and penalties of high treason; having plotted to subvert "that absolute sovereignty," by the introduction of a constitutional form of government.

It is to be remarked that the hereditary and the absolute character and quality of the Monarchy were essentially combined, that the hereditary was auxiliary to the absolute, that the absolute was the aim and purpose of the state reasons of that time: whence it is to be inferred that the absolute charac-

ter cannot be attacked without destroying the hereditary, either in regard to the legal or the political view of the case. The object of the revolution of 1660, was the establishment of despotic power: the introduction of a constitution vitiates the proceeding, and nullifies all its consequences. The very grounds upon which the new measures rest, imply an authority in the king to dispense with the laws of 1660, or in the nation to supersede its then revolution. In either case the *Lex Regia* falls; and it remains—to revert to the anterior state, or to create a new one. In the one case the Crown of Denmark again becomes elective, in the other, you must deal with the succession of the crown as you have with the institutions of the country. These constructive alternatives are practically reduced to one and the same solution, and the succession is resubmitted for decision to the nation.

It is impossible to imagine, taking it upon the points of law, treating it on considerations of an historic kind, viewing it as a matter of national policy, or submitting it to the mere rule of common sense, a case more clear. It is not the arguments, it is the proofs that are cumulative: it is the marrow and the root of the whole matter in debate. There is not a single argument urged on the other side; the point has not been so much as raised;* the object was to keep it out of view. We have heard of unrighteous judges, of false testimony, and

* “There can be no question as to the succession of Denmark Proper.”—*Gruner*.

packed juries : but in this cause, judge, jury, testimony, advocates and parties have from beginning to end been suborned, brow-beaten, falsified, and packed. Prince Frederick of Hesse, has therefore no legal claim to Denmark, and it is the assumption of his indefeasible right which threatens the disruption of the Monarchy.

The founder of the Oldenburg line in the Duchies was the same Christian I. who we have seen was called to fill the throne of Denmark. The Estates of the Duchies, in electing him in 1640 as their Duke, expressly stated that he was selected not because he was already King of Denmark, but because he promised to maintain the indissoluble connection of Holstein and Schleswig. There was, moreover, an agreement between the parties to select the Duke in future amongst his male descendants. Up to the middle of the 17th century the right of election remained intact, when the order of succession according to primogeniture was introduced, and Frederic III. in 1650, with the sanction of the Diet, promulgated a law confining the succession to the male line in the order of primogeniture, stating explicitly that "this is to be an Everlasting Law of our Royal line of the Princely House of Schleswig-Holstein." This is the only law promulgated in the Duchies. In 1709, the House of Saxony, then reigning in Poland, advanced claims of succession not only in Denmark but in the Duchies, on the ground of descent from the female branch of the reigning House of Denmark. Frederic IV. protested against such claims on the Duchies, emphati-

cally declaring that “the female succession in Denmark has its roots in the *Lex Regia*, and does not extend to the Duchies.” It is clear that any change in the order of succession in the Duchies could only be effected by the constitutional sanction of the Diet, or by an act of violence on the part of the Crown, which, however, to have legal value, must have received the sanction of the same authority.

An act of violence the Danes assert did take place in 1721. As this is the whole of their case in regard to the Duchy of Schleswig, it is necessary to examine into that transaction. Frederic IV. (the monarch, be it observed, who in 1709 we found vindicating so conclusively the rights of the Duchies against all pretenders) feeling the inconvenience resulting from divided sovereignty in the Duchies, seized on the portion of Schleswig possessed by the Gottorp branch, and declared his intentions by letters patent (22nd August, 1721) to incorporate *that portion* of the Duchy with his own. He exacted an oath of homage from the Nobles, Prelates, and other Proprietors of the Ducal portion, in which they recognised his right to reunite to the Royal the Ducal portion, and to incorporate the same anew and for ever after with the Crown, having been in olden time severed from said Crown “*injuriâ temporum*,” and in which they swore fidelity to him, his heirs and successors, “*secundum tenorem legis Regiæ*.”

In this the Danish writers affect to see the resumption by the Crown of a fief a long time alienated,

viz. the whole of Schleswig, and the recognition of the act by the arrière-vassals. But the letters-patent point to the Gottorp portion only as having been "in time of Difficulty and misfortune unjustly severed from the Crown of Denmark," and the oath was not required from the holders of land in the Royal portion. The effect, therefore, if not the intention, was limited to the fractions of the Duchy, and did not effect it as an integer. It is, however, contended that thereby was introduced into the whole Duchy, and indeed into both Duchies, the order of succession established in Denmark, because the Proprietors had sworn allegiance to the heir and his successors according to the Royal Law. But the individual act of the Proprietors in a fractional portion of the Duchy could not dispose of the rights of the entire Duchy, or reduce it to the condition of a Danish province.

If the oath meant anything more than a recognition on the part of the arrière-vassals of a *sole* Duke, it became divested of all value whatever.

On the other hand, the King succeeding by virtue of the law of 1650, *he* could not change the order of succession therein laid down; such a change required the intervention of the Estates formally convened in Diet.

As to the words "*secundum tenorem legis Regiæ*," there might be ambiguity if there had been but one law to which they could apply, and that law a Danish one: but the ambiguity disappears when there are two: both are *royal* laws. It is not therefore the Danish royal law of 1665 that is meant

—but that of the Duchies—the law of 1650. If there was an intentional suppression, the fact would only prove the strength of the objection, and if the term *Danica* had been introduced and adopted, which it was not, it would nevertheless be destitute of legal value.

The Danish writers seek to fortify their case by an incidental reference to conquest. But if conquest be used as an argument it must supersede all others; —if not, then it cannot be advanced. Conquest in itself changes nothing: the war abrogates anterior laws and treaties: the compacts which succeed conquest, establish the new rights, if there are any. Such a pretence is therefore wholly inadmissible, and were it entirely valid it would apply only to the Ducal portion of the Duchy; and again, if valid and applicable to the whole Duchy, the Danish Government has put itself out of court on this plea, by treating for a renunciation with Russia.

As regards Holstein, a German fief,* the Danish partizans object to the nonfulfilment by the Agnatic line of certain forms of investiture—neglect of which cannot now be remedied in consequence of there being no head to the Germanic Empire. Suffice it to say that a question of form is a preliminary objection, and it has fallen from the moment the discussion has been opened on the merits of the case.

Further, the argument holds good at least against the members of the Oldenburg family, that the

* By the Convention of Odease in 1579 the principles of German feudal law were introduced into Schleswig: the same arguments of informality may therefore be urged in regard to that Duchy.

two Duchies are indissolubly connected, such being the original stipulation on which the Duchies consented to accept that family in the person of its founder : nothing but the express sanction of the Diet can reverse this agreement.

So long therefore as the *Lex Regia* is admitted to have force, the succession in Denmark depends on the will of the reigning king ; whilst as regards the Duchies he has no title whatever to interfere.

Now if Christian had determined to unite the monarchy in the person of Prince Frederick of Hesse, the course to pursue was to address himself to the Diets. He would thus have given to himself immense power over the deliberations of these bodies, and might have readily obtained of them the settlement he desired. He might have failed, but by the other course it was impossible to succeed—especially when the Prince of Hesse was presented under the sanction of a matrimonial alliance which evinced the purpose of over-riding the right and will of the Duchies by a foreign coalition. If he failed with the Duchies then he could fall back upon Denmark. If the Duchies would not accept Hesse, he could make Augustenburg acceptable to Denmark. He could do this alike by the virtue of his despotic power, not then abrogated, or through the Constitutional machinery, at that very time projected : and the hereditary Dukes of the Duchies would have become again kings of Denmark on the very grounds of the original Constitution of the Monarchy. What might have been then effected is not to be judged of by the feelings and

opinions which now prevail. Blood had not then been drawn—oppression had not been resisted—rebellion not punished—the King had yet power—the Government credit—the Duke of Augustenburg was not odious. These are the consequences of, not the reasons for, the course adopted.

One or other of these courses had of necessity to be taken to preserve the integrity of the monarchy. But the integrity of the monarchy was subordinated to the Prince of Hesse. No one has denied that the King of Denmark might have set aside the Danish succession in the *Lex Regia* and no one has denied or can deny that by adopting the Agnatic line he would have prevented the disruption of his estates. But no one inquires why a course so obvious and so easy has not been—is not adopted. Nor is it that the question is passed over in absolute silence. It is perceived and avoided, and if noticed, it is slurred over. In the most authoritative * document that has yet appeared, the question is placed and then disposed of by two contingent hypotheses; that the Prince of Hesse flattered the Dynastic propensities of the late King, and that the suppression of the ancient constitutional liberties of the Duchies

* “ It is clear that the late King of Denmark might have easily prevented the disruption of his Estates, by establishing, in virtue of his absolute power, the male succession in Denmark. But whether an overthrow of the male succession in the Duchies flattered certain dynastic propensities and national vanity, or offered the additional attraction of the prospect of getting rid of ancient inconvenient constitutional liberties, this very simple means has not been adopted.”—*Bunsen, Memoir to Lord Palmerston*, p. 25.

flattered the vanity of the Danish people. A manner so lax of dealing with a question so grave, in a document purporting to be a state paper, put forth in justification of an invasion, and in prospect of an European war arising out of the event, fills the mind with astonishment. Here is clearly a mystification.

It would be but natural for Christian or Frederick to seek to preserve the succession in his own family as against strangers, or in his own immediate line against remoter branches ; and if dynastic propensities swayed him, the Duke of Augustenburg must be a stranger or a remoter branch than the Prince of Hesse. Will it be believed that he is the nearer of the two ! Frederick of Hesse is nephew of Christian and first cousin of the present King : the Duke of Augustenburg was brother-in-law of the late King, is such to the present ; the Duke's son stands in the same relationship to both Kings as the Prince of Hesse. Further, the Duke of Augustenburg is the eldest son of Louisa, only sister of Frederick VI., whose family were again intermarried with the present reigning branch.

As to the Constitutional rights of the Duchies, the argument required that they should be prostrated by the adoption of the Prince of Hesse ; but those who put forward this hypothesis deny the very power. Is it not strange when both parties, nation and monarch, were bent on putting an end to absolutism in Denmark proper, that these constitutional liberties should not have been employed

for that end? As to Danish vanity, it was surely as easy to have enlisted it on the side of the integrity of the kingdom, as on that of the enforcement of the Danish tongue on the Schleswigers, at the risk of the disruption of the monarchy, with the certain loss of Holstein.

The only conclusion to be drawn is, that the case was intentionally embroiled; that every passion and every frailty of humanity, was called forth to obscure the judgment of the parties in a matter in which a Foreign Power had so great an interest at stake. It was, in fact, a contest between the Russian and Danish Cabinets, and no other result was to be anticipated, save that which we have seen, unless there had been parity of capacity in the conductors of the cause on both side. Denmark had no man equal to cope with the men that Russia had, and hence the inextricable confusion of the whole matter—a consequence which must appear under similar circumstances in every transaction, public or private.

So much for the Internal difficulties. We must now consider the claims of Foreign Powers—for the constitutional interposition of the Diets settled all hereditary claims resting on mere title of descent, as between all the branches springing from the ancient dynasty of Oldenburg, save in so far as those claims might be backed by force. The Russian line is alone in a position to thwart or oppose such a settlement. That she would be disposed to do so is unquestionable, as not only her special claims on parts of Holstein would be shut out, but

she would be shut out as heir-general. There may be, at present, no prospect of an extinction of the lines preceding the elder branch of Gottorp, but in no royal house have indigestions been so frequent and opportune as in that of Denmark,* and that prospect too remote to awaken the attention of Europe, may to her eyes present the attractions of a nearer fruition. The question then is, whether she could have thwarted or would have ventured to resist such a decision, for it would have had at once to be resisted. She could not have done so, as is shown by the care employed to lead the parties away from that easy accommodation. The King would have been able to direct against her the whole of that machinery, which he has allowed to be directed against himself; he would have been the preserver of the internal tranquillity of Schleswig; he would have been treated by the German confederation as the guardian of the rights of Holstein; he would have taken his stand on the fundamental compact of the indissoluble union to each other of the two Duchies; he would have been the protector of the integrity of the Monarchy, and that by implementing old contracts with the people, and rehabilitating their political rights, he would have had the guarantee of England and France in reality to appeal to, and if force had been employed against him, he would have been exposed to "attack" not to *insurrection*. In such pretensions put forward by Russia, Europe would indeed have seen cause

* Six known or suspected cases have occurred since that of the unhappy English Princess who sat on the Danish Throne.

of alarm, and the imprudence of such a step may be measured by the care she has taken to conceal the very fact of her possessing claims. But the supposition is ludicrous. Russia attacks no people that is united, and no Government that is able, and we are supposing the case—alas! vain supposition of a people, united by a plan of an able Government.

This is what the King might have done; what he did do, was precisely the reverse. He foreclosed the succession in Denmark, and attempted to force that of the Duchies. The letters patent, (July 8th, 1846) declare the common descent of the whole monarchy in the Cognatic line. Yet—"Respecting some parts of the Duchy, there are circumstances which oppose our asserting with equal certitude the title of all our lines to this Duchy." Thus was Christian well aware of the value of Russia's "cession," and if she was opposed, and of right (a right admitted by the reservation) this project for maintaining the integrity of the monarchy was a failure on its very face; nay, it frustrated itself. By the marriage with the Archduchess Russia having nailed Christian to the Prince of Hesse, drew off to play a separate part.

Against the letters patent the Duchies protested—Holstein appealed to the German Confederation. The King had to explain away the meaning of his letters patent, and to submit to a justificatory decree of the Confederation which bound him to the reversal of his act. On this the plan of Union came into operation, and he attempted to effect by an administrative amalgamation, that unity of suc-

cession which he had failed to bring about by an act of arbitrary power.

It is in the spirit of our times, not by ambition, but on principle, to concentrate power; customs, rights, are held to be only distinctions which separate men and impair the strengths of Governments. This is the blight on every political experiment; by it despotism reaps the victory, whenever the people wins the battle, and oppression is the result of every exercise of a nation's power. It does not therefore suggest of necessity any profound or malignant purpose to hear of a constitution proposed by the Danish or any other monarch for "the whole of his States;" yet a prince like Christian VIII. could not have fallen into such a scheme either through liberalism or inadvertence, which were neither to his nature, his antecedents, nor his circumstances. The disruption of the monarchy was before him; he was casting about for expedients to avert it; that monarchy was composed of two, if not equal at least balanced portions, and those portions were themselves but outlying fragments of two opposing systems, namely, the Scandinavian body on the one side, and the German on the other. The vulgar doctrines of centralization were here inapplicable, and he had before his eyes the experience of surrounding nations.

The last event which had disturbed the tranquillity and threatened the peace of Europe was an attempt to impose on a population of 300,000 souls, in the Pyrenees, the benefits of a liberal constitution; and although the Queen of Spain at the head of ninety-seven and a half per cent of the

Spanish people, against two and a half per cent, was backed by the active interference of England, France and Portugal, yet did she run a narrow risk of losing her crown, and after the expenditure of forty millions sterling, and the periodical devastation of Spain during six years, did these ancient liberties of that trifling population triumph in the convention of Bergara over the power and the wisdom of civilized and constitutional Europe.

Or going back to the last century, did not a similar cause bring on those disturbances of Europe which ended in the great revolution of France, and caused to England the loss of her magnificent transatlantic possessions? Was not this a result of her wishing to concentrate administrative power, and giving undue extension to representative authority?

A more recent and more apposite experience is presented by Russia herself, a fact which, though hidden from the eyes of Europe, could scarcely be unknown to Christian VIII. The Cossacks, little as it may be suspected abroad, are not a mere troop of irregular horse, but a constituted republic separated from Russia in a far more distinct manner than the Duchies are from Denmark: they admit no Russian to civil or military rank or post, and utterly repudiate the ecclesiastical pretensions and usurpations of the official Russian Church. An ukase was published assimilating their administration to that of the other provinces of the empire: their contingent had by precaution been already dispatched to distant frontiers; nevertheless the deputy Hetman instantly sent orders for the regiments of reserve to

rendezvous at the point of their territories nearest to Moscow. The Emperor did not accuse them of beginning the war, but with an army of 1,200,000 men at his disposal explained the ukase as a mistake.

It is possible to conceive that Russia should seek to get rid of a Constitution which interfered with her military system and religious unity—that the *doctrinaires* of Madrid should attempt to efface a contrast that put to shame their constitutional freedom when sustained only by a population insignificant in numbers—that England should have erred in estimating the strength and dispositions of a colonial population unarmed, unorganized, unrepresented, and only an outlying portion of her immense domains; but that Denmark should have out of her own head, devised an administrative union with the Duchies is too preposterous to believe. The Government of Copenhagen had neither project of conquests nor of religious concentration with which their rights or creed interfered; they were neither insignificant nor remote; there could be no mistake as to their disposition or their power to resist; they compose two-fifths of the population of the kingdom, and constitute one-half of its wealth; without them Denmark is nothing—less than nothing with them in arms against her. Denmark furnishes exclusively the maritime force of the kingdom, of little or no avail against the Duchies: and a contest would assuredly give to them powerful allies, and draw down on her the chances of a terrible retribution. Dismemberment was not then the limit of the consequences to be

apprehended from such a design, but was one so evident as not to escape the penetration even of a child.

Christian VIII. is gathered to his fathers, and Frederick VII. reigns in his stead. The dying King addresses a letter imploring him to walk in his footsteps ; the successor with Oriental deference kisses the signature, and with filial piety obeys the command. Within three days the benevolent intentions of the new monarch are announced by a proclamation.

The Constitution was not, however, absolutely enacted. The King called on the different portions of the kingdom to elect in common with himself, men of trust, and experience of advise respecting it. He declared at the same time that the "existing laws and institutions of the provincial states" should be respected, and also "the existing union of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein." The Duchies were not seduced by the offer of equality, the temptation of controlling the Exchequer, or of seeing the Parliament held in their territory alternately with Copenhagen. They did perceive in "the Constitution" the sacrifice of their independence, but they did not conceive that the case was desperate, and proposed to comply with the orders of the King to select advisers, though these were not empowered to concur in any centralized representation.

Up to the middle of February, 1848, nothing had been done that could not be recalled. The caution of the mode of procedure, the determined manner in which it was met, alike gave promise of the adoption

of a course which should prevent the catastrophe of civil war; and this solution was the more to be expected from the fact that, in the then reigning agitation of men's minds, the crown of Denmark, which had ever had a leaning towards those dependencies which, in the Chancery style of Denmark were "personal" to itself, had in the Duchies a sure support. The dews of faction however watered the seeds which an enemy had sown, and the popular party prepared the way for Russia's combinations at Copenhagen no less effectually than at Berne or Bucharest, Paris or Palermo. We must now glance at the internal events which reversed in a few days the relative position of the parties.

There were on the accession of Frederick VII. three parties: that of the Court, that of the Liberals, and that of the Duchies. The Court looked to the Duchies as a Bulwark against the popular invasion, and deprecated an amalgamation which would reduce them to a powerless minority. It sided therefore, with the Duchies, and both were united against the Radicals. The objects of the Liberals were the diminishing of the royal prerogative, the establishing of a representative constitution, and a centralized administration; with these views, the facsimile of those of Paris, they associated Danism, the counterpart of the Germanism of Frankfort. In both points the obstruction they met, and the danger they had to apprehend, proceeded from the Duchies. In them were planted the *hereditary* roots of the monarchy; they clung to old rights, despised new theories and rejected proffered liberties. There was

a country subject to the King, but not suited to the kingdom; there was an army of which the King could dispose, there a place of refuge whither in a possible contingency he might fly. The Duchies at once presented a popular triumph to achieve, a Danish territory to incorporate, and a German principle to subdue.

The provoking tenacity with which the two factions of this Vendée of the north clung to each other, rendered it impossible to hope to obtain both the latter objects, and their option was expressed in the frantic cry, "Denmark to the Eyder." The practical point was the rupture of their Federal Bond.

Holstein backed by the German people, and linked to the German Confederation, it was dangerous to attack, and hopeless to subdue; Schleswig could be attacked and subdued only by isolating it. The plan was therefore simply this, to incorporate Schleswig and cut Holstein adrift; hence the anomaly of a simultaneous proposition of "incorporation" and "separation." By this single blow they expected to get rid of German interference, to extend Danish nationality, to deprive the crown of a German fief, to take from it the support of the Conservative Duchies, and place it in a position in which it could no longer resist the elevation of parliamentary Privilege on the ruins of royal Prerogative and popular rights.

Now will be understood the object of the proposal of the King, in the nomination of "men of experience." He was himself to nominate sixteen, eight

for Denmark, and eight for the Duchies; Denmark was to choose eighteen, and the Duchies as many. The sixteen nominees and the eighteen men of the Duchies secured to him a majority against the radical views, including the separation of the Duchies and the dismemberment of the kingdom. This arrangement unquestionably held out to the Duchies the hopes of an adjustment, against which they would have closed the door by refusing to nominate delegates. The radical party were disappointed in their hopes, but encouraged by the concession, and immediately made use of it to arouse the spirit of the Capital. They had recourse to the process of clubs and petitions, and were soon able to assume the tone of menace and an attitude of intimidation.”*

Now came the news from Paris. Every where it is the same story : be it Beckarest—be it Palermo—be it Presburg—be it Vienna—be it Berlin—be it Copenhagen—be it Rendsberg, at each, events are, at the close of February, 1848, conducted to that point where the narrator has to say, “Now “came the news of Paris, and the explosion took “place:” “preordinations of good luck”† too remarkable to overlook, too elaborate to explain.

* It is to be observed that the Royal Power was attacked through the Duchies. The Court Ministry were held up to public odium as “*Danish Schleswig-Holstein.*” In the *Faedrelandet* (the movement paper) the Ministry of Count Moltke is denounced for having for its principal object “the preservation of Holstein,” and he is charged with being equally ready to sacrifice “*Danism* in the one Duchy, and *Germanism* in the other.”

† Lord Malmesbury.

The Moltke ministry fell. The men of the Clubs, the men whose watchword was "Denmark to the Eyder," who had threatened to write with the sword the laws of Denmark on the backs of the Duchies, came into power. In their hands was now to be the nomination of the sixteen members appointed by the Crown, and under their influence were to be elected the eighteen Danes. There were no longer three parties—the Court was absorbed into the Liberals, and nothing stood in the way of the plans of the Casino—a centralized administration, Schleswig a Danish province,* Holstein cast to Frankfort, or any other monster, with an appetite for the meal.

The news of the change of ministry produced the explosion in the Duchies. The following is a Danish view of the event :

"On January 28th, 1848, the King signed an ordinance, by which he conferred a *constitution* on his States, with a common Chamber for the kingdom, and the two Duchies to be assembled regularly at fixed periods in places to be deter-

* "His Majesty King Frederick VII. and his councillors, however adverse to acknowledging the rights of the Duchies (in regard to the succession) have nevertheless for a time opposed so violent and unjust a demand. For it was but a few weeks prior that his Majesty had pledged his word 'that at least the present union of the two Duchies should be respected.' * * * * By assembling the populace before the King's palace, by ominous votes of want of confidence, and by direct threats, did they force the King to dismiss his ministry," &c.—*Memoir of the Provisional Government of Schleswig Holstein.*

“mined afterwards and alternately in the Kingdom
“and the Duchies.

“The Constitution was to be submitted for examination to Deputies, of which the majority
“should be elected by the Provincial States, the
“same number for the Duchies as for the Kingdom,
“though the population of the former was not equal
“to that of the kingdom.

“The Separatist party in the Duchies did not
“conceal their dissatisfaction at this royal act of
“favour. On the 17th of February, 1848, an
“assembly was held at Kiel to consult on the steps
“to be taken, and it was decided to choose Deputies
“opposed to the Union.

“Whilst parties were in this position of mutual
“apprehension and embarrassment, intelligence arrived of the events at Paris, and the Schleswig-Holsteiners regarded the opportunity arrived for
“realizing those projects. A meeting of members
“of the States of the two Duchies took place at
“Rendsburg the 18th of March, 1848, when it
“was determined to send a deputation to Copenhagen to represent to the King the desires of his
“subjects in the Duchies, and the state of the
“country.

“The establishment of a separate constitution
“for Schleswig Holstein, based on universal
“suffrage, formation of a civic guard, complete
“freedom of the Press and of meeting, immediate
“union of Schleswig to the Confederation,
“immediate dismissal of President Scheel: such

“were in substance the demands addressed to the
“King.

“Messrs. Beseler, Reventlow, Preetz, and Bargum, were authorised again to convene the Assembly in case of emergency. The Deputation
“left Kiel the 21st.

“The news of the Assembly at Rendsburg
“reached Copenhagen early in the morning on the
“20th, together with the intimation that the
“Deputation would arrive two days after. The
“sensation it caused was very great. That evening
“(20th March) there was a great meeting at the
“Casino (club), when it was determined to solicit
“the King to change his Ministry and elect another
“who had sufficient determination and energy to
“defend the rights of the Crown in regard to Schleswig, whilst yielding to Germany what should be
“demanded in regard to Holstein. The following
“morning a deputation presented an address to the
“King, who replied that the Ministry was dissolved,
“and another should be formed, which did not
“take place until three days afterwards (24th). It
“is superfluous to repeat that the King could not
“give an answer to the Deputation of Kiel before
“the formation of the new Ministry. They therefore
“could not leave Copenhagen before the
“evening of the 24th. But before their departure
“the revolt had already broken out in Holstein.
“The night of the twenty-third or twenty-fourth,
“without waiting for the reply of the King, it
“was decided at Kiel to appoint a Provisional

“ Government. The Prince of Augustenburg
“ immediately repaired to Rendsburg on the
“ morning of the twenty-fourth, where he seduced
“ the garrison to embrace the side of the revolt,
“ on the pretext that the King was a prisoner at
“ Copenhagen.”

WAR BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE DUCHIES.

Now at last we have the quarrel made and each party accusing the other of having commenced it. But what is the quarrel about? Not certainly the succession of the Crown, yet this was the cause of the difference. They make a war, and it is on other grounds, a war of nationality. This war of animosity is to prevent by mutual hatred the Duchies from accepting the Cognate, the Danes the Agnate branch and so render impossible a settlement of the succession so as to preserve the integrity of the kingdom: in mutual recriminations and wrongs they have not only lost sight of their object, but have ceased to desire it. On the spur of passion, in the heat of apprehension, they are precipitated into bloodshed without so much as statement or explanation.

Rendsburg being occupied by the insurgents, the Danes, in the beginning of April, 1848, enter the Duchies with 10,000 men, and attack Flensburg. The insurgent force, amounting to half that number, who are driven from their positions, fly in the greatest disorder towards the Eyder,—when a foreign army presents itself, which, travelling by railroad, had reached and crossed Holstein, and was now advancing through Schleswig to their support!

The case was an insurrection : it was a domestic affair. There was a civil war, indeed, but no foreign power had been attacked, or had declared war against Denmark ; they all appeared to ignore the existence of the feud. If this army was a private levy, such as that of the sympathisers in Canada, the Texas or Cuba, they were pirates, and not less so if they consisted of the troops of a Government. There are precedents for the illegal interference of a Government to support another Government against insurrection, but hitherto there had been no instance of a Government overstepping the law of nations and constituting itself a party to an insurrection without conforming to the ordinary rules and declaring war. This new course was reserved for the nineteenth century to witness, for Prussia to perpetrate, and Europe to endure.

But whatever the unscrupulousness of that Cabinet, whatever the baseness of the rest of Europe, how comes Prussia to put herself forward in this matter ! The act invites inquiry into her position, and imposes the necessity of fathoming her motives.

Whatever the amount of power acquired by Prussia in the course of the last century, she had been reduced at the close of the last war to the condition of a third rate state. She was at that time reconstructed afresh, not by her own means or dexterity, but through the policy of another Government, the same which in the same Congress obtained the final cession of Poland. It was at the time pointed out by the ablest diplomatist present (Talleyrand) that Russia's object was to have in Prussia a dependant

through which she could act on Germany. This reconstruction of Prussia took place at the expense of all her neighbours, Russia excepted—namely, of Saxony, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark; so that no alliance could take place between these Governments and the Cabinet of Berlin, whilst that Cabinet had to seek against them the support of that of St. Petersburg. The dismemberment of the two Scandinavian kingdoms took place in a manner which bears directly on the question at issue. In 1814 Norway was taken from Denmark, the pretended compensation of Swedish Pomerania being given in exchange; in 1815 Swedish Pomerania was taken from Denmark, and given to Prussia, who was made to surrender, as a pretended compensation, Lauenburg to Denmark. She thus stood to Denmark as a partitionary power, and in the troubles of that country she might see a prospect of reincorporating Lauenburg.

The troubles of Denmark further aided her views on Germany. In the well known dispatch of Pozzo de Borgo, reviewing in 1829 the interests and positions of the Powers of Europe in reference to Russia's designs on Turkey, he passes over Prussia as a Government which could give to Russia no umbrage; he speaks of it as one whose *part* was adjusted (*la Prusse a son rôle tout fait*): she had, he says, "*the objects of her ambition under her hand*:" he defines that *rôle* as one of encroachment (*empietemens*). To know all this required no revelation, but here we have it in the most unquestionable shape.

It was in Germany that these encroachments were to take effect—she was to balance, then subvert Austria. The present King did not yield to his predecessor in those qualities and in that ambition (if the word may be so employed) which had been signalised in his predecessor. To him was made to apply the old monkish prophecy,

Pastor expectat gregem,
Germania, regem.

And it failed not to be remaked that his accession had occurred in the corresponding year of this century to that of Frederick the Great in the last, and of the great Elector in the one which had preceded it.

The explosion of 1848 came, Prussia was one of the first victims: she was not only swept internally by the revolutionary fury, but nearly driven by it against her northern Protector. The King succeeded in turning on the Poles the popular frenzy excited against Russia: then a diversion was furnished in the Duchies, and on Danism and Scandinavianism was to be expended the young fervor so troublesome at Frankfort, so alarming at Berlin. But it was not that a door was to be opened to military enterprise. Revolution was to be shamed by discomfiture, and to be put down by disgrace, as well as by exhaustion. The evident policy of the King of Prussia, as regarded reaction, the German monarchy, Lauenburg, and Holstein, tallied with the services required from him by Russia in furtherance of her views on Denmark.

But this unparalleled outrage could not be dared

without some pretence of justification. A manifesto was not even deemed a proper channel for such a pleading. A wholly new process was adopted, one indecorous in its form as it was pitiable in its contents—a pamphlet, printed in English, and published in London, purporting to be “A Memoir” addressed to the British Foreign Minister, and having appended to it the signature of the representative of Prussia. Mr. Bunsen has at least proved that in this age devotion is not extinct, and that men are to be found ready, like the Persian of old, to undergo any mutilation of fame or face, when there are despots to serve and Babylonians to circumvent.*

This memoir begins with fifty-six pages of special pleading on incorrect data—of self-contradiction and “cheap” exposure of the follies of the opposite party; then follows a *Postscript* to which is consigned the object of the publication, the announcement of the fact of the piratical invasion, which had just taken place. The pretexts which are adduced are beneath criticism, but I pause here to offer some remarks suggested by the Memoir itself.

Mr. Bunsen labours to prove that the Duchies are inseparably united. This position, true in itself as regards the obligations of the King of Denmark to the Duchies, he uses to establish a right of German interference as regards Schleswig, and

* Mr. Bunsen was all the while representing himself as the warm friend and devoted advocate of the Duchies, who were made to believe that this memoir was, on his part, an act of devotion by which he compromised his official existence.—*Note to Second Edition.*

thereupon constitutes the entrance of Danish troops into that undisputed fief of the Danish Crown, an attack on Germany in general and Prussia in particular. If the argument cuts one way it also cuts another, and the "indissoluble connexion" bars all interference of Germany in the affairs of Holland; but whatever the value of the argument, was ever such a justification heard of, for an invasion!

But so soon as this corner is turned the indissoluble union is cast away, and the pretended negotiation closes with the positive proposal to cut Schleswig in two, and on the rejection of this condescending offer the troops march, and the responsibility of the "attack" is thrown on the King of Denmark.

That monarch is then told that he has been befooled from the beginning—that nothing was easier than to prevent all this trouble by the mere adoption of the Agnatic line of Denmark. Most true—and Prussia knows all this! Why then was it not urged in 1846?—why is it urged in April 1848?—Why is it then published as a railing accusation, and cast as an additional impediment in the way of a settlement?

In respect to the claims of Russia, Mr. Bunsen contradicts himself, asserting (p. 3) that the question had no European interest by the fact of Russia's renunciation, and (p. 19) denying the validity of that renunciation on the grounds that the Gottorp line had no claims to renounce. Was it not the part of the Prussian Government to ascertain the views

of the Russian Government respecting its own claims before making forward assertions, whether vague or precise, and declarations whether coherent or contradictory? Had not this enquiry to be made before entering the territory with an armed force? Can any one believe that the Invasion or the Declaration was so made, or doubt that the Minister of a Power so dependant, and an individual so astute,* should thus venture to sneer alike at Russia's claims and acts—unless by authority? Such language on the part of Prussia and such conduct, could never have been endured, had it not been commanded.

Throughout the Memoir there is no further allusion to Russia; but in the introduction to which the name of another person is appended, Russia is pointed out as the ally—"the only Ally" of this "ill-advised monarch," "an Ally who never yet refused the appeal of a King whose despotic tendencies had roused his subjects against him:" the Danes and the Duchies are alike warned against an artful Government who makes use of their mutual

* Mr. Bunsen on philosophical grounds, namely, the civilizing and the "Japhetising" of the Orientals, professes his anxious desire to see the power of Russia established on the Bosphorus. On Germanic grounds, he devotes himself in the cause of preventing her ascendancy on the Sound. He is, no doubt, not destitute of valid reasons by which to reconcile the apparent discrepancy, if discrepancy there be. To his diplomatic management Russia is chiefly indebted for the last result: she is possessed of no agent more indefatigable or tortuous; none have worked for her with more consciousness or premeditation; he is to be found at every corner with a different story, and able to effect for her what her avowed agents could not accomplish.

misunderstandings to get possession of the Sound. Who after this can doubt the sincerity of Prussia, or her watchfulness over the interest of Germany and of Europe?

The Preface warns both Duchies and Denmark against Russia: the Memoir warns the Duchies against France. It is to Germany, or more properly to Prussia that the Duchies owe their fearful agitations and their present sufferings, and the miseries and extinction that awaits them.

In 1806 there was an attempt on the part of Denmark to unite them to the kingdom; it was resisted, not by Germany, but by the Duchies themselves, and specially by the protest of the Duke of Augustenburg.* The revival of the attempt was occasioned by the connection of Holstein with the Federation; for according to the Treaties of 1815, the members were to have States-General and Constitutions: so while the Duchies were deluded into the hope of the revival thereby of their ancient constitution, to Denmark was offered the temptation of separating the Duchies by a constitution to be granted to Holstein. The Germans are filled with zeal for this Holstein constitution: where is their anxiety for that of Prussia and of the other members? The futile agitation in Germany produced the counter

* The family of Vasa then reigned in Sweden, and the Swedish Government protested also against the act. The Danish Government apprehending similar opposition from Russia, instructed its representative there to declare that this union did not effect the ultimate succession; in fact, Germany took no part on this important crisis.

Danish agitation at Copenhagen which broke the measures of the Court, forced the radical party into power, brought the war, prolonged it, closed it with an *Austrian* occupation, to be followed by a *Danish* despotism, and concluded by a *Russian* protectorate and possession.

Mr. Bunsen answers three arguments of Denmark for the superseding of the rights of the Duke of Augustenburg, viz., the letters-patent of 1721, the act of homage of the same date, and the Gottorp renunciation; but the letters-patent of Christian VIII. put forward a fourth argument, namely, the guarantees of England and France of the 14th of June and 23rd of July, 1720. Towards the close of the Memoir he deals with this subject in a special manner, and the Memoir concludes with asserting that "the guarantee must be supposed to have ceased when it lost its object," and that it so lost its object by the renunciation of the House of Gottorp. This application is wholly upset by the terms of the Treaty of 1727, wherein France and England declare their obligation to "execute the guarantee they had given against any invasion or hostility on the part of the Czarine or of *any power whatsoever* which should *come and attack the Duchy of Schleswig*." Now, admitting the guarantee to be of no value, as of course it is not, against the House of Augustenburg, it is of value against, and exactly provides for, the act of *Prussia*: therefore is the point separated from the other arguments and then perverted, and (the announcement of Prussia's act

being thrown into a postscript) it is disposed of before the event is known.*

Prussia's consciousness of the weakness of her case, or rather of the impossibility of making out any, is shown in the straits to which a man of Mr. Bunsen's ability is reduced ; and yet this is a pleading of a great government on which, it says, that it awaits the " verdict " of the " people of England."

Prussia having apparently got this verdict, and being constituted belligerent and neutral—party and mediator† at once—let us resume the military march of this history.

The Danes advanced upon the town of Schleswig, occupied it, and took up a position to the south. On the 23rd April, the Prussians amounting to 14,000 men accompanied by the troops of the Duchies, reinforced to 8000 say 22,000 in all, advanced and drove them back. On the north of Schleswig, a defile and a dyke bars the passage, and the Danish army must have been annihilated, had not the Prussian General discovered that his troops wanted nourishment: the recall was sounded. The commander of the Holsteiners, the Prince of Schleswig Holstein, remonstrated

* The King of Prussia addressed an autograph letter to the Duke of Augustenburg in March 1848, to give him the assurance of *his right* being supported.

† The Prussian troops enter to support the " basis of mediation " in consequence of the German Federation having, *through Prussia*, offered " its own mediation," and because " to have waited one moment longer would have been to stultify Germany." —*Memoir*, p. 58.

with the Prussian General Wrangel, who answered, "It is my affair not yours, the responsibility rests with me, nothing," he added, "is lost—the Danish army is beaten, and with the reinforcement of the troops of the Confederation, it will be annihilated in a week; it is but fair to reserve some of the laurels for them."

The troops of Hanover, Mecklenburgh, Oldenburg, and Brunswick arrived in great numbers, and the following morning the pursuit was to commence. The infantry on foot and the cavalry, mounted from 4 o'clock in the morning, were however kept to observe the Danes as they quietly defiled, when allowed five hours start they were pursued, but the Prussians being pushed out right and left were not so fortunate as to overtake them. The Confederates under the Duke of Brunswick, and General Halkett were more lucky, but so soon as the firing attracted the attention of the Prussian Commander-in-Chief, the recall was sounded. When it was pointed out to General Wrangel, that the Danes, unless intercepted, would seek refuge under the guns of their ships, he replied, "God knows where they will go." The Danes had abandoned their artillery and baggage at Flensburg, but afterwards they returned, harnessed their horses, and without molestation carried them off to the Isle of Alsen. On the return of the Duke of Brunswick, a stormy but fruitless altercation ensued, and the Duke sick of Prussian strategy, quitted the camp and returned home.

The whole of the Danish forces had been em-

ployed, and had been beaten and repulsed, they were unable to undertake anything, but yet they were concentrated at Alsen, where they were in communication with their ships, and while defended by the narrow strait from attack, were ready on any favourable turn, again to cross into Schleswig. The Duchies were freed from the enemy and occupied by a victorious army of 53,000 men; the war had therefore to be carried into Denmark proper. General Wrangel entered Jutland with the main force, leaving 20,000 of the confederates to watch the Danes at Alsen, who at the utmost amounted to 15,000. Nevertheless, General Halkett allowed the Danes to cross the strait, to establish a *tête du pont*, to construct a bridge, to seize on the heights which commanded it, on them to build redoubts, and plant heavy artillery! When these operations had been completed, he commenced operations, besieging the newly constructed works, he placed his troops in a half circle round Duppel; this point being in direct communication with the *tête du pont* and the island, could in a single night be occupied by the whole Danish force, which would then find itself in the centre of the Germans, and be able by a sortie to beat and destroy them in detail. This was foreseen by the whole army of the besiegers, except the General, and it was executed with equal facility and success by the besieged.

On the 28th of May at the dawn of day, the Danes fell upon the Germans with their entire force. Halkett sent aides-du-camp to order up one divi-

sion after another—each in succession arrived too late.

But where was General Wrangel? Master of Jutland* at the least, for the whole Danish force was at Duppel. Not at all: he had evacuated Jutland; *his* movement was accounted for by a “*secret order*” from Berlin.

But surely he must have been still in Jutland when this disaster befell General Halkett. By no means: he had entered Schleswig four days before, on the 24th of May, and was marching on Duppel; the distance was twenty leagues, but happened to arrive too late.

A numerous army, finding itself beaten and baffled at every turn by an enemy which it had defeated, could not be kept silent even by Prussian discipline, and it became necessary to undertake something; it appeared, however, that the choice of defeat was the only option allowed to the Prussian General. An attack was now made on the Danish redoubts, and the Prussian guard met with no better success than the Hanoverians and

* “Prince Frederick of Schleswig-Holstein, the then Commander of the troops of the Duchies, *protested* and *remonstrated* against passing the frontier of Jutland on the 1st of May, 1848. This measure was not only suggested, but ‘imperatively ordered by General Wrangel.’ Prince Frederick represented that the Duchies carried on a wholly ‘*defensive*’ war, and not an ‘*offensive*’ one. He then wanted his corps to be left as a reserve to the Confederate Army on the northern frontier of Schleswig. This too was overruled; and this forced step furnished one more argument to prove the rebellious intentions of the Duchies!”—*Note by a Schleswig-Holsteiner.*

Mecklenburghers,—and so ended the first campaign.

Prussia had taken part in the war as the ally of the Duchies: now, without their knowledge, she made an arrangement with the enemy with respect to the movements of the troops of both parties. This arrangement did not affect a single isolated point; as, for instance, the evacuation of Jutland, but every operation of the war.

But the Duchies disappear; the parties are now the Confederation and Denmark, and an arrangement between Denmark and Prussia is entered into to divide the two Duchies, the inseparable union of which was the pretext of Prussia's interference! At least, then, after this compact, it only remains to arrange the conditions of peace.

But it was not for this that M. de Cazes had been despatched to Copenhagen; the memoir of M. Bunsen penned—the recall sounded at Flensburgh, and the Prussian guards sacrificed at Duppel. England now appeared on the stage as mediatrix.

The terms “mediation,” “conference,” “protocol,” conjure up hideous and mysterious phantoms. Nothing can happen in Europe, Asia, in the New World, or on the coasts of Africa without a London protocol — could the Duchies escape? Let us examine this matter according to the true interests of England, and the dull generous character of her people, forgetting for the moment the slippery and inexplicable activity of her diplomacy.

The dismemberment of Denmark threatened to compromise the peace of Europe, and might furnish

an opportunity for encroachments to Russia, or France, or Prussia : England could see therein only a misfortune. But in addition there was for her a consideration of the highest order. The independence of a small maritime state was at stake—a State which held the passage of the Sound, so that, besides three dangerous chances, there was one certain danger. It was not that France or Prussia might extend their territory or influence, but that Russia might close the Baltic, and issue on the ocean. England had also simple and positive duties to fulfil ; she was bound to maintain the integrity of the Danish territory against all aggression : there was no impediment to the fulfilment of that guarantee—no such impediment has ever been alleged ; as to Prussia and the German Confederation, a single word sufficed to arrest them. France was under the same obligations as England. But there was no need of considering the dispositions of the Powers, the word that would have sufficed to arrest the invasion would have sufficed to prevent the dispute. The occasion was an interference with the constitution of the Duchies by the King of Denmark : England, therefore, had to say to him, “ I am bound to defend you against aggression, but I have the right to demand that you “ shall not provoke attack.”

England did the very reverse. She sanctioned the aggression of the King of Denmark against the Duchies, and the aggression of the King of Prussia against Denmark ; she acknowledged the obligation of the Treaty, to encourage Denmark, and abstained

from executing it, to encourage Prussia. In a word, she fixed the quarrel by supporting both parties, and then withdrew from them every means of adjustment, by constituting herself mediatrix. Perfect harmony reigned between the action of England and Prussia. The latter lent to the Duchies, armies, while she secured to Denmark victories. The former lent to Denmark the encouragement of words, to the Duchies and their allies, that of impunity; and as in the warlike operations of the one, nothing can be granted to the inexperience of the General—so in the diplomatic combinations of the other, nothing can be explained by the incapacity of the Minister.

England's conduct is as explicable as that of France or that of Prussia, but by the rule once suggested by M. Thiers, "You have mistaken your parts, you have mistaken the interests of Russia for your own."

The effect of the mediation was simply to allow six months to the parties to recruit their strength. The second campaign opened by the entrance of 20,000 Danes into Schleswig. The Duchies mustered a nearly equal force, consisting however in a considerable degree of German volunteers and Prussians; they were commanded by a Prussian general, Bonin, who had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to supersede the General of the Duchies.*

* Whilst Prince Frederick, General-in-Chief of the army of the Duchies, was in Schleswig trying to reorganise his troops, a deputy at the Diet at Kiel observed that "Fortune favoured the Duchies by giving them the opportunity of obtaining a distin-

There soon arrived 50,000 troops of the Confederation, of which nearly the half were Prussians; in fact, the Duchies furnished to the King of Prussia a Siberia and a Circassia, where the turbulent found occupation and the seditious repose.

The Danes were speedily driven back, and following them the Schleswig-Holsteiners entered Jutland, and were soon joined by the Prussians, under General Pritwitz, who had succeeded General Wrangel. He divided this powerful army into two bodies; the one composed of Prussians and Hessians was sent in pursuit of a body of Danes, a third of their number. The Schleswig Holsteiners, to the amount of 14,000, were dispatched to blockade Fredericia, which was *open to the sea*, of which the Danes had the command! The heights of Goulsk, three leagues from the fortress, were crowned with redoubts; these were taken by assault, and the victors pursuing the fugitives might have entered the fortress with them, when the Prussian's recall sounded. A blockade being perceived to be of no possible use, it was resolved to besiege the place in form; the army sat down before it, and the works were commenced. If the Danes had chosen a point by attacking which their adversaries would uselessly waste their strength, and give them an

“guished Prussian officer as their general, whose appointment “would avert such disasters as those which had occurred.” The Prince on this sent in his resignation, and two days after General Bonin arrived, empowered by an order of the Prussian Cabinet, to accept the command of the army of the Duchies against Denmark, with whom Prussia had just concluded an armistice!

opportunity of striking, without risk, a fatal blow, it would have been Fredericia to which, lying on the sea, the whole Danish army could be brought, or from which, the garrison might at pleasure be removed. The Danes at Alsen were watched by the brave troops of the Confederation ; those in Jutland were pursued by the Prussians. Both corps give their several antagonists the slip, and enter the place, while the Confederates and the Prussians remain at their posts in observation ! General Bonin was familiar with the place, having been stationed there for four weeks during the preceding year. The reinforcements were daily seen entering the fortress, till the place was crammed full of men, and the besieged far out-numbered the besiegers ; yet the siege was continued, and the men kept in the entrenchments ; the bombardment was discontinued “ not to exasperate the enemy,” but the enemy never ceased his fire. The army could not restrain its discontent and its alarm. The General justified himself by saying that his measures were concerted with General Pritwitz, who would be on the spot when necessary. One morning the Danes came, but Pritwitz did not. That day the sun rose over the wrecks of the camp and of the Confederation army, whilst the besieged carried into the fortress the fifty guns which had fallen into their hands. It is to be observed that Fredericia is in Jutland : the Prussians can attack Jutland, but the Danes dare not enter Holstein ! This achievement constitutes the campaign of 1849.

But the sea, treacherous by nature, had its part

here to play. The Germans were enthusiastic about ships, and resolved to have a navy, not because they had a coast and colonies, but precisely because they had none. The first event in their maritime annals occurred on the 4th of June, 1849, when three steam vessels built in England, with gunners taught on board the "Excellent," and carrying 68-pounders, issued from the Weser to amuse themselves with firing at a mark on the tranquil ocean. When about to begin this exercise, they perceived the smoke of a steamer coming out of the Elbe, and they soon made her out to be a Dane, and gave chase. The steamer distanced them; but they fell unexpectedly on a Danish corvette, under Heligoland, where she was enjoying the sunshine, and drying her sails. The little steam squadron dignified itself with a broad pendant; the "commodore" was Mr. Brommy,* who, after some shots were exchanged, steered away. The astonishment of the inhabitants of Heligoland at such desperation on the part of the "pirates"† may be easily imagined. The Governor, himself a sailor, had just exclaimed, "Poor corvette, five minutes more and

* Mr. Brommy began by being a cabin-boy on board a Hamburg vessel, and after several changes of fortune found himself lieutenant of a corvette taken from the Turks by Lord Cochrane during the Greek war, and afterwards commander of a steamer; but he arrived in Greece only after the close of the struggle.

† Lord Palmerston wrote to the Senate of Bremen to demand the reason why three pirate steamers under an imaginary flag had issued from the Weser to attack a Danish ship in the neutral waters of Heligoland. Obviously the Minister could not be deceived in the matter.

she must strike !" The "Commodore" obtained the decoration of Commander of the Order of Merit from Oldenburg, of the Guelph from Hanover, and some others. This is the beginning, progress, and termination of the history of a German fleet, unless the following fact is to be added as an appendix : Brommy was created Admiral, and thereupon the German empire expired.

The armistice of 1849 effected the original scheme of Prussia, the cutting of Schleswig into two parts. The Eyder was an inviolable line—that belonged to the Confederation ; the parties were to retire, the one south of the Eyder, the other north of Schleswig : then a line is drawn from Tondern to Flensburg ; and neutrals are to be stationed on either side ; Swedes and Norwegians on the north ; Prussians and Oldenburghers on the south. These neutrals ! Why, they had just been engaged ; but Holstein, too, is neutral in its territory, while belligerent in its troops ; Schleswig is to be evacuated by her own troops ; they are to occupy a neutral territory,—Holstein ! By these monstrosities the contest is prolonged, Germany occupied, and the banners of Scandinavism and Germanism arrayed against each other on the Baltic, whilst the Muscovites are pouring down the Carpathians, and the Czar is allowed quietly to appropriate by propping up, the crown of the Cæsars which he had first cast into the mire.*

But in all this what part does Denmark play—does she not expose and denounce to Europe this

* "Pas une couronne ne tombe dans la boue ; qu'un de mes cousins de Cobourg ne la ramasse."—NICOLAS.

scandalous violation of all forms and all laws hitherto observed by nations and respected by men? Denmark was quite safe; she had been first put in the wrong; she knew, besides, nothing of public law;* and she had two confidential advisers—Russia and France.†

But the *armistice* having thus regulated affairs of war and peace, in its Proteus progress becomes a government. It institutes a triumvirate to govern the Duchies; one of these to be appointed by Denmark; of course, then, one will be appointed by the Duchies; by no means, *Prussia* appoints the second. The third, who is to be the arbiter between the two and sole governor—how is he to be named? The Queen of England is to appoint him; still, however, on the condition—a condition which does honour to the forethought of the Conference, that he shall be acceptable to *both* parties. The person selected was one against whom both parties formally protested, and it was precisely by means of this double protest that the appointment was made.

Colonel Hodges had first distinguished himself—if the expression may be so applied—amongst the

* A Danish class-book defines “Declaration of war”—“a formality formerly considered necessary, but now *generally omitted*.”

† It was only too much to be feared that the plan now proposed was nothing but the execution of the project which the late French Government had recommended, and as it appears with a decided promise of French support against any claims of the Germanic Diet and the German nation.”—*Bunsen*, p. 31.

mercenaries sent to Spain to put down the Basques; he was consequently selected for an important and delicate post which had just been created—that of British Consul in Servia (1837). At this time the “entente cordiale” reigned between England and France, there had been then no Syrian war, no Pritchard affair, and no Spanish marriages. Servia was of all points in Europe that where the opposition most displayed itself of Russian schemes and English interests, and with a view to this very antagonism the post had been created. Yet on Colonel Hodges applying for instructions, and endeavouring to elicit some directions as to his course by putting cases inferring that he would be thwarted by Russia and supported by France, he was answered in these words:—“You deceive yourself if “you expect to receive a real support from France, “and you will see that it is not Russia that England will have occasion to distrust.” It is needless to say how Colonel Hodges acted under the impression of these prophetic words, what troubles he raised in Servia, what embarrassments he occasioned to Sir Stratford Canning, not equally confided in by their common chief; so well did he do his patron’s work that when the country rose to cast out the creature of Russia, their then Prince, it was chiefly against the agent of England that this fury was directed, and he had to fly. “When he arrived “he found his consular duties slight; but events “were stirring of the greatest importance, and he “threw himself into the heat of every political intrigue, so that in the course of eighteen months

“he had produced such a complication of
“circumstances as would take two ambassadors
“extraordinary to resolve. The Noble Viscount
“did not recall him, and for this reason Colonel
“Hodges was driven out, the Prince he had sup-
“ported lost his throne, the house of Colonel
“Hodges was burnt, and he fled to Vienna.”* His
zeal, however, was soon rewarded by a better post,
the Consulate-General of Egypt, and when in
course of time a cooler one became again requisite,
he was removed to Hamburgh.

This was the man whom the Queen of England
was advised to propose as third member for the
Duchy of Schleswig. His nomination produced
such exasperation that Prussia was compelled to
protest and thereby, according to the terms of the
Armistice, to exclude him from the Commission.

But in London they were prepared for this occur-
rence: the Danish Minister protested likewise.
Lord Palmerston, provided with these documents,
presented himself to his colleagues. “Here is,”
said he, “in this hand the protest of the Duchies
“against my nomination; in that, that of Denmark.”
His colleagues bowed again as they had often done
before, and the conditions of the Convention were
held to be fulfilled in the impartiality of the
Minister.

At length the armistice reached its term, and the
campaign recommenced its course. Prussia had
made peace with Denmark, and the enthusiasm of

* Mr. D'Israeli, March 8th, 1842.

the troops of the German Confederation was cooled. The Swedes and the Norwegians who had been transformed into neutrals were embarked and sent home, and for the first time the business is left to the two parties.

Denmark with great efforts had been able to assemble 40,000 men with ninety-six guns: her maritime strength need not be reckoned, being of little or no avail. With this force she could not expect to conquer the Duchies, and she had the certainty before her eyes that their defeat and her triumph would reawaken enthusiasm and exasperation in Germany, and excite another tide of invasion. How was it, then, that no thought arose of an accommodation? On their side the Duchies could expect nothing from the continuation of the war, and still less from the interposition of their foreign allies. It is difficult to conceive how both were kept from remarking that the aggregate effect of this endless intermeddling was simply mutual exhaustion, being left always to fight, but never allowed to fight it out, in a difference which had originally sprung out of a common desire to avoid a separation. New incentives and stimulants had, however, been found requisite at Copenhagen. France sent a distinguished general, the celebrated Philhellénist Fabvier, to discourse of campaigns and suggest plans of operations, and Russia herself had come forward at length to smile on the undertaking. She allowed hopes of a subsidy to be entertained, sent a squadron to hover on the coasts, and, together with the use of steamers for the transport of troops,

lent to the enterprise that great modern invention —“moral support.”

The renewal of hostilities took place, indeed, by the act of the Duchies, who crossed the Eyder before the Prussians had retired beyond that canal, “manifestly with the connivance of the Prussian “General Hahn” to anticipate the Danes in securing that important line of defence, which crosses the isthmus at Isted.

Schleswig, the field to which this contest was circumscribed, is one hundred miles in length and not fifty in breadth; but in fact the arena was further narrowed to its southern extremity, and consisted in the maintenance of that ancient line of defence to the north of the town of Schleswig, where for 1000 years the Danes had taken their stand against the Emperors and Popes, and where may still be traced the ruins of the great lines constructed at that early period.

The forces employed were, in proportion to the means of the parties, enormous. If England in a civil war made a similar effort, her armies in the field would amount to 1,000,000 men. Denmark, as I have said, mustered 40,000, with ninety-six guns. The Duchies moved across the Eyder 30,000 men with eighty guns, chiefly of large calibre, leaving four battalions of reserve.

A causeway and military road leads from Flensburgh, where the Danish troops, entering from Jutland or arriving by sea, would effect their junction, southward through the centre of the province to the town of Schleswig. On both sides the country

is difficult from broken ground and defensible positions, but principally because interspersed with bogs and marshes: some five or six miles in advance of Schleswig, a natural line of defence composed of lakes, marshes, steep banks of rivers, and forests extends across from east to west. The causeway passing by the village of Isted is inclosed in a gorge, the heights on the left being backed by the long lake of "Lang Sô," and on the right by almost continuous marshes. The heights on both sides were crowned by batteries of which the crossing fire enfiladed the passage, and these were strengthened by fieldworks and redoubts. Here was stationed the mass of the forces of the Duchies and of their artillery. Had the Danes been repulsed in an attack upon this position, they must have abandoned their offensive attitude, and the war would have terminated by their inability to effect anything, for the Duchies standing on the defensive only would not have prosecuted any advantage they might have obtained.

On the 24th July, 1850, the Danish army advanced on Isted, and drove in the outposts. The following morning at 2 o'clock, they made an attack at every point, sending out detachments right and left, to attempt the passages beyond the marshes and beyond the lake. They were however repulsed on all points, and at Stolk lost four guns and their best general Shlepperegrell, who had led the *sortie* at Frederica, beaten Wrangel at Duppel, and commanded on every occasion on which the Danes had been successful. After such a check it was not

to be supposed that the attack could be renewed with discouraged troops, and without any necessity; but at nine o'clock, they were on every point brought again to the charge and again repulsed. The troops of the Duchies were inferior in numbers by 10,000 men, and their sole business was to defend their strong position; they had been under arms for twenty-four hours, and had had to sustain one assault during the night, and one in the morning, and though excited by success, were exhausted and disordered; three reasons against pushing them on even had an advance movement been on other grounds imperative, but they were led against the enemy into the plan to *pursue their advantage*. When well advanced, a fresh body of 10,000 Danes falls upon them, drives them back, and enters the entrenchments with the fugitives.

As no general with the commonest qualifications could have been guilty of so gross an imprudence, it might be inferred that Prussia having now made peace with Denmark, had withdrawn her officers of experience, and left the Schleswig Holsteiners to the conduct of some provincial Hannibal; but Prussia was not so unmindful of her friends, and if prudent had not ceased to be considerate. She had not left them in so hopeless a predicament, and the catastrophe was therefore not to be laid to the charge of inconsiderate patriotism and inexperienced valour.

General Willisen won his spurs at the battle of Leipzig; during the peace he devoted himself to tactics, was professor of the military art, and published several works, which have become class-

books in Germany : but this branch did not suffice to absorb his talents. In the convulsions of 1848, the king of Prussia was in want of a "Pacifator" for Posen, and upon him fell the Royal choice. It may be recollected, though in these days memory is short, that in the first outbreak of revolutionary enthusiasm, the German people took it into its head to war with the Czar, and seriously proposed to drive Russia into the deserts of Asia and the snows of the Pole.

Revolution in the south and west presented only a local colour ; but to the north and east, although it failed not to articulate the watchwords of freedom there was associated therewith the idea of independence. They saw Russia near and imminent, beetling like an iceberg over their heads, and menacing at every hour an avalanche. They well knew that no form of internal government could resist her invasion, or subsist if hostile to her views, so that the revolution in Prussia was just as much directed against the Emperor at St. Petersburg, as against the King in Berlin. It turned consequently to the Poles as its natural allies, and whilst calling out for "Free Press," "Free Meetings," "National Guard," and "Representative Chamber," it called out also for "Restoration of Poland : " it adopted as its philosophical conclusive, that its triumph was but temporary and incomplete till it had succeeded in disabling Russia from interfering in the forms of government of other countries. This it is which explains the momentary enthusiasm throughout Germany in the cause of Poland, and

the expectation of seeing the outburst of revolution, pour itself from that country over the north. This direction of the public mind would have united had they not been so before, the domestic and dynastic interests of the kings with the political ends of the Russian Cabinet. That of Prussia saw no safety save in those very auxiliaries which the people of Prussia looked upon as their deadliest foes. But that aid could not be obtained directly; the means of safety lay in establishing a schism between the Poles and the Germans. Some estimate may thus be formed of the qualities required for a Pacifier of Polish Posen: a man was requisite who knew how to combine heart with head.

Willisen played his part to admiration: he succeeded in presenting the king as the patron of the anti-Russian enthusiasm, and then returned to Berlin, apparently to counteract some secret machinations, by which his Royal Master had been overreached: he left his apartment after a long conference, at two o'clock in the morning, when the king addressing his court, which awaited, said, "Gentlemen, you want war with Russia; well, you shall have it," and on this, the secret order was dispatched for disarming the Poles. The shock of contradictory propositions, passion and mystery, exasperations and uncertainty effaced all anterior impressions; the public was at sea, and so—the anti-Russian projects fell, the revolutionary spirit evaporated, and the royal diplomacy triumphed at Berlin and in Posen, as at Duppel, and at Fredericia. Willisen was, it is true, accused of trea-

chery by one party, and therefore he was defended by the other : he himself published a voluminous defence, which every body devoured, but which no one could digest. It was, however, said to be much to the taste of his master, and the Emperor.

Willisen now took the road to Italy, and directed his steps to Piedmont. His liberal sympathies and Polish antecedents opened to him every door and every heart : he was conducted from position to position, from army to army. Passing from the military to the diplomatic branch, Ministers underwent his examination ; public offices opened themselves to his inspection. His review completed, he posted to Peschiera, and soon after returned with Radetzki, to visit his Sardinian friends : he so interested the Field Marshal by his conversation, that even with the pre-occupations of the field of Novara, he did not allow him for a moment to quit his side.*

* Already has the defeat at Novara been attributed to *one* act of treason, but the treason was much deeper than that of one General of Division. The Austrian and Piedmontese governments were both betrayed, the one to the other. The independence of Lombardy, which Austria offered through England on the 22nd of May, was filched away by the same process ; and the victory, secured by management to the Austrian arms in the south, was the signal for the blow struck at Hungary, where all was already prepared to sacrifice to Hungary the Austrian armies, and then Hungary to Russia. The warlike operations of these years were all made safe like those we have been examining. The Spanish marriages, the Confiscation of Cracow, the Swiss mediation, the disturbances of Italy and Sicily, the French, with its concomitant revolutions, are all facts which are linked together,

This adventure completed, Willisen again turned his face northwards, and opportunely reached Berlin at the very moment that the Peace with Denmark constrained the King to recall General Bonin. The successful "Pacificator" of Posen was exactly the man required. It is true that the objection which had caused the recall of his predecessor equally applied to him. He too was Prussian, Prussian officer and Prussian general: but seeing how Conventions are executed, and armistices observed, we must admit as good a distinction between General Willisen and General Bonin, as between the two sides of the demarcation line from Tondern to Flensburg. Thus it will be readily conceived that though at Isted General Bonin was no longer in command of the troops of the Duchies, the "Pacification of the North" lost nothing by the change.

After losing a strong position by an ambuscade, and sacrificing about 4000 men,—continuing to apply the maxims of strategy which he had been so long engaged in teaching, he fell by mathematical gravitation on the south, never stopping until he had placed behind him the fortress of Rendsburg. Evacuating or abandoning the whole of Schleswig, he withdrew behind the Eyder, which the neutrality of Holstein forbade the Danes to cross. His

and the process laid bare in regard to any, may be assumed to exist in respect to all.

I have been informed that I have mistaken General Willisen for his brother. If so, the King of Prussia is lucky in having *two* Willisens instead of one.

army, though defeated, had received reinforcements, which raised it far above its complement when it took the field, whilst that of the Danes, which had suffered nearly as severely as its antagonist, received no reinforcement whatever. It was in a hostile country, and had to strengthen and to fortify its various positions. In extending its operations, it was liable to be at any point attacked by the whole force of the Duchies from behind the Eyder, which is a river or canal cut from sea to sea, and across which it did not dare to venture, nay, not even to fire. General Willisen was a great admirer of the Napoleon combination of concentration, the art of which consisted in inducing the enemy to radiate his forces. Here the enemy had laid out for him the positions. He could attack them at any point with his whole force, and annihilate them separately; and he selects their two exposed positions to the extreme right and left; marching under cover of the Eyder, he attacks at both, and is repulsed. Thus ends the campaign; Willisen* returns home; and for the Duchies, of course, we will have an armistice.

N.B.—The subjoined extract from the public news, as printed in London on the 25th May, will

* Though now for the first time published, this paper has been circulated in manuscript, and the writer has received various rectifications especially as regards this battle. A pamphlet has been sent to him as containing the disproof of his account: he subjoins some extracts in the Appendix, see No. I.

fully justify the qualifications as tactician of the Prussian General ; other men win honours by gaining battles—they by losing them.

“ *Berlin, May 22.*

“ The Russian Imperial Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, sat opposite the Emperor and the King of Prussia, between the President of the Cabinet, M. von Manteuffel, and *General von Wrangel*, whose next neighbour was Count Orloff, the Russian *Minister of Police*. During dinner, the King himself called on the guests to fill their glasses to the brim (*bis zum Rande*), and gave the following toast :—

“ ‘ In my own name, and *that of my army*, and in the name of all true Prussian hearts, I give the health of His Imperial Majesty of Russia ! God preserve him to that portion of the world which God has given him for an inheritance, and to this age, to which he is indispensable.’

“ The Emperor replied, ‘ *Dieu conserve votre Majesté*,’ adding immediately afterwards in German,—‘ I drink to the welfare of the King of Prussia and *his admirable army*.’

“ The toast was drunk with the utmost enthusiasm, and the hall re-echoed with oft-repeated ‘ *Hochs !* ’ ”

In the same paper in which the above is reported, the “ *Times*,” observes :—“ The continent is governed literally, if not symbolically, by Colonels in Russian uniforms.”

AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF THE DUCHIES.
RUSSIAN EVACUATIONS OF THE PRINCIPALITIES.

No! This time the armistice is replaced by 20,000 Austrians. Protocols had hitherto sufficed to stop hostilities; and if neutrals were wanted, had not Prussians, Hanoverians, Mechlenburgers, Norwegians, and Swedes, all been transformed into that character? We have seen in the affair of Aleppo that Protocol was disposing itself to take flight from London to Paris: a Minister for Foreign Affairs, censured by a vote of the House of Lords, saved only by a small majority in the Commons, extorted by the menace of a dissolution, had for a time at least to walk softly. Besides, Austria was now so far quelled that these convenient documents could be safely replaced by an army of the Cæsars.

A more perfect exemplification of the process of breaking up a community has never been seen. First, Denmark and its Duchies ruptured; then the Duchies broken in two; the knife then passed through one of them. There is brought into play neither Russian art nor armies: it is all effected by impersonality and abstraction. First, we have Dynastic sympathies; then Constitutional freedom; and lastly, Popular impulse. These occupy

the stage in the first act of the drama ; in the second figure *Fédération* and *Mediation* : in the third, “*Danism*” and “*Germanism*” grasp Schleswig and devour it. The Germans of Schleswig in the early part of the struggle, and when the anterior impressions remained, concurred with the Danes of the Duchies : it was not till the foreign German and the Danish troops compromised the natives in their mutual animosities, that they joined in this factitious bitterness. To conjure up a “*Danism*” as something distinct from “*Germanism*,” was a folly outstripping any folly of which even Europe in recent times has been the theatre. Danes and Germans are of the same stock, and their language is more closely allied than that of Poland and Russia, than ancient and modern Greek. The Duchies had neither decreed, like the Hungarians, the dethronement of the King-Duke, nor proclaimed a new political creed like the Italians ; no speculative designation could be affixed to men who only claimed to continue to possess their own ; but, as you cannot excite passions without calling names, epithets had to be invented. There is this difference between their fate, and that of the other victims of 1848, they can look back without shame ; they have bravely fought ; they have indulged in no extravagant aims, and submitted only to necessity.

From the moment that the quarrel was established, Russia had accomplished her end : she triumphed, whoever won the victory, because her game was their division. She could be foiled only by an accommodation, and against that chance, she

is now definitely protected through the occupation by the troops of a Power depending on her for existence.* They will not retire, until a diplomatic settlement takes the matter of the Crown and succession out of the hands of the parties and transfers it to a conclave of foreign diplomatists. In the mean time the Duchies will be reduced politically to a level with the Principalities, with this exception, that they will not understand whence their sufferings come, and will turn their hopes towards their oppressor,—their animosity on their Sovereign and his people.

Regiments of that Hungary so recently placed “at the feet of the Czar,” are now marching to the shores of the Baltic, to subjugate to him the Sound. The occupation of the Principalities commenced that pacification of Hungary of which the occupation of the Duchies is the result; and at the moment of this inconceivable invasion of the Duchies by Austria, the Principalities are on the point of an incredible evacuation by Russia. It may be that from the beginning, all had been prepared and that “the feint on the Bosphorus was to secure the Sound.”† However, both points were on the cards: but in the Principalities Russia encountered an obstacle,—a man, an accident which did not befall her in the Duchies or in Europe.

In treating of contemporary events, it is rarely that we can connect the catastrophe with the march of

* Written it will be recollected in January, 1851.

† General Aupick, French Ambassador at Constantinople.

the Drama, still less so, when dealing not with a single transaction, but with a double event. This advantage we here possess. Russia, it is true, has only promised to evacuate: if her word be of little value, not so her necessities. It is because the first only is thought of, that so little credence is here given to the declaration, that the very Government disbelieves the victory it has achieved.

The Principalities afford to Turkey the most advantageous diplomatic field whenever she makes up her mind to stand up for herself. There Russia can neither put forward her allies, nor, as in Egypt, Syria, or Greece, play upon their mutual jealousies. Freed from such entanglements, Turkey is morally if not intellectually a match for Russia—physically, she is more than a match for her. It may be difficult to move the Turks, but once they have resolved, they will adhere to their point with more pertinacity, and carry it out with as much dexterity as any people on earth.

From the moment, therefore, that the Porte had said and decided that the Principalities should be evacuated, the thing was done. The manner of effecting it has been peculiar and characteristic.

The most offensive feature of the occupation was the charge for the support of the Russian troops, exacted without treaty or warrant, the Turkish troops conjointly occupying, being entirely defrayed by their own Government. The resources of the Provincial Government having failed, the Russian General offered to open for them a credit on St. Petersburg, and so they had become, by supplying

the Russians, indebted, to the amount of nearly twenty millions of piastres, to Russia. It was on this point that the Porte determined to raise the question, and she waited for an occasion.

The Hospodar of Wallachia, Stirbey, had proposed to place his son in the Russian diplomatic service, on this Achmet Effendi, Commissioner of the Porte, had taken offence. A Hospodar lies on no bed of roses when the Porte declares itself his adversary; and to regain its good will sacrifices had to be made or artifices employed; the plan devised was, that he should himself remonstrate against the Russian occupation. Consequently, Logotheti, Kapou Kiayah, of the Hospodar, and a notorious Russian agent, was commissioned to deliver to the Grand Vizier a memoir in which it was stated that the Province could no longer bear the burden of the Russian troops, and the Porte was urged to take measures, if not for their removal, at least for the reimbursement to the Provincial treasury. On presenting it, Logotheti said, "You will see that the Prince is not so black as Achmet Effendi would make you believe." The Grand Vizier answered, in his quiet way, "Very well, we will see what we can do for him." The Kapou Kiayah, beaming with delight, repaired to the Russian Embassy to announce the favourable progress of the affair. A few days afterwards M. Aristarchi, the Russian dragoman, went to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to suggest, that if the Porte was not inclined to withdraw *its troops*, and *its Commissioner*, it need not "*donner suite*" to the application of the Prince.

Now the Porte transmitted its formal demand for the evacuation, which left Constantinople upon the 15th January. On the 21st, M. Titoff took occasion informally and verbally to communicate to Ali Pasha that the proposal would meet with no obstruction, as he had already received the orders of his Court to make it ! No steamer had that day arrived in the port of Constantinople, no messenger had dismounted at the Russian Embassy ; no communication could have possibly reached M. Titoff for the eight previous days. Such was the result of the inquiry immediately instituted by the Porte.

Either M. Titoff had by anticipation been armed with powers to meet this contingency, or he acted under an unmistakeable necessity presented by the case. To discover that necessity requires no research and involves no speculation ; it is as clear as the sun at noon day. In the Principalities she is detested and her position is next to untenable. The Porte has not been led into any signal error in her management of them, or into any base surrender ; but, on the contrary, and in contradiction to all her past history, has relied on them, backed them, and succeeded in establishing mutual confidence and concert. As to the "*Ultima ratio Regum*," that point is also free from ambiguity. Turkey has now a respectable disciplined force which she never had before since Russians and Turks have met in battle array, and it is Russia's greatest care that the Turks shall have no inducement to weigh the relative strength of the two empires. It must also be ob-

served that the immediate object of the occupation had been accomplished by the subjugation of Hungary. The Russian troops in contact with the Turkish, so much better paid and fed, were being inoculated with disaffection to that degree, that the regiments already relieved, have been dispersed and sent in small bodies to remote stations.

If for these reasons it was requisite to yield—then was it desirable to yield with promptitude and grace. Thus would the occasion of friendly counsel be preserved, the evacuation shorn of its utility to the Porte, and—the door left ajar.

The Turks having themselves seized and sent away the leading men opposed to Russia, the Government is actually in the hands of her partizans; by the withdrawal of the Russian troops the governing jealousy falls on the Porte; Russia can always fire off a revolution, and bring back her army. The evacuation, to be real, must rid the country of a foreign faction as well as of foreign troops. The political evacuation can take place only when the Porte, on withdrawing her soldiers, shall enter with a charter in her hand, and say to the people, this arbitrary and provisional condition shall cease; here is the rule by which you yourselves shall live.

This is what the Porte proposes: this is what Russia has to prevent; by her prompt consent she will be admitted into the Council Chamber, and so will prevent it. Already has the Porte been thrown into doubts and hesitancy, fearing to have fallen into a trap: we thought, say they, that we had

hit them a heavy blow,—they smile and thank us !

Unless the Porte had acted for herself and by herself, this so far fortunate issue could not have been secured ; yet as its redoubtable protectors will no doubt arrogate to themselves the merit of her success, the following facts deserve to be stated.

At the critical moment of the negotiation, on the 21st January, the British Ambassador, after having been refused a private audience, at a public audience represented to the Sultan his Ministers as having lost the confidence of England, and being unworthy of that of their master.* As to France, not that her word matters one way or the other, she was sending in an ultimatum, and breathing flames about the Holy Places. Thus Turkey, being relieved from her officious friends, achieved the greatest diplomatic victory which her annals have to record. Alas ! for Denmark, she was not equally lucky.

Whilst the troops of Russia's satellite are marching into the Duchies, Russia announces the withdrawal of her own troops from the Principalities ! The surrounding populations, at least, will not fail to see in this fact, evidence of strength and resolution in Turkey to resist the pressure of the Power which they all detest and fear. If the barrier pre-

* The day before, the Russian Minister sent to the chiefs of the adverse party, to inform them of the step which next day the English Ambassador would take, and of the language he would hold.

sented to Russia by the Powers of Europe has fallen, another has arisen, where least expected, to supply its place. Venal pens will hardly suffice to attribute the retreat of the Muscovite hordes from the Danube to "the moderation of the Emperor,"—or the activity of that Western diplomacy which has placed the Sound within her grasp.

CONCLUSION.

May, 1852.

As to the evacuation of the Principalities, and the disposal of the Danish succession, the conclusions above stated in January 1850, have been to the letter verified. The succession, is in such a manner disposed of, that no less than three branches and six young men who stood between Russia and the general succession are put out of the way. If now not sufficiently docile, as a nominally independent state, Denmark can be at once absorbed as an inheritance, by the mission of an Orloff or a Jazmaji.

In pretending to unite the successions they have *confused* the lines. They have taken from the families hereditary right—from the Kingdom and Duchies constitutional right. They appear to create a compound right of hereditary and elective, but really substitute their will for law. This decision of the mediators is for the sole benefit of one of them, whose rights of remainder entail are intact, whilst the intervening lines are superseded. This interested party is admitted into the mediation on the grounds of a renunciation of claims, which do not affect the general succession.

As to Prussia, it will now be apparent what role she has played from the beginning.

On the evacuation of the Duchies by the Austrians, a note of Prince Schwartzenburg, expounding the views of the Cabinet of Vienna, has appeared, and we are apprised of the fact that death overtook that statesman at a moment of struggle with Russia. It is therefore possible that the Treaty of the 8th May may be connected with that event. This note* denounces, in terms, the schemes of Copenhagen, and in fact, the pretensions of the Conference: it lays down the maxim, that each portion should maintain its own right and laws: it asserts the necessity of preserving the integrity of the monarchy, but does not assume that the Conference shall usurp this power: it presents that simple view of the case which if taken by the King of Denmark, would have prevented all that has happened.

Austria sees all this in 1852 !† Had she no representative at Copenhagen in 1846—no knowledge of the acts of the Confederation in 1848 ?

Is it not possible that the Danes, who have been hitherto considered a calm and judicious people, at

* This document will be found Appendix No. 2.

† The line taken by the Austrian Cabinet on this occasion may be referable to Mr. Prokesch, its Representative at Berlin. It was no secret that he looked upon all these scenes with distaste; and there can be little doubt that he apprehended their source and purpose. It was not concealed at Berlin, that Russia had interposed to prevent the Austrian Government from sending him as Ambassador to Constantinople.

sight of this additional humiliation, should recover from their frenzy, and turning on the foreigner the animosities which he has so easily kindled between them, at last unite in one dignified act, and give to themselves a king?

A P P E N D I X.

No. I.

BATTLE OF ISTD.

(Extracts from a Danish Work.)

“ Le moment décisif de la bataille était arrivé. Depuis quelques instants on s’apercevait qu’il y passait dans le centre de Willisen quelque chose d’extraordinaire. Des divisions entières avaient épuisé leurs provisions de poudre ; on se plaignait que le Général en Chéf ne donnait pas d’ordre ; de temps en temps des soldats de différents bataillons se trainoient péniblement jusqu’ auprès des nôtres harassés de fatigue et incapables de continuer le combat. Ils se couchaient par terre ne songeant plus qu’à se reposer et à se rafraîchir. En vain les officiers les exhortaient à marcher. Nous n’avons pas d’ordre à recevoir de vous, répondaient ils. Beaucoup d’autres personnes des environs se joignaient aux officiers pour piquer leur amour propre, en les engageant à aller aux secours de leurs frères d’armes. Oui, disaient ils ; quand nous aurons mangé. Tout semblait devenir de plus en plus contraire à l’armée ennemie. Enfin Willisen apprit que le Colonel Schepelern était à Schuby et menaçait sa ligne de retraite. * * * *

“ Le Colonel Schepelern selon le plan de la bataille se trouvait vers onze heures et demi à Schuby sur les derrières de l’ennemie. On a vu rarement un mouvement circulaire réussir si complètement.”—p. 32.

“ La confiance qu’on avait dans les talents militaires de Willisen était encore si grande dans les rangs de l’armée, que l’aile droite de

l'ennemi qui avait souffert le moins, *prenait la retraite pour un stratagème.* * * * *

“ Les Holsteinois qui d'ailleurs se battaient bravement eux-mêmes, disaient avec raison, ‘ Les Danois ne se battent pas, ils ne font qu'avancer.’

“ Willisen chercha à sauver sa réputation du grand Capitaine en disant que la bataille n'était pas finie. On ne m'a pas fait abandonner ma position par des manœuvres, disait il ; c'est et nous écrasant qu'on nous a fait quitter le champ de bataille.”—p. 39.

“ Après la bataille d'Isted il (Willisen) comprit qu'il avait mal jugé les Danois. Son entourage l'avait forcé malgré ses principes stratégiques de perdre les avantages d'une position défensive pour prendre l'offensive au risque de s'exposer à mille dangers. Et maintenant il était poussé malgré lui vers Missund et Frédérickstadt ; son honneur était engagé il ne pouvait plus s'arrêter.

* * *

“ A Neumynster il fut poursuivi de cris injurieux et reçu à coups de pierres.

“ Le Général Wrangel se trouvait caux aux lorsque la nouvelle de la victoire lui arriva. Il était en compagnie d'une noble famille Danoise, avec laquelle il était très lié. Il fit bonne contenance, félicita les Danois et parla de Willisen *comme d'un homme à qui l'on ne pouvait se fier.*”—Troisième Campagne de Schleswig, racontée par F. HAMMERICH, Chapelain de l'Armée. (French Translation.)

No. II.

NOTE OF PRINCE SCHWARTZENBURG.

“THE revival of the provincial Diet of Holstein, which His Majesty the King of Denmark has authorised, appears to the Imperial Cabinet both from a general point of view, and in relation to the law of the German Confederation, as a welcome and important turning point in the Danish question. The Danish Ministry can hardly observe the position of Denmark and Europe, at the moment, the future of the nation is about to be settled on a new foundation, without themselves admitting that this wise decision can only be considered a first step towards the restoration of the vital conditions of the Danish Monarchy. The idea of separating Holstein more than formerly from the other parts of the kingdom, and connecting Schleswig so much the more closely with Denmark, contradicts the principle of the integrity of the Monarchy, for which we are prepared to give a new guarantee. This idea does not originate in the demand of the great Powers ; it belongs to a system which more or less, in every country, tends to obtaining a new division of the map of Europe, drawn according to the different nationalities. The steps which have been taken to effect this, which have found their expression even in the scheme of organization drawn up by Count Sponneck, and the open or secret end of which is the incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark, belong to the innovations of 1848 ; and the time appears to have arrived for placing a limit to them, according to real and permanent principles, also for this important part of the north. Schleswig has in all ages formed a connecting link between Denmark and Holstein. In contradiction to the policy followed by the Danish Crown till recently, it is

sought to alienate the institutions of Schleswig from those of Holstein, in order to assimilate them to those of a democratic Denmark, which is a violation of existing rights no less than of the permanent interests of the kingdom. In the part we wish to take in the new establishment of the Danish Monarchy, we cannot, and will not, give up the rights of the German Confederation, and the position it occupies in the political system of Europe. The condition of our participation in an European guarantee are hereby defined:—A common succession to the Throne and political institutions for each part of the kingdom, secured by the unity of the monarchy; no actual or expressed incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark; provincial Diets in Schleswig as in Holstein; and a settlement of the position of Holstein in the German Confederation in such a manner that a friendly relation to Germany may be rendered possible. This is the basis on which alone, according to our sincere conviction, the new edifice of the deeply shaken Danish Monarchy can be erected. Your Excellency will make such use of this despatch as you may think the interest of the cause requires, and at the same time request M. von Der Reedtz to place it before His Majesty.”

GUIDE
DES
BAIGNEURS

AUX ENVIRONS DE TROUVILLE.

GUIDE

DES


BAIGNEURS

AUX ENVIRONS DE TROUVILLE,

orné d'un grand nombre de vignettes sur bois et d'une
carte itinéraire des environs;

PAR M. DE CAUMONT,

DIRECTEUR DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE POUR LA CONSERVATION
DES MONUMENTS HISTORIQUES.



CAEN,

TYP. DE A. HARDEL, IMPRIMEUR-LIBRAIRE,
RUE FROIDE, 2.

—
1853.

AVERTISSEMENT.

Depuis long-temps on nous demandait un guide des promeneurs aux environs de Trouville : pour satisfaire à ce désir des baigneurs, nous avons prié M. de Caumont de détacher quelques notes de sa *Statistique monumentale du Calvados*, et il a bien voulu accéder à cette demande avec l'empressement qu'il met toujours à accepter les propositions utiles : le Guide du voyageur que nous publions est son ouvrage ; nous ne doutons pas que les renseignements positifs qu'il renferme ne soient appréciés de tous.

Aujourd'hui que, grâce à M. de Caumont, l'archéologie est populaire ; que, grâce à d'autres hommes éminents, les notions de géologie et de botanique sont répandues partout et qu'elles entrent même dans le cadre des études auxquelles se livrent les femmes, il était indispensable qu'il y eût un Guide sérieux, comme celui que nous publions,

pour les personnes distinguées qui fréquentent les bains de Trouville.

On y trouvera des indications suffisantes sur les principales excursions à faire autour de cette ville, dans un rayon de 4 à 5 lieues ; sur les monuments, les plantes rares, les faits géologiques les plus remarquables qui s'y rencontrent.

Nous prions d'ailleurs toutes les personnes qui feront usage de ce Guide, de nous signaler les lacunes qui nécessairement y existent ; de nous indiquer ce qu'ils auraient voulu y trouver : nous nous empresserons de les satisfaire dans une nouvelle édition.

L'éditeur,

A. HARDEL,

Membre de l'Institut des provinces.






1^{re}. EXCURSION

DE TROUVILLE A PONT-L'ÉVÊQUE

PAR LA VALLÉE;

Retour par les hauteurs de St.-Gatien et par la forêt de Touques.



Je propose aux promeneurs de diriger leur première excursion vers le chef-lieu de l'arrondissement, la petite ville de Pont-l'Évêque.

Le bourg de Touques que l'on rencontre d'abord n'est qu'à 2 kilomètres de Trouville ; c'est un bourg de 1,100 habitants, qui était plus important autrefois qu'il ne l'est aujourd'hui. On y voit deux églises intéressantes : la première, réparée aux frais du gouvernement, sur la demande de M. Le Normant, de l'Institut, mériterait une description particulière. Elle appartient au style roman, sauf la porte occidentale, qui ne date que du XVII^e. siècle, et qu'on distingue au premier coup-d'œil.

Une tour à pans coupés irréguliers, dont nous présentons le dessin, est assise sur le transept.

Les antiquaires ont été très-partagés au sujet de cette église : quelques-uns en ont fait un monument du X^e. siècle ; la plupart n'y trouvent aucun caractère qui

puisse le faire rapporter à une époque plus ancienne que le XI^e. ou le XII^e. siècle.



TOUR DE L'ÉGLISE SAINT-PIERRE DE TOUQUES.

L'autre église de Touques offre deux époques très-distinctes. Le chœur et la tour dont voici l'esquisse, sont du XV^e. siècle.

La nef est du XI^e. siècle , sauf les ouvertures et quelques reprises modernes qu'on y a pratiquées.



ÉGLISE SAINT-THOMAS DE TOUQUES.


Château de Bonneville. — Tout près de Touques, sur le coteau qui domine la rive droite de la rivière , se trouve le château de Bonneville.

Depuis le règne de Guillaume-le-Conquérant qui résidait souvent à Bonneville , un grand nombre de personnages éminents sont venus dans ce château, ainsi que l'attestent les chroniques. Beaucoup d'actes y ont été signés des ducs de Normandie , rois d'Angleterre. Guillaume-le-Roux y résida plusieurs fois. Henry I^{er}. y a tenu sa cour :

parmi ses successeurs nous y voyons Jean-Sans-Terre et Philippe-Auguste.

En 1417, la première place attaquée par les Anglais débarqués à Touques fut celle de Bonneville : j'ai donné, dans mon *Cours d'antiquités*, 5^e. volume, le texte de la capitulation que furent obligés de faire les commandants du château, Jean de Bonenfant et Guillaume Le Comte.

Le château offre encore une enceinte de murailles



Bouet del.

ENTRÉE DU CHATEAU DE BONNEVILLE.

garnie de plusieurs tours et une porte en ogive assez belle qui pourrait dater de la fin du XII^e. siècle ou du commencement du XIII^e. ; c'était la seule qui donnât accès à la place : elle était précédée d'un pont-levis. Les fossés autrefois pleins d'eau sont encore profonds du côté du Nord et du N.-O.

Les murs d'enceinte, qui ont 8 à 10 pieds d'épaisseur, étaient en 1780 bien plus élevés qu'aujourd'hui ; les débris

ont été dispersés et jetés en partie dans la cour du château. Le niveau actuel de cette cour est élevé de 10 pieds au-dessus de l'ancien, ainsi que des excavations l'ont prouvé, et le rez-de-chaussée tout entier de l'ancien château se trouverait aujourd'hui sous terre. Je donne à ce sujet de plus amples renseignements dans ma *Statistique monumentale du Calvados*. Il ne reste plus que le mur d'enceinte; les logements intérieurs ont disparu.



Bouet del.

UNE TOUR DU CHATEAU DE BONNEVILLE.

Voici la tour la mieux conservée, elle domine la riche


vallée de la Touque et l'embouchure de cette rivière où nos ducs s'embarquaient pour l'Angleterre et débarquaient si souvent lorsqu'ils revenaient sur le Continent. J'ai fait remarquer, dans mon *Cours d'antiquités*, que le château de Bonneville se trouvait au centre et très-convenablement placé pour se porter de là sur tous les points du territoire continental soumis au pouvoir des ducs de Normandie, rois d'Angleterre.

Canapville est la première commune que l'on rencontre après Bonneville dans la direction de Pont-l'Evêque.

Le manoir seigneurial, dont voici la vue prise à vol d'oiseau, se compose de bâtiments d'exploitation disposés autour d'une cour de forme irrégulière. L'habitation du maître, près de la principale entrée, composée d'une grande et d'une petite porte, est reconnaissable à ses grandes lucarnes, à sa tourelle d'escalier et à ses deux étages, la plupart des autres bâtiments n'en ayant qu'un seul. Le colombier, de forme carrée, est au milieu de la cour.

Le XVI^e. siècle nous a légué un certain nombre de manoirs seigneuriaux de cette espèce, réunissant tout ce qui dépendait d'une riche exploitation rurale : des remises, des écuries, des granges, des étables, puis l'habitation du maître, formaient la ceinture ou l'ensemble des constructions composant le manoir et son enceinte; on y voyait une chapelle, et le colombier formait, comme à Canapville, un bâtiment séparé des autres.

Le manoir de Canapville est en grande partie construit en bois, comme l'étaient alors, et le sont encore, la



VUE GÉNÉRALE DU MANOIR DE CANAPVILLE.

plupart des habitations du Pays-d'Auge où il était plus facile de se procurer du bois que de la pierre, quand les chemins étaient à peu près impraticables pour les charrettes.

Si nous poursuivons notre course après avoir jeté un coup-d'œil sur l'église de Canapville, dont quelques parties sont romanes, nous apercevrons, sur la gauche, à 1 kilomètre au moins de distance, l'église de St.-Martin-aux-Chartrains, ainsi nommée parce qu'elle dépendait de l'évêché de Chartres, lequel nommait le curé.

M. Lemétayer-Desplanches, membre de plusieurs académies et inspecteur de l'Association normande, a signalé, à peu de distance de l'église, la présence de tuiles romaines, preuve que dès les temps les plus anciens il y avait là un centre d'habitation.

L'église du Coudray se trouve ensuite sur le bord de la route; elle a conservé presque intacte sa tour, qui paraît du XIII^e. siècle et qui est couronnée d'une flèche en charpente, ses modillons et quelques parties de sa maçonnerie primitive : les fenêtres ont pour la plupart été élargies et refaites de forme carrée, forme ignoble pour une église et que les maçons de campagne, chez lesquels le goût et l'instinct artistique sont si peu développés, ne manquent pas d'employer sans s'embarrasser de l'effet qu'elle produit.

Un porche précède la porte latérale par laquelle on entre dans la nef. Ces accessoires des anciennes portes d'église sont encore assez communs dans l'arrondissement de Pont-l'Evêque.




VUE DE L'ÉGLISE DU COUDRAY.

Nous arrivons à St.-Melaine, dont l'église offre encore quelques parties romanes, et nous entrons à Pont-l'Evêque.

M. La Butte a donné, dans son *Histoire de l'arrondissement de Pont-l'Evêque*, un bon article sur cette petite ville. Nous ne pouvons que renvoyer à son livre fort intéressant, où les principales localités de cette partie du Pays-d'Auge ont été décrites.

L'église de Pont-l'Evêque se compose d'une nef assez élevée avec ses bas-côtés : elle n'a point de transept.

La tour est placée à l'extrémité occidentale, comme



BREVIERE SC.

Bouet del.

PARTIE OCCIDENTALE DE L'ÉGLISE DE PONT-L'ÉVÊQUE.

dans beaucoup d'églises du XV^e. siècle. Elle est très-pe-sante, flanquée de contreforts saillants et se termine brusquement par un toit en charpente, couvert d'ardoises.

En général, l'ornementation de cette église n'a pas, dans ses moulures, la finesse que l'on trouve dans beaucoup d'édifices datant, comme elle, du XV^e. et du XVI^e. siècle : cela tient, je crois, à la nature de la pierre employée. La craie est très-tendre dans l'arrondissement de Pont-l'Evêque ; elle éclate facilement sous le ciseau, et le calcaire oolitique, dont on peut se servir à son défaut, est d'un grain assez grossier. La craie a été employée dans la construction de l'église dont nous parlons.

L'intérieur offre une certaine magnificence dans l'élévation de la grande nef et surtout dans l'ornementation des voûtes des bas-côtés, dont les arceaux multiples sont garnis de pendentifs.

Il n'y a pas une seule partie de l'église de Pont-l'Evêque qui paraisse antérieure au XV^e. siècle, et diverses parties de l'édifice, notamment les voûtes dont je viens de parler, ne sont évidemment que du XVI^e. MM. Le Court et Lemétayer, qui font des recherches sur l'*Histoire de Pont-l'Evêque*, trouveront sans doute les dates précises de la construction première et des reprises diverses qui ont été faites.

Les lourdes consoles qui supportent un entablement au-dessous des fenêtres de la grande nef, annoncent assez le temps d'Henry IV, ou même une époque plus récente encore.

Il est évident qu'un désastre considérable a forcé de reprendre en sous-œuvre et de reconstruire la partie supérieure de la grande nef. Il n'y a même pas de voûtes en pierre dans cette partie, et celles qui existent ne sont qu'en bois. Il y en avait eu d'abord en pierre.

Il existe encore six verrières presque complètes dans l'église de Pont-l'Evêque ; elles sont dans le chevet. D'autres fragments de vitraux se voient dans d'autres fenêtres.


Après l'église , il n'y a pas de monuments importants à Pont-l'Evêque.

Le tribunal est , comme la plupart des édifices construits pour cette destination, orné d'un péristyle formant saillie et présentant l'image d'un temple *tetra-style*.

La sous-préfecture est placée dans un hôtel précédé d'une cour et dont le jardin donne sur la prairie du Sud. Plusieurs des maisons qui se trouvent de ce côté de la rue principale de Pont-l'Evêque , rue qui traverse la ville d'un bout à l'autre , ont des jardins qui donnent sur la même prairie , et cette partie de la vallée est admirablement encadrée au milieu des collines qui la bordent.

Bedville. — Si l'on veut faire une promenade sur la rive gauche de la Touque , à 3 ou 4 kilomètres de la ville , on trouvera d'abord le château de Bedville qui remonte au XVI^e. siècle ou à la fin du XV^e. , et à l'intérieur duquel il existe des peintures , des pavés émaillés et des boiseries intéressantes , puis , dans une jolie petite vallée voisine , la commune de *St.-Imer*.

St.-Imer. — *St.-Imer* était le siège d'un prieuré dont l'origine remontait au XI^e. siècle. Hugues I^{er}. , comte de Montfort , avait fait des donations considérables au prieuré , vers 1066. Son fils , Hugues II , donna l'église et ses prébendes à l'abbaye du Bec , afin qu'ils y remplaçassent les chanoines. M. Louis Du Bois rapporte que , par deux chartes , Robert I , comte de Montfort , prêt à partir pour



Bouet del.

VUE DU CHATEAU DE BEDVILLE.

la Palestine, confirma ces donations dans la deuxième moitié du XII^e. siècle et donna quelques autres biens, notamment une terre au Torquène et une saline à l'embouchure de la Touque. Par deux autres chartes, l'une



Bouet del.

ÉGLISE DE SAINT-IMER, PRÈS PONT-L'ÉVÊQUE.

de 1194, l'autre de 1198 environ, souscrites par Hugues III, comte de Montfort, ce seigneur ajoutait de nouveaux biens aux largesses de ses prédécesseurs, les-

quelles furent mises sous la protection du Saint Siège, par une bulle du pape Luce III.

Le cartulaire de l'abbaye du Bec renferme des actes plus récents relatifs à St.-Imer; ils ont été tous recueillis et publiés en 1761, par H. de Roquette, prieur-commandataire de St.-Imer, à l'occasion d'un procès qu'il soutint alors au parlement de Rouen.

Mais pour revenir à Trouville, le soir, par St.-Gatien et la forêt, il ne faut pas s'arrêter trop long-temps à Pont-l'Evêque.

En quittant cette ville, on peut faire une halte à Launay, chez M. Eudes, membre de l'Association normande, qui conserve dans l'église de la paroisse, aujourd'hui sa chapelle, deux statues tombales fort intéressantes que M. Bouet a dessinées.

En voici les inscriptions :

Cy giste Vipart chlr en son vivat sr et patron de Launay et de Brucourt
leql trespasa en lan Mil cinq^{cc} le xxii^e jour de novembre priez Dieu pour
son ame.

Cy gist noble dame Daqueline dame de Brucourt en son vivat
esponse de noble ho^e Guille Vipart chlr seigneur de Launay et
patron de ceste egle laqlle trespasa le mcredy xvi jour doctobre lan .
m. iiii^{cc} iiii^{xx} viii.

Ces statues ont conservé en partie leurs peintures primitives.

On n'aura plus qu'à suivre la nouvelle route de Pont-Audemer pour visiter St.-André-d'Hébertot.

St.-André-d'Hébertot, qui a vu naître le chimiste Vauquelin, était le siège d'un des châteaux des ducs de Nor-



STATUE TONNEALE DE JAQUELINE, DAME DE BRUCOURT, DANS L'ÉGLISE DE LAUNAY.

mandie, rois d'Angleterre; ils s'y rendaient souvent quand ils étaient dans le duché; les actes qu'ils y ont signés en sont la preuve.


St.-André-d'Hébertot possède encore un beau château qui mérite d'être visité. On y voit une tour carrée munie de machicoulis, et de larges douves d'eau vive baignent le pied de ses murailles; du reste, l'architecture de ce château ne paraît pas remonter à une époque bien reculée; il a été reconstruit de fond en comble depuis le XVI^e. siècle. On trouvera de nombreux détails sur St.-André-d'Hébertot dans un mémoire récemment publié par M^{me}. Philippe-Lemaître, membre de plusieurs académies.

De St.-André nous gagnons St.-Gatien par la nouvelle route.

Après avoir fait quelques observations géologiques, avoir visité les sables jaunes analogues à ceux de Rabu, que quelques géologues ont assimilés aux sables ferrugineux (*iron sand* des géologues anglais); après avoir observé la craie verte exploitée sur plusieurs points pour l'amendement des terres, on pourra, si l'on est botaniste, faire une herborisation dans la forêt de Touques avant de rentrer à Trouville. Cette forêt renferme, en fait de plantes rares, celles dont les noms suivent, et dont nous devons l'indication à M. Morière, membre de l'Institut des provinces, secrétaire-général de l'Association normande.

Helleborus viridis L.; *Actæa spicata* L.; *Cardamine impatiens* L.; *Sagina stricta* Fries; *Malva alcea* L.; *Androsæmum officinale* All.; *Impatiens noli tangere* L.; *Monotropa hypopitys* L.; *Lathyrus Bithynicus* Lam.;

Epilobium spicatum Lam.; *Bupleurum tenuissimum* L.;
Inula helenium L.; *Cineraria campestris* Retz; *Campanula rapunculoïdes* L.; *Pyrola minor* L.; *Atropa belladonna* L.; *Stachys germanica* L.; *Neottia nidus-avis* Rich;
Luzula maxima DC.; *Scirpus Savii* Sebast; *Carex extensa* Good; *Lycopodium clavatum* L., etc.



2^e. EXCURSION

DE TROUVILLE A DIVES

PAR TOUQUES ET TOURGÉVILLE;

Retour par Dozulé, Annebault et Beaumont.


Pour suivre l'itinéraire que nous venons d'indiquer , il faut passer la rivière sur le pont de Touques; on arrive bientôt à St.-Arnoult.



ÉGLISE DU PRIEURÉ DE SAINT-ARNOULT.

L'église du prieuré de St.-Arnoult , assise sur le pen-

chant d'un coteau , au-delà de la rivière , offre une charmante ruine ; elle est en partie d'architecture romane (XI^e. siècle) et l'on voit des arêtes de poisson dans ses murailles , en partie d'architecture ogivale (XV^e. siècle). Près du chevet est une source minérale renommée pour certaines maladies , qui est entourée d'un mur. Une crypte très-curieuse existe sous le chœur , partie la plus ancienne. On y voit un grand nombre d'ossements et de têtes de morts.



CRYPTE DE L'ÉGLISE DE SAINT-ARNOULT.

Mais il faut remonter en voiture pour nous rendre à Tourgéville.

L'église de Tourgéville est près de la route ; ce n'est pas un monument bien intéressant , et pourtant elle mérite qu'on s'y arrête un peu : à l'intérieur on voit , du côté de l'épître , un écusson que l'on retrouve dans la chapelle du château de Glatigny , dont nous allons parler , et portant 4 molettes d'épron sur un champ de sable , séparé par une bande d'azur au croissant d'argent.

On lit sur un des contreforts de cette chapelle (côté de l'évangile), une inscription en caractères gothiques qui se termine ainsi :

reposent
les corps des seigneurs du Hamel
du Sollier dictes pour eulx Pater
noster Ave Maria

Sur l'arcade qui existe entre le chœur et la nef, se trouvent fixés des fragments de bois sculpté dans le style du XV^e. siècle, dont les courbes ne s'accordent pas avec la position qu'ils occupent : il est probable, et en cela j'adopte volontiers l'opinion de M. Bouet, qu'ils ornaient primitivement la chapelle des seigneurs du Sollier.

On lit aussi l'inscription suivante sur une dalle servant de marche d'autel à la chapelle de la Sainte Vierge :

CEST
LE TOMBEAU
DES SEIGNEURS
DE GLATIGNY
GIVERVILLE
BARONS ET
CHASTELAINS DE
LA FERTE FRESNEL
1646.


De Tourgéville à Blonville il y a 2 kilomètres, on aperçoit l'église ; mais le château de Villers mérite toute notre attention, il se trouve à quelque distance du côté droit de la route : c'est un des plus intéressants de la contrée par sa position, ses plantations, la magnifique vue dont on jouit vers le Nord. La mer res-

semble à un lac placé tout exprès pour le château. Elle en est à plus de 2 kilomètres, mais la pente du terrain, l'encadrement du paysage, produisent une telle illusion qu'elle paraît à l'extrémité du parc. La ville du Havre s'élève en amphithéâtre sur l'autre rive de ce beau lac, que sillonnent une foule de navires aux blanches voiles et de bateaux à vapeur à la noire fumée. Les promeneurs apprécieront toute la beauté du spectacle qui a déjà inspiré plus d'un poète.

Le château de Villers appartient à M. Paris; il doit dater du XVII^e. siècle. La vue que nous donnons est prise du côté de la cour. L'édifice a plus de grâce du côté opposé, par suite de l'abaissement du terrain, mais M. Bouet, qui a fait ce dessin, ne pouvait se résoudre à tourner le dos à la mer, qui, ce jour-là surtout, était du plus beau bleu. Il y a des sites qui exercent sur l'artiste la même influence que l'aimant sur le fer, qui le magnétisent et le retiennent dans une douce extase. C'est ce qui est arrivé à M. Bouet et ce qui arrive à bien d'autres quand ils visitent la magnifique position de Villers.

Le village de Villers que l'on voit sur le bord de l'eau, aux pieds du château, est une localité très-ancienne qui devait exister sous les rois mérovingiens et probablement long-temps avant eux, car on y a trouvé des médailles d'or frappées à l'effigie de ces rois et des briques qui probablement sont romaines : tout cela se rencontre avec d'autres objets dans les terres que les vagues ont rognées sur le bord de la mer, dans les parties les plus basses du rivage. Ainsi cette anse de Villers, dans laquelle se cachent aujourd'hui quelques maisons, devait être anciennement un petit port.

En remontant le coteau, et tout près du château, M.



Bouet del.

CHATEAU DE VILLERS.

Paris a découvert, il y a vingt ans , dans une de ses fermes , d'anciennes sépultures et des cercles en pierre ollaire qui remontent aussi à une époque très-éloignée : toutes ces preuves ne permettent pas de douter de l'ancienneté du lieu.

Les marais qui s'étendent dans le vallon compris entre Villers et l'éminence de Benerville, renferment des plantes que les botanistes viennent y chercher chaque année.

Mais il faut quitter Villers. En reprenant la route de Dives, on distingue à gauche , au milieu de magnifiques avenues de chênes, le château de Glatigny , qui a appartenu à feu M. de Talaru.

Du côté de l'entrée , ce château est construit en briques rouges frettées de briques noires ; les bossages sont en pierre ; les toits sont surmontés d'épis et ornés de riches découpures en plomb et en ardoises.

Le côté opposé est en bois , en style de la renaissance, et les fenêtres du rez-de-chaussée sont protégées par des grilles saillantes.


La chapelle a conservé une ancienne décoration héraldique fort curieuse.

L'église de St.-Pierre-Azif est à plus d'un kilomètre de la route , au Sud. Elle renferme des tableaux remarquables de l'école flamande.

On y voit aussi une fort belle statue tombale qui porte le costume du civil de la fin du XIV^e. siècle.

La famille de Grenthe avait donné à cette église des vitraux peints dont il existe encore de beaux restes. On lit sur une de ces verrières :

M cinq cens lxvi (1566) Rogier
Jehan . de . Gerete . escuier . S^r. de
Pierre . Azif . a . doe . ceste . viestre



Bouet del.

CHATEAU DE GLATICNY.

Et sur une autre :

q cens quatre
dix neuf ceste vitre
...onnée par maistre
Eion pbre demevrant
. Dieu pour loi

Du même côté se trouve, à quelque distance de la route (environ 3 kilomètres), le château de Glanville, appartenant à M. L. de Glanville, membre de l'Institut des provinces et inspecteur des monuments historiques du département de la Seine-Inférieure.


La croix Heuland est un point où s'opère la jonction des routes venant de Dives et allant à Pont-l'Evêque avec celle que nous suivons, laquelle n'est qu'un embranchement.

La croix Heuland, dont on a fait un monument très-ancien (du XII^e. siècle), n'est que de la seconde moitié du XVI^e. siècle : c'est une croix en pierre comme on en trouve encore quelques-unes, mais qui mérite d'être respectée et soigneusement conservée.

Si l'on aimait à explorer les églises de campagne, on pourrait, en faisant 2 kilomètres sur la route d'Annebault, visiter celle de Branville, dont voici une esquisse et qui appartient à cette architecture du XIII^e. siècle si répandue dans le Calvados, architecture caractérisée par les étroites fenêtres en forme de lancettes et les modillons sous la corniche.

La route de Dives passe à une distance à peu près égale des églises de Gonnevillle et de Douville.

On parcourt, dans l'espace de 3 kilomètres, la crête



Bouet del.

VUE DE L'ÉGLISE DE BRANVILLE.

des côteaux qui bordent la vallée de Grangues et l'on aperçoit, de place en place, la mer et la côte, depuis Dives jusqu'à l'embouchure de l'Orne : ces vues sont délicieuses et très-variées.


Le prieuré de Rouville, qu'on trouve du côté droit de la route, offre des ruines qui ne sont pas sans intérêt pour l'archéologue ; les bâtiments d'habitation étaient accolés à l'église, au milieu d'un beau verger : c'était, du reste, un prieuré peu considérable qui dépendait de l'abbaye de St.-Pierre de Préaux.

Mais hâtons-nous d'arriver à Dives ; on peut y aller par deux voies : la plus directe serait celle qui passe par les plateaux de Grangues et de Trousseauville ; mais la plus douce pour les voitures est celle qui cotoie la vallée de la Dive.

Nous descendrons donc jusqu'à ce que nous trouvions la route de grande communication de *Dozulé à Dives*, qui traverse celle que nous parcourons ; nous suivrons le tronçon de cette route qui se dirige au Nord, et quand nous aurons fait 3 kilomètres, nous serons arrivés à Dive.

Dans ce parcours on passe au pied de la butte de *Basbourg*, point culminant qui domine toute la vallée.

C'est sur cette butte qu'était monté le roi de France, après avoir passé la Dive avec une partie de son armée, tandis que l'autre, arrêtée par le reflux de la mer qui avait grossi la rivière, et poursuivie par les troupes du duc de Normandie, fut *écrasée et en partie noyée*. Le poète Wace fait, dans les vers suivants, une description très-animée de cette déroute de l'armée française par les



Bonet del.

RUINES DU PRIECRÉ DE ROUVILLE.

Normands, en 1060, et je compte rappeler ce fait important par une inscription :

Donc véissiez route haster,
L'un Franceiz l'autre avant bouter (1).
Mult lor annie la cauchie,
K'il truvent lunge et empirie (2),
Et il estoent encumbré
De ço k'il aveint robé :
Mult en véissiez desrouter
E tresbuchier è fors voler,
Ki puiz ne porent relever,
Ne en la dreite route entrer.
El pont passer fu grant la presse
Et la gent mult d'aler en presse (3);
Viez fut li pont, tresbuchent enz,
Li planches caïrent (4) soz li genz,
La mer munta, li flot fut grant,
Sor li pons fu li faiz pesant,
Li pons tresbuchia è chaï,
E ki ke out de suz péri.
Maint en chaï emprez li pont,
Ki devala el plus parfont.
El pont chaïr fu la criée
Mult dolerose et effrée;
Mult véissiez herneiz floter,
Homes plungier et affondrer;
Nus ne se pot vis escaper,
S'il ne fust bien duit (5) de noer (6).

{1} *Pousser.*

(2) *Et mauvaise.*

(3) E la gent mult d'aler engresse * *Mss. de Duchesne.*

(4) *Tombèrent.*

(5) *Accoutumé, instruit.*

(6) *Nager.*

* *Se presse.*

Dives, où le duc Guillaume embarqua une partie de l'armée qui conquît l'Angleterre en 1066, est bien déchue de son ancienne splendeur; et, en voyant la rivière couler tranquillement au milieu des fertiles pâturages, on ne se douterait pas que la flotte du duc Guillaume stationnait, en 1066, là où ruminent aujourd'hui des troupeaux de bœufs.

Mais de grands changements s'opèrent à l'embouchure des rivières par les alluvions qui s'y forment. Wace nous affirme que celle de la Dive était, au X^e. siècle, une baie maritime, quand il dit :

Soubz Varaville vint o sis nés soulement

Là u Dives entre en mer, assez près de Bavent.

Il est positif que des salines existaient à Varaville et sur beaucoup d'autres points de la vallée, et l'on ne peut se refuser à admettre que le sol s'est exhaussé par les apports continuels des eaux (1).

Dives a toujours son port à 2 kilomètres au-dessous du bourg; mais tout porte à croire qu'il a changé de place, et il est certain qu'il a perdu de son importance.

Le seul monument remarquable qui soit à Dives est l'église. Elle appartenait à un prieuré dépendant de l'abbaye de St.-Etienne de Caen, et c'est un édifice assez important que je ne décrirai pas, parce que ma *Statistique monumentale du Calvados* (t. IV) en présentera plusieurs esquisses. Disons seulement, pour fixer les idées,

(1) C'est ce que nous voyons partout. Ravenne, qui était un port de mer au VI^e. siècle, se trouve aujourd'hui à 2 lieues de la mer; de vastes plaines herbées occupent l'emplacement du port où les flottes romaines étaient à l'ancre du temps de Justinien.

que , hormis quelques restes du XI^e. siècle sous la tour , le monument est du XIV^e. et du XV^e. Ainsi , le chœur , avec la grande fenêtre du chevet et les bas-côtés qui l'accompagnent , offre tous les caractères du XIV^e. , aussi bien que les chapelles du transept. La nef et les bas-côtés qui lui correspondent sont de la fin du XV^e. siècle , ou même du commencement du XVI^e.

Rien de plus élégant , de plus habilement découpé que les moulures et les feuillages de la porte occidentale de la nef ; c'est un véritable chef-d'œuvre de sculpture.

On conservait à Dives un Christ fort ancien , qui a disparu , et qui passait pour avoir été pêché dans la mer.

Un tableau assez curieux , qui se voit toujours dans le transept Nord , représente cette découverte et celle de la croix qui s'en était détachée , et qui fut retrouvée deux ans après. Les inscriptions que porte ce tableau m'ont paru mériter d'être transcrites. Les voici. Elles servent , comme on le voit , d'explication aux différentes scènes peintes sur le tableau :

COMME LES
PECHEURS DE DIVES
PECHERENT EN LA MER L'IM-
MAGE DE S^t SAUVEUR SANS CROUX
COMME LES PECHERS DE CABOURG
POUR Y AVOIR PART EURENT GRANDE
ALTERCATION.

COMME APRÈS LE DICT IMAGE FUT PRINS
EN LA MER , IL FUT DICT PAR ENTRE EUX QU'IL
SERAIT APPORTÉ DANS L'ÉGLISE DE DIVE
OU LON LE REÇU EN GRAND JOYE ET
SOLENNITÉ.

COMME AU DICT IMAGE L'ON FICT
TROIS CROUX QUI NE LUI SERVIRENT ,

CAR DEUX SE TROUVERENT TROP
COURTE ET L'AUTRE FUT TREU-
VÉE TROP LONGUE

COMME DEUX

ANS ENSUIVAN APRES L'IN
VENTION DU DICT IMAGE P

LA GRACE DE DIEU LES DICT PE
CHEURS DE DIVES PECHERENT EN LA
MER LA CROUX DU DICT IMAGE EN
LEURS RAYS

COMME LIMAGE ET LA CROUX FURENT
JOINGS ENSEMBLE POUR DIVINE FUT TREUVEY
QUE C'ETAIT LA PREMIERE CROUX DU DICT
IMAGE

COMME PAR APRÉ QUE LIMAGE FUT
CLOUÉ CONTRE LA CROUX ET TOUTE LES
CHOSE SUSDICT RECOUGNU ET DEUBE
MENT AVENU, FUT ELEVÉ EN CROUX
COMME VOYEZ

Les mêmes scènes étaient représentées aux clefs de voûtes, maintenant détruites. Voici ce qu'on lit à ce sujet dans les manuscrits de de Boze à la Bibliothèque impériale.

« A la première arcade, la plus proche du chœur, ladite inscription supportée par un ange en demi-relief :

Lan de grace mil et un le sixiesme jour d'aoust au dit an print limage de S^t Sauveur en ceste église son repos, le S^t. image sans croix vint. mais deux ans après ly vint la croix que sur la mer vi par marinaux. Dieu le v . . . que par eux fut accomplys.

« A la clef de la seconde arcade, sur laquelle est gravé et figuré un vaisseau rempli de plusieurs matelots et qui est surmonté d'un ange en demi-relief qui semble indiquer auxdits matelots ladite image de saint Sauveur, les mots suivants sont écrits et gravés » :

De la grace de Dieu les marinaux de Dives leverent de la mer St Sauveur en leurs rets.

« A la clef de la troisième arcade est la figure de saint Sauveur en croix , en relief. »

« A la quatrième sont gravés et figurés , en bas-relief, des charpentiers travaillant à faire une croix pour l'église St.-Sauveur. »

Il paraît qu'au XVI^e. siècle l'église et le cimetière étaient fortifiés.

La Société Linnéenne ou d'histoire naturelle a tenu plusieurs de ses réunions à Dives, où elle trouvait, dans les fossiles des falaises des *Vaches-Noires*, d'intéressants sujets de recherches. Les plantes des marais et des dunes méritent aussi l'attention des botanistes. — M. Morière leur recommande les espèces suivantes :

Marais d'Auge. — *Stellaria glauca*, Smith; *Lathyrus palustris*, L.; *Comarum palustre*, L.; *Rumex maritimus*, L.; *Sparganium natans*, L.; *Carex filiformis*, L.; *Carex caespitosa*, Good.; *Scirpus uniglumis*, Link.; *Calamagrostis lanceolata*, Roth.; *Polystichum Thelypteris*, Roth.

Dives. — *Adonis æstivalis*, L.; *Cochlearia Danica*, L.; *Reseda phyteuma*, L.; *Trifolium maritimum*, Huds.; *Caulis latifolia*, L.; *Oenanthe Lachenalii*, Gmel.; *Euphrasia Jaubertiana*, Bor.; *Orobanche cærulea*, Vill.; *Statice limonium et pseudolimonium*; *Armeria pubescens*, Link.; *Blitum polymorphum*, Mey; *Atriplex littoralis*, L.; *Hippophaerhamnoïdes*, L.; *Urtica pilulifera*, L.; *Salix aurita*, L.; *Juncus bulbosus*, L.; *Kæleria albescens*, D. C.; *Lepturus filiformis*, Tr.

Beuzeval. — *Lepidium draba*; *Bupleurum tenuissimum*.

Cabourg. — *Silene conica*, L.; *Melilotus leucantha*, Koch; *Trifolium scabrum*, L.; *Helosciadium repens*, Koch; *Gentiana amarella*, L.; *Bupleurum aristatum*, Bartl.; *Chondrilla juncea*, L.; *Orobanche Galii*, Duby; *Rumex maritimus et palustris*, L.; *Euphorbia Portlandica*, L.; *Salix repens*, L.; *Orchis coriophora*, L.

Merville. — *Astragalus Bayonensis*, Lois; *Liparis Loeselii*, Rich.


Il y a quelques années, la Société Linnéenne fêtait, à Dives, le savant Léopold de Buch, de Berlin, venu à Caen pour visiter nos terrains du Calvados, et portait, à la fin du banquet, un toast à l'illustre comte Alexandre de Humboldt. La présence de Léopold de Buch à Dives est le fait le plus récent qui se rattache à l'histoire de la localité.

Il ne me reste plus, en terminant, qu'à rappeler que j'ai proposé d'ériger, à mes frais, sur l'éminence qui domine le bourg de Dives, une borne monumentale commémorative de l'expédition de Guillaume-le-Conquérant en 1066, et que ce projet recevra bientôt son exécution (1).

Ce fut à Dives, comme on le sait, que le duc Guillaume embarqua une grande partie des provisions de sa flotte et de son armée. Chose remarquable, nous trouvons dans la partie de la tapisserie de la reine Mathilde conservée à Bayeux et qui représente la conquête de l'Angleterre, un

(1) J'aurais de longs détails à donner sur la géologie du pays et sur les falaises qui bordent les côtes de Dives et de Trouville; mais je préfère renvoyer à ma Topographie géognostique du Calvados, qui renferme sur ce sujet plus de renseignements que je ne pourrais en consigner ici.

charriot à quatre roues transportant au port, des lances et du cidre ou de la bière, dans un de ces petits tonneaux allongés et très-bombés au centre qui sont encore en usage dans le Pays-d'Auge et que l'on y connaît sous la dénomination de *barils*.



Ainsi, depuis plus de sept siècles ce tonneau est en usage; on comprend que, tant que les chemins ont été aussi mauvais qu'ils pouvaient l'être au moyen-âge, on n'ait pu se servir d'autre chose : le baril se transporte facilement à dos de cheval, et il est beaucoup plus facile à remuer que les grands tonneaux quand on veut le placer sur une charrette.

Pour revenir de Dives à Trouville, le chemin le plus court est celui qui suit le rivage, au pied des falaises, à partir de l'embouchure de la rivière; on verrait avec intérêt les falaises très-élevées qui existent de ce point jusqu'à Villers, et si l'on s'occupait de géologie, on ferait sur la stratification des couches d'intéressantes observations, en même temps que l'on pourrait recueillir des coquilles fossiles auxquelles le fer sulfuré donne une teinte bronzée qu'elles n'ont pas dans la plupart des autres formations; on verrait un des plus beaux gisements d'argile d'Oxford que l'on puisse observer en France, et au-dessus de ce vaste dépôt quelques bancs oolithiques, puis, au sommet, la craie verte ou *green sand*.

Mais, pour revenir par le rivage, il faut être à cheval, les voitures ne peuvent plus y passer, et comme je parle

pour des personnes qui voyagent en voiture avec le confortable dont nous a dotés la civilisation actuelle, nous ne pouvons guères les promener par cette voie. Il n'y a pas 40 ans que c'était pourtant la route ordinaire de Caen à Rouen.


Nous reviendrons donc par la route déjà parcourue jusqu'à celle que nous avons quittée en face de la chaussée de Varaville, mais nous la traverserons sans nous arrêter, afin de suivre la direction du Sud pour arriver au bourg de Dozulé. La vallée de la Dive, que nous suivrons ainsi en la remontant, l'espace de 8 kilomètres, est toujours bornée, à l'Est, par des éminences composées d'argile d'Oxford avec quelques lambeaux de la formation de la craie aux sommets.

Brucourt est la première localité que nous rencontrons à notre gauche après avoir traversé la route de Trouville à Caen : ce lieu est connu depuis long-temps à cause de la fontaine minérale qui y amène chaque année un certain nombre de buveurs. Ce sont des eaux chargées de fer, d'acide carbonique et de sulfate de fer.

Criqueville est à 2 kilomètres de Brucourt, du même côté.

Le château de Criqueville est une construction assez remarquable qui appartenait à la famille de Launay. La grande salle, au rez-de-chaussée, renferme une magnifique cheminée portant la date 1584. Les poutres ont encore conservé quelques peintures.

Cette famille avait une chapelle seigneuriale dans l'église de Criqueville; on en a fait la sacristie, et sous cette chapelle était un caveau qui renfermait plusieurs cercueils de plomb. L'inscription suivante, gravée sur



Pouet del.

VUE DU CHATEAU DE CRIQUEVILLE.

une table de marbre noir , existe encore dans la sacristie, où je l'ai copiée.

D. O. M.

Soubz cette voute reposent attendans le dernier jugement , les cendres de noble dame Marguerite Richart dame de Hérouville et Ranville , femme de feu mess^{re} Robert de Launay , gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du Roi et ch^{er} de son ordre , S^r de Criqueville , duquel mariage elle eut deux fils et une fille , Lainé desquels luy survécut. Et après avoir fait bâtir et dotté cette chapelle ou le dit S^r son mary et elle sont inhumez fonda une messe tous les jours de la sepmaine et un service annuel en la dite chapelle , une messe qui se doit célébrer tous les samedis en l'eglise Notre dame de la Délivrande près de Caen et une autre encor tous les jeudis de l'année avec un service annuel au couvent des carmes de la même ville. Pleine de piété envers les religieux , charitable envers les pauvres , très vertueuse et bien avisée en la conduite de ses actions , s'estant dans le travail d'une longue maladie retirée de la conversation du monde pour vaquer entre les siens au service de Dieu et se préparer à la mort , décéda en sa maison à Caen le IX de septembre M DC XVI.

Post luctum fratris quem funus mersit acerbum

Proh dolor en matri ducimus exequias

Ille obiit juvenis propecta hanc sustulit etas

Funera sunt tamen hæc utraque acerba mihi.

Matri obtime ac benemerenti filius mærens posuit.


Requiescat in pace.

Des endiguements considérables , qui ont été exécutés aux environs du château pour le garantir des dérivaisons de la petite rivière d'Oudon , remontent en partie à l'époque du château. Ces grands travaux doivent procéder des mêmes hommes , de ceux qui élevaient des châteaux à hauts toits et à murailles épaisses.

L'abbaye de Royal-Pré était située près de Criqueville , mais il n'en reste presque plus rien.

Nous allons prendre la route de Caen à Rouen , en-

deçà du bourg de Dozulé, que cette route traverse dans toute sa longueur. Avant d'arriver à cette route on distingue, à 2 kilomètres vers l'Ouest, la tour et l'église de Goustranville; nous ne pourrons visiter ce monument. C'est d'ailleurs une église intéressante par son architecture; la nef est romane; on y remarque deux portes, l'une, à l'Ouest, ornée d'un double zigzag, l'autre, au Nord, décorée de quatre rangs du même ornement. La tour latérale, au Nord, est de deux époques : de transition, à sa partie inférieure; du XIV^e. siècle ou du XV^e., dans sa partie supérieure. Terminée en plate-forme, son ensemble



TOUR DE L'ÉGLISE DE GOSTRANVILLE.

rappelle, sous certains rapports, le charmant campanille de la cathédrale de Florence.

Dozulé s'est accru avec une rapidité étonnante, depuis l'établissement de la grande route de Rouen, qui autrefois passait par Dives pour se rendre à Honfleur. Le bourg de Dozulé offre une belle rue, dont les maisons sont en contact comme à la ville. L'église, qui était trop éloignée, a été reconstruite, il y a peu d'années, dans le style gothique, à l'extrémité du bourg, par M. Vérolles, architecte du département.

Il y a chaque semaine, à Dozulé, un marché considérable.

En sortant de Dozulé, la route est conduite au milieu d'une vallée creusée dans l'argile d'Oxford (1) et dominée par des coteaux recouverts de craie verte. On voit à gauche le village d'Angerville, dont les seigneurs étaient à la conquête de l'Angleterre. Une motte féodale, près de l'église, indique l'emplacement de leur château.

A 3 kilomètres d'Angerville, on remarquera, du côté gauche de la route, le joli chalet de M. de Roissy, inspecteur de l'Association normande.

Tout près de ce point, à Annebault, dont le seigneur était à la conquête en 1066 (2), la route quitte la vallée pour franchir les coteaux et parvenir sur un vaste plateau formé par la craie, qui s'étend jusqu'à Pont-l'Evêque (3).

Dans cet intervalle, rien ne vient frapper les regards du voyageur. A une lieue de Pont-l'Evêque et à un quart de lieue au Nord de la route est situé le bourg de Beaumont, renommé par son couvent de Bénédictins, fondé,

(1) V. ma Carte géologique du Calvados.

(2) Les ruines du château existent dans un bois, au Sud de la route.
(Voir le V^e. volume de mon Cours d'antiquités monumentales.)

(3) V. ma Carte géologique du Calvados.

en 1066, par Robert Bertrand, seigneur de Roncheville. Ce prieuré, dépendant de St.-Ouen de Rouen, dirigeait, avant la Révolution, une école militaire dans laquelle une de nos grandes illustrations, le savant La Place, avait professé les mathématiques.


Quand l'archevêque de Rouen, Odon Rigault, visita le prieuré de Beaumont en 1267, il y trouva douze moines. Il paraît qu'ils possédaient alors une bibliothèque; car Odon leur prescrivit de *faire le catalogue de tous leurs manuscrits* et de l'inscrire sur le grand livre de l'église. Il ordonna aussi au prieur de faire souvent la visite des cassettes des moines, pour les empêcher de s'attacher aux biens du monde et de rien posséder en propriété.



CHEVET DE L'ÉGLISE DE BEAUMONT.

L'église paroissiale, qui est celle du prieuré, est de

diverses époques ; la travée suivante donne un spécimen des parties les plus anciennes.



TRAVÉE DE L'ÉGLISE DE BEAUMONT.

C'est avec plaisir qu'on lira , dans le chœur , l'inscription suivante érigée par les moines , en 1788 , à la mémoire du fondateur Robert-Bertrand de Roncheville :

HIC JACENT
ROBERTUS BERTRAN
BARO ET VICECOMES

DE RONCEVILLA
ET SUZANNA EJUS UXOR
HUIUS MONASTERII
FUNDATORES
ANNO DOMINI
MILLESIMO SEXAGESIMO
HANC LAPIDEM VETERI EXESO
POSUERE MONACHI CONG^{nis}.
S^{ti} MAURI ANNO SALUTIS
1783

On voudrait en voir de pareilles dans tous les établissements religieux. L'histoire locale y gagnerait et serait mieux connue.

Une partie du monastère subsiste encore, il en existe une ancienne vue très-curieuse dans la collection du *Monasticon gallicanum*, que j'ai reproduite dans ma *Statistique monumentale du Calvados*.

M. Follebarbe, de Beaumont, qui a rendu déjà bien des services à son pays, a eu l'heureuse idée d'élever, dans le bourg, un monument à la mémoire du célèbre mathématicien La Place (1).

Le marché hebdomadaire de Beaumont est un des plus importants du pays pour les bestiaux.

De Beaumont une route excellente nous conduit à celle de Pont-l'Evêque à Trouville, que nous avons suivie dans notre première excursion.

Nous traverserons Roncheville d'où tirait son nom la famille Bertrand, fondatrice de Beaumont; et, après avoir passé la Touque, nous ne serons plus qu'à 6 kilomètres de Trouville, à la hauteur de St.-Martin-aux-Chartrains.

(1) La Place naquit à Beaumont le 22 mars 1749; il est mort à Paris le 5 mars 1837.

3°. EXCURSION

DE TROUVILLE A HONFLEUR

PAR CRIQUEBŒUF ET EQUEMAUVILLE.

Retour par la plage jusqu'à Villerville, et par les plateaux depuis
Villerville jusqu'à Trouville.

La plupart des baigneurs viennent à Trouville par le Havre, depuis qu'un service de bateaux à vapeur a été établi entre ces deux villes : ils n'ont donc pu visiter Honfleur, et ce sera pour eux un but de promenade qui occupera agréablement une de leurs journées de loisir.

Il faudra partir de bonne heure, monter vers la forêt de Touques, et suivre la route qui conduit à Honfleur par Criquebœuf. Avant d'arriver à cette commune, on pourra visiter le château de Villerville, qui appartient à M^{me}. la vicomtesse de Banville.

L'église de Criquebœuf est intéressante et pittoresque. C'est un monument de transition, c'est-à-dire qui appartient au XII^e. siècle, époque à laquelle l'architecture se transforma en passant du style *roman* au style *ogival* ou

gothique. Un lierre couvre une partie des murs de cette église abandonnée, dont nous avons réclaté la conservation et que nous avons fait classer au nombre des monuments historiques du Calvados. Cette église, dont le patronage appartenait au seigneur de la localité au XIV^e. siècle, appartenait au chapitre de Cléry dans le XVI^e.; avant la Révolution ce chapitre en était encore possesseur.

Dans la vallée qui se trouve à peu de distance de l'église, on peut observer un gisement considérable de travertin ou tuf calcaire que les eaux de la vallée continuent à former. Elles incrustent encore aujourd'hui les mousses, les plantes, et même les coquilles d'eau douce, mais il est facile de reconnaître qu'elles ont anciennement formé des dépôts beaucoup plus considérables, et que leur puissance incrustante a beaucoup diminué. Partout on observe la même décroissance, et il n'est pas rare de trouver des roches considérables de travertin là où il s'en forme aujourd'hui très-peu. C'est dans la craie que j'ai trouvé le plus fréquemment ces tufs calcaires. On s'en est beaucoup servi pour bâtir au moyen âge dans nos pays, et l'on sait que les Romains ont construit une partie de leurs édifices avec le travertin, dans la campagne de Rome.

La route laisse Pennedepie sur la gauche pour incliner vers Equemauville, commune dont l'église appartenait encore, au dernier siècle, au chapitre de N.-D.-de-Cléry.

A partir du village d'Equemauville, on entre dans la route de Caen à Rouen.

Cette arrivée de Honfleur est magnifique et bordée d'une belle avenue d'ormes.

Honfleur a deux églises : l'une, S^{te}.-Catherine, est



TOUR DE L'ÉGLISE SAINTE-CATHERINE.

construite en bois, et n'a guère de remarquable que cette bizarrerie. Elle se compose de deux nefs parallèles et accolées, dont l'une, plus ancienne que l'autre, peut dater des dernières années du XV^e. siècle ou du commencement du XVI^e.

La tour est séparée de l'église, et se trouve au-delà de la rue qui passe devant le portail occidental.

Le portail de St.-Léonard annonce, par la délicatesse de ses moulures, le XVI^e. siècle, tout au plus le commencement du règne de Louis XII. Le reste de l'église a été refait en très-grande partie.


La tour, en forme de cloche, n'est que du XVIII^e. siècle.

On trouvera dans l'ouvrage de M. La Butte, un grand nombre de détails curieux sur l'histoire de Honfleur et sur ses fortifications, dont il ne reste plus que quelques débris.

De grands travaux hydrauliques, dirigés par M. l'ingénieur en chef Tostain, ont sensiblement amélioré le port; les nouvelles jetées sont à visiter.

Quelques maisons anciennes existent encore à Honfleur, mais, comme partout, le nombre en diminue rapidement. Celle qui suit est la plus intéressante, je crois, de celles qui subsistent. Elle est en bois et conserve encore la plupart de ses moulures, quoique les fenêtres aient été élargies.

Notre-Dame-de-Grâce, petite chapelle dédiée à la Sainte Vierge et très-vénérée des marins, s'élève au sommet de la falaise qui domine la mer, à l'Ouest de Honfleur. Il ne faut pas oublier de gravir cette éminence; on jouit de là d'une vue magnifique. La chapelle actuelle n'a



MAISON DE BOIS A HONFLEUR.

point de caractère, elle est d'une architecture peu ancienne.



CHAPELLE DE NOTRE-DAME-DE-GRACE.

Pour ne pas revenir à Trouville par la même route , on pourra suivre les bords de la mer par Vasouy , Pennedepie et Villerville. Là il faudra rentrer dans les terres , car les voitures ne peuvent plus , comme elles le faisaient autrefois , passer sous les falaises de Hennequeville , la mer étant encombrée de blocs de pierre. On devra d'ailleurs , si l'on fait cette excursion , s'informer de l'état de la route jusqu'à Villerville , parce qu'il peut changer d'une année à l'autre. Si l'on faisait cette excursion à cheval , elle n'offrirait aucune difficulté.

Géologie. — L'exploration des falaises , entre Honfleur et Trouville , est chose facile , et bien des géologues l'entreprennent. En sortant de la ville , sous la côte de Grâce , on voit des couches de craie fortement chloritées ,

représentant le *green sand* ou grès vert. La falaise s'abaisse à Vasouy et à Pennedepie, où on commence à trouver très-développée l'argile de Honfleur, avec des fossiles nacrés, décrits par M. Deslongchamps et cités dans ma Topographie géognostique du Calvados. Au-delà de Villerville, l'argile de Honfleur s'élève, et l'on voit surgir graduellement des calcaires appartenant au groupe de l'oolite supérieure, et qui atteignent une assez grande hauteur à Hennequeville. On peut consulter la coupe figurative que j'ai donnée de ces falaises, dans l'atlas de ma Topographie géognostique du Calvados.

L'argile de Honfleur que plusieurs géologues regardent comme identique avec le *Kimeridge-clay* est bleuâtre, grise, rarement jaunâtre; elle alterne, principalement vers le bas avec des couches peu épaisses d'un calcaire marneux également bleu, au milieu desquelles on remarque quelquefois des concrétions de calcaire compacte jaunâtre.

On voit en outre dans les falaises de Hennequeville et de Villerville, alternant avec les marnes précédentes (principalement vers la partie inférieure) un grès dont la pâte argilo-siliceuse est remplie de globules oolithiques très-luisants, de fer oxidé et qui contient des lignites, des coquilles formant parfois lumachelle et un grand nombre de grains de quartz hyalin jaunâtre dont le volume varie depuis la grosseur d'un plomb de chasse jusqu'à celle d'une noisette. Lorsque les grains de quartz disparaissent, ce qui arrive fréquemment, les couches de grès se changent en calcaire marneux, et se confondent avec l'argile bleue. Ce grès présente aussi des couches d'un grain très-fin, plus dures et plus siliceuses que les autres qui ne contiennent pas de fer oolithique; elles se lient à un calcaire placé au-dessous de l'argile de Honfleur et que l'on a désigné sous le nom de *calcaire de Blangy*.

Ces diverses couches se trouvent réunies dans la falaise de Hennequeville, dont on peut esquisser la coupe ainsi qu'il suit :

COUPE DE LA FALAISE DE HENNEQUEVILLE.


Craie.	{	1°. Craie avec silex grisâtre et un grand nombre d'Alcyons environ	400	pieds.
		2°. Terre verte	40	
	{	3°. Argile de Honfleur	60	
		4°. <i>Id.</i> alternant avec plusieurs couches de grès ferrugineux rempli de grains de quartz hyalin et de globules de fer oolithique.	20	
		5°. <i>Id.</i> alternant avec plusieurs couches d'un grès plus compacte, et rempli de coquilles brisées formant une sorte de lumachelle.	10	
		6°. Grès plus siliceux que le précédent et contenant moins de coquilles.	6	


On trouve au milieu des couches, des noyaux aplatis d'un calcaire lithographique très-compacte et du fer oolithique disséminé.

Calcaire de Blangy et grès.	{	7°. Calcaire siliceux fort dur contenant des globules de fer oolithique (partie supérieure du calcaire de Blangy).	1	pied.
		8°. Calcaire blanchâtre siliceux et feuilleté passant au silex nectique.	3	
		9°. Calcaire semblable au n°. 7.	2 p.	1/2.
		10°. <i>Id.</i> rempli de moules intérieurs de Trigonies.	1	1/2
		11°. Plusieurs couches plus ou moins dures de calcaire semblable au précédent.	3	
		12°. Silex noir en couche, passant à un grès grisâtre et finissant par se confondre avec le calcaire.	1/2	pied.
		13°. Plusieurs couches calcaires passant au grès.	4	
		14°. Calcaire jaunâtre sans coquilles (pierre à chaux de Blangy) plusieurs couches.	5	
		15°. Marne blanche.	1	
		16°. Calcaire d'un blanc jaunâtre renfermant des moules de coquilles turriculées (Nérinées?)	6	

Coral-rag.	{	17°. Marne blanchâtre.	1 1/2 pied.
		18°. Calcaire semblable au n°. 16.	2
		19°. Calcaire rempli de Polypiers (coral-rag).	6
		20°. <i>Id.</i> plus compacte.	5
		21°. Oolite du coral-rag.	

Les mêmes superpositions pourraient s'observer à l'intérieur des terres, le long des vallées, si les pentes étaient abruptes comme dans les falaises; mais elles sont, on le sait, très-douces pour la plupart, et les éboulements des couches supérieures sont venus glisser sur les couches moyennes et inférieures. Néanmoins, sur certains points, l'excavation des vallées fournit au géologue des coupes très-intéressantes, indiquant assez nettement l'ordre des différents dépôts.





SÉANCE TENUE PAR L'ASSOCIATION NORMANDE

à Trouville, en 1869.

QUELQUES NOTIONS

SUR

L'AGRICULTURE DE LA VALLÉE DE LA TOUQUE

ET DES CONTRÉES VOISINES.

L'Association normande tenait, en 1849, à Trouville, dans la salle de conversation des bains, une séance publique à laquelle assistaient un grand nombre de dames et de personnes distinguées : toutes recueillaient avec empressement des notions sur l'agriculture et la statistique agricole du pays, et la séance offrait un véritable intérêt aux auditeurs.

Persuadé que ces notions n'exciteront pas moins l'attention des baigneurs en 1853 qu'elles ne l'avaient fait en 1849, nous présentons ici le résumé de l'enquête qui a eu lieu sur l'état de l'agriculture.

Exploitation des prairies. — Les prairies de la Touque nourrissent un grand nombre de bestiaux pour la boucherie et seulement quelques vaches à lait.

Les bœufs que l'on met à l'engrais dans les herbages

ou prairies d'ambouche, viennent de contrées plus ou moins éloignées, du *Cotentin*, de la *Bretagne*, du *Maine* et du *Poitou*, quelques-uns même de plus loin. Mais c'est particulièrement aux foires qui se tiennent dans les pays indiqués que les fermiers et les propriétaires du Pays-d'Auge vont acheter les bestiaux maigres. Le pays n'en élève qu'une très-petite quantité par suite des frais que l'élevage entraîne, et parce que les vaches à lait étant relativement en petit nombre, leurs productions deviennent elles-mêmes des vaches à lait, si ce sont des genisses, et passent à la boucherie au bout de quelques semaines pour l'approvisionnement du pays en veau, si ce sont des mâles.

Sans doute on pourrait élever dans le Pays-d'Auge, si les fermiers y étaient plus soigneux et plus actifs. M. Durand s'est efforcé de les faire entrer dans cette voie, mais il n'est pas probable que d'ici à long-temps on puisse les y déterminer. Ils prétendent qu'ils gagnent plus à convertir en fromage le lait que consomment les jeunes veaux. C'est une question que nous n'avons nullement l'intention de discuter ici.

Les bœufs achetés hors de la Normandie ou les vaches que l'on destine à la boucherie parce qu'elles ne donnent pas assez de lait (vaches dont on achète aussi une partie dans des foires plus ou moins éloignées) sont donc mis au printemps dans les prairies en quantité proportionnée à la fertilité du fond; cela s'appelle *charger les herbages*. Pour charger les herbages, c'est-à-dire pour acheter le bétail nécessaire quand l'herbe vient à pousser, les fermiers qui ne sont pas, comme on le dit, *au-dessus de leurs affaires*, c'est-à-dire qui n'ont pas su amasser une certaine somme d'argent par les bénéfices de

leur commerce, sont obligés d'emprunter pour *faire leurs foires* et ils rendent cet argent quand les bestiaux sont gras et peuvent être vendus pour la boucherie, à Poissy ou sur d'autres marchés.

Jadis la Normandie avait, avec le Nivernais, le privilège à peu près exclusif d'approvisionner Paris ; aujourd'hui, par suite de l'établissement des chemins de fer, qui rapprochent de la capitale les pays d'élèves, les fermiers de ces pays se sont livrés à l'engraissement et font une concurrence sérieuse aux pâturages normands, en même temps qu'ils exigent de leurs animaux maigres un prix plus élevé qu'autrefois.

Un bœuf qui se vend *sur pied* au marché de Poissy 45 à 50 centimes le demi-kilo, en a souvent coûté 35, maigre. L'herbager gagne donc 2 sous par livre sur l'animal qu'il a nourri pendant plusieurs mois, quelquefois toute la saison d'été.

Le grand talent des acheteurs de bestiaux est de distinguer ceux qui s'engraisseront le plus facilement et aussi de les placer dans le fond qui leur convient. Tel herbager, d'après l'opinion commune, convient à des bœufs du Cotentin et ne convient pas aussi bien à des bœufs du Poitou et réciproquement.

On appelle *bœufs d'hiver* ceux qui sont engraisés au foin l'hiver, dans les étables, pour être livrés à la boucherie au printemps.

Le produit des vaches à lait consiste en beurre et en fromage ; le beurre de la vallée d'Auge serait aussi bon que celui d'Isigny et du Bessin si les fermiers voulaient soigner leurs laiteries et procéder comme on le fait dans l'arrondissement de Bayeux, mais ils ont leur routine dont ils ne veulent pas se départir : par exemple, ils

coulent souvent leur lait dans l'appartement où ils font le fromage, ce qui nous paraît d'autant plus mauvais que l'odeur et la fermentation du fromage doivent donner un mauvais goût à la crème.

Dans la séance tenue par l'Association normande, à Trouville, en 1849, M. Durand s'exprimait ainsi :

De quel appareil, de celui représenté par la vache à lait, ou de celui représenté par le bœuf à l'engrais, retire-t-on le meilleur profit? Je pense que c'est de la vache à lait qu'on retire la plus grande quantité de principes alimentaires. Effectivement, la vache à lait dépensant moitié plus d'aliments et en tirant un aussi bon parti, il s'ensuit que l'on n'a qu'une ration d'entretien pour la vache à lait.

Mais *sous quelle forme employer le lait?* Auprès des grandes villes on trouve le débit du lait, et là il se vend 25 centimes le double-litre, 50 cent. aux environs de Paris. Le lait, vendu 25 cent. est vendu moitié moins cher que ne représente sa valeur nutritive ; car, en faisant l'analyse d'un double-litre, on trouve autant de principes alimentaires que dans une livre de viande, qui se vend 50 cent. Mais n'y a-t-il point une forme sous laquelle le lait peut rapporter plus que 25 cent. ? Oui, cette forme est trouvée : c'est le *fromage de Camembert ou celui de Pont-l'Évêque*. Le jour où ces fromages seront connus au loin, les agriculteurs n'en feront pas assez pour la consommation. Or, pour un fromage de Camembert, il faut un double-litre de lait, et il se vend 50 cent. au bout de quelques mois. Or, une vache, donnant 20 litres de lait par jour, peut donner dix fromages et produire 5 francs par jour ; tandis que le lait vendu dans les con-

ditions les plus avantageuses ne donne que 2 francs 50 cent. Le fromage de Pont-l'Évêque ne peut rapporter moins : avec 6 litres de lait on fait un fromage, vendu de 1 fr. 50 cent à 2 fr. ; d'où il suit que l'on obtient encore 5 fr. , c'est-à-dire moitié plus que le prix du lait , vendu à 25 cent. le double-litre. Il est donc important que l'on encourage et que l'on propage le commerce du fromage de Pont-l'Évêque , et que l'on donne des récompenses à ceux qui y apporteraient des améliorations.

Il ne faut pas croire que le fromage ne puisse se faire que dans certaines contrées, par suite de la diversité des pâturages. Le pâturage peut avoir de l'influence ; mais on l'a exagérée. Ainsi l'on a fait dans divers pâturages de bons fromages de Camembert , ailleurs qu'à Camembert.

Je dis donc que c'est la forme du Camembert ou du Pont-l'Évêque qui est la meilleure.

Le Livarot est fait avec du lait écrémé, et vendu immédiatement. Une vache, qui donne 20 litres de lait par jour, fait deux fromages de Livarot, et 750 grammes (une livre et demie) de beurre : ces deux fromages se vendent 50 cent. chacun, *maximum* ; et une livre et demie de beurre produit 1 fr. 50, ce qui fait 2 fr. 50 cent. ; plus le petit lait que l'on a dans l'un et l'autre cas.

Pourquoi donc fait-on du Livarot ? — C'est qu'on en trouve plus facilement le débit, et qu'on l'exporte dans les départements voisins. Sans doute il ne faudrait pas que tous les agriculteurs fissent tout Pont-l'Évêque et abandonnassent le Livarot ; l'important, c'est de provoquer une meilleure fabrication.

Exploitation des terres de labour. — L'arrondissement de Pont-l'Évêque, entrecoupé de coteaux et de vallons,

est divisé en deux parties distinctes : l'une , composée de vallées larges et profondes , arrosées par des cours d'eau ; l'autre , de plateaux essentiellement appropriés à la culture des céréales.

La craie , les argiles de Honfleur , le coral-rag et l'oxford-clay , forment , comme on doit le prévoir , des zones agronomiques très-distinctes.

L'agriculture des plateaux ou terres labourées est moins avancée que dans la plupart des autres contrées du département.

L'assolement triennal , avec jachères , est le plus en usage. Il y a quelques exceptions.

La profondeur moyenne des labours est de 0 m. 15 c. environ ; elle est nécessairement déterminée , assez souvent , par la mince épaisseur de la couche arable ; autrefois à peine on égratignait la terre ; il faut , au contraire , labourer le plus profondément qu'il est possible , en piquant jusqu'au sous-sol.

Suivant la nature des terres , on fait des sillons plus ou moins larges. Ils ont de quatre à huit raies. Les petits sillons sont le plus en usage.

On donne cinq labours , pour le blé , sur les plateaux , et quatre seulement dans les vallées. — Plus le terrain est compact , plus il a besoin de labours.

Une charrue , sur laquelle on attèle parfois deux bœufs , et un cheval devant , pour les terres compactes , deux chevaux pour les terrains plus légers , peut labourer 35 à 40 ares seulement dans les terres compactes , 50 à 60 environ dans les terrains plantés en pommiers , et habituellement 80 ares à 1 hectare dans les sols moins difficiles.

On se sert de l'ancienne charrue normande. Sa construc-

tion est à peu près partout la même. Toutefois, on emploie exclusivement les charrues légères à versoir en fer pour les terrains de la *campagne* ou des plateaux, et on en a adopté de plus pesantes, présentant un versoir en bois de frêne ou de pommier, dans les terres très-fortes ou tenaces.

Les variétés de blé cultivées dans l'arrondissement sont :

Le blé blanc;

Le blé rouge.

Le blé blanc est le plus répandu dans une grande partie des *campagnes*, sur les plateaux. Sa paille est mise au premier rang parmi celles de froment, pour la nourriture du bétail.

On cultive trois sortes d'avoine : *rouge*, *blanche* et *grise*. On sème l'avoine blanche au printemps. L'avoine d'hiver est cultivée dans les communes d'Equemauville et de Genneville. Elle donne un produit plus considérable et meilleur en grain et en paille que les espèces du printemps.

La quantité de blé à employer dans les semailles varie suivant la nature du sol. Il faut, par acre (97 ares 25 centiares), deux hectolitres de blé dans les bonnes terres, — deux hectolitres un quart dans un terrain ordinaire.

La meilleure époque pour ensemercer le froment paraît être le milieu d'octobre; mais on sème toujours de bonne heure sur les plateaux. Généralement, on commence à semer à la St.-Michel; il reste très-peu de semailles à faire à la Toussaint.

On change les semences de nature de terrain, c'est-à-dire qu'on emploie à l'ensemencement des terres argileuses les grains récoltés sur les terrains calcaires. Les cultiva-

teurs du canton de Honfleur les font venir des communes de Bonneville-sur-Touque et de Canapville.

La récolte du blé se fait encore à la faucille , quoique l'on commence à faucher.

On récolte environ de 250 à 300 gerbes par hectare. Il faut 12 ou 15 gerbes pour donner 1 hectolitre de grain , pesant, en bonne moyenne, 80 kilogrammes.

Dans les cantons de Blangy, de Cambremer et de Dozulé, il y a des terres qui rapportent jusqu'à 20 hectolitres par hectare. — Le produit des terrains de mauvaise qualité est trop souvent de 12 hectolitres. — L'hectare donne, terme moyen , 16 hectolitres.

Dans plusieurs communes du canton de Pont-l'Evêque (Saint-Martin , Canapville , etc.), le rendement du blé varie depuis 20 jusqu'à 25 hectolitres à l'hectare.

Le canton d'Honfleur ne diffère pas sensiblement de celui de Pont-l'Evêque : pourtant le minimum de la récolte est, pour dix communes de ce canton, de 18 hectol.

Généralement, dans le pays, selon que le sol est médiocre ou fertile, cultivé avec négligence ou avec soin, on trouve le terme moyen entre 18 et 25 hectolitres.

Le poids de l'hectolitre de froment varie de 70 à 80 kil.

Les plantes cultivées dans les prairies artificielles sont le trèfle, la luzerne, le sainfoin, l'ivraie d'Italie ou raygras.

On coupe le trèfle deux fois, et on le fait pâturer ensuite. Il produit à l'hectare de 1,200 à 1,400 bottes environ, chacune pesant 6 kilog. 1/2.

Le trèfle incarnat n'est cultivé que pour la nourriture au vert. Il rend au moins 5,000 kilog. par hectare.

La luzerne réussit fort bien sur la côte. On la cultive à

Bourgeauville , Trouville , Glanville , etc. On n'en trouve pas dans le canton d'Honfleur. Elle dure six à sept ans. On peut en faire trois coupes. Un hectare de luzerne donne 7,000 kilog. de fourrages.

La culture du sainfoin n'est pas très-répandue. Il est cultivé avec succès au Mont-Canisy, sur les buttes de Benerville et de Deauville. On le coupe deux fois. Le grand sainfoin donne 6,000 kilog. à l'hectare, et le petit ordinairement 5,000.

On emploie rarement la chaux dans l'arrondissement de Pont-l'Evêque, parce qu'elle n'y est pas à bon marché. — Son prix est de 1 fr. 50 c. à 3 fr. l'hectolitre.

La chaux est presque toujours mise en compost.

Exceptionnellement, quelques cultivateurs mêlent du fumier à la chaux.

Il faut fumer la terre pour chaque ensemencement.

Depuis un temps immémorial, on se sert, le long du rivage, de varech, de chien de mer, d'astéries ou étoiles de mer, appelées vulgairement *fifottes*.

En général, on trouve la marne dans les cantons de Cambremer, de Blangy, de Dozulé et de Honfleur. Il y en a de blanche et de grise.

La marne grise a ordinairement un effet prompt, mais qui ne se soutient pas; la blanche est meilleure que la grise, et son effet dure plus long-temps.

On la dépose sur le sol, en lignes parallèles, par petits tas égaux. On marne tous les 25 ans.

Le marnage diffère beaucoup, suivant les localités.

Dans le canton de Honfleur, on met 300 hectolitres à l'hectare, et même jusqu'à 600.

Dans le canton de Blangy, on emploie la marne jusqu'à concurrence de 40 mètres cubes par hectare, et le sol en

a pour 30 ans; mais, communément, on ne donne qu'un demi marnage, parce qu'il est d'expérience que trop de marne prive d'une bonne récolte, et que ses effets ne deviennent alors sensibles qu'au bout de trois ou quatre ans. Ces marnages se succèdent tous les quinze ans.

Dans le canton de Cambremer, aux environs de Bonneboscq, on croit avoir éprouvé que les fortes doses de marne brûlent les terres et les stérilisent pour quelque temps. Aussi l'usage que l'on fait de cet amendement est d'en répandre 20 mètres cubes par hectare tous les quinze ans.

Le marnage ne dispense pas de fumer.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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A LETTER

*London
Sept 18th 1831*

James Emerson

FROM

from Wm. Tennant Esq.

GEN. ARTHUR CONDORCET O'CONNOR

TO

GENERAL LAFAYETTE,

ON THE

CAUSES WHICH HAVE DEPRIVED

FRANCE

OF THE ADVANTAGES OF

THE REVOLUTION OF 1830.

LONDON:

**EDWARD RAINFORD, 13, RED LION PASSAGE,
RED LION SQUARE.**

1831.

PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR,
RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE manuscript of the following Pamphlet was transmitted to me, with the permission of its able Author to present it to the British Public.

It expresses the opinions of a great party in France ;—of a party which there is little doubt will ultimately be dominant in that country : indeed the advocates of the opinions here expressed would disclaim the name of a party. They hold themselves to speak the opinions of the nation, and that the struggle lies between the nation on one side, and a faction created by corruption and upheld by selfishness on the other. If this be true, and if the nation be enlightened and firm, the issue cannot be doubtful.

Besides the interest which will belong to this Pamphlet as an exposition of the state of public opinion in France, it possesses nearer claims to our attention from the reflected light it may possibly throw upon our own affairs.

We here see a nation which did not hesitate, in vindication of its rights, to take steps to which (we fondly hope) we shall have no occasion to resort. Yet this nation, thus prompt and bold, has (for a time at least) been baffled and foiled. This may operate as a sign and a warning to us ; it may

teach us, as we advance in the course of political improvement, to make our way good; to root out those noxious weeds which, if left, will assuredly yield a future harvest of corruption.

It now appears, that while the heroical people of France were pursuing the open enemy and spoiler, the suttlers of their own camp, the men who ate but did not fight, have united with the relics of the routed foe, and seized upon the fruits of the victory, or rather have made the victory unproductive of those results, for which alone the victors contended.

C. H.

London, June 22d, 1831.

A LETTER,

ſc.

MY EVER DEAR AND ANCIENT FRIEND,

OUR friendship was formed in the Revolution of 1789. It was founded on the same love of liberty, strengthened by the same constant and invariable attachment to that liberty, which neither exile, nor the dungeons, nor the frowns or favours of despotism, have been able to shake or diminish. I was one of the last that embraced you in your camp at Sedan, in 1792, when you were forced into exile from your beloved France, whose liberty has ever been a thousand times dearer to you than life. We then took different roads, but both led to the chains of despotism;—yours, to five years secret imprisonment in the dungeons of Spandau and Olmutz; mine, to the same term of a like incarceration in the towers of London and Dublin, and in the fortress of Fort George in Scotland. We met in France, in 1802; and after considering the despotism of Bonaparte and the Bourbons with the same eye, we found ourselves on the old ground of 1789 in the glorious Revolution of 1830. On the morning of Wednesday, the 28th of July, I found you alone in Anjou-street. We deliberated; (if it be not already treason,) we conspired against the ordinances of the 25th, and the dynasty of divine right. Scarcely had we determined on the part we should take, when a deputation of the youths of the Colleges of Law, Medicine, and Polytechnique, arrived to consult you on what was to be done.

It was then that with the firm calmness that ever characterized you on all the important occasions in which you have acted, you addressed them in these words: "My children, you could not apply to me at a more favourable moment. I am an old revolutionary French general; by me is an old revolutionary Irish general. We have been deliberating on the subject of your mission, and have agreed that the hour is come to resist the ordinances, and wage a war of extermination against the dynasty of the Bourbons. We have no hopes from the foreign troops; little from the privileged corps; but we may count on the soldiers of the line: they have the hearts of Frenchmen; they will neither shed the blood of their brethren, nor fight against the liberty of their country." The young heroes flew to their expecting comrades, and the words of the veteran of liberty vibrating in their ears were the signal of the struggle, which, in three days of matchless valour, atchieved the immortal Revolution of July.

Who can forget the transports of joy with which our glorious Revolution was hailed in the capital, and the enthusiastic adherence of the Departments? Yet scarcely was it accomplished, when it was perceived that the fruits of the victory were not for those who had won it, but that they were reserved for men, who, far from contributing to it, saw it with indifference and even regret. Can we be astonished that an uneasiness always augmenting shall have succeeded the national joy, or that men should be alarmed lest the agitation and discontent shall lead to another catastrophe? It is cruel to see a generous, magnanimous people always frustrated of the rights they have so often and so gloriously won. It is still more cruel for men like you and me, who have seen them bereft of the advantages of the Revolution of 1789, and that notwithstanding the promises of all the governments which have succeeded one another, none have been realized. Should not the Revolution of 1830 have restored to them at least all the constitution of 1791, assured to their fathers? The soul is saddened at seeing a noble people thus deceived and tantalized; at seeing the cup so often raised to their parched lips, and so often dashed to the ground by the cruel perfidy of their oppressors?

In a free country, where the government is placed on a solid and secure basis, the accession of one man to power, or the retreat of another, ought to cause neither fear nor

alarm. But, after a Revolution, when a new dynasty has been chosen to cleanse the state of all vicious institutions, corruption and abuses, accumulated by despotism during thirty years, and to place liberty on the only basis on which it can stand,—equality,—the dismissal of the man of half a century's unsullied, unvariable patriotism was an ill-boding signal, that has been seen and felt by all France, from one end to the other; and, when this open act of hostility against the Revolution has been followed by the removal from office of such men as Lafitte, Dupont de l'Eure, Odillon Barrot, and Comte; when all the men frankly attached to the principles of the Revolution have not only lost their credit, but have been objects of distrust, many of persecution; and when nine-tenths of the agents of Charles X. are still the agents of the king of the Revolution,—it is as evident as day that the party which has been formed out of the partisans of the abuses of thirty years' standing, has prevailed, and that the principles in virtue of which the king was chosen and accepted, principles which the nation hailed with such rapture, have been abandoned. So unwise a conduct has produced its fruits: the people are uneasy, disturbed, and discouraged; the emigrant and jesuitical faction full of joy and hope; and the king has lost his popularity.

The necessary consequence, the worst of our cruel situation, is, that the despotism of the last thirty years has thrown the nation into such a state of confusion, it offers such a chaos to the public mind, that we seem to stand still for want of knowing where we shall go, or what we shall do. The object of this letter is to discover the evil, and to trace it to its source by explaining the cause and pointing out the remedy. First,—of the evil.

No sooner was the Revolution accomplished, than every mind was anxious to find out the men to whose patriotism and talent it could be confided. We were all, like Diogenes with his lantern, seeking for men; and then, for the first time, the nation discovered that it is the nature of despotism to debase and corrupt the instruments it makes use of, and that the thirty years' despotism of Bonaparte and the Bourbons was the cause of the evil so cruelly felt. As it is upon the existence of this evil that all my reasoning is founded, I cannot take too much pains to prove it. The fact is confirmed by the query now made throughout France: "Where shall we find men of pure principles?"

No one had better means of knowing the men he employed than Bonaparte. You, my dear friend, and very few others, are the only men who escaped the general contamination. Besides, he that has done the evil, is surely the man who knows it best. In that respect, the Memorial of St. Helena is a precious document: as such I quote it in support of what I advance. The following are Bonaparte's own expressions, as taken down by his biographer, and corrected by himself. "He made a violent attack upon the immorality of the high officers of the state and placemen; on their want of political religion or national feeling, which induced them to administer one day for one, and the next for another." "That levity, and inconsistency of ours is of long standing, said he; we were Gauls still, and we shall never be worth our price till we substitute principles for turbulence; *pride* for *vanity*, and, especially, the love of *institutions* for that of *places* *."

In this declaration, that all the public officers and placemen had lost every national feeling, we cannot doubt that Bonaparte spoke his real sentiments. Perhaps he forgot that he was condemning himself; for he ought to have known that it is by corruption a despot prevails on the citizens to renounce every national feeling, and prefer the interests of one man; that he eradicates from their hearts every generous disinterested passion, to fill them with cupidity and egotism: he should know, that when he made men serve as instruments to deprive the country of its liberty, he bereft them of every thing on which self-esteem can be founded, and that without self-esteem no sentiment of honest pride can find place. Bonaparte well knew that, having destroyed all subjects of pride, it was his interest to supply its place by subjects of vanity; and of this he was not sparing, for no despot ever deluged a country with such varieties of puerile vanity, or turned it more to his own advantage.

Again, "The upper classes in England, said the Emperor, had *pride*; in France, they unfortunately have nothing but *vanity*. There the great characteristic difference between the two nations lies. At this day the mass of our people has more national feeling than any other people in Europe. *It has profited of its twenty five years Revolution*; but the class the Revolution has raised has not *proved itself*

* Mem. St. Hel. vol. iii. p. 75.

*worthy of its exalted situation : it has shown nothing but corruption and versatility ; in the last crisis, it displayed neither talent, character, nor virtue ; it lost the honour of the people *.*"

Here he repeats the same charge of vanity, which he contributed so powerfully to encourage; and that of want of pride, which he destroyed by eradicating every sentiment of real merit. When he took this class into his hands, he found them full of independence, and actuated with the sacred fire of liberty : it was his despotism that left them without *talent, character, or virtue*. I request you will observe, that Bonaparte acknowledges that, while he destroyed the first class, he left the nation sound : and this is the state in which the Revolution of July found it. The same thing may be said of the army. In complaining of the corruption of his marshals and generals, Bonaparte does ample justice to the soldier and intermediate officers, as will be seen by the following passage: "Bad intentions were beginning to creep in among us; fatigue and discouragement had demoralised a great number; my lieutenants were becoming effeminate, dispirited, awkward, and consequently unfortunate. *They were no longer the same men as at the onset of our Revolution*, or during the period of my glory. I am told that several dared to advance, that at the commencement they were fighting for the *republic*, for the *country*, whilst latterly it was only for a *single man*, his own interests, his insatiable ambition, &c. &c. What a pitiful subterfuge ! Let them inquire of the great majority of the young and brave soldiers, of the inferior officers,—did ever such an idea enter their heads? did they see anything before them besides the enemy of their country, and, behind them, the honour, glory, and triumph of France? Those never fought better than they did latterly. Why dissemble the truth? Why not tell it out frankly? *Most of the generals were tired of war*, because *I had glutted them with too much consideration, too much honour, too much riches*. They had tasted the cup of enjoyments, and were only sighing after repose. They would have purchased it at any price. The sacred fire was about to be extinguished. They would have wished to be marshals of Louis XV. †"

Here Bonaparte brings the parties in presence: he pro-

* Mem. St. Hel. vol. iv. p. 161.

† Ibid. vol. vi. p. 109.

duces the charges and the defence of those he accuses, and it is impossible not to be convinced that it is himself he condemns. If the men he accuses were corrupted by *too much consideration, too much honour, too much riches*,—Who was it was so prodigal of them?

Bonaparte had dealt too long and too largely in every species of human depravity to have the smallest belief in the existence of virtue. Making a difference between serving the country and the cause of liberty, and serving a despot, *a single man, his interests, and his insatiable ambition*, appeared to him a pitiful subterfuge. In the same sense he says, “If the Bourbons have had to complain of the entire desertion of the soldiers and the people, they certainly had no right to doubt the devotion and fidelity of the chiefs of the army, the pupils and partisans of the Revolution, who, notwithstanding an experience of twenty-five years, showed themselves on that occasion mere children in politics. They possessed neither *emigrant* nor *national* principles*.”

The army and the nation suffered and were harassed by his despotism, but the summits were exposed to his corruption. A despot takes care of the instruments of his power; once he has secured the number of oppressors he wants, he leaves the oppressed nation to her sufferings. It was not until the extravagant undertakings of Bonaparte had wearied Fortune, and that she had abandoned him, that he began to open his eyes on the irreparable evil his despotism had brought on his country, by extinguishing the sacred fire of liberty, and substituting egotism, vanity, and corruption in its stead. He found that he had himself destroyed the national spirit which alone could save the country from its invaders. He became indignant at the ravages he himself had made, and, in his excessive conceit of himself, he did not see that he was pronouncing his own condemnation. “I could not do everything by myself; the nation should assist me in saving her: I knew the people felt so. Thus is he suffering to-day without having deserved it: the *mob of intriguers, the title-men and placemen alone are guilty*. What seduced them, what lost me, was the mildness of the system of 1814, the benignity of the restoration. The change of prince was for them a matter of no importance. They all expected to re-

* Mem. St. Hel. vol. vi. p. 280.

main what they were, whatever successor I might have; Louis XVIII. or any other. In that great affair, *those unskilful, greedy and egotistical men* saw a mere competition of little moment, and *only thought of their individual interests*, when an exterminating war of principles had commenced, which would destroy them all. I must own, that I raised and surrounded myself with a *vile canaille*, and here I do not allude to the Faubourg St. Germain*.”

Is it possible to express more contempt for *the mob of intriguers, title and place-men!* Well may we patriots cry out against them, and insist that the Revolution of July should deliver us from that accursed race, when the man who made them what they are, and whose instruments they were, calls them *vile canaille!* There is one more passage so apposite that I cannot refrain from quoting it. “We are naturally so restless, so full of plans, so loquacious! In the event of twenty revolutions occurring, we should instantly have as many constitutions. The latter is what is most thought of, and the least heeded. What novices we are in that noble and glorious career. *Our great men in that respect have proved themselves so little!* Would to Heaven that the youth of our days may profit by so many faults, and show itself as wise as it will be ardent †.”

Let me observe, that a man must have all the effrontery of Bonaparte, to dare speak of the want of respect shown in France for Constitutions. From the day he promulgated *his* Constitution, to the day he abdicated, he respected it so little, that there is no instance in which he permitted the Constitution to form any restraint upon his despotic will. It becomes *him* to speak of respecting the Constitution, who, in answering an address of the representative national body, said: “I have a title, and you have none. What are you in the Constitution? Nothing: you have no authority; the throne alone is in the Constitution. All is in the throne and me!”

To return to the quotation. Would not one be inclined to imagine that Bonaparte was speaking after witnessing the Revolution of July, when we experienced such a dearth of men to support it. He was well aware of the *havoc* he had made by debasing and corrupting the men whose spirit he had fashioned. He well knew that the future hope of France lay in the generation that was to

* Mem. St. Hel. vol. vi. p. 447.

† Ibid. p. 196.

spring out of the destruction and ruin he left us in. Compare those revelations of the author of all our misery, with what has passed since the summits of society have shown themselves what they are; and who that has the heart of a Frenchman,—who that feels for the honour of his country, can have seen without indignation the contrast exhibited within these last seven months, between the generous disinterestedness on the 27th, 28th, and 29th of July, of the middling and lower classes (which constitute the nation), and the egotism and insatiable cupidity of the class of men who pretend to occupy the highest rank in the social order? When we have beheld the former brave the bayonets and grape-shot of the satellites of despotism, during three entire days and nights; when we have seen them in the midst of temptations of every kind, respecting all but the tyranny that assailed the liberties of their country; and with a generosity above human nature, in the midst of their dying and dead brethren and friends, pardoning, nay more, succouring their enemies; and when, on the other hand, we have witnessed the scenes that have passed since the Revolution in all the government offices,—the crowds of elegantly dressed solicitors, who from day-break till dark filled the vast hotels of the ministers, and obstructed every avenue leading to any edifice where a place was to be begged for,—the mind is not less indignant than perplexed, at seeing the classes, their inferiors in instruction, give such exalted proofs of disinterestedness, generosity, courage, and, in a word, of every virtue; whilst the class placed at the summit of society, which claims a monopoly of those high sentiments of honour, hitherto supposed to belong exclusively to men of high rank and education, disgrace themselves by an absence of all shame and all sense of independence. At any time such conduct would have been disgusting; but now, amidst the display of such noble virtues as have commanded the admiration of every people in Europe and America, the vileness of that privileged class has shocked and outraged the sentiments of a nation with whom a refined sense of honour has ever been the first mover.

It is a great philosophical truth, that the character of nations and of the classes that compose them, like that of individuals, is formed *for* them and not *by* them; that every class is what the laws, the customs, the circumstances, in a word, the government under which they live has made them. Hence the corruption and debasement of the last

thirty years' despotism produced their effect, in forming the men it employed for its instruments to self-love, cupidity, and an attachment to the abuses to which they owe their rank, their fortune, and *their honours*. The fact has been avowed by the author of this irreparable evil; all France has seen it, is convinced of it, and deeply deploras it. Let us seek for the cause, and then we shall be able to apply the remedy.

In political statistics, the nation is divided into two unequal parts. One is composed of all those who live by their labour and talents in the arts, the sciences, literary pursuits, in agriculture, manufactures, commerce,—in short, of all those who procure an independence by producing something that contributes to the wants, pleasures or instruction of their fellow-citizens, or who live by the acquisitions made by themselves or their fathers. That part is the nation: it is the governed part; it pays all the expenses of the State, and requires nothing in return but protection of person, property, and liberty.

The other part consists (when it is the Court that confers appointments) of the small privileged fraction which calls itself the governing and Court party. On the selection of that small fraction, the economy in public expenses, the confidence of the people, and the good administration of the country depend. It is not astonishing then that I should here seek the cause of the evil which afflicts the nation. Its importance requires a serious examination.

Before the Revolution of 1789, the governing party was everything, the nation nothing. Under the feudal system the Court governed *solely for its own interest*; it considered the industrious class as its property, and all it produced as its revenue; it took on itself to portion out the nation's wealth among the privileged instruments of its despotic power. The men of that party seemed to imagine that they were a species superior to the rest of mankind, a heaven-born race, and that their other fellow-creatures came into the world with saddles on their backs and bridles in their mouths, while they were born with whips in their hands and spurs to their heels. In consequence of these notions, not only was the property of that class exempt from all taxes, but all the moneys levied on the people became their patrimony, as members of the governing party. This debasing fabric of oppression and iniquity was raised on the idea that the privileged class was for

ever dishonoured, should it seek its independence in any species of labour or useful industry; while the height of honour was to lead a life of luxury and extravagance, at the expense of the laborious class. The injustice of those *privileged beggarly robbers* was equalled by the insolence and contempt with which they treated the people they impoverished and plundered.

While the Court has the appointment of all the agents of the people, while human nature remains what it has hitherto been, all power will be exercised for the interest of him who possesses the right of conferring and withdrawing it. The welfare of the nation requires that its affairs should be entrusted to men who are aware that their offices depend on the diligence, ability, strict probity and economy with which they discharge them. But when the interest of the Court is solely to be consulted, every appointment is the result of Court intrigues: address, cunning, baseness and flattery in the solicitors are the only qualities required; real talent and ability not only count for nothing, but are against the possessor. The *sine qua non* is, that he belongs to the party. That evil being the source of the debasement and oppression under which the nation groaned, the object of the Revolution of 1789 was to remove it; and this the Constituent Assembly radically effected by its immortal decree of the 4th of August, 1789, which abolished for ever every sort of privilege.

Liberty can only stand on the basis of equality, and despotism cannot stand but on the ruin of this equality. It must have privileges, for by them alone it can find accomplices to crush the people and their liberties. Hence Bonaparte hastened to violate the decree of the 4th of August, and to deluge the nation with his mongrel half-home half-foreign princes, dukes, counts, &c. &c., his grand and small crosses, and all the new-fangled orders his genius, fertile in the work of corrupting, could devise. To that was since added the revival of all the old feudal privileges; so that at the Revolution of July we found that privileged class not only doubled, but more griping, more indigent, and more servile than ever. With this immense scaffolding standing and consolidated by the restoration, who can wonder at the scandalous scenes that have come to pass since the late Revolution, or at the resistance so successfully opposed to the just rights of the nation by the servers of every despotism? I have now before my

eyes the Declaration of the Chamber of Representatives of 1815, signed by fifty-five of the most distinguished members of the present legislature. I read the following passage in the declaration: "The old and new hereditary nobility and feodality are abolished." Why has that vital principle never been acted upon? There is the source of the evil. For the last thirty years, the industry of France has been plundered by the privileged men, who would consider themselves dishonoured did they owe their existence to their talents or labour. In France, this race of drones have ever been the ruin of industry, they have preyed on the political body for the last fifteen years. They have cost us thousands of millions. How applicable to them are the lines of the poet:

*Sic vos non vobis nidificatis, aves :
 Sic vos non vobis vellera fertis, oves :
 Sic vos non vobis mellificatis, apes :
 Sic vos non vobis fertis aratra, boves :*

which might be translated as follows:—People of France, the bread you earn by the labour of your hands and the sweat of your brow is neither for you nor your children; it will be devoured by a swarm of placemen, intriguers, and courtiers.

That the evil and its cause lie here, no one can doubt; and that it is to perpetuate this evil to their profit, to the ruin and oppression of the people, that the men of all the abuses and corruptions of the last thirty years' despotism have combined all their efforts; this is the real source of the resistance we have seen to the fulfilment of the conditions on which the throne was conferred and accepted in the glorious days of July.

Having exposed the evil and its cause, I shall now proceed to point out the remedy.

You, my dear friend, who have witnessed the many extraordinary events that have confounded and perplexed the political affairs of France since 1789, can best appreciate the difficulties a man, who undertakes to explain our real political situation, and to suggest the means of restoring public order or liberty, has to encounter. The fact is, that the storms of so many revolutions have so often driven France on the shoals of despotism, that she has lost her way. Let us imitate the navigator who, when the winds have driven him out of his course and out of his reckoning, begins by ascertaining from what point he

started, in order to discover where he is, and where he is to go.

Nothing is more certain than that we have set out from that feudal despotism which has, for ages, debased, oppressed and enslaved all Europe, and that we proceeded straight forward from the Revolution of 1789, which destroyed that humiliating despotism, by the immortal Constitution of 1791, an ever-memorable monument of the genius and patriotism of the Constituent Assembly. That glorious emancipation of France alarmed all the feudal despotisms of Europe. The example for nations in feudal bondage was too dangerous to be tolerated, and millions of mercenary slaves were led to subdue us and to eradicate liberty from the heart of our country. Hundreds of victories, in eight years of unexampled heroism, have left an eternal monument of what liberty can do against despotism. But from the 18th of Brumaire, year VII., that sacred fire has been extinguished. Our blood and treasures have been lavished to raise feudal thrones, which before had cost so much blood and valour to overturn.

When Sheridan was asked how England had incurred her enormous debt, he replied, "She spent one half of it in driving the Bourbons out of France, and the other half to replace them on their throne." So it was that half the victories of the French nation served to put down the feudal thrones of Europe, whilst Napoleon used the other half to re-establish those despots. He boasts of it as his noblest exploit. He destroyed the glorious principles of the Revolution of 1789, and of the Constitution of 1791; he threw open France to the whole feudal faction, collected together every wreck and remnant of its odious system, and re-edified it by all the means which corruption and debasement placed at his disposal. Away with delusion; the Revolution of 1830 has brought France back to the same ground she stood upon in 1789.

It is to Bonaparte's desertion to feudal despotism we owe that deplorable result, and that we are obliged to fight over the battle gained in 1789. The nation was resolved on having liberty, cost what it might; and she nobly fought for it, and conquered. Bonaparte was determined on having despotism, and made common cause with the despots of Europe. Shall we crouch to those powers? Shall we tamely consent to have the stature of our liberty brought down to the pigmy standard of a *just middle*, that

we may not give umbrage to our despotic enemies? Shall we renounce the free and energetic language of real liberty, and adopt the court jargon of *quasi* liberty, *quasi* sovereignty, which is nothing but *quasi* despotism! No; the nation has spoken: she will not suffer a second treason, nor allow feudal despots to crush liberty, by invading countries that have a right to be free, and are our natural allies, our firmest support in the unavoidable struggle which will decide whether Europe is to be free or enslaved. No; France will never suffer such cowardice; it is contrary to her interests, to her freedom, to surrender advantages that make her irresistible: it is, above all, contrary to her honour.

Here then do we stand again on the ground of 1789. Three roads offer themselves, out of which the nation must make a choice:—that of the old feudality; the English system in its corrupt state, or, as it is now called, the *just middle*; and the system of the constitution of 1791. A fair and free exposition of those systems will tend to direct the nation in that choice; for (thank Heaven!) she has now arrived at that degree of political knowledge and force, that no power on earth can force her to receive or suffer any system which is not of her adoption. The French nation has irrevocably reconquered its sovereignty: in future, the king who should dare to contest it, or, by invoking divine right or any other, should presume to reign for the interest of his family, or that of a faction of placemen, must resign his power; for hereafter the nation will not submit to a government that is not established for the *general interest*. I shall prove that the attempt made by Bonaparte was the cause of his ruin, that it was likewise the case with the Bourbons, and that it must be the destruction of every prince who dreams of such an undertaking.

Before I enter on the examination of those systems, I must premise that there are many obstacles in the way of a fair and clear discussion. Since 1793, when a faction horribly profaned the name of liberty, and affixed to its sanguinary government the sacred name of *republic*, the partisans of despotism, profiting by the panic, persuaded weak minds that the act which proscribed liberty itself was the act of liberty, that liberty and anarchy were inseparable, and that a nation who attempted to conquer the one would inevitably fall into the other. The natural conclusion of all this was, that liberty was impossible, and that

despotism was the *beau-idéal* of human government, and the *ne plus ultra* of all that human genius is capable of attaining. The absurdity of that conclusion is the best refutation of those who propagate so odious a calumny. Yet have we seen men, who since the Revolution have opposed every concession to liberty, with such a *furious moderation* (as you so truly qualified it) stoop to calumniate the people who proved themselves so noble in July, in order to gain partisans in the Departments, at the expense of truth, among the ignorant and the timid. I shall again have occasion to return to this subject.

There is another obstacle which must be surmounted: I mean the difficulty of understanding the terms now employed in politics, not one of which has a fixed or defined meaning. During the leisure of a long and weary captivity, I conceived the idea of reducing politics to a science. The observations I then made I shall now call to my aid.

The great Bacon is justly called the father of sciences, for he first placed them on a solid foundation. Before him, they rested on words which had not a fixed meaning. Bacon showed that every science derived its origin from the nature of things. Faithful to that great principle, it strikes me that there is but one form of government suited to mankind; and that, properly speaking, it is more an administration than a government. Nature has conferred on man the right of governing the insensible and inanimate part of the earth, without either restriction or limit. It is an *absolute despotism*, because it is exercised solely for the interest of the governing party, without any regard to the interest of the governed. She has also invested man with the command over all the other animals in the world; and this also is *absolute despotism*, being exercised solely for the interest of the governing party, without any regard to the interest of the governed. That it is Nature's intention that those governments should be absolute and despotic is evident, from her having withheld from the governed a sense of their interests, from her having denied them the necessary faculties to enable them to combine their force, to protect themselves and to resist oppression. Hence Nature has abandoned those parts of the creation to the absolute sway of man, who may strike, load, and chain them; and, without incurring the charge of injustice, converts the whole produce of their labour to his own use, and even kills and eats them. But Nature has not acted

so by man: she has endowed him with a strong sense of his interest, with a firm desire to defend it; and she has given him the necessary faculties to combine his efforts with his fellow-men, to repel all attempts made against their interest; she has imparted to him a conscience, that never ceases to upbraid him when he disregards the rights and interests of other men, but which leaves him at rest when he violates the interests of those inferior beings which she abandons to his entire discretion without account or remorse. What stamps those great laws of Nature with the seal of her supreme sovereign power is, that the most excessive use, and even abuse, of the despotic power she authorises man to exercise over beasts, produce neither confusion nor disorder in the world; and that, on the other hand, the wars, massacres, rebellions, and revolutions, that have filled the earth with disorder, violence, and destruction, have all sprung from the injustice of those who have attempted to govern men for their own private interest, as if they were beasts.

If this reasoning be just, men may govern their beasts for their own interest; but man is of a higher order, and has a right to be governed in a manner suitable to his own interests. With that sentiment engraved on my heart, and with the firm conviction that every Frenchman is of the same way of thinking, and ready to shed the last drop of his blood to defeat the pretensions of any man, or party of men, who, invoking the principle of divine right, would attempt to govern us like beasts,—I enter on the system of government now in question, and hope to be able to point out a remedy for the evils that affect us.

I place myself on the ground we stood upon in 1789. The Constituent Assembly directed its attention to the feudal despotism which it was called upon to destroy. At that time, as well as now, the English system had its votaries; but the members of that assembly possessed too much genius to become the servile imitators of a government that was threatening ruin. This would have been building Chalcedon with the site of Byzantium in view. They had too good a taste not to prefer the latter. A party, formed since the events of July, wishes to force the nation to reject that choice, and to adopt the former. They represent the French system as an *extreme* one, and grace the English system with the name of *just middle*. It was by adopting this last system at the time of their restoration,

that the Bourbons expected to recover their lost feudal despotism, or at least a valuable equivalent for it. It is, of all systems, the most congenial to court solicitors and placemen, and as such it is not to be wondered that those men should now labour so hard to preserve it. They are so full of it, that their brain is inaccessible to every other political combination. Out of their *doctrine* they see no safety for the country: they measure every man's capacity by that standard; and he who does not come within a hair's breadth of it, is treated by them as a suspected person, as a *jacobin*, an anarchist. Those men imagine that they have discovered the original system; and yet they have seen but a very unfaithful copy of it, in De Lolme or some other writing. I will here endeavour to describe that system, in order to dissuade the French nation from adopting it. I consider myself at least as conversant with it as those interested Anglomaniacs who are so enamoured with its deformities.

Born and educated under that system, having filled for years the highest offices in the administration and legislature, and passed many years in the intimacy of the greatest men that country has ever produced, such as Fox, Sheridan, Grey, Erskine, Whitbread, &c.; known to all the Opposition of their day, who honoured me with their friendship and confidence, I may without vanity pretend to have as much knowledge of the English system, as men who have possessed none of those advantages, or whose information is only derived from a cursory view, or from what they have read in books.

The English system and the old French despotism have had the same feudal origin. They were both founded on the feudal despotic law of primogeniture,—a law of monopoly, inequality, and exclusion, which was framed in the darkest ages of barbarity, ignorance, and superstition. The king and the barons, both clerical and laical, who were almost his equals, were all: the people were absolutely nothing. Men, as ignorant as beasts, must necessarily be treated as such, because they have no means of making their interests respected:—such is the principle on which the feudal system rests. As the people acquired some instruction and independence, they took advantage of the quarrels of their barbarous tyrants, to obtain some small right in the management of their affairs; not a tumultuous right, but the most precious of all, a representa-

tive right. This right was not a concession, but came from necessity: but when once the people obtained the right to name their own agents, their interests began to be counted for something. With this right, the nation struggled for her liberty with various success, until, after having punished one despot and chased away another, it arrived at the Revolution of 1688, from which time the Government has taken the form and principles on which it has ever since existed. The theory of this system, as fixed in 1688, is, that the people shall by their representatives impose the necessary taxes; but the practice has, by two operations, completely destroyed this theory: the one by passing the right of choosing the representatives from the people to a few individuals; the other, by placing in the hands of the Executive the nomination of all the agents of the people, in Church and State, with enormous emoluments attached to each post. By those operations the English Government has been totally changed since 1688. Before that time, the Crown contested the right of the representatives to the sole power of imposing taxes, and this often by imprisoning them and by other arbitrary acts; but it never corrupted them. They were chosen by the people (for before 1688 the commerce of rotten boroughs was unknown); they partook of their spirit, and had the same interests with them. If the people were sufferers, their representatives suffered with them; if the people were plundered, their representatives had no share in the spoil; then Parliaments were popular, and enjoyed the confidence of the people, because, by their incorruptible perseverance, they had been constantly working to extend the liberties of the people, —liberties for which they obtained the most express stipulations, written in the blood of one King, and confirmed by the dethronement of another, for attempting to annul them. But since 1688, instead of being despotic by its arbitrary acts, the Crown has secured to itself an equally untroubled power, by the enormous expense of levying on the whole of those who are to obey the laws, sufficient to corrupt the majority of those who are to make them. By this change the increased burdens of the people became the increased power of the monarch, an increased profit to the hereditary aristocracy, and the utter annihilation of the representative democracy. It is in this sense that the partizans of this model-system maintain, that the fewer the hands into which the national representation is concentrated,

the more perfect it is: and when the Executive has obtained the greatest possible means of corrupting the representatives, by buying up the probity and independence of those whose duty it is to defend the people's rights, then is this Government arrived at the *beau-idéal* of representative government; then, and then only, the *odious, contemptible* people are reduced to a state of *wholesome* subordination. It is then this Government is said to acquire the reputation of a *strong* Government; for it is a fixed principle with the partizans of *this kind* of representative system, that by every right you concede to the people, by so much you weaken the Government; and that by every right you take from the people, by so much you augment the force of the Government. But these men do not take into the account, either the prodigality, or the debts, or the ruin, which have invariably been the consequence of the absence of all the necessary control which it is the object of their system to destroy; nor the exasperation this abuse of power, and the usurpation of this sacred right of the people to have uncorrupted agents, must excite in their hearts; nor, with July before them, will they see that such a system in France must inevitably lead to a Revolution. Let us come to the proof of what I advance. Like a tree, Government is known by its fruits. What has the model-system produced in England after 143 years that it has been planted and watered with so much blood and enriched with so many millions of wealth? When a great national interest is at stake, it is only with great material, positive facts, that men should attempt to counsel her on the part she shall take.

Before this system of buying the probity, the independence, the talent, the honour of the national representation was established at the Revolution of 1688, England owed not a shilling.

In 1688, England owed nothing.	£.	£.
From 1688 to 1697, her representatives contracted a debt of		21,515,742
From 1697 to 1701, they reduced it by	5,121,041	
From 1701 to 1714, it was increased by		37,286,375
From 1714 to 1722, it was again increased by		1,601,902
From 1722 to 1739, it was reduced by	8,328,354	

	£.	£.
From 1739 to 1748, it was in- creased by		31,338,689
From 1748 to 1755, it was re- duced by	6,003,640	
From 1755 to 1764, it was in- creased by		67,227,134
From 1764 to 1775, it was re- duced by	10,415,474	
From 1775 to 1783, it was in- creased by		137,608,881
<hr/>		
Total amount of the debt con- tracted from 1688 to 1783		296,578,723
Total amount of the debt paid off from 1688 to 1783		29,868,509
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Balance of the debt contracted from 1688 to 1783		266,710,214
At the peace of 1814, this debt was increased by the war in support of this system of rotten boroughs and non-control, to the enormous sum of		800,000,000

Such is the mortal wound this model-system of corruption has inflicted on the nation! Such is the inevitable ruin this system nurtures from its birth, and that hurries it to its grave. After fifteen years of profound peace, this great industrious nation, endowed with greater means of capital, of machinery, and mercantile manufacturing ability, than any other people ever possessed, has been struggling against the extreme of misery, without being able to pay off her monstrous debt; and it is at the moment this system offers to the view of the world such a dreadful spectacle of difficulty and misery, when the English Government itself has wisely renounced this system, and the Crown has called the nation to its aid against the usurpation of the proprietors of rotten boroughs,—this, I say, is the moment when a set of men in France have the assurance and stupid ignorance to invite Philip I. to separate from the nation, to throw himself into the system of influence, corruption, and placemen, without having one single material for its construction or support.

Compare the materials a French King can command for constructing such a system, with the prodigious materials the King of England has at his command, and *that* when he is forced to renounce this system. Where have we in France the colossal patronage which the dominion over 140 millions of subjects in India affords?—in the West Indies, Canada, the Seven Islands, the Cape of Good Hope, Gibraltar, &c., &c., where there are so many thousands of pro-consulships, to pay the wages of corruption!—independent of the immense patronage in Church and State in England, Scotland, and Ireland. But, what is still more important, where is the law of primogeniture? Where are those leviathan properties, that form the basis on which this model-system of corruption rests, which though so great and massy, are this instant trembling under the load of debt and misery that has accumulated to crush them? If this example is not sufficient, we have one near home, and equally recent. The Bourbons have just made an essay of that model-system in France. Bonaparte had usurped the nomination of every agent of the people from the highest to the *garde champêtre*. In his rage to *despotise* all and everything, he left as little agency to the people as he possibly could. The Bourbons inherited all this immense scaffolding of corruption and despotism, mounted on a scale perfectly Asiatic. All his bashaws were made inviolable, for all their oppression of the people; slaves to their masters, but tyrants to the nation. This *personnel*, so rich in corruption, in the hands of the Bourbons did not suffice. They found it necessary to call to their aid means of violence, illegality, fraud, administrative and other vexations, fabricated plots, massacres, national plunder; for all those means were found necessary to support this model-system in France. If one adds to these means the enormous sums the Bourbons have received and squandered during fifteen years, no less than 635,000,000 of francs ostensibly, and who knows how many hundred millions besides, obtained by fraud; and if we examine the milliards voted each year, and the enormous debt that has been so rapidly augmenting during fifteen years of peace, we shall be convinced that the fruit the tree has borne in England, the same it has borne in France, and must bear in every country, where it shall be planted. We have seen that the cupidity of placemen is insatiable, and that the more milliards they get, the more they desire. They are a race who, when chosen by

the Crown, must from their nature ever be in perpetual war against the wealth, industry, and liberty of the country. What has been the result of all those efforts to maintain this English system in France by the Bourbons? Charles X. and his counsellors became convinced that even with all these joint means of corruption and despotism, the post was untenable; that in France, where the just law of the equal partition of property in families exists, there was no place for leviathan hereditary lords, and proprietors of rotten boroughs; and that when there is neither broker nor merchandize, trade cannot exist. The battle was fought, and the fall of the Ministry of such men as Villele, Peyronnet, Corbieres, proved that a system which exacted the sacrifice of national honour would never be tolerated in France. It was in despair, after the experiment had been made, that Charles X. had recourse to his ordinances of July, by which he attempted to put the nation back to the same ground she stood on before 1789.

These examples, in England and in France, have but to be seen to convince the most incredulous. Yet what effect have they produced on the partizans of corruption? None. I think it is Hobbes who says, "Mount a well-paid establishment for men to prove that every axiom in Euclid is false, and you shall never want professors." Where is the remorse of placemen that have been the ruin of England this century past? Where is the contrition and the repentance of those who for the last fifteen years have been gorged with the wealth of France? True to their principle, they are the same men under Philip I. as they were during the fifteen years' despotism of Bonaparte, and during the fifteen years' plunder of the Bourbons. These men find the people perfectly qualified to choose their Deputies; but to choose their under agents would be the utter destruction of their dear system of corruption, and consequently would lead directly to *anarchy* and all the *horrors of 1793*. I have described that system such as it has been in England since 1668, and such as it has been in France since 1815. I come to the French system such as it was established by the Constituent Assembly in 1791.

When the Constituent began this memorable work of French liberty, they had before their eyes the famous model-system of England, with all its corruption, extravagance, its debt, and its imminent ruin; and at the same time they had in view some admirable principles of liberty, which

this British system contained, and these they retained. But they found that the system, as it had stood in England since the Revolution of 1688, far from being calculated to support these liberties, was found to have undermined them, and to make the nation pay exorbitantly and ruinously dear for the small share of those liberties it left to the nation, and that nearly all the profits of the labour and sweat of the people were for the aristocracy. These men of genius examined the model-system from its source, and through all its course from 1688 to 1789, and they convinced themselves that it carried from its birth the principle of corruption, which was fast hurrying it to its destruction. They saw that the great fault of the men who made the settlement of 1688, was to have preserved the unjust, unnatural feudal law of primogeniture, a law utterly incompatible with equality and consequently with liberty. The Constituent placed French liberty on the just and paternal law of equal partition in families; and here is the vital difference between the vast, profound genius of the men of the Constituent Assembly, and the narrow conception of the men of 1688. The latter retained the principle of inequality, and with this pernicious principle they retained the corruption, abuses, and ruin that ever attend it;—while the former placed the liberties of France on a basis as broad as the soil for which they legislated. By the law of primogeniture, the pure elective representative government is impracticable. Make the right of voting universal, the leviathan fortunes which this unjust law creates will buy up all the votes of the poor dependent electors. Confine the right to the middling class,—they are the tenants and dependants of these leviathan fortunes. So that while this law subsists, I defy the English to make a reform in their representation, able to control prodigality and corruption. See, on the other hand, what guarantee for public order and liberty the wise law of the Constituent has brought with it. By this law the whole property of France is, by its continual action, nourishing equality; the ease and independence of the people are hourly extending, and the blessings of education are placed within the reach of millions, who before were plunged in the most profound ignorance and superstition; a divine effort which has been powerfully aided by the immense sale of the national property, and by the immense capital that has been employed these many years in cultivating small portions of lands; an employment so profitable that

one hundred small proprietors can give double the price for a property which any single capitalist can afford to give with a view of placing his fortune in land. Here lies the glory of the Constituent. Here France offers the most complete refutation of all those vile calumnies of the partizans of the system of corruption, who find it their interest to represent the people so passionately disposed to renew the disorder and anarchy of 1793. I have put them in judgement before their country, and I call on them to show the most distant analogy between a nation of privileged tyrants and of dependent people, whose hearts were filled with hatred and vengeance against their oppressors, as was the case in 1793; and the people of another generation, become proprietors, born and *bred* with liberty in their hearts;—a whole nation, the humblest of whose heroical exploits would have ennobled the blazoned armorials of the proudest feudalism in Europe. I defy those base calumniators of their country, to show a nation in the world that offers anything like the same solid guarantee for public order and for liberty, and that has the same independence as France for exercising the right to choose her own agents; I defy them to show a country in the world that possesses the tenth part of the number of proprietors who have the same solid interest in the landed property; a country where the middle class extends so widely over the soil, and where the margin of overgrown fortunes at one extremity, and of dependent men at the other, is so narrow. This is a boon the Constituent has bestowed upon France, and one that hourly brings others with it; for as the wealth of the nation increases, it extends like a fluid all over the surface, enough to fertilize equality, without overwhelming either the liberty or independence of the people. It is this that guarantees us from the evil of this model-system, where three hundred millions a year are not sufficient to keep mendicancy from starving.

The man who is not learned in the science of political economy can have no pretensions to take part in the government of France at this day. Let those phrase-makers who fatigue the public with their paradoxes, tell us where are the materials in France for their hereditary aristocracy, their mixed feudal Anglo-monarchy. Will they establish a house of peers as you would an hospital at the public expense, or by the advantages of marriage, like the flock of merinos at Rambouillet, by the high price of its rams?

This is far from the account of the colossal fortunes of England, far from the great capitalists of the rotten boroughs; yet with all those immense advantages the work has failed in England, it has failed in France, and the essay has caused a terrible catastrophe; and this is the moment we are to make another attempt. The Constituent, by the Constitution of 1791, had purged the Government of all Court intrigue, of the race of solicitors, of the ruinous prodigality and corruption of placemen, by investing the people with the choice of their agents. In this constitution, by the ancient right, as ancient as the first Christians, the people were to choose the ministers of their religion; by another article they were to choose their Judges; by another, all the municipal officers; by another, all the administrators; by another, the public accusers; and in the army, the part of the King is designed in conforming himself to the laws of advancement. Here the evil is destroyed in its source, and this is the most important difference between the French and the English systems. The men who composed the Constituent Assembly, the only truly constitutional assembly that has been since 1789, were profoundly acquainted with the extent of the evil which this race of privileged courtly placemen inflicted on the nation, and they tore it up by the roots by placing the nomination of their agents in the hands of the people. I have explained in part the evils that necessarily flow from depriving the people of this right, but the question is so vital to liberty that it cannot be too profoundly discussed.

All the great publicists agree that the people are endowed with perfect capacity to choose their agents. Montesquieu says, (vol. i. p. 18,) "The people are admirable for choosing the men to whom they should confide a part of their authority; they have but to be determined by the things of which they cannot be ignorant, and by the facts that fall under their senses.....all those things are facts of which they must be better informed in public than a monarch in his palace.....If the natural capacity of the people to distinguish merit could be doubted, we have but to cast our eyes on the continent, and the astonishing choices which the Athenians and the Romans have made, which it is impossible to attribute to chance."

The extraordinary diffusion of property in France, and the independence it has created above that existing in any other country, gives the French nation a better claim to

exercise this right than any other people in Europe. The English, who have so long been in the habit of exercising so many representative and popular rights, have all expressed their admiration of the order and regularity with which the elections have been conducted in France. If, then, it cannot be denied that the people are perfectly qualified to choose their legislative Deputies (by far the most important of any), why should they not elect all their inferior agents?—a right which the Constitution of 1791 had so wisely invested them with. If this principle of election had been adopted on the 31st July, what scenes of dishonour, scandal, and baseness would have been spared to the nation! Then the Ministers, instead of sullyng their ministry with all those vile and debasing intrigues, would have referred the choice of the public agents to the *notables* of the jury-lists in the Departments. What different choices would have followed! The Government would have been supported by men chosen for their merit, who enjoyed the confidence of the people; and instead of having to this day nine-tenths of the Carlists in office, the notables of all France would have done justice to that emigrant and jesuitical faction. Not one would have remained to conspire against the liberty of the nation. Not a judge that was tainted with Jesuitism and that was a Carlist, that was not known to them,—not a man that would not have been replaced by men free from those dangerous opinions. But no; that system of corruption was carefully preserved by the majority of the Chambers. The sweets of *postiling* were too advantageous* to be abandoned, and, in this immense movement, you might as well transfer a franc of public stock without the brokerage of an *agent de change*, as transfer a place without the brokerage of a national Deputy;—a degree of turpitude to which even the rotten borough-mongers have never descended.

The people of France are convinced that in the dearth of political virtue in the upper class, a Republic cannot subsist, because it cannot be supported by a strong public spirit, and a general propensity to prefer the general interest to all private considerations. They know that men who have been fashioned by thirty years' abject servitude to the will of an absolute master, are utterly incapable of that severe virtue which makes the country their god;

* It has been a rule with Ministers of late to require that the solicitors of places should have their demands postiled by some Deputy.

equality, liberty, and law, their religion. We know that the nation is pure; but until the gangrened part is put away, and habits of economy and love for the public good have become general; until the rising generation have attained a knowledge of public affairs, and while such numbers of determined inveterate enemies to all liberty, and as determined advocates for despotism and its abuses, are in the heart of the country,—an attempt to establish, at this time, a pure Republic, must not only fail, but would plunge France into such a state of disaster as would retard liberty incalculably. This is the opinion of all those wise enlightened republicans with whom France has not ceased to abound. They know that the executive power is a dangerous weapon, which ought not to be left in the way of every goer and comer, but should be put into the hands of the father of the family. For all the other parts, they are but implements of husbandry, and can be confided, without risk or danger, to all those who have the most skill and the best dispositions to employ them.

This is conformable to the great principle of political economy, that the people should have the doing of every thing that they are able to transact by agents of their choice in their local capacity, and that they should delegate to the Government only what cannot be done but by the collective force of the whole. On the observance of this great principle all liberty depends. It is the antipode of the principle of despotism, which engulfs and concentrates all the powers without distinction. It is essential to economy, the vital principle of the prosperity of nations. It is the sole means of drying up the sources of corruption, by which every department of the state is inundated with swarms of useless and insolent placemen, who devour the bread of the laborious. The necessity of placing the election of their agents in the hands of the people, springs from a principle of human nature, which ordains, that he who has the greatest interest in the faithful discharge of a duty, should possess the superintendence of the conduct of the agent, who should be the man of his choice.

This is the sole remedy for the evils that affect the nation. By putting the right to nominate all the agents in the people, as the Constituent Assembly had placed it, you put the competitors for the honour of serving the country in the view of their fellow-citizens; you interest the people to observe and scrutinize the life and conduct of

the men whose virtues and vices they are daily called to appreciate. It makes the aristocracy feel that it is by their virtue only they can hope to arrive at distinction and honours. This begets an harmony and a sympathy in the two great divisions of society, and subdues the vile passions which so often sow discord, contempt, and hatred. It disarms the pride and insolence of the overgrown rich, and it gives to the less favoured wherewith to procure themselves, not only the civility, but the benevolence of their superiors; and by chasing away disdainful arrogance, it creates a general simplicity of manners, which gives a family look to the nation; and the higher that fortune or the choice of the people shall have placed one of its members, the more he will feel the necessity of being serviceable and condescending.

Let us reverse the medal, and suppose that it is the Court that shall name all the agents of the people. All appointments must be the effect of intrigue; first, at the Court (and this includes the whole tribe of courtiers); then in the antechambers of the Ministers and their creatures. There it is to be sifted, passed and repassed in the public offices, and in all these the women, their confidants and favourites, are not inactive. The result of all this is, that every one of those who take part in the nominations, are as ignorant as they are indifferent about the talent or fitness of the solicitor. These qualities are wholly out of the question; for the art of soliciting stands upon ground utterly independent of talent or merit. In this trade the sole consideration is, *how the men are recommended*. Is he a Prince, a Duke, a Marquis, a Count, or even a Baron? Is he decorated? Has he the Grand Cross? Is he a member acknowledged and received in the number of placemen? Was he a councillor of state, a prefect, or any faithful servant of Bonaparte or of the Bourbons? In a word, is he of that class of privileged men for whom it would be a dishonour to owe his bread or his independence to his labour and talents? Is he one of those men who *has a right* to be maintained by taking the bread of the people? Here is the seat of the evil. It is this mob of placemen that weighs like a nightmare on the industry of the people, and that corrupts so many thousands. This is the nursery where the race of courtiers, sycophant flatterers, is raised, and that has poisoned every species of monarchy: a vermin, that, as yet, no monarchy has been able to shake off. The

infamy of this race is proverbial. Montesquieu has so justly described it, that his description cannot be too often repeated. (vol. i. p. 48.) Let us read what the historians of all ages have said on the courts of monarchs. Let us remember the conversations of men of all countries on the wretched character of courtiers. This is not a matter of speculation, but of sad experience. "Ambition in idleness, baseness in pride, a desire of enriching themselves without labour, an aversion for truth,—flattery, treason, perfidy, breaking of all their engagements, contempt for the duties of a citizen, fear of the virtue of the prince, hope of his weakness, and, more than all this, a continual ridicule thrown on virtue, are, I believe, the characteristics which have distinguished courtiers in all times and in all countries."

The Constituent Assembly had a perfect knowledge of this race; it knew that as long as the court had the nomination of the agents of the people, these courtiers would have the preference, and in its profound wisdom it put the court out of the possibility of working its own ruin. For it knew that it invariably happened that when the court had this nomination, a formidable party soon found itself in determined hostility to the dearest interests of the people; that as this trade of intrigue, soliciting and placemen extends itself, and that its members have tasted the sweets of great appointments at the expense of the people, they form an alliance between themselves; they conspire against the interests of the nation, against her liberty; they multiply themselves; they defend their common interests; and all this on the principle of corruption, and on the principle that this corruption is the sole force of the Government. I will cite one proof of this in ten thousand, that has just happened.

The Deputies voted that all pensions *illegally* given since 1807, had *no legal title* and *should not be paid*. Yet the Peers, faithful to the system that corruption is the force of Government, subverted this vote of the Deputies, and established that a claim which could not be maintained before a court of justice, was valid for a pensioned placeman against the nation; and it was a Minister*, named the 30th of July last, that was the reporter of this violation of the law;—a striking example of the absurdity of an hereditary

* The Duke of Broglie.

Chamber in a country where it is forced to have recourse to such means to support its existence.

If the wise decision of the Constituent, that the Crown was incapable of exercising the right of nomination without its own ruin, could want support, we can find it in the experiment Bonaparte made on the head, for even he allows that it was above his force. Such authority is too great and too apposite to be omitted †. “Now that I am out of the question, that I am a private man, that I reflect as a philosopher on the time I was called upon to perform the works of Providence, though I have not ceased to be a man, I see how much really chance had to do with the destinies of those I governed, how much favour and credit might be *accidental*. *Intrigue* is at times so *dexterous*, *merit* so *awkward*, these extremes are so close, that in the atmosphere I was in, with the best will in the world all must have been a *mere lottery*. Could I do better? Was it by my intentions or my endeavours that I failed? Have others done better? It is thus, above all, I should be judged. *The vice is then in the nature of the post, and in the force of things.*”

When we consider that the man who has made this avowal, is, of all the men that ever ruled, the man who was the less liable to be diverted from his affairs by pleasure, or by any one human affection, and that he was endowed with a most extraordinary perspicacity in discerning the qualities of men; and when such a man confesses that the nominations he made were all, or nearly all, *pure hazard* and merely *accidental*; that *intrigue* was too adroit to suffer him to discover *real merit*; that the atmosphere of a Court rendered all he did a *mere lottery*, and that he avows, after all his experience, that the vice is in the *nature of the post* and *in the force of things*,—where is the King, or the Minister, who, without exposing himself to the charge of presumption, shall dare to say he can control Court intrigue in the choice of public agents?—that what was hazard, lottery, and accident in the hands of Bonaparte shall become certainty in his?—that he shall be strong enough to subdue a vice *that is in the nature of the post* and *in the force of things*, and which Bonaparte declares was above his most strenuous efforts? The great and vital question, which decides the good or vicious ad-

* Mem. St. Hel., vol. vi. p. 199.

ministration of a country, its prosperity or its ruin, is, Whether the people shall choose their agents to do all they are capable of doing in their local capacities, and delegate to Government only the part that requires the collective force of the nation.

Political history affords no example where, in a representative Government, the Court has exercised the power of naming the agents of the people, that it has not introduced such corruption and prodigality as occasioned the nation's ruin. See the state of England at this day, after an experience of 143 years. See the effect it has had in France, in increasing her taxes and her debt by milliards, after a short experiment of fifteen years. It is the nature of this system to increase its prodigality by geometrical progression. It sets to work thousands who have every interest to push the nation to its ruin.

England is perhaps the richest nation of which history has made mention; she has not only more capital, but more ability in commerce, manufactures, and in the employment of machinery, than any other country. Yet has this system squandered her wealth, by exorbitant taxation, and by a debt of 800,000,000*l*. What madness in France to persist in following such an example! Let not the French Government and its partizans deceive themselves. France is a country of small proprietors, who will no longer endure this extravagance. The most rigid economy is for her an imperious necessity. The publication of every year's budget of North America, where a Government of perfect liberty costs so little, makes men reflect on the difference between *a people who have no class of privileged men who think it a dishonour to owe their independence to their talent and industry*, and a people where this race devours the wealth of the nation, and it demonstrates that the more this evil is examined, the more we must be convinced that it is the real cause of the disgust felt throughout the nation.

This question leads to another, which involves every thing dear to the nation;—no less than the question, Whether the King she has chosen shall reign for the *interest of the nation*, or for the interest of a dynasty and of the faction of placemen he adopts to support it.

If the King be determined to reign for the general interest, he can have no objection that the people shall name their own agents, that the superintendence of these agents shall rest with the people, and thereby assure to the nation

perfect confidence in the men charged with administering their affairs.

The general interest will thus be accomplished, and the King will have attained the object of his reign. But if, on the other hand, he seeks to have no other object than to set up his own particular interest by the means of corruption, and to form a Court party by influencing the electors and their Deputies by places and honours, (if it be not a profanation to call that honour thus acquired,) in this case the leaving to the people the power of naming their agents is what he and all the men of this faction will most strenuously resist. Then the hopes of the glorious days of July must vanish, and the nation is put back to the ground she stood on under the Restoration. Disgust and discontent must inevitably follow at seeing the old system of corruption and concentration in force with the same placemen that have served all the despotisms of the last thirty years.

From the day the Duke of Orleans made the solemn engagements with you, acting for the nation, at the Hotel de Ville on the 30th of July, I have anxiously watched every act of the Government to enable me to discover in what interest it was directed. It is with grief I am forced to declare, that not an act has been done that was not indicative of a resolution having been taken to support the new dynasty, by a faction of dependent placemen, in opposition to the interests of the nation; in a word, that the old system of the Restoration was to be servilely followed, and that the men of the last thirty years' despotism, prodigality and corruption were to be the instruments of the new dynasty, as they have been of Bonaparte and of the Restoration.

It is quite simple that, at the first moment, men like you, Lafitte, Dupont de l'Eure, and Odillon Barrot, should be regarded as indispensable; for the first moment needed men who were pure nationals, neither Bonapartists nor Bourbonists. But the nation must be now fully convinced that your presence must have been singularly obnoxious, judging by the indecent haste with which your services have been dispensed with. I do not speak of the interests of the nation, for they are now out of all question, but of the interests of the dynasty, which were at the onset placed on a foundation as wide as the nation. Never was a King more popular. The most ardent republicans were

his warmest supporters, and, with the exception of the factious, the rest of the nation placed no bounds to their joy, so long as they believed that the Government would be conducted for the *general interest*, that the engagements entered into with you would be religiously fulfilled. It is useless to discuss how far the Crown has counted on the national support, how far the alarms so universally spread have been grounded, how far they have changed public opinion; but it is my duty to say that the King who abandons the support of the nation for the support which corruption can procure him from intriguers and placemen who have served all the Governments these thirty years, places his throne on a footing that has not one sound plank to support it, and abandons the rock on which it might have braved the efforts of all the Governments of Europe.

The truly great men of the Constituent Assembly not only restored to the people the nomination of their agents, but by their immortal decree of the 4th of August 1789, and by the declaration at the head of the Constitution of 1791, annihilated all the privileges, feudal titles, and distinctions, which produced those vampires that can find no existence but in the blood of the people. No system of despotism can exist without the aid of this detestable race: no system of liberty can exist with them. Bonaparte was convinced of these truths, and put all his wonted activity to re-edify this pillar of despotism. The Bourbons, with the same view, reintegrated the ancient privileged castes; so that, since 1789, France has retrograded in the road of privileges and despotism, and in its way has doubled the evil.

Of all the rights of which despotism has robbed the people of Europe, the great imprescriptible right of judging the merit and demerit of those who have served or disserved them was the most important. But it is the fault of the people when they suffer this inalienable right to be usurped; for as the exercise depends upon the sanction of public opinion, the moment the people can perceive how deeply its usurpation affects their honour and debases the nation, they can resume it, and annul all that has been done without their sanction. Bonaparte, who was the first, since 1789, to usurp this inalienable right of the people, made himself the sole judge of merit. He corrupted every notion of what confers true honour, by deciding that the men only who supported his despotism, and betrayed the liberties of their country,

were worthy to wear the emblem of honour; and that the men who: had the firmness and patriotism to oppose his despotism, were unworthy to be counted amongst the men of true honour. Bonaparte not only usurped this imprescriptible right, but he employed it to corrupt public opinion. But opinion is too subtle for the grasp of the tyrant. He may usurp the right to adjudge honour where reproach is due, but he cannot give his judgement duration. An appeal must always lie open to public opinion. It is an appeal, ages cannot proscribe. We can at this day judge all the despots who by violence, usurpation or fraud, have enslaved and oppressed their country. We can judge all the sycophants who have supported and flattered the usurpers of the rights of their country. From the moment public opinion becomes enlightened, and that the people can distinguish in the decorated satellite of the despot, the man who betrayed to him their liberty,—from that instant the fraud is detected, the charm is broken; and the gaudy trappings that covered the treason, and represented courtly honours, are despised. When a people can distinguish between real liberty and its counterfeit, they will be enabled to distinguish between true and false honour. It is such a people only that is worthy to appreciate liberty and honour, for they only are capable of reversing the judgement of a despot, and as legitimate judges, and settling in the last resort, decide in sovereign cassation. Until then, the instruments and accomplices of usurpation and despotism may mislead and delude public opinion, and trample real liberty and honour under their feet; but the victims they have so long held prostrate are too lovely, too dear to humanity, not to find millions of generous spirits to raise them, and to vindicate the dishonour and insult to which they have been so long exposed.

The love of distinction is the source of all honour. It is the noblest passion of the soul. It is the silken thread by which Nature leads men to the greatest sacrifices to the public interest, and to the most exalted virtues. It is by abusing this first of all passions that Bonaparte debased and degraded his victims. Instead of a sign that should represent this noble passion, he substituted a false coin, that represented nothing but the most hollow puerile vanity; that, instead of reposing on sterling services rendered to the liberties of the country, reposed solely on the services rendered to the despot. This false money offers too shock-

ing a contrast with the sterling ore of liberty that the glorious days of July have put in circulation, to permit the two to circulate in the same country together. Their value is so diametrically opposite, that the one must depreciate the other. The reward of services rendered to the country is a great national act. It is a question that involves a great imprescriptible right, in which the liberty and honour of the nation are deeply at stake. It is a question which concerns the great mover by which the nation can be directed and excited to patriotism, and to the greatest sacrifices men can make to the general good; or, by a false direction in the interest of a Court, towards cupidity, egotism, and puerile vanity. It leads men to betray the liberties of their country for their individual advancement in riches, in rank, and *honours*, that are an insult to the nation for the ruin of whose liberty those bribes have been given. When it is a question of national honour, the subject cannot be too minutely discussed.

When it is maintained that the spring of human actions is solely confined to the sensations of pleasure and pain in the direct ordinary sense, perhaps it should be received with some grains of allowance. No doubt it is true, without any restriction, when applied to all the inferior animals, in whom the desire for food, shelter, and procreation is the sole spring of action. But it is not the same with man. Nature has endowed him with a passion unknown to the other animals, and that places him high above them. This passion is the *love of distinction*. Without this passion, man would be a most ordinary animal; he would grovel and wallow in filth and mire, without any other desire than that of food, shelter, and procreation. This passion cannot be said to be the *subject* of pleasure and pain: it is their *master*; for when it commands, it makes men brave them both. It drives him to action; and the more he does to content its cravings, the more it impels him. In the sciences, in the arts, in all literary pursuits, where the love of distinction plays so great a part,—what incessant application, what study, what pains it imposes, what pleasures it makes men renounce! In war, what privations, what fatigues, what dangers, it drives men to encounter! Even in the most vulgar way of acquiring distinction, *by riches*,—what incessant bustle, what storms, what shipwrecks and conflicts of the elements it makes men encounter! When the love of distinction is under the direction of the

great tribunal of public opinion, which, with rigorous, impartial justice, decrees rewards for services rendered to the country; when the men who devote their lives and their genius to the advancing the progress of the intellectual world, and in destroying ignorance, superstition and slavery,—it is then, and then only, that society can be said to be composed of men such as Nature designed them; it is then we may hope to see the high places in the social system filled with men who have attained those civic virtues that confer the real title of *great*. It is then we shall see a people worthy of liberty exercising this great imprescriptible right of appreciating and discussing the merit of those who have deserved this greatest reward. It is then the people shall cease to extol and deify the despot who has destroyed every vestige of liberty, and corrupted the national mind. It is then a generous enlightened people shall know how to reserve all its enthusiastic love, esteem, and gratitude, for the truly great men by whose genius and efforts they shall have been raised from the degrading corruption of despotism to the noble and dignified condition of free men. It is the usurpation and shameful abuse of this imprescriptible right of the people, that has banished truly great men from amongst us. It is this that has made our modern *great men* so contemptibly *little*,—pygmies, when compared with the great men Greece and Rome produced, where the sovereign people were the judges of merit. But in modern times this right has fallen into the power of despots; and the noble passion, of the love of distinction, has been corrupted by the vilest prostitution. Men excuse themselves from exercising those great virtues that fill the interior man with self-esteem and self-approbation. They content themselves with the exterior marks that represent nothing but the intrigue and business by which they were gained.

Such is the force of this noble passion, that when despotism shuts the way that leads to true glory, generous spirits will rush with passionate blindness in pursuit of false distinction. Nor is it until the reflection that comes from adversity and defeat has awakened their senses, that they are capable of appreciating the debasement that awaits the man, who for vanity and personal interest betrays the liberty of his country to a despot, and who, by aiding to break the spring of patriotism, has contributed to lay his country prostrate and humbled under its enemies.

Of all properties, the *consideration* a man can acquire in the estimation of his fellow-citizens, is by far the most precious; it is that for which he will sacrifice every other. What would be thought of the pretensions of a Court, if it attempted to give a higher value to the coin when it represents the property of its courtiers, than when it represented the property of the rest of the nation? It would appear a monstrous injustice, and could not be endured. There would be an outcry against it throughout the country. And shall a like injustice be suffered when it concerns the most invaluable of all the goods that man can possess? If it cannot be denied that *reputation* is the most precious of all human property, and that every man has the same equal right that it should be represented by the same sterling ore,—is it services rendered to a despot against our liberties that shall fix the rank men shall hold in society?

Let us come to the proof. During the fifteen years' despotism of Bonaparte, and the fifteen years' would-be despotism of the Bourbons,—for one man who has been ennobled or decorated for having opposed despotism and supported liberty, one hundred thousand could be cited who have been elevated for having supported the despotism that destroyed every article of our Constitution.

One-half these honours came from Bonaparte. If he conferred them for courage, there is not a man in our army who did not deserve them. But if he made the selection (as cannot be doubted) in the sole view to recompense the men he found best disposed to support his despotism, the men he excluded are those who, in the eyes of the nation, would have been most deserving. What the caprice of a despot can give, the caprice of a despot can retake. Bonaparte has loudly proclaimed, that those on whom he lavished his honours have since proved themselves wholly unworthy of them, and that it was by gorging them with too much riches and honours they had been made unfit for any. The men he has so grossly insulted must have more vanity than pride, when they hesitate to tear from their breasts emblems that have been so vilely blasted by him who conferred them. But if this consideration was not sufficient, the whole should have imitated those who have ceased to wear these emblems, from the day they were profaned by the impure mixture of thousands, whose sole title was to have fought in the ranks of our enemies,—for such is the origin of the other half of those honours.

As to men of science, a ribbon in their button-hole, or the empty name of Baron, proves nothing for their superior knowledge in the arts and sciences. It is by their works they can be dignified, and those are before the public.

As a political institution, all distinctions given by the Government are an usurpation of one of the greatest rights of the people, and serve as a means of corrupting.

Never have I seen a Court recompense a citizen for having resisted its encroachments on the liberties of the nation*. The effect which this usurpation of the Crown over the great imprescriptible right of the people has to corrupt public opinion and national honour, has been well described by an energetic writer, in 1788, a year before the decree of the 4th August. His words are: "But if the Court usurps the right of granting privileges and honours, I see nothing in the public esteem but a money debased by the combinations of a vile monopoly. The signs of convention for marking consideration are displaced. They lead astray the sentiment of it." "With most men this sentiment ends by being corrupted by an impure alliance. How should it escape the poison of the vices to which it contracts the habit of paying homage?"

"With a few enlightened men, esteem retires into the bottom of their hearts, indignant at the shameful part to which it is intended to subject them."

"There is no real esteem; and still its language, its manner, subsists in society to prostitute false public honours to intriguers, to favourites, often to bad men."

"In such profligacy of manners, genius is passed over or persecuted, virtue is ridiculed, and in view a multitude of signs of decoration, variously chequered, command imperiously respect for mediocrity, baseness, and crime." "How shall not such honours come to stifle honour, corrupt opinion, and degrade the mind?"

"In vain shall you pretend that, virtuous yourself, you never confound the fortunate *charlatan* or the vile courtier, with the good servant who presents a just title to *public re-*

* I fear it will be found, in every country where the Government usurps the right to confer honours due to merit, that they will seldom be bestowed on those who have had the virtue to resist the encroachments of power on the rights and liberties of the people. I fear, if nobility were confined to the men who merited it, the list would be greatly diminished in every country.

compense : on this head answer experience that attests your innumerable errors.”

The principles I advance are not new. They were those of all France in 1788. I know not if the principles maintained under the old feudal despotism are not too strong for men whose principles have been fashioned by thirty years of modern despotism.

The Constituent Assembly had the same presentiment of the evil and abuse of this usurpation in the hands of power. Why shall not the Revolution of July restore to France the invaluable advantage of abolishing all sorts of privilege? Is it that the French people in 1830 are less worthy of liberty and equality than their fathers were in 1789? Is it that the Revolution of 1830 has been less glorious,—that it has been conducted with less respect for public order, or that we have less constitutional knowledge,—that we should be made to retrograde? If not, where is the pretext for the party that is so obstinately bent on withholding those rights which the Constitution of 1791 assured to the nation? Is it this privileged phalanx, that has been doubled since 1800, that is strong enough to oppose the mass of the nation, or that their origin or their services confer a title that authorises such extravagant pretensions?

During the Revolutionary war, before our heroical armies began to advance the interest and gratify the insatiable ambition of one man, when they fought for the Republic and the country, they disdained all feudal titles and privileges. They were not corrupted with crosses or titles. No; the generals of those times were actuated by the sacred fire of liberty and the love of country. The Hoches, the Marceaus, the Klebers, and the whole of the army sought for other honours besides those the destroyer of the liberty of their country could give them : and is their place in the Pantheon of history less well assured because their names have not been disfigured by some feudal nickname? Is their fame less dear to Frenchmen, or the blood they shed for their liberties less precious? It will not be disputed that the Romans were good judges of civil and military merit, and that they were ever ready to reward services rendered to the country. Yet in 700 years, during which they conquered the then known world, that sovereign people in all this time found occasion at long intervals to confer but a few laurel or oak crowns to encircle the brows of its heroes! How different were the ideas of this great sovereign people,

of honour, from those of Bonaparte, who, after one single battle, found more occasions to confer *honours* than Rome in seven centuries! The Bourbons (whose reign was the greatest national affront which our enemies could offer us), rising above Bonaparte, found opportunities of conferring honours upon thousands, where the country could perceive nothing but disgrace and baseness.

If Brutus, Cato, and the Gracchi could come amongst us, and see such thousands of placemen in the Capitol all decorated with emblems of honour, what an exalted idea would not those lovers of liberty have of this decorated part of the nation, and what a contemptuous opinion they would conceive of the rest of the people who had not been able to obtain the same honours, when so many thousands had given them the example. But when they should ask to be led to the house of the man who had been the truest and most invariable friend to the liberties of his country; the man who by so just a title possessed the confidence of the nation; and when with common accord all the people should conduct them to Anjou-street*; and they should see that this man of the nation wore none of those emblems of honour, and that one of the first acts of his life had been to *disdain all privileges*; and when they should learn that all the *emblems of honour* were the gifts of the despots, who, for thirty years, destroyed the liberties of the country,—those Romans would know by what standard civil and military honours had been measured in France.

When we see a man whose breast is decorated with a series of insignia of honour, he represents himself to his fellow-citizens as superior to other men for services rendered the country, as he is superior in the number of his decorations. Yet since the glorious week in July, in what street, in what alley, in what house, in what hovel, can this decorated man meet a citizen, before whom he durst boast that he has fought for the liberty of his country, or against the tyranny that assailed it, with more courage, more patriotism, more disinterestedness, than this modest, humble citizen, before whom he displays with such ostentation his pretensions to superior merit? Durst he maintain that after having conquered despotism and set up the liberty of the nation, he had claimed less from the country for his services? The contrast between the decorated, privileged,

* The street where General Lafayette resides.

itled placemen and the rest of the nation, is too shocking to be longer endured. It forms an anomaly too revolting between the privileges by which the despotism of thirty years has vitiated equality and recruited the race of intriguers, solicitors, and placemen, and the new æra of liberty which the glorious Revolution has established, to admit that such discordant parties should exist together in the same country. The most industrious nation in the world could not long support the prodigality and plunder by which this system of corruption is upheld. Prodigality and plunder will ever be inseparable in every representative Government that rejects the support of the nation, to place all its dependence on servile privileged dependent placemen, whom it pays with the produce of the labour of the people.

Let the advocates of this system of corruption be consistent and imitate their model. Let them begin by repealing the law of the equal partition of property in families, and substitute the law of primogeniture and settlement. Let them draw from the nation not one, but twenty *milliards*, to set up an hereditary legislative body. Abrogate the law of election, and place the elective franchise in the deserted villages on the estates of this new aristocracy. Acquire for France 140 millions of subjects in India, with millions of places and proconsulships over all the world, and then let them see that England, with all those immense advantages, which a French Government has not, after crushing the people, has wisely taken the resolution to give up the system.

Before 1789, the French Court lived in such profound security, that it suffered a large mass of talent to form itself in France without fear or distrust. No panic then terrified the nation from studying the vices of despotism and the blessings of freedom. The men of the Constituent Assembly have left an eternal monument of the most profound and luminous discussion on liberty and representative government, which, until then, the world had ever seen. These men were all intimately acquainted with the inveterate vices of the feudal system. They had been all bred and educated in the midst of this debasing and humiliating despotism, and their thorough knowledge of its deformities gave them the intimate conviction, that the French people never could be reconciled to endure any law that was tainted with feudal privileges. In this conviction, those legislators destroyed every despotic means of concentration

and the inviolability of Government Bashaws. It is on the most intimate conviction, a conviction founded on the experience of my whole life, that I adjure my countrymen to insist on all the liberties contained in the genuine Constitution of 1791, as the sole remedy to the evils with which privileges and Court placemen menace their freedom, their industry, and their property. No Frenchman can see without the most poignant sorrow, a faction persuading the new dynasty, on which we had so confidently placed all our hopes for securing our liberty on the principle of equality and popular rights, place all its dependence on the men whose sole merit is servility, cupidity, and self-interest,—with which they have served all the despotisms since 1800. Men whose rank, fortune, and honours, depend on the continuance of this system of concentration of all popular rights in the Crown.

If I had the power of exacting from the Ministers of the 13th March the most unequivocal documents to prove the whole truth of what I have advanced, I could have suggested nothing more conclusive than what their conduct, in the few days of their existence, has furnished. The President of the Council, in his opening speech, says that the principle of the Government is to exact the concurrence of *all its agents without exception*. If he meant to require a rigorous obedience from all the public agents of France, in the *discharge of their functions*, nothing could have been more for the general interest. But if it goes to establish, that because a citizen is a public functionary he must pay passive obedience to Ministers in all parts of his conduct, *without exception*, and servilely make the sacrifice of his rights and opinions on things foreign to his functions, I do not hesitate to assert that there is not a principle more arbitrary in any of the despotisms of Asia, or one more destructive of constitutional freedom. But the Minister, by his circular letter to the Prefects of France, has erased every doubt on the subject. Assuredly the offer which a great part of the people have made of their lives and fortunes to defend their country against the foreign powers that would dare to attack it, and against the Pretender, has nothing to do with the functions of public agents. Yet the Minister not only menaces all these agents with the reprobation of the Ministry of the 13th March, for the expression of their opinions as free citizens; but he aggravates the culpability of this violation of all constitutional

liberty, by introducing the name of the King as a party in the act. What renders this conduct more extraordinary is, that the employing of those threats against public agents, for acts done out of their functions, and the using the name of the King to second these threats, form one of the heaviest charges which the Deputies brought against the Ministers of the 8th of August. The present Ministers have furnished a positive proof that they are resolved to make the new dynasty rest on the most abject, servile, unconstitutional, and passive obedience of all the placemen in France. They not only do not suffer it to rest on the nation, but they oppose to the nation the whole force of its placemen. Nay more, in a moment of impatience and violence, the Minister calls the offer of the people to repel the enemy and the Pretender, an *act of opposition the most violent and the most marked* to the Government. It would require, to take away the absurdity of the expression, that the Minister should declare that he *would not* oppose the invading enemy nor the Pretender; for otherwise it is impossible to conceive how the men of the Association can be in *opposition* to Ministers. In what instance have the Ministers of the Restoration attacked the constitutional right of the people with more despotism, or with less regard to the rights and opinions of the citizens? Has the triumvirate of Villele, Corbiere, and Peyronnet, at the head of their *three hundred*, and of all the placemen in France, avowed this odious system of corruption with a more thorough contempt of our constitutional rights! All the difference I can see is, that what the Ministers of the Restoration let out by degrees, and always with a certain reserve, the Ministers of Louis Philippe have dared to avow openly and with menace. They have taken an opportunity of placing the new dynasty on the very same ground as the Restoration, which nothing but a spirit of folly could have induced them to choose. In this conduct it is impossible not to see four egregious faults: 1. The violation of the Constitution; 2. The depriving the Government of the support of the nation; 3. The reducing it to the sole support of placemen, whom it dishonours; 4. The not having placed the Government at the head of the Association. It is with all my force I deny that this tyrannical system, a sect of *Doctrinarians* have been so insultingly forcing on the nation, since the Revolution, is anything like the system of England.

If the Doctrinarians, who are so enamoured with their

deformed caricature of the English system, had given themselves the trouble of looking to the original, they would have found that, from 1688, when England established her liberty, to the time when the family of the Pretender became extinct, there was not a time that the people of England did not hold meetings in their localities, to make the offer of their lives and fortunes to oppose the Pretender, and the foreign powers that supported him; and that since 1688, to this day, there never has been an occasion, when the nation was threatened, that the people have not made like offers. And the Government, far from regarding this act of public spirit as a *vive opposition*, has constantly accepted it, as the most noble and honourable succour a Government can receive. The reason is clear: In England, the Government makes no distinction between placemen and other citizens: all are equally freemen in its estimation. In France, the Government looks on placemen as its passive servants, whom it can cashier at its pleasure, whose salary buys up their rights and opinions. England has had 143 years' possession of constitutional liberty; that is, has existed for that period under a Government supported by public opinion. France has just escaped from the chains of thirty years' concentrated despotism, which has so held the public in leading-strings, and Government has so contracted the habit of excluding them from exercising any one, even the least, of their rights, that the expression of the offer of their lives and fortunes appears to it as a *vive opposition*,—as if it were the officious act of a slave, who should have waited until he was *commanded* by his master, or like I know not what tyrant, that condemned to death his faithful servant for drawing his sword in his presence without his permission, though it was to save the life of his master.

This doctrinarian system rejects all that is good in the English system (there is much that is excellent, and which the Constituent had preserved), and it adopts a most odious copy of all that is bad,—a copy so dissimilar, that it demonstrates the consummate ignorance of the sect that has made it. This copy is nothing but the despotic concentration of Bonaparte, with the whole arsenal of his Bashawships, and his universal usurpation of all the local affairs of the people: not one atom of which is to be found in the English government; where, instead of concentration and monopoly, the part of the administration that is in the hands of the people is so great, that it would require a volume to give

all the details,—of all which details there is not one particle in the hands of the people of France. In this country the Government has *manufactures*; and what is worst, is the *monopolizer* of whole branches of industry, with directors, secretaries, clerks, &c., with monstrous charges for office; while in England the Government manufactures nothing, and even often employs private ship-builders to furnish its ships of war.

In England, the administration of the roads, bridges, and canals, are all in the hands of the people. The profession of road-makers and engineers, who furnish the plans and conduct the works, and their education, is at their own expense, and is left free to competition, like that of lawyers and physicians. But in France, all these public works are monopolized by the Government, and the people wholly excluded. An immense corps is educated, maintained, and their widows are pensioned after their death, at the public expense. Post travelling, enormous expenses, office charges, are paid them; and this for works much better done in England at half the expense. This single article stands for 39,990,000 francs in our budget,—with this essential difference, that in England all those employed are free citizens, while in France, by the new *doctrine*, they are slaves to the Ministers.

Instead of our prefects chosen by the Court, with their palaces, their secretaries, their clerks, their immense offices, with their expense, their courts *d'empereurs au petit pied*,—the same functions are discharged in England by the High Sheriff. I performed those functions; and, like all others, perfectly independent of the Court and the Ministers, wholly at my own expense. Twenty-four of the notables of each county, who are chosen every six months, conduct most parts of the administration, equally without fee or emolument. In the administration of the 300 millions levied annually to maintain the poor, the Government of England has no interference, nor in the vestries that are charged with all the parochial affairs. In a word, all the administration is in the hands of the people of England, and not a particle of it is in the hands of the people of France. In the law department for all England, there is but one Attorney and one Solicitor General for the Government; and in France, there are a thousand public Accusers, because, in France, the Government always meddles in the suits between individuals,—and in England never.

In England the state of the national representation is so vicious, that it gives a most extensive latitude to corruption in the buying and selling of votes in the Parliament and at elections. But, to the honour of the English Government, I must say that it never descends to the baseness of punishing or reprobating, or even controlling public agents, for expressing their opinion on subjects foreign to their functions. The only persons of whose conduct it expresses its disapprobation, are the immediate officers of the King's household. In England, the Government respects public opinion; and for the honour and consideration of the agents it employs, it knows that if it attempted to vilify any class of men for the free exercise of their opinions as citizens, there would be but one voice to petition the King to dismiss the minister who had so basely attacked their constitutional rights. But in France, thirty years of degrading despotism have so fashioned the minds of ministers and placemen to egotism, cupidity, and servile obedience, that they have ceased to feel the debasement and dishonour such a violation of rights brings on the country. No! the brokership of *postiling* of national representatives, whose office is to watch and control ministers, would be looked on in England as gross prostitution, and incompatible with the dignity of men filling the stations of Ministers and Deputies. The essential difference between the original system of corruption that has existed since the Revolution of 1688, and the imperfect copy which the Bourbons introduced into France at the Restoration, is, that in England the Government, with all its corruption, never forgets that its first duty is not to ruin national industry by meddling in its affairs, but to confine its action to those affairs that require the whole collective force of the nation, and to leave all the rest to the people in their local capacity. While in France, the Government destroys not only the industry of the people, but their liberty, by the mania of domineering over every thing and every one without exception. The consequences of this immense difference (no less than that between liberty and oppression), is, that in England, all the notables out of the capital find occupation in the provinces, in their local capacities, which procures them the consideration and esteem of their fellow-citizens: and in France, this same class of men are condemned to do nothing; or, if they are to find occupation, they must have recourse to intrigue, servility, and every species of baseness, at Court, or at the

Ministers, or in their offices, to solicit a place, which, far from procuring them consideration or esteem, places them in a state of servitude, where the most imperious masters exact the abandonment of their opinions as men, and of their rights as citizens. Hence the profound debasement and depravity which this vile trade of intrigue, Court soliciting, and placemen, has introduced into this numerous class amongst us : an evil which neither national honour, nor national liberty, nor national industry, can withstand : an evil so monstrous, that it has but to be clearly explained and freely denounced, to induce the people to claim their rights of nomination of their own agents, as the sole remedy to this national pest.

I should have ended here ; but as the present Ministers have raised the mask, and avowed openly that the nation is not to be governed on the principle of general interest, but that Government is to be continued on the same principle as that which was adopted at the Restoration ; that all is to be directed for the interest of a dynasty, by the support which Ministers are to derive from the most servile and passive obedience of all the placemen in France, to the most imperious and despotic commands of their masters ; and this, not only in what regards their functions, but to extend to their rights and opinions as men and as citizens. According to this plan, the Revolution of July is but a simple resistance to the Ordonnances of Charles X. All is to re-enter into its old course ; and adieu to the engagements of the Hotel de Ville, to all popular institutions, to all rights with which the Constitution of 1791 endowed the nation : they give place to the despotic system of concentration, the usurpation of all the rights of the people, with which Bonaparte and the Bourbons, and their faithful accomplices, have been working these thirty years to establish despotism.

The experience of all I have seen these forty years has left a profound conviction in my mind, that those principles, which the Ministers of the 13th of March have adopted, must lead to the same catastrophe as that to which the Ministers of the 8th of August brought the Government of Charles X. : a conviction so intimate, that I cannot refrain from undertaking to show that the same conduct has been the ruin of all the Governments that have succeeded one another from 1791.

I meet every day men who imagine that they have all the

talent and knowledge required to be deputies, ministers and statesmen, who seem not to be aware that the invention of the press has increased and disseminated knowledge, in quarters where nothing but the most profound superstition and ignorance reigned before; that human knowledge is an accumulating fund, which generations transmit to their successors, and that the increase of this invaluable property is always in geometrical progression; that it is on the minds of the great industrious independent class, which makes the force of the nation, that this augmentation of knowledge has made, and is hourly making, the most rapid progress; that nothing is more certain, than that the press prepared the materials of the fire which burst forth in France in 1789, and caused the Revolution; that it is this same press that has caused the Revolution of 1830; that the manner in which it has been viewed by all France proves that the spirit of liberty has lost nothing of its force (for never has that spirit been so strong); that it is this irresistible power which all the Governments since 1791 have attempted in vain to oppose; that it is their having shut their eyes to irresistible causes, and their as irresistible effects, that has been the ruin of all these Governments, and that will be the ruin of all those that follow them, if they persist in the same wilful blindness.

A brief review of the past will convince us of this important truth.

It would be lost time to stop to prove that it was the attempt which Louis XVI. had made to destroy the Constitution he swore to maintain, that caused his ruin and the subversion of his Government. I will not sully my pen with writing the thousand turpitudes by which he and his Ministers laboured to subvert all the liberty the Constituent Assembly had established. Those infamies are fully detailed in the *Annals of the Revolution* written by his minister Bertrand de Molleville. Nothing can exceed the depravity and perfidy with which the whole civil list was employed to corrupt the citizens, to organize dishonour, and juridically or otherwise to assassinate the patriots. From the moment the nation made Louis XVI. descend from his despotic throne, he was the last man in the world it should have chosen to mount the Constitutional throne of 1791; for thus it became a Restoration, and a Restoration is the worst of all Governments. The more the Constitution contained of liberty, the more a King brought up to des-

potism must detest it. To confide a Government of liberty to a despot is to confide a machine to *machine-breakers*; the better it is, and the more it abridges labour, the more ardent they are to destroy it. Madame Campan, in her *Memoires*, tells us, that on arriving in his palace, after taking the oath to maintain the Constitution, Louis XVI. threw himself into his arm-chair, and cried out to his wife, "All is lost!" and that very night he sent off Mr. Goguelat to Vienna, with a letter to the Emperor, to demand foreign aid to destroy that same Constitution, a few hours after he had sworn to maintain it. A perjured King is the artisan of his own ruin.—I pass to the monarchy of Robespierre.

No one will deny that this atrocious tyranny fell for having destroyed every vestige of liberty. The partizans of despotism affect to call this tyranny a Republic, whereas it was the exterminator of the Republic. Let them call it by what name they will, they can never prove that it was not an atrocious monarchical tyranny; for if ever there was a pure absolute monarchy, it was Robespierre's. While he reigned, there was not a head in all France that must not have fallen the moment he willed it. If his was not the Government of one man, I defy any one to show me in all history an absolute monarch. Not Nero, Caligula, Commodus, nor Louis XIV., nor even Bonaparte, could boast with more autocratical truth that *l'Etat c'est moi*, than Robespierre could.

This tyranny of Robespierre forms a hyperbolical deformity even in the history of human despotism. It is not a Government of men, but of anthropophagi,—another cave of Polyphemus, where every thing was devoted to die. It was a sanguinary infuriated monarchy, devoid of every security for life, property, or persons. All was at the mercy of a hateful atrabilarious monster. Danton it was who laid the foundation of this horrible monarchy. He was one of those rare characters, who, the moment they conceive a gigantic project, devise gigantic means of executing it. He suspected the firmness of the people to resist the invasion of the Prussians, and resolved, cost what it might, that the Revolution should not retrograde;—he had recourse to terror. He ordered the massacres of September; and so determined was he in his purpose, that he sent to the guillotine all those who disapproved the horrid means he was resorting to. But he soon perceived the absurdity of destroying liberty, with the intention to save it; and that in his anxiety

to support the Republic he had killed the Republicans. No sooner was he aware of the monstrous error into which he had fallen, than he offered his life in expiation. Robespierre saw a throne vacant, floating in blood, and placed himself on it. Like every despotic monarchy, that of Robespierre had but one spring—terror; its wheel of state but one mover—the blood of the people: and as the increased heaps of its victims clogged its rotation, he was forced to augment the torrent.

The partizans of despotism and its abuses have found in this absolute monarchy a theme for calumniating liberty and republican government, and a means of alarming the ignorant and the timid, by comparing the present Revolution to the times of 1793. The most superficial comparison will prove the infamy of the calumny.

When the Revolution of 1789 had freed the nation from the most tyrannical aristocracy that ever oppressed and debased a people, that aristocracy repaired to the different feudal Courts of Europe, to raise enemies against their country. Those men, for centuries in possession of all the power, consideration, and riches of the State, were equally odious and obnoxious to the people, and by this last act they roused a spirit of hatred and revenge that knew no bounds. Add to this, that the corruption of manners, introduced under the regency and reign of Louis XV., was so great, that the prostitution and profligacy of the privileged class produced in the capital lees of all that was most infamous. It was a real *canaille*, similar to that organized and trained by the Ministers of Louis XVI. at the expense of so many millions, to every sort of disorder, infamy, and crime, and which were employed in the like works during the horrors of 1793.

In fine, those composing our present middle class were men, who, in 1793, never having before exercised any political rights, were ignorant of the duties they impose, and who, proceeding from the degrading condition hitherto attached to the plebeian class, had not acquired the conscience and habit of self-estimation and independence, which forty years' absence of feudal despotism have now given them.

Compare that state of things with the one existing to-day, and the most prejudiced must agree that all those fruitful causes of disorder and revenge which existed in 1793 have entirely disappeared. The Emigrant faction

of Coblentz has dwindled into naught; it has credit nowhere; so far from exciting the hatred and vengeance of the people in July, the little attachment they showed to the cause for which they had professed such devotion, drew from the people nothing but contempt and indifference, and not one of them has either been attacked or molested. The middle class, so backward in 1793 in constitutional knowledge, is all composed of well-informed educated men, conscious of the dignity that becomes free citizens. Of that *canaille*, so infamous in 1793, not one was to be found in all Paris in the days of July, nor since. If we take into account, that, from being the oppressed and humiliated *vilains* of the nobles, the people of France have become the independent owners of the lands of their ancient oppressors, and that education is making rapid progress amongst them; it is with the pride of a citizen, who glories in the immense progress of the nation, that I oppose these solid unanswerable arguments to the calumnies of detractors; and in the face of those men whose doctrines are founded on falsely depreciating their fellow-citizens, I assert that the people of France are at the head of the civilization of Europe, and that while all the other capitals have their *canaille*, that race is extinct amongst us. This the immortal days of July have proved.

Born and educated in Ireland, and a Frenchman only by adoption, I should blush not to render this justice so due to my fellow-citizens. What then should be the shame of those Frenchmen, where the soil is their mother, who for the vile spirit of party find such pleasure in defaming their country?

The memoirs that have been published in such numbers during the Restoration, have brought to light the real authors and investigators of the horrors of the reign of Robespierre. The Emigrant and Jesuitical faction have claimed the merit, demanded and received the reward of their deeds. These men have proved that not a head of a Republican fell, that was not demanded and paid for by the intermediary denunciators, who were all foreigners, and furnished with foreign gold, and that all the threads of the scene were at Coblentz.

A complete history of those sanguinary deeds of the Emigrant faction, from 1789 to 1830, will, it is hoped, shortly appear, and give the detail of the most infernal wickedness that is to be found in the annals of human crime.

'Then will be seen in broad day, the guilty that accused their innocent victims, and provoked the vengeance of crimes they themselves had committed. M. de Serres, although an emigrant, condemned his party, and told the truth when he said, that the mass of the Convention was composed of men pure and commendable for their virtues.

All doubts have been removed. The guilty are discovered. Thousands of the most undeniable proofs have evinced that neither the people of France, nor the Convention, nor the glorious Revolution of 1789, nor the love of liberty, nor the principles of Republicanism, were the authors of the horrors of 1793. No, France remains pure with all her glory; at first struggling against the organized bands of despotism with unorganized citizens, and from the moment she had organized her armies, marching from victory to victory, amid every privation; evincing such proofs of disinterestedness, delicacy and honour, as no people under similar circumstances ever offered an example of.

It is true there is no danger that any Ministers will ever attempt to set up terror as the means of government. But we, who profess republican principles, by which we mean a Government founded on general interest, in opposition to a Government formed in the interest of a family and a coterie of abject, servile, and passively obedient place-men, owe it to ourselves, to reject with disdain and horror, the most distant affinity with the sanguinary monarchy of Robespierre, which, so far from being a Government of Republicans, was their exterminator.

Of all the epochs since 1789, that of the Directory is the most important to be consulted, because it has points of a most striking analogy with our present situation. It is a great misfortune that when once a *mode* has been established with us, however absurd, it must have its course. Nothing will be listened to that can be said against it. This is the case with the mode which the partizans of Bonaparte and the Clichy faction set up, to decry the Government of the Directory. It is to this we must impute the levity, and, I fear, the ingratitude, with which the nation has treated the Constituent of 1789, and the Government of the Directory. After the long experience we have had, we have nothing to do with the passions of factions and coteries; facts being our sole guides.

The tyranny of Robespierre's monarchy had broken

every spring which gives motion to the administration of affairs or to the government of a nation. The wheel of the state was at a stand, from the instant the torrents of blood that turned it had ceased to supply it. Society presented the spectacle of a vast chasm, that had engulfed all the materials of social order. It was in this state that France offered herself to the view of the Directory at its installation. Nothing in ancient Republics is simpler or more noble than this installation, as related by La Reveillère, one of its members, and written by Bailleul. "When the Directors entered the Luxembourg, it contained not a single piece of furniture. In a closet, round a limping table, one foot of which was rotten with age, were deposited a few sheets of paper and a horn ink-stand, which fortunately they had had the precaution to take at the Committee of Public Safety. The Directors sat down on four straw-chairs, by the fire of a few ill-lighted sticks, borrowed from the gate-keeper Dupont. Who would believe that it was in this sorry situation that the members of the new Government, after having well examined all the difficulties, I will say more, all the horror of their position, took the determination to struggle against all obstacles, to perish or to extricate France from the abyss into which she was plunged? They drew up the act by which they dared to declare themselves constituted."

These courageous citizens found the circulation crushed under the weight of near 40 milliards of discredited paper, not a penny in the treasury, not even wherewith to pay messengers to announce their installation. Anarchy everywhere, the armies naked, disorganized, without pay, not even the eight francs in specie a month, the then pay of the brave disinterested Generals of the Republic. The traitor Pichegru got himself beaten purposely at Heidelberg, by connivance with the enemy; the Rhine was open on the side of Mentz; civil war raged in La Vendée; Holland was on the point of being invaded by England; and to complete the scene, the plunderers of the public fortune insulted the public calamity by exhibitions of the most indecent debauchery, in contrast with the general misery of the people, by which they gave a vicious direction to the youth of the capital.

Yet from this unparalleled state of desolation and misery did the Directory assemble an army which enabled the immortal Hoche to crush the civil war on all the western coast, and two other armies with which Hoche and Moreau

threatened Vienna on one side; and they assembled a fourth army with which Bonaparte penetrated on the other side; so that in eighteen months from its installation, this Government, which it has been fashionable to decry, forced Austria to sign the peace of Campo Formio, by which she was forced to abandon Italy; it extinguished the civil war; restored to France the boundaries of the Rhine, and forced England herself to treat of peace; it re-established specie, revived work and industry, instituted public exhibitions for national manufactures, founded a National Institute on a vast plan, worthy of a great and enlightened nation; created an admirable system of public education, with primary normal and central schools, without converting into tyranny the sacred rights of the parents, and without fashioning the minds of the youth to despotism or superstition; they established the uniformity of weights and measures, organized and enriched the National Museum, ordered a compilation of the Civil Code to be made: in fine, this Directorial Government, for whose immense services France has been so unjust and so ungrateful, was the creator of all our national institutions, of which Bonaparte has taken all the merit, though he did but corrupt them to his despotism. Here is assuredly more than enough to have placed a Government on the most durable foundation; for what Government, in four years, ever counted so many triumphs, and with such scanty means, in Germany, La Vendée, Italy, Holland, and in Egypt? What Government ever established, in so short a time, so many and such magnificent institutions? The more it has done to merit stability, the more its fall should be a lesson to all future Governments to avoid rejecting the support of the nation which occasioned its ruin.

Unfortunately, the profligate Barras was entrusted with the party police of the Government, and by his intrigues with the Pretender, and his sale of licenses to return to all emigrants indiscriminately who could pay him, he filled France with this faction, whose perfidy and crimes have never failed to bring on revolution in any Government which has the folly and weakness to suffer its plots. A faction whose device is, to use the words of a feudal Duchess, "Vengeance, pillage, fire, murder, are the means that one should not fear to employ: everything being permitted in defending so noble a cause*." Such was its device in 1793,

* See the *Moniteur*, No. 295, 25th Messidor, year 3.

in 1815, in 1830, and such it will ever be; and if it had succeeded in its last attack on our liberties, it would have raised its scaffolds and deluged France with torrents of blood. The real danger came from this faction: the secret correspondence of Clichy, and its ramifications, its intrigues at the elections, its venal journals supported by funds from without,—this was the mortal enemy the Directory permitted to fortify itself throughout France; which egregious fault forced it to the necessity of the *coup d'état* of the 18th of Fructidor, that led to the destruction of the excellent Constitution of 1795.

Placed between the Emigrant faction and a handful of crazy Utopians, with the Nation in front, instead of putting itself at the head of the Nation, to crush its enemies on both sides, Sièyes, in horror of the Utopian spectres that haunted his imagination, confounded the Nation with the insignificant band of anarchists, threw the Government into the arms of a despot, where he vainly expected to find a saviour: and this is the fate of every Government that flies from the nation to give itself up to a faction. I pass to the usurpation of Bonaparte.

If ever the experience of a fifteen years' government left the evident proof that a Government in the interest of a dynasty has been utterly impracticable in France, since 1791, it is to be found in the fifteen years of Bonaparte's reign. No man was ever endowed with a more violent passion for despotism than Bonaparte, or with more talent to ensure success, or was more indefatigable in the pursuit of his object. No man in whom the affections of the heart had less power to divert him from his purpose, nor any that was less stopped by scruples of conscience for the consequences that might result to the rest of the world. In a word, he was formed by nature one of the most active and vigorous despots she has ever produced. Yet never did immense labours, nor oceans of blood, nor mountains of treasure even in his hands, lead to a more miserable defeat and failure. Never was there a more dreadful proof that the most Herculean efforts to establish despotism in France are utterly impossible, and that the Minister who dares attempt to govern otherwise than for the *interest of the nation*, must bring the Government to its ruin.

Did ever man take his measures more in the interest of despotism than Bonaparte? He found the nation rich in a vast number of citizens, endowed with a spirit of independence, disinterested, and preferring public interest to all

other considerations. The corruption and debasement of those public-spirited, virtuous citizens, was the work which the despot found the most pressing, and that he hastened to accomplish. It was the most irreparable of all the thousand ills his insatiable ambition has entailed on France, that which has been the most cruelly felt since our glorious Revolution, and that will continue to be felt for a long time.

He got up a Government after his own fashion, to facilitate his usurpation, and stocked it with his senate, his legislative body, &c. He annexed large emoluments to each individual, so much the more corrupting, that the people, long reduced to the greatest privations, had contracted the manners of republican simplicity. He found the nation in the plenitude of her sovereign power, and with immense property acknowledged national. The usurper disinherited her of all. In his mouth everything became *mine*; his fellow-citizens, *my subjects*, *my armies*, *my senate*, *my corps legislatif*; and with these usurpations he fabricated *his* Constitution, that it might serve in his hands to destroy every vestige of *our* liberty. All France may remember what ardent love he professed for liberty at the beginning of his usurpation; what speeches he delivered in her favour; what popular manners he constrained himself to adopt. But when he had once organized power, and centred it all in his own hands, he began the horrible work of demolition. Not a day that he did not astound our ears with the fall of some popular right. The fall of each member of our liberty struck with grief the hearts of all those worthy of her. In the little opposition that was openly made to him, the nation saw you and Carnot in the first rank: you, in your private capacity, and Carnot, as tribune. The latter defended liberty in the following words:

“ Was liberty then shown to man that he should never enjoy it! No, I can never consent to look on this boon, so universally preferred to all others, without which all others are nothing, as a mere illusion! My heart tells me that liberty is possible; that its reign is easy and more durable than that of any arbitrary Government. I voted at the time against the Consulate, and now I vote against the re-establishment of Monarchy.”

It is for the citizens who opposed the usurpation of all our rights, and the destruction of all our liberties, that

France, when she shall have learnt how liberty is to be established, and how it is to be preserved, will raise statues with gratitude and admiration: it is then that all the vile mob that sold themselves to power will be despised and forgotten.

The Tribunate was the only speaking part of Bonaparte's Constitution. All the rest were his mutes, and when he destroyed it, it was the head he struck off; it was the last act of the tragedy. All that a despot could do was accomplished. Henceforward, France was reduced to a state of the most absolute slavery. In no country did the will of one man, not excepting Robespierre during his reign, more completely annihilate the will of every other. He left five Codes on paper. But the sole practical code of this modern hero was comprised in two words—*I will*: these annulled every other. Not a man could stir but with his permission; no man was free whom it pleased him to imprison; no power could open his dungeon, procure him a trial, and afford him the means of proving his innocence, as long as it was the will of Bonaparte to refuse it. Not a thought could find utterance that was not in praise of him and his despotism, not only in France, but all over Europe. Not a line could be published to censure or even discuss his arbitrary acts, that there was not an agent of his ready to imprison and punish the author. With his *Blockade*, by which he destroyed the commerce of Europe, in his interest as a despot, such was his terror of the manifestation of public opinion, that he rendered it more difficult to smuggle a foreign newspaper, than a cargo of the most precious commodities. To such a degree did he enslave the press, the most precious of all our liberties, that the loss of the battle of Trafalgar was not suffered to transpire for six months, and thousands of mothers were left in ignorance and torture on the fate of their children.

It would be endless to enumerate the thousandth part of the means this active and indefatigable despot employed to stop the current of liberty in France and in Europe. Never did man possess more Herculean powers, nor employ them with more vigour or perseverance; and never did man fail with more discomfiture and humiliation.

Two men, in seeming opposition, but having both the same design of stopping the current of liberty, have figured on the theatre of Europe together,—Pitt and Bonaparte. In the history of no country do we find two men, who were in-

vested with such enormous power, so completely fail in effecting their purposes, or bring such ruin on their countries. The milliards they have spent, and the milliards their ambition has left to be paid, the ocean of blood they lavished, and the assistance they gave despotism in Europe, prove that these men, whose genius is so vaunted, knew nothing of what they had undertaken. Yet both have left with the vulgar (and in this vulgar are many who think themselves statesmen) colossal reputations for talent, in the countries where their ambition has caused such ruin.

In England, the cruel effects have brought on reflection. Men have begun to see through the deception that has been used to make them believe that all the blood and all the wealth was employed to support their liberty. Since they have seen that the whole has ended by replacing the Bourbons on the throne of France, the reputation of Pitt has fallen as low as that of his immortal opponent, Fox, has risen. Fortunately, the remedy of the evil Pitt has left, is now in the hands of the disciples of his glorious rival. But in France, Bonaparte's conduct was a thousand times more decidedly hostile to liberty, for it went to the most atrocious destruction of every principle that could render its existence possible. The ruin he brought on France has been attended with such humiliation, defeat, pecuniary sacrifices, and national humiliation in Europe, as she never experienced even in the days of King John. Yet do we meet thousands every day who profess the most ardent love of liberty, and at the same time testify the most enthusiastic admiration for this man, who devoted his life, his talents, and his most strenuous efforts to destroy it; for the man who not only destroyed liberty, but corrupted the mind of the people, annihilated public spirit, and substituted in its place cupidity, egotism, vanity, and the contempt of every virtue.

I own to you, my dear friend, that there is a levity, an inconsistency, a contradiction so shocking in those discordant professions, that in spite of my ardent hopes of seeing liberty established in France, this clashing of principles rises like a cloud that obstructs my sight. It is a gross absurdity to treat our liberty as if it were a cap or a coat, that the *mode* has brought into fashion today, and that the caprice of the next day may banish; where men seem to think liberty has no other foundation than vanity and caprice, and that it requires neither care, nor sacrifices, nor

civil courage to maintain it. When men's principles proceed from two points so diametrically opposite as Bonaparte and liberty, they are worse than weathercocks, for even the fickle winds do not blow from contrary points at the same moment.

If men would look at this modern hero through the glass of reason and justice, what jugglery, what knavery, what perfidy, what contempt of mankind and of their interests, what egotism, what destructive ambition, what vain-glory would they detect in all his acts ! What dreadful sacrifices all his vices have imposed upon the suffering people (millions of human lives among them), to create the false and ruinous glory which attaches to his name ! Perhaps men who have hearts to feel will think that the making of such heroes costs humanity too much, and that after all we have paid, it is possible to find true glory at less expense. But the false ideas of greatness, arising from our feudal education have left such false notions of human greatness, that we reserve all our admiration for power, no matter in what hands hazard has placed it, and without which the most sublime virtue is forgotten.

I own that, so far from adoring the man, who held in his hands the power of establishing liberty throughout Europe, and who employed his power to rivet the chains of France and of other nations,—he is the object of my execration ; and so far from thinking that such a man deserves the name of *great*, in my opinion he should be looked upon as the basest and most criminal of mankind. But supposing, agreeably to the vulgar opinion, and contrary to all truth, that greatness could be thus acquired, I deny that Bonaparte can have either with us or with posterity any right to this august title. The man who can aspire to greatness, founds his title on the achievement of a sublime work. He must show that he had genius to discover the *means* by which his success could be secured, and he must have the talent to employ these means in a manner so as to attain his object. I shall show that in every one of these Bonaparte has completely failed.

As to the object, it will not be disputed that there is nothing either great or sublime in destroying the liberty of nations, reducing them to slavery, and lavishing their wealth and their blood to establish despotism ; and least of all, when this greatest of crimes is committed for the sole interest of the criminal and his family. But let me put aside

all consideration of crime and virtue in the object, and view Bonaparte only as a man devoured with the ambition of being a great conqueror. He must have known that all his success depended on the choice of the *means*; and if he had so little genius as to have preferred those by which he did and must infallibly fall, it is impossible to call him a *great man*.

The first duty of a man who undertakes a great enterprise is to consider the *means* of execution he possesses. A truly great genius would have seen that he lived in an age when no Government could have stability, if it were not founded on the principle of *industry* and *public utility*. This principle has introduced amongst us a science unknown to our fathers, which is to the body politic what matrimony is to the human body. The man that is ignorant in either case acts entirely in the dark.

If Bonaparte had consulted the principles laid down by œconomists, like Smith, Turgot, or Condorcet, he would have learned, what every one now knows, that the important inventions lately made have created an immense mass of knowledge and a proportionate spirit of liberty, which, since the Revolution of 1789, *have* acquired a force which no human power can stop or repel. He would have known, that as the cause of its own nature must have attained additional force every day, so the effect must also have a corresponding increase. But no; instead of Bonaparte's seeking his *means* in the advanced civilization of the age in which he was acting, and consulting the spirit that ruled it, an Italian himself, he formed himself after his countryman Machiavel's prince, and made his hero Pope Alexander VI. his model, of whom Machiavel says *: "His whole life was one continued imposition upon mankind; he neither did nor thought of anything else but how to deceive others; no man ever made stronger protestations of sincerity, or took more oaths to confirm them; no man ever showed less regard for those engagements. Yet he was so well acquainted with the credulity of the world that he always found people to work upon, and *succeeded in all his designs*." This was the source from which Bonaparte drew all his political principles; he never concealed that he considered an honest man a fool. Those were the lessons that Napoleon had engraved on his Italian mind, when he took so

* Machiavel's Prince, chap. 18.

many oaths to the Republic, which, he says, he was determined on betraying from the battle of Lodi. Such were the principles with which he destroyed the Constitution of 1795, with which he usurped the power; and it is with these principles he juggled the French nation out of every vestige of her liberties. He was of a very different opinion from your friend, the great Franklin, who used to say, "Did rogues know their interests, they would become honest men through roguery." It was this littleness of mind (which charlatan habits and love of deceit gave this Italian), that rendered him incapable of conceiving the immense means an honest man, with his talent, might have found, in conforming to the spirit of the times.

He found France and all Europe full of the sacred fire of liberty, and the despots trembling, astounded, and dismayed on their tottering thrones. He found the people of Europe anxiously awaiting the bursting forth of this sacred fire, and daily expecting the French armies, whom they regarded as its harbingers. With such colossal means as he possessed, a truly great genius would have taken an enlarged view of the vast theatre on which he was going to act a great part; he would have seen on what side the current of the human mind was running; he would have been convinced that it was rapid and irresistible in favour of liberty and against despotism. On the other side, he would have seen that all the efforts in the world must lead, in the end, to defeat, disgrace, and ruin. I did not wait till Bonaparte's death to publish the ideas here expressed. In 1803 I wrote a work in which I exposed this opinion. I gave it to Bonaparte, who had it printed. In it, among others in the same sense, were these words: "Let us come to the fact by which this question must be decided. From most of the Governments of Europe having lagged behind, or from having been in direct opposition to the will of the people, a movement has manifested itself in the European nations towards an amelioration in their political state. Commerce, a diffusion of property, and education, have eradicated or shaken those prejudices, which the sloth, superstition, and ignorance of ages had planted. Let us distinguish between the alarm France may give to despotism, and the *alarm she would cause in the minds of the people who live under those despotic Governments if she should attempt to subdue them.* Is it not this spirit of liberty in the hearts of the people of Europe (the very spirit by which

France has performed such wonders herself), *which would oppose the most invincible resistance to her pretensions?* If France was to attempt to subdue the nations of Europe, it is not from the slavish part she would experience an opposition; it is little for slaves to change masters. No, I assert it, *they are the most ardent, enthusiastic lovers of liberty, whose valour she would have most to admire:* the oppression and tyranny of a perfidious Government may unman and disarm a people by depriving them of everything that is worth defending; but a people who have a country to fight for, who are determined to possess the blessings of freedom, cannot be conquered. Confining our remarks to those countries where the Governments are despotic, as long as France remains neutral between the people and these despotic Governments, there is no question that *as far as she may have occasion to act in conformity with the spirit of liberty and the love of equality that exists in the hearts of these people, she will find a most extensive alliance. The moment she acts the part of a conqueror or of a plunderer, the alliance is broken, and the enthusiasm takes the opposite direction*.*

And again, page 98: "No despotic Government that is wise will make war upon France, while this sympathy exists between her and the popular spirit of Europe; and no people can expect that France, after the blood and capital she has expended in her own Revolution, will find it her interest to engage in a war to accelerate the progress of liberty elsewhere. The enlightened Government of France will leave the progress of liberty in Europe to the operation of those great causes which have brought it to its present state of advancement, and the Governments to the wisdom of accommodating their conduct to the popular spirit; whereby the waste, devastation, and horrors of a Revolution may be avoided. *Thus France cannot abandon this sympathy with the popular spirit of Europe, without renouncing her surest guarantee in peace, and her best ally in war; but if she set up for a conqueror or an oppressor, she must expect to create the most inveterate opposition vengeance can furnish.*"

Well; Bonaparte did abandon that popular spirit of Europe; he undertook to crush it. He lost its precious alliance, and he found the inveterate opposition and the vengeance that destroyed him, in the Landwehr and the Landstrum, whose enthusiastic spirit he might have secured to

* The Present State of Great Britain, by Arthur Condorcet O'Connor, p. 91; Paris, year 12.

himself. But his heart was too corrupted and egotistical, to conceive or to act the part of a truly great man; he failed, and died in the chains he had forged for the world.

If, instead of forming his ideas by Machiavel, who was born about the time printing was invented, when the people were ignorant of their interests, Bonaparte had founded them on his own times, 400 years later, when the people had gained knowledge, and learned their interests, and the benefits of liberty, he would have seen that the man who has the ignorant temerity to strive against the principle of public interest must struggle against a torrent that will inevitably overwhelm him. Had he possessed the genius to discern and to employ the immense and irresistible means he rejected, he might have boldly marched forward, and would have found, that instead of lengthening his line of operation, which is the great danger of conquering armies, it should have been absorbed as he advanced, and his forces augmented. By leaving the people the advantages of liberty, they would have felt the French cause to be their own, and would have willingly contributed to aid it. Thus Italy, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and all Europe, as far as the boundaries of Russia and Turkey, would have formed the basis of his operations. A population of 130 millions, animated with the sacred fire of liberty, would have extirpated in one single campaign the barbarity of Russia and Turkey from Europe, and thus the spirit of liberty would have gone the round of the world. This was the truly great and glorious occasion that fortune threw in the way of Bonaparte, and that his despotic soul was not capable to conceive or to seize.

Instead of adopting those magnanimous ideas founded on the liberty and prosperity of nations, and the extraordinary means they would have furnished, he exhausted the population of France, putting her youth in regular cuts, as if they were the trees of his forests, and in subduing or setting up the feudal despots of Europe. Instead of centupling his force by bringing the people of Europe the liberty they so ardently expected,—far from even conciliating them, he did everything to excite their vengeance. He plundered them several times; he crushed them by the enormous taxes his wars forced their despots to exact from them; he crushed them again, to pay the requisitions and tributes he imposed on their masters. He sent crowds of his administrators to overrun those countries; and when they had plundered all they could, they took all the sterling money,

and left a base coin to replace it. In order to leave them nothing, he occupied their country for years with his numerous armies, and forced his soldiers to dispute with them their bread and that of their children. He took corps of those nations into his service, and made them feel what it is to be auxiliaries of the Conqueror.

By this tyranny and plunder, solely in his interest and that of the accomplices of his oppression, he drew upon France the popular vengeance of all the nations of Europe. After fighting hundreds of battles in which human blood flowed in torrents, without any profit to France, or to any other nation, but with certain and dreadful losses to all, he so exasperated the people he had so long and so insultingly trod under his feet, that his tyranny made their despots appear to them indulgent masters. Such was the resentment that Bonaparte had excited in their hearts, that they accepted the promises of liberty their despots had *proffered* them, and made Bonaparte feel the thunderbolt of that spirit of liberty he disdained. Then fell to pieces the scaffolding of despotism he had raised on the rotten basis of cupidity, egotism, vanity, and all other vices. Then was France made to pay for the tyranny and plunder his insatiable ambition had so long inflicted on the people of Europe; and then appeared in all its light the false policy of France, in having abandoned her alliance with the spirit of liberty for one with despotism.

No doubt those swarms of locusts to whom he abandoned the wealth of the people of Europe, and those he gorged with *too many honours and too much wealth*, have cause to regret the downfall of his despotism, and to wish to see a successor of a like disposition:—no doubt they will ever consider him a *great man*. But it is not such men, nor the vulgar he dazzled with his victories, that have produced such despotism and ruin in France, that are capable of forming an impartial judgement on the question. This must be postponed for the generation that is coming forward; it is that generation which we should make every effort to enlighten on a subject that concerns so nearly the national honour. The vulgar see nothing in the art of war but the brilliant side, which is the offensive. But with those who have studied this art, the defensive part will appear the most difficult, and that which requires by far the most military talent. History abounds with generals great in the offensive part, but in the defensive, the Xenophons and the

Fabii are rare. Yet to be entitled to the rank of a great captain, a man should be equally perfect in both parts. Cæsar is at the head of those rare perfect generals. His campaign in Africa, where with a handful of men he maintained a defensive war against a whole Roman army, is a master-piece.

No one will deny Bonaparte the merit of being a great general in the offensive. All his combinations were for the attack, and in this he was most formidable. But here we must stop. In all that concerns the defensive, he was absolutely nothing. On all occasions when the armies he commanded were reduced to act on the defensive, he took to flight. When the army of Egypt was reduced to the defensive, he fled and left it to Kleber. When at Esling, by the fall of the bridge, the army was reduced to the defensive, he fled and left it to Massena to save it. In the retreat from Moscow, he abandoned the retreat to Ney, and fled the instant he could; and if instead of fighting the hopeless and disastrous battles of Leipzig, the 16th and 18th October, he had known how to conduct a defensive retreat, he might have arrived on the Rhine with 200,000 men for the defence of the country: for want of which talent, he sacrificed nearly the entire of his army, and the independence of France. In fine, at Waterloo, he surpassed himself;—the same pusillanimous flight, the same desertion of his army, the same abandonment of the defensive.

These numerous examples amply prove, that in the thousand vicissitudes to which even the most successful general is subject, the general who has not the talent to conduct a retreat, and does not know the defensive part, is unfit to conduct a great enterprise.

The rising generation will read the account of the victories their countrymen have gained, even in the cause of despotism, with admiration for the talent and valour with which they were achieved; but they will weep to think that so many heroes and such precious blood have been sacrificed to place a family on despotic thrones, in their own country, and in Spain, Italy, Germany, and Holland. It is with far other sentiments they will read of the deeds of the armies that fought for the liberty of France. It is with enthusiastic joy they will read of those glorious victories that our armed citizens gained in repulsing the coalesced despots of Europe. They will inform themselves of each trait of heroism that was displayed at Jemmapes, at Fleurus, at the

taking of the lines of Weissemburg and Haguenau, at Zurich, at Hohenlinden, and hundreds of other places, where so many wants and privations were all so nobly supplied by the sacred fire of liberty, and where the honour of defending this glorious cause was all the recompense the men of those times would accept. They will blush to think that in the days when their country groaned under the leaden sceptre of despotism, no battles were talked of but those fought in its service;—that while not an humble stone had been raised to our patriot generals, an attempt has been made to raise a statue to perpetuate the memory of the man to whose usurpation and despotism we owe the cruel difficulties our liberties have to surmount since our glorious Revolution: for it is to his having perverted and corrupted the higher ranks of our social order, we have to impute the dearth of national characters to conduct our political affairs. Bonaparte has done himself more justice than his flatterers, when he says, “The Bourbons had my memory and my conduct at their disposal. If they had wished it, *I should have remained in the eyes of the vulgar an ambitious man, a tyrant, a public disturber, and a plague.*” The mind must indeed be vulgar and low that acquits Bonaparte, solely because the Bourbons did not know how to govern. It is not by a circumstance wholly independent of his merit or demerit he can be judged. Every man, according to justice, should be judged by his own deeds. The deeds of Bonaparte have had too much *éclat* to be forgotten. They are the facts by which posterity will judge him.

His fall, after the immense means his fertile genius and the energy of his character invented and employed to stop the current of liberty in France, authorises us to assert that henceforth it will be impossible. The fall of the Bourbons is a still further corroboration of this great and cheering truth. The partizans of Bonaparte say, that at the Restoration the nation made a *halt in the mud*. Nothing is more false and unjust. Indeed, it may be said that Bonaparte did all he could not only to make us halt in the road to liberty, but that he strove to make us go back to the utmost limits of slavery. No; never did nation march forward with a more intrepid step towards liberty, than France has done from the Restoration. Whence are derived all the reputations that have been made in France, in every station of life, from 1815 to 1830, if not from the vigorous efforts that have been displayed in favour of liberty during that

period? It is true, it was not only in mud France had to march,—she had to wade through her own blood. But nothing could stop her until she vanquished despotism in the glorious days of July; and nothing can stop her until she obtains the liberty she fought for. But, thanks to our position, we are not driven to make these heroic remedies our daily regimen. The Liberal Press has been the artillery that has marched at our head during the last fifteen years. It is to her we owe the conquests we have made. It was the genius and talent of the courageous editors of our Liberal Press that prepared us for the struggle. It was they, who in the foremost ranks led us to combat. To them we owe the noble example our National Guard has set to reject the gewgaws of vanity. It is their talent and patriotism that will enlighten our electors in the choice of our Deputies, and it is by the Press and the national representation that henceforward France will correct her institutions and perfect her liberty.

If it were possible to place myself on the same footing of equality and intimate friendship with the King, upon which I stand with you, I would address him thus: “Sire, the illegal and unconstitutional means that the Ministers of Charles X. employed to vitiate the elections and corrupt the electors in 1830, formed a chief accusation of the Deputies against them. Such vast powers, and in such hands, at such a crisis, could not fail to produce these effects. Seeing this stain in their origin, the public anxiously watched all their votes, and from those it has been judged that those elections have produced 114 pure Carlists, and as many more of men imbued with the principles of the Restoration, with some deserters of the old opposition, forming in all a decided majority, all staunch friends to the system of concentration and the abuses of the last thirty years’ despotism, and in complete hostility to the principles of the Revolution of July.

“Thus constituted, this majority began by assuring its permanency by usurping, under one pretext or another, your prerogative, that could abridge its existence. Next it eluded the dissolution of the hereditary Chamber of Peers, whose composition, being part of Bonaparte’s Senate, and the rest of Louis the Eighteenth’s emigrants, rendered it incompatible with the liberties of France.

“Louis XVIII. began his reign by an extensive purification of the whole judiciary body. In the *Cours Royales*

alone, he dismissed 294 Judges. During Charles the Tenth's reign the nominations of that body were left to the Jesuits. All this judiciary body has the Chamber of Deputies preserved.

"Such is the composition of the three corps that have been invested with the legislative and judiciary powers of the State since the Revolution of July. If a committee composed of the most zealous Carlists and Bonapartists, assisted by Metternich, Nesselrode, and Wellington, had the naming of those three corps, I know not in what they would have done otherwise, or have chosen men, who before your elevation to the throne were more inveterately your enemies, more hostile to the honour or liberties of France, more opposed to the principles of our glorious Revolution, or who with more cunning and intrigue could have driven from your service the men who had most contributed to place Your Majesty on the throne, and who enjoyed the confidence of the nation. The great advance this faction has made in eight months proves how worthy it has been of its mission.

"Sire, the trial of the Ministers of Charles X. was connected with the warmest and most sensitive affections of the Parisians, and of all France. The occasion was too favourable not to be seized on by the faction: men that have ever been known for the most violent partizans of the Draconian code, adopted at once the philanthropic proposition of M. de Tracy, and thereby alarmed the people on the score of the interference of Government to save the Ministers.

"This was artfully acted upon by the men, who, quitting your palace, proclaimed that they found you resolved on saving the Ministers, cost what it might. The effect of this manœuvre on the public feelings was incalculable, and was as ably as wickedly improved to throw you into the dependence of the faction, and to separate you from the people. While Lafayette was passing whole nights at the head of the National Guard, to parry the danger with which this intrigue threatened your dynasty, and while the National Guard and the youths of the Colleges were sacrificing their most violent and hateful resentment to public order, the faction was at its nocturnal work, planning the attack that was to drive from your Council Lafayette, Dupont de l'Eure, and all the men sincerely attached to the Revolution.

“With three corps of this origin, can the nation be astonished you should have felt for seven months the impossibility of forming a Ministry of national men, in which there were neither Bonapartists nor Carlists? It was not until after twenty-one changes, that at last the faction reduced you to take a Ministry, which commenced by sacrificing the word and honour of the nation abroad, adopting the system of corruption and servile placemen at home, that places the force of your Government in the abject and passive obedience of all public functionaries in France; which subjects them to the absolute command of a Minister in all things; estranges from your Government the patriotic part of the nation, which embraced the Revolution of July with all its consequences; that, faithful to the despotic principle of concentration of all powers, has openly declared that the generous offer of the energetic part of the nation to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to support you against your enemies and those of the country, is a *vive* and *marked opposition* to this Ministry. If, indeed, the Bonapartists and the Carlists had made such an offer, Your Majesty might well have doubted of their sincerity. But to insult the nation which is firmly attached to the King of its choice, and is neither Bonapartist, Carlist, nor Jesuit, cannot be explained but by considering the temper of the factions, to gratify whom, or to appease despots, the insult has been offered.

“Sire, the French people are clear-sighted. They cannot but draw their conclusions when they see the manner in which the bill brought in against the family of Charles X. has been treated, and the proposition your Minister has made you, to cheer the hopes of the Bonapartists by the sight of the statue of their despot overlooking the capital of the nation, which all his efforts were exerted to corrupt and enslave.

“Sire, the hatred of the faction for our generous youth is as old as the Restoration. In the moment of their sublime devotion, a word of reproach to the faction (though that word was just and true) was made a pretext to insult them. The resentment that followed, so natural and lawful, has been converted into a charge of rebellion, and your Ministers have the shame and disgrace of filling the prisons with those noble youths, to whose ardent patriotism, in great part, the nation owes its liberty, and Your Majesty the Crown; and while the faction is filling your councils and

your palace with men, who for thirty years have been the servile instruments of our oppressors, they are prosecuting your most ardent adherents. Sire, the *Comité Central Revolutionnaire*, which sat at the Archbishoprick with Fouquet Tainville at its head, could not do better. If those are the acts of men attached to your dynasty, and to the peace and liberty of France, that have prepared those scenes for our patriot King, I leave it to the most fertile imagination to show us what more disgraceful spectacle the most inveterate enemies of Your Majesty could prepare for you and the nation.

“ When the favourers of despotism have succeeded in concealing their principles under the cloak of moderation, and have made some dupes, nothing is easier than to make thousands, for nothing is more contagious than panic. Any King will satisfy a faction of placemen,—a Bonaparte or a Charles X.; and the more prodigal he is of the public money, the greater in their estimation is his merit. But the nation sighs after a King who shall destroy those vampires. You, Sire, from your principles, those of your family, the exploits of your youth, the purity of your political life, (uncontaminated by any contact with the despotism of Bonaparte or that of the Bourbons—a thing not less precious than rare in the elevated class,) are become the *man* for all those who seek a Government founded on general interest; and in spite of the cant of moderation and hypocrisy, such a Government is a Republic.

“ Montesquieu said, that the English Monarchy was a Republic; and Aristotle proclaimed, 2200 years before him, that a *Monarchy in the general interest was a Republic*. In this sense, which is so ancient, and which is the true one, the people of England and the people of France are *Monarchical Republicans*. It is the *prose* they have been speaking, like the *Bourgeois Gentilhomme* of Molière, without knowing it. The nation is aware that a Government in the *general interest* can be presided over by an hereditary King, as well as by an annual Consul, as at Rome, or a President for four years, as in America. The French people are convinced, that in the state of parties in France, the election of an executive magistrate would lead to a civil war, and to all the horrors of anarchy. In this conviction, they have adopted you, and the dynasty of the House of Orleans, with all their heart. You are for them the *necessary and indispensable man*. They will maintain you on the throne on

which they have placed you, not from the silly notion of Divine Right, nor from a servile attachment to your family, but on the most solid of all grounds,—the conviction that the peace, prosperity, and liberty of the country is inseparably linked with the choice they have made. This is the indissoluble tie that binds the nation to your family; and, far from the factions within and the despots without being able to loosen it, any attack on their part will but draw it closer. But this is on the condition that your Government shall be in the *general interest*; for such is the knot that unites you to the nation. It is not because she gladly and willingly abandons the future right to elect a King, and makes the office hereditary in your family, that she thinks herself bound to make a like abandonment of all her rights, where the general interest imperiously demands she should exercise them herself. The nation sees that, in the nomination of 40,000 mayors, the people are infinitely better judges to discern who is the honestest man in the commune, than a Minister or Prefect, who probably does not know an individual in its population. She knows that in taking the nomination of those officers out of the hands of the people to place it in those of the Prefects, who are the election-agents of the Ministers, Government has no other object than to give Ministers 40,000 means of corrupting the electors. It is the same with all the other nominations that the people are competent to make, not only without the smallest inconvenience, but with immense advantage to economy and to their liberties. The national representation grants your Government annually a milliard and more. This sum you want to carry on your Government. But if the nation can, by a noble disinterested devotion to the public service, collect this sum at an immense saving, in what respect will the milliard be less efficient in your hands when collected by the nation? These are but so many means of corruption in the hands of Ministers. For the nation knows that when the Government is in the general interest, a Minister has no need of corrupting her representation, nor her electors; that it is only when a Government is established in the interest of a family and of placemen, that this concentration of all the nominations of the people's agents becomes a *sine qua non*.

“Sire, Your Majesty can be at no pains to comprehend me. Few have had better means of knowing the purity of your political principles and the innate probity of your

heart. It is a duty I owe my fellow-citizens to proclaim it by my humble testimony. In 1796, I lived in the intimate society of the person who educated you, in the same house at Hamburg. The ardour of your patriotism, the solidity of your principles, were the increasing subject of her warmest praise. All she feared was that your attachment to private life, and your repugnance to the contentions of political struggles, would deter you from taking a part.

“ Sire, the King of England gives, at this moment, the most noble example to the Constitutional Kings of the earth, by his appeal to the People of England, to assist him in freeing himself and them from a faction tyrannical to both. Are the people of France less generous? No! make the appeal to the nation! Millions of swords will fly from the scabbard, to put down the faction that dare to destroy your constitutional prerogatives. The same Monarchical Republicans that are seconding William IV. in England, will second Philip I. of France; and amongst these I do not include the *soi-disant* Republicans, who have been making so much noise with the sole view of obtaining places.

“ A patriot King is essentially a civil magistrate, who has no need to date his despatches or his decrees from the *Sultan's stirrup*, nor is he a *Quixote* running round the world in search of adventures, nor tormented with the puerile vanity of signing a decree at Moscow, to regulate the Opera dancers at Paris. We are a free people: we are no longer conquerors for despotism or ambition. Such conquests have cost us and humanity too dear to induce us to recommence them. Our national chief ought not to appear to us always in the dress or under the aspect of a warrior. Like the Kings of Ossian, he should never descend into the plain, but when the victory is doubtful.

“ A patriot King is surrounded by grave men, learned in the sciences of legislation and political economy, and men versed in diplomatic knowledge; and as *aides-de-camp* are seldom deeply skilled in those sciences; he reserves them for his reviews, or for war, and never for political police,—an opprobrium Bonaparte imposed on his *aides-de-camp*.

“ France hopes from her King, who is an honest man, the abolition of this infamous and corrupting institution, which a military despot cannot dispense with. For such a man a political police is indispensable: he lives in the midst of constant terror; the sword of Damocles is always sus-

pended over his head; he is in constant suspicion of all the world; and seeks to secure himself from the hand that may strike him, by the daily reports of the millions of spies who unceasingly watch over every action, every word, every look, and endeavour to guess the very thoughts of men. His Police is his Government. All the other parts,—his Ministers, his Administrators, and even the entire judiciary body, are but appendages to this monstrous police, which, to be complete, must have at its head a man that has given proofs, in the second city of France, of the most cold-blooded cruelty. Such a police offers the truest and most horrible representation of the imaginary government of hell. Bonaparte's Government was the seat of this police, and his aides-de-camp were charged with the different branches.

“ The Bourbons, who inherited the vast arsenal of Bonaparte's despotism, found this police the richest portion of the whole inventory. It was to the taste of Louis XVIII., whose genius had shown itself in his *Institutes* *. Bonaparte's police was enlarged in his hands, and embellished with the infernal invention of fabricated plots; and this King was proud of having formed a Minister in so precious a science.

“ Sire, a political police is an insult to a patriot King, and a reproach to the nation that has chosen him. His police is in the hearts of the people; his safety, his safeguard, is the love and attachment they bear him. In a free state, every citizen honours himself by denouncing a traitor who conspires against the liberty of his country; but in a despotism, where the protection of the Government is intrusted to branded ruffians, a *Vidocq*, and his *forçats libérés*, the citizen shrinks with horror from any such contact. The last degree of infamy to which a Minister can condemn men whose functions are foreign to the police, is to force them to occupy themselves with it. The more a Government thinks to render itself strong by such measures, the more it renders itself contemptible. It is a deplorable error. Every power that dishonours the men it employs, commits suicide; and the Minister, who, in a Constitutional country, fabricates plots, places his head on the block, and deserves the utmost severity of the law. Nothing is so corrupting, so

* This was the name of the secret societies he organized to carry on the civil war, assassinations, and robberies, that were to bring about his restoration.

useless, as a political police; and when we see a Prime Minister set out by demanding 1,500,000 francs for this execrable institution, it is evident he knows nothing of a Government in the general interest. At London, with a population and an extent nearly double those of Paris, a hundred agents suffice for the service of the secret police that watches over the lives and properties of every one; and yet there are in that city 300,000 souls, who, rising in the morning, are not sure to dine in the day.

“ Permit me, Sire, to conclude with a comparison. If in a season of storms and unusual rain, your Ministers were to communicate to Your Majesty their fears lest the waters of the Seine might inundate the Capital, and that in their ignorance they should propose to you to construct a dyke at *Choisi le Roi*, you would not fail to represent to them, that no dyke, however strong and high, could prevent the water forming in the clouds, nor this water from falling in torrents between the source of the Seine and the Capital; that consequently the dyke could serve but to overflow the whole of the country; that the higher and stronger the dyke, the greater the mass that must destroy it, and deluge the Capital. But, Sire, has the influence of the Press been less certain in producing ideas of liberty? Has not this influence gone on augmenting, especially since 1719? Have the vast dykes that the Bourbons and Bonaparte have raised been able to stop it? Has the current of liberty been ever stronger or more rapid than since the Ordonnances of July, that were made to drive it back? It is then a mathematical fact, that as it is impossible to destroy or even diminish the cause, the effect must go on augmenting; and it follows hence, that instead of dykes, it is *new canals* that are wanting to carry off the increasing torrents. And what are these canals, but the creating occupation for the public mind, by destroying the despotic system of centralization, that takes everything out of the hands of the people, and by restoring to them all they are capable of transacting in their own interest?

“ Sire, in a time like this, quacks only will dare propose to you a panacea that shall assure to your dynasty immortality. Permit one, who is sincerely attached to its existence, and that in the firm conviction that it is necessary to our liberties, to offer you the opinion, that it is more by identifying your dynasty with the general interest, and by giving to the people the enjoyment of all the rights they

are capable of exercising, than by retaining those rights in the hands of your Ministers, who will never fail to abuse them, that you can assure the longest possible duration to the House of Orleans."

This is the language in which I think a real friend to the King might address him ; but experience authorizes us to fear, that austere truths are not always those that find the easiest access into a Court. This shall not prevent me from expressing the ideas of the age I live in. I do not count on the approbation of courtiers or of placemen. All my hopes are in the rising generation : for it I write. It will not have a military Government, nor a Government of the Court, nor a Government of Jesuits. This generation will be wholly national. I have the conviction, that there are in our social state vices which menace our liberties ; and no human consideration shall hinder me from denouncing them.

We have been witnesses of unexpected fortunes and rapid elevations. I have seen them all vanish, that did not rest on services rendered to the general interest. All this, I avow to you, has left on my mind the most profound contempt for this *ephemeral greatness* ; and the only ambition it has left me, is, that of obtaining the esteem of men like you, and to bequeath to my children a life without stain, and the reputation of an enlightened consistent patriot.

It is with these sentiments I shall ever remain your devoted friend and the admirer of your virtues,

ARTHUR CONDORCET O'CONNOR.

April 15th, 1831.

REMARKS
ON
NEW ZEALAND,

IN FEBRUARY 1846.

BY
ROBERT FITZ-ROY.

LONDON :
W. AND H. WHITE, 24, PALL MALL.

1846.

LONDON :

J. DAVY AND SONS, PRINTERS, 137, LONG ACRE.

REMARKS ON NEW ZEALAND

IN 1846. .

CHAPTER I.

THE following brief remarks may be useful to persons interested in New Zealand, for whose service they are intended.

In order to comprehend more readily the present state and prospects of the local government, the colonists, and the aboriginal natives of New Zealand, it may be advisable to commence by noticing the geographical features, and the climate of the country; both of which have been considerably misrepresented by some persons.

Extending in two long, but rather narrow principal islands, (with a few smaller ones adjacent,) New Zealand lies between the parallels of 34° and 48° south latitude, and between the 166th and 179th meridians of east longitude. It contains about 62,000,000 acres, and is bounded by nearly 3,000 miles of coast line. The country is generally hilly; in many parts mountainous. Forests, thick woods, impervious jungle, or high fern, cover the greater part of the surface, which is extremely broken, and intersected by numerous ravines. Swamps abound, and rivers or streams are numerous; but scarcely any are navigable except for large boats.* In only a few localities is there any considerable extent of level land,—and in those alone is natural grass pasturage found. But the soil is generally fertile—in some districts exceedingly so,—and the climate is extremely favorable for vegetation.† The general character of the soil—except in the wooded vallies, or in the swamps—is a light sandy loam, near the surface; but rather clayey below.‡ Deep ploughing and

* Hokianga, Kaipara, Wanganui, admit vessels a short distance within their mouths.

† Almost too much so, the pruning knife being constantly required in gardens.

‡ This sandy clay forms a tough sub-stratum, approaching to stone in hardness, previous to exposure to the weather.

fallowing are found to improve even the worst soils* much beyond former expectation; but the valley lands are so rich as to require little or no labour beyond clearing and surface ploughing.†

The climate is very healthy, and, in fine weather, particularly agreeable:—but there is so much violent wind, and such frequent as well as heavy rain, that substantial houses and warm clothing are required at least as much as during a mild winter in England; although the temperature is remarkably equable. These frequent and heavy rains wash away quantities of the loose friable soil, and cause much additional trouble with respect to roads, fences, and gardens. But these remarks apply principally to the sea coasts. In the interior, on the eastern slopes of mountains rising to ten or twelve thousand feet above the sea, whose summits are covered with perpetual snow, much colder and drier weather is found: but on their western flanks,—especially along the west coast of the large southern, (or middle island,) there are dreary mountainous regions clothed with almost impenetrable forests, and covered by clouds carried with the prevailing westerly winds. The worst climate is towards the south west extremity of these islands; the finest in the eastern and northern districts. The northern region, being in a lower latitude, is proportionally warmer. Notwithstanding the prevalence of rain and wind, the country and the climate are eminently favorable to animal and vegetable life; but they require the most active bodily exertion, and some outlay of capital, in order to reduce the wilderness to a profitable condition.

The principal events connected with New Zealand are now so generally known, that I would not here refer to any that occurred previous to 1844, were it not indispensable to mention those few which are more particularly connected with any explanation of the present state of affairs.

At the beginning of this century the state of the country and the aboriginal population of New Zealand must have corresponded nearly to the descriptions previously given by Cook; but the older natives agree in saying that the numbers of their countrymen have greatly diminished during their own remembrance, and that this diminution appears to have been caused by epidemic diseases, by warfare between tribes,

* Cold sandy clay.

† There is much volcanic soil in the northern and central districts of the northern island.

on account of disputed territorial boundaries, and by the infanticide of female or weakly children. As soon as the neighbouring colony of New South Wales began to flourish, small vessels thence sometimes visited New Zealand; a precarious trade was thus opened; and by degrees—notwithstanding many atrocities, (not committed by the barbarous cannibals alone)—some advances were made towards intercourse, and a few natives ventured to Sydney. With two of these * the Rev. Mr. Marsden visited the Bay of Islands, in 1815, and laid a foundation for subsequent improvement.

It is worth notice, that while Mr. Marsden was trying to win the confidence of these native chiefs, and, through their influence to obtain a friendly reception for the first missionaries, there were persons at Sydney striving to counteract his efforts, and assuring these islanders that, if they complied with his advice, their country would soon be overrun by the English, and they themselves would be treated like the aborigines of New South Wales. Plausible arguments were then † used in Sydney, and were soon repeated at the Bay of Islands, similar to those employed lately in many parts of New Zealand: but Mr. Marsden at last succeeded; and a few daring Englishmen, supported by the Church Missionary Society, were permanently located among some of the most warlike and independent tribes. One of the missionaries ‡ who encountered the trials of those early days, told me that the first two or three years he spent in New Zealand, could only be described as a living martyrdom,—so frequently was he apparently about to be sacrificed by the then savage and blood-thirsty natives.

After the Church of England Missionaries had made some progress, the Wesleyans arrived, and began their useful labors; selecting Hokianga as their first station: and about this time an irregular traffic with Sydney was increasing, which for several years, tended rather to strengthen and encourage the missionaries, whose knowledge of the native language induced frequent appeals to them by all parties, as interpreters and mediators, if not as judges. During about fifteen years previous to 1840, many British subjects, some Americans, and a few Frenchmen purchased land, and became actual settlers: but during the two or three years immediately preceding 1840, such a rage for buying land in New Zealand prevailed—

* Duatera and another, who were chiefs of some note.

† 1815.

‡ Mr. King.

especially in New South Wales—that immense tracts were said to have been bought,—title deeds, (however useless), were sold and re-sold,—ruinous losses and disappointments were the inevitable consequence,—and dissatisfaction began to spread, not only among the white, but also among the coloured people.

New Zealand was then, and had been for about twenty years, a resort of convicts escaped from the adjacent penal colonies,—who very soon adopted the habits of the natives,—acquired their language,—and, in several instances, were tattooed. Sealing vessels, and ships engaged in the whale fishery frequented the coasts, and as their crews,—particularly the sealers,—were usually reckless in their conduct, lives were frequently lost in the more remote harbours, of which no public account has been given: but particulars of the most notorious massacres have been repeatedly published.

I regret to say that in nearly all the affrays,—the origin of which I have been able to ascertain—the white man appears to have been the aggressor, not always unintentionally. Ignorance of language, customs, boundaries, or taboo marks, have not caused so many quarrels as insult, deceit, or intoxication. Thus while the missionary was endeavouring to christianize the native,—and was eminently successful for a time,—his numerous opponents were diffusing their vicious influence, and demoralising the followers of their depraved examples.

At the beginning of the year 1839, it is supposed that there were not fewer than 80,000 aboriginal natives, (including women and children), and nearly 2,000 white people in these islands. Perhaps about 3,000 only of the above number of natives were on the southern islands, while not less than 77,000 were on the northern. This great disparity in population between two adjacent islands so nearly equal in area, seems to have been partly a consequence of the comparatively recent peopling of New Zealand, and the course of migration; but chiefly the result of a disparity of climate. Neither the kauri tree, nor the kumera plant, are found on the southern (or middle) island: those shores are more exposed to wind and tempestuous sea; and as there are only a few harbours on the eastern coast, canoes cannot be much used. It is said, however, that the natives of the middle, (or large southern) island, were more numerous before they became acquainted with white men,—from whom they caught ‘measles’ and other diseases, which carried off many more people than now survive.

In the northern, or principal island, the natives were most

numerous along the accessible parts of the coast, and about the rivers and lakes, much of their subsistence being fish.* They were not migratory,—excepting when conquerors of better territory; a case by no means infrequent, because the chief cause of their quarrels was land. Nearly every freeman in each tribe knew his boundaries, and the history of his family and possessions for several generations; but the extent claimed was sometimes insisted on tenaciously as a point of honor, rather than for its actual utility, since there was usually much more than they required for their own use. However, it should be remembered that extensive lands not only kept doubtful neighbours at a distance, but afforded a greater range for selecting trees for canoes, for fishing, for eel preserves, for rats,† and for the choice of fertile spots for cultivations.

About 1000 white settlers were then living near the Bay of Islands and Hokianga, and not less than an equal number were dispersed over the country; some—the escaped convicts—secluding themselves as far in the interior as possible. This limited number of white men excited no jealousy on the part of the natives, with whom they traded. On the contrary, every chief of note was desirous of having his own “pakeha”‡ living under his protection, and acting as his adviser as well as agent or factor. The missionaries themselves, and all the early settlers, lived under the special protection of their native neighbours,—those generally from whom they had obtained land. This state of things gratified the chiefs, and they naturally thought that with more “pakehas” they would have more trade, and more advantages over other tribes. At that time they felt no loss of influence or authority. They themselves were the undoubted masters.

The principal and the more respectable settlers, then habitually looked to the chiefs for security from molestation on the part of ill-disposed inferior natives,—and to the missionaries for restraining the covetousness or anger of the chiefs, which the great influence acquired by the missions could alone effect.

The universal respect in which the natives held these pioneers of christianity and civilization is a sufficient proof that

* Eels are particularly prized, and are caught by wicker traps like those used in Europe.

† Rats (the native animal so called), were sought for food. It is supposed that this was a small creature resembling a rabbit rather than a rat. It is now seldom seen.

‡ Pakeha means stranger, alien, or foreigner.

their personal behaviour was generally correct. The natives are such keen observers of character and conduct,—so quick in detecting inconsistency, and estimating individuals by their actions, that an inconsistent person—though professing to be a missionary—would have no moral influence.*

It appears that personal character—as sincere friends and truthful advisers—upheld the missionaries with the majority of the natives, nearly as much as the doctrine which they taught. However readily the gospel was received, and eagerly as this sagacious and inquisitive people learned to read and write, it may be feared that only a rather small proportion of nominal converts became really christians. Novelty, and what may be called a fashion of the time, have very great effect on these islanders: a striking instance of which may be given in the speedy apparent conversion of many natives to the Roman faith, when the French bishop, Dr. Pompallier, and some French priests first arrived in 1838. When asked by the old English missionaries why they did so, the reply was: “we like to try what is new.”

When the rumour of intended colonization and government by Great Britain was spread abroad, a fresh light dawned on New Zealand, and all the early native jealousies, lulled since 1825, were revived with increased force. The mission dreaded the effects of extensive colonization, although desirous of British government. Some of the old settlers were disinclined to lose their monopoly of trade, and to submit to the restraints of English law. American and other settlers, not British subjects, were naturally averse to our interference; and bad characters—especially escaped convicts—of course dreaded the approach of legal authority.

But when once the decision of the British Government was made known, no exertion was spared by the Church of England and Wesleyan Missions to dispose the principal chiefs favorably towards such a change—a political change, which increasing local disorders and plans in preparation by various speculators, rendered imperative. Mr. (now Archdeacon) Henry Williams, at that time the head of the Church of England Mission in New Zealand, was particularly zealous and active; and his influence was then greater than that of any other individual in the country.

But the missionaries could not conscientiously urge, and

* 'The loss of character and influence caused even by settlers' misconduct with respect to native women is remarkable, although unhappily of ordinary occurrence.

did not encourage the natives to part with their lands in the wholesale manner then required by speculative purchasers. On the contrary, they cautioned them to remember the future wants of their children, when numerous strangers would be settled among them; and while advising the natives to encourage the new comers, and treat them kindly, they dissuaded them, openly and honestly, from parting with such land as would be required for their own maintenance, and that of their descendants. The hasty attempts of the New Zealand Company to buy large tracts of land, without even ascertaining the correct boundaries, or communicating with most of the owners: and their precipitate settlement of British colonists in ill chosen localities are now known to the public. Their first and principal settlement, at the south end of the Northern Island, was established at the end of 1839.*

Early in 1840, Captain Hobson, of the Royal Navy, who was instructed by government to treat with the natives for the cession of their sovereignty to the Queen of Great Britain, arrived at the Bay of Islands. He was cordially welcomed by the Church Mission, the Wesleyan Missionaries, and the more respectable settlers, as well as by many influential chiefs; but the French Romanist Missionaries, the Americans, and a considerable proportion of the natives, looked on with displeasure and distrust which were but ill-concealed.

The treaty of Waitangi, so important to all parties interested in New Zealand, was signed on the 6th of February, by most of the chiefs present; and copies were forthwith sent about the country, as well as round the coasts, in charge of Mr. Henry Williams, Major Bunbury, Mr. Shortland, and other duly accredited persons. Major Bunbury went, in H. M. S. Herald, to Cook's Strait, and along the middle island to Stewart Island. Mr. Williams and others went to Cook's Strait, and round the southern part of the northern island. Mr. Shortland visited the tribes north of the Bay of Islands.

After lengthened and minute explanations, and earnest discussion of the actual import and probable consequences of the treaty, it was signed by a large majority of the principal chiefs, on behalf of their tribes and themselves. Those who did not sign were either opposed to the arrangement, were of minor importance, or were in the interior, out of reach.

This treaty has now been viewed in many lights. Some

* Two of those places having very little available land, and the third having no harbour.

persons still affect to deride it; some say it was a deception; and some would unhesitatingly set it aside; while others esteem it highly as a well considered and judicious work, of the utmost importance to both the coloured and the white man in New Zealand. That the natives did not view all its provisions in exactly the same light as our authorities is undoubted: but whatever minor objections may be raised, the fact is now unquestionable that the loyalty, the fidelity, and co-operation of any natives in New Zealand has hitherto depended mainly on their reliance on the honor of Great Britain in adhering scrupulously to the treaty of Waitangi—the Magna Charta of New Zealand.

When Heke was agitating the northern natives by his arguments against the government, he took great pains to show them that the British flag being hoisted on any territory, was a sign that the land belonged to the Sovereign of Great Britain, and that the people of that land were become slaves. He contended that the governor and the bishop were only slaves,—that they were obliged to obey the directions of their Sovereign (who now was a woman) and that to preserve the freedom of New Zealanders the British flag must not be admitted on their territory. To meet these arguments, Archdeacon Henry Williams circulated printed copies of the treaty of Waitangi, and himself discussed the question of the flag* at every meeting of the natives in his neighbourhood. By degrees he succeeded in counteracting Heke's mystification of the subject.

* Te kara (the colour.)

CHAPTER II.

1840—1844.

The misgivings and partial opposition occasioned by the proceedings of the British authorities, and recent settlers in the northern part of New Zealand, as well as the jealousy roused by the sudden arrival of large bodies of colonists in Cook's Strait, were neutralised for a time by the attractive advantages of a brisk trade with these new-comers, whose demand for pigs, potatoes, fish, and native labour, was unprecedented and very lucrative. By the payment received for these, and for their lands, the natives in the vicinity of the Pakeha* settlements became rich in the estimation of their remoter countrymen, and were not a little envied.

Eagerness to trade, and to have settlers near them, overcame all other considerations during 1840, and 1841; but in 1842 the tide began to turn. More settlers arrived in every ship. The natives were not only treated with less caution and less kindness than previously, but they were threatened, even on trifling occasions, with the punishments of English law;† and they were told by ill-disposed or unreflecting white men that their country was taken from them, that they were now Queen Victoria's slaves, and that they could not even sell their own property—their land—as they pleased. These taunts were felt deeply. The natives had been so accustomed to pass freely across land or water, wherever they pleased in their own districts, that they were perplexed by seeing fences rising, and by finding that people were becoming averse to their company. They also found that land which they had hastily sold for a few articles, soon consumed or worn out, was resold for many times—perhaps more than thirty times the value which they had received. They discovered that the government understanding of the treaty of Waitangi not only bound them to give the Queen of England the first offer of land they wished to sell, but that they could not sell to any other person, even if the government, on behalf of Her Majesty, declined to purchase. They were moreover much astonished and irritated by

* Foreign, strange, alien.

† To them unintelligible.

the interference of government with estates purchased from them previous to 1840; and by hearing that all land so bought, exceeding a certain quantity to each original purchaser, would be transferred to the government. In addition to these and other serious causes of irritation, the chiefs began to feel that they were no longer the principal persons; but that their influence and power were diminishing rapidly: that they were becoming suitors to the white men, instead of—as formerly—the white men being dependent on them.

Probably, there is not in the world a race of men more truly democratic with respect to civil and personal independence, and yet equally aristocratic in their regard for descent and family connexion. On these subjects their feelings are sensitive in the highest degree. As an instance, when the now notorious Heke first heard the Queen prayed for in Waimate Church, instead of the chiefs (who were considered the principal authorities previous to 1840), he asked, indignantly, why the Queen of England was exalted to the skies, and the chiefs of New Zealand were trodden under foot. As another case, I have witnessed a long and anxiously sustained argument, lasting nearly a whole day, between two families, or portions of a tribe, respecting the ownership of a tract of land. One party had sold the ground to an Englishman for a small vessel of about thirty tons burthen; the other party denied their right to do so, and claimed the vessel. After tracing back their respective descents through eight generations, eagerly contesting every point, both parties agreed that the actual sellers of the land had not the right, and that the vessel ought to belong to the others, who also were willing to sell, on the same terms. On this the chief of the real owners waived the right of himself and his family, saying that they did not really want the vessel, but they wished their right to be known and acknowledged. For this right, I may add, they would have fought to extermination, if the quarrel could not have been settled in any peaceable manner.

These instances, among thousands similar, will suffice to show what a high-spirited and jealous people they are, and how keenly they must feel any attempt to treat their customs, or what they consider their rights, slightly: moreover, how anxiously they must watch the progress of a Race which they themselves say is causing them to disappear, just as the Norway rat, brought by the first English ships, has driven away or destroyed the native rat.*

* I have never seen a native rat, but suspect that it was an

It is necessary to bear in mind, that intercourse between the tribes, from one end of the islands to the other, is continual and rapid, whether war or peace prevail. Their mental activity, their love of talking, and their retentive memory, make them eager to collect and transmit intelligence. Hence, all proceedings of importance, whether at the Bay of Islands, or Cook's Strait, or elsewhere, are, in a few weeks, the subject of discussion throughout the country.*

The gradual development of the real nature of the change which an established government, however feeble, would tend to work,—and the operation of courts of law, civil punishments, apprehension of offenders, and especially imprisonment for trial,—had already done much to make the natives more and more doubtful of the advantages of their altered position, when in June 1843 the fatal affray at Wairau gave a shock which vibrated through the length and breadth of the land.

That the settler should try to take land by force of arms was a startling idea, and it at once revived every former suspicion. Until then the settlers had been supposed to be men of peace, and trade; and the missionaries had invariably done their utmost to prevent warfare, but a new view was opened by the collision at Wairau. Happily—or, I should say, providentially,—the settlers at Wellington and Nelson were arrested forcibly in their insane projects of arming the community and attempting to act with farther hostility against the natives. Such conduct must inevitably have caused the total destruction of those settlements under circumstances of the most cruel description. Warlike preparations were stopped by the local government, conciliatory steps were taken, and the rising storm was dispersed. Awful indeed would have been the consequences, had a rash attempt been then made to apprehend the slaughterers of Captain Wakefield and his companions.

At this time there was neither fortification, nor defensible position, nor place of shelter or refuge for women and children, in either of the settlements. There were not four hun-

animal not yet described by naturalists. In the Friendly Islands, rat shooting was a favorite diversion.—See “Mariner’s Tonga Islands.”

* If a native who is travelling has really no particular news to tell, he invents something, in order that he may be a welcome guest where he stops. Frequently the natives sit talking by their fires during the whole night.

dred serviceable muskets among the whole white population, and even these were ill provided with accoutrements and ammunition. The whole military force consisted of one company* of H. M.'s 80th regiment, stationed at Auckland. There was no ship of war.

Afterwards the arrival of H. M. S. North Star, and a company† of the 96th regiment, at Wellington, tended much to quiet the alarm of some settlers; while the judicious conduct of the authorities suppressed the hostile demonstrations of other colonists.

Before passing on to the events of 1844, it should be carefully noted that the removal of the seat of government, in 1841, from the Bay of Islands to Waitemata or Auckland, caused very great dissatisfaction to the natives of the northern districts, living near that Bay and Hokianga. They soon discovered that the restraints and inconveniences of the newly-constituted authority which they had consented to acknowledge, however reluctant to obey, remained to interfere with them; while the countervailing advantages of augmented traffic, and good markets, were not only lost—gone to their greatest enemies‡—but that even the trade enjoyed previous to 1840 was almost destroyed by the Custom House regulations, and by the presence of government officers at Kororareka—(now called Russell).

The illness and death of Governor Hobson,§ no doubt increased the difficulties under which the country was then struggling. The designs which he was forming, and the local acquaintance that he had gained, perished almost unrecorded. He suffered severely from the distractions of his false position, and the treatment he received while struggling to make the best of adverse circumstances.

Although selected for his difficult task on account of his qualifications; although he had previously visited the Bay of Islands and Cook's Strait in command of H. M. S. Rattlesnake, and had particularly distinguished himself by his conduct and gallantry in the West Indies, his representations of the real state of the country, true to the letter, were slighted, and his opinions, now proved sound, were bitterly assailed.

* (78 men).

† (56 men).

‡ The Waikato and Ngatewhatua tribes.

§ In 1842.

NOTE.—As the four next Chapters notice questions in which I was concerned, they are not written in the first person.

CHAPTER III.

1844.

The governor* appointed to succeed Captain Hobson arrived at Auckland in the last week of 1843, nearly a year and a half after his decease. During this long interval the colonial secretary† had acted as governor.

Auckland has many advantages in point of situation, but it wants more wood and running water. A better position might perhaps have been selected, in the same part of the island, and one less exposed to wind and rain would have been more agreeable; though possibly not so capable of defence as that of Auckland might be made.‡

The harbour is very good, the land around is not high:—and there is a spacious outer roadstead, land locked from prevailing or indeed from almost all winds, where fleets might anchor in safety. The adjoining coast is usually a weather shore with smooth water. Within the harbour, which is long but narrow, there are more than four square miles of good anchorage. Any ship may enter or depart under sail.

H. M. S. North Star§ attended Captain Fitz-Roy, the newly appointed governor, from Sydney to Auckland, and thence conveyed him to Wellington and Nelson.

The stay of this ship having been limited|| to one month, caused more haste in visiting those settlements than was consistent with the deliberate proceedings which their extremely critical state required; but as Sir Everard Home's orders were not discretionary, the governor endeavoured to make the most

* Captain Fitz-Roy.

† Mr. Shortland.

‡ If Auckland is not now in the best position for the capital, the only one superior is within twenty miles of that place.

§ Commanded by Sir J. Everard Home, Bart. C. B.

|| By the Admiralty.

of this one month by immediately visiting the settlements then supposed to be in a precarious state,—not from the natives' natural ill will, but from the consequences of provocation given by the settlers.*

At this time (1844) the New Zealand question was attracting general notice; and the insuperable impediments to colonizing that country peaceably, in the face of its native population—according to the “Wakefield theory”—were becoming evident. Colonization was stopped, and the capital already embarked was nearly expended without any adequate return, either realized or in prospect. Besides which the local government had neither money nor credit, and was in debt more than one year's revenue. There were no means of paying any salaries—however long in arrear: scarcely could the most pressing and ordinary payments on account of the colonial government be made. Various local laws, urgently required on account of frequent disputes which occurred between settlers and natives,—to whose condition English law is more or less unsuitable,—had been too long deferred; land claimants were suffering more and more from delay in deciding on their respective cases, and public affairs generally were very much in arrear.

At Auckland alone there was so much pressing business to be transacted by the government, that months of labour were required; nevertheless, the state of the southern settlements made it imperative on the governor to hasten thither, and before the end of January he landed at Wellington.†

Words could not express the surprise and disappointment with which Port Nicholson and the town of Wellington were seen for the first time. The port is too large to be sheltered, even from prevailing winds; and it has a long narrow entrance from the open sea, between threatening and really dangerous rocks, making it almost a blind harbour. It is nearly surrounded by high hills covered with forests; and appears to have but little level, cultivable land in its immediate neighbourhood. The stormy climate, the straggling, exposed, and indefensible nature of the town, and the depressing prospect for the future in such a locality, during at least the present generation, might well cause sorrow that such a situation should have been chosen.

* Between Auckland and Wellington it is usually a ten days' passage for a man of war.

† Four weeks only after arriving, with his family, at Auckland.

The principal objects of the governor's visit to Wellington and Nelson were to check and endeavour to allay the hostile feelings which were rapidly increasing between the white and coloured races; and to effect, if possible, an amicable settlement of the New Zealand Company's claims to land near Port Nicholson. It was quite obvious to unprejudiced persons that hostilities—especially on account of land, would prove fatally destructive to colonization; and that, therefore, the prosperity of the settlements depended on the maintenance of peace, mutual confidence, and good will. That sound policy dictated a pacific and conciliatory course, as plainly as right principle, cannot now be denied; but it was controverted at that time, and not a small number of the settlers were then so eager for hostile movements, that they scarcely seemed to have patience with the governor for refraining to adopt their suggestions. They would not believe that the natives could ever become formidable opponents, or that it would be useless to cultivate the soil if only under the protection of troops. They would not believe that no one could work in the interior while continually exposed to the rifle of the native; neither would they believe that no produce of the land could pay for cultivation at the point of the bayonet.

The destructive effects of measures tending to bring on hostilities between the two races, seemed almost entirely discredited at Wellington and Nelson, where the feeling of animosity against the natives was so very strong that the permanent interest of the settlers—especially the scattered outsettlers—was altogether disregarded. No one appeared disposed to give the natives credit for courage, or skill in warfare,—no one seemed to doubt that they would fly before a very small detachment of military;—the prevailing feeling appeared to be anxiety for a collision.

Designing persons encouraged this feeling; partly with the view of having more troops quartered in their neighbourhood, and consequently a better market for their produce,—partly with the hope that hostilities would drive away the natives and leave the settlers in undisputed possession of all the land round Port Nicholson.* Where every storekeeper and farmer was interested in the presence of troops, it was hard to

* These persons cared not for the general good of the settlement (which was much promoted by the vicinity of natives), they thought only of supplying the market with their own produce, at their own price, undisturbed by native competitors.

separate an occasional truth from the inventions and exaggerations with which interested persons were continually deluding others. Had their efforts to bring on a quarrel been successful, there cannot now be a doubt that Wellington would have suffered a fate worse than that of Kororareka. The hostile natives would have been more numerous—nearly all heathens, unimproved in their habits—and there would have been no place of refuge for women and children.

The governor endeavoured to check hostile feelings by public and private expression of the views of government, and of the improbability that more troops would be detached to New Zealand. He stated his own opinions also without reserve; and one immediate consequence was, the commencement of a virulent newspaper opposition to all his measures.

As the New Zealand papers have received undue credit in England—however little noticed in the colony where their editors and contributors were well known,—it may here be remarked that the Wellington paper was then under the influence of the New Zealand Company, and a branch of the Union Bank of Australia.

The Nelson paper was an organ of the most violent advocates of hostility with the natives, but so cleverly written, that one could not help wishing its editor more creditable employment.* Both these papers strove unceasingly to misrepresent the motives and acts of the governor, to propagate falsehoods, and to excite the settlers to a line of conduct, the very worst that they could pursue for their own interest.

From Wellington the North Star conveyed the governor to Nelson, where the state of affairs and the proceedings were somewhat similar to those at Wellington; but as personal feelings had been excited to the utmost, it was natural that there should be more difficulty in persuading those who had lost their friends at Wairau, that under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the government could not, without injustice, become their avenger.

The locality and neighbourhood of Nelson are very unsuitable for an important settlement. Far out of the track of shipping,—at the bottom of a deep bay—shut in by high wooded hills—with scarcely any level land,† and with a

* The Nelson paper also was greatly influenced by the branch of the Union Bank of Australia, which was much mixed up with the Company's proceedings, and appeared to identify itself with that body.

† Except at a great distance.

confined harbour accessible only to small ships,—it is indeed much to be lamented, that, under any circumstances, such a situation should have been selected. -

At Waikanaë, opposite Kapiti (or Entry Island), the meeting took place with those notorious chiefs, Rauparaha and Ranghiaiaata, which has caused so much comment; and it was there made known that the governor would refrain from avenging the death of our countrymen who fell at Wairau.

It would occupy too much of this limited paper to give all the reasons for that decision, which was approved of fully by Her Majesty's Government, though most displeasing to a considerable number of the settlers at Wellington and Nelson. From that time their newspapers never ceased to revile Captain Fitz-Roy—to condemn his conciliatory policy, and to blame every measure which had for its object the prevention of hostility between the white and coloured races.

It may only be briefly remarked in this place, that, by their own shewing, the English party who caused the Wairau conflict were in the wrong,—that strict justice must have decided against them, and could scarcely have condemned the savages whose fury was so suddenly roused. But, supposing the natives apprehended and tried at a criminal court;* legal proof would probably have failed—and they would have been acquitted for want of positive evidence. What object then could have been gained by their trial? Would the great end of all punishment have been attained, that of deterring others from similar crimes? or rather would not an opposite effect have been caused? Indiscriminate chastisement, by arms, might have been applicable to rebels or aliens; but these natives were considered to be British subjects, and they were not then in a state of rebellion, however ready to rise and defy English authority in New Zealand. Any attempt to apprehend the chiefs Rauparaha or Ranghiaiaata would have been effectually resisted by force of arms; and had such an attempt been made, of course it must have been carried through. These leaders would have retreated into their fastnesses, where no regular troops could have followed: thousands would have joined them: hostilities against the settlers would have been commenced, and their ruin must have followed:—ruin under the most horrible circumstances of heathen warfare. Another course might have been taken by the governor. He might have kept the question open pending a reference to the home government. Had he done so, the interval of suspense would have been occupied by the natives

* To insure an impartial jury the venue must have been changed.

in preparations for defence: their whole thoughts would have been warlike: they would have been taunted and threatened by some of the settlers: and irritating passages would have been translated to them from the newspapers. As soon as they themselves were organised and prepared by strong pāhs,*—they would have lost no time in attacking the settlements before the anticipated arrival of military reinforcements. These intentions are now known to have been entertained. It is also fully ascertained that they proposed to endeavour to draw their opponents into the woody defiles of their almost impracticable country, well knowing the advantage they would then have over the mechanically trained soldier; or the awkward settler unaccustomed to warfare.

Almost naked, without shoes, and independent of a commissariat, the hardy native in his own forest is more than a match for the white man.

Can any reflecting person now doubt, after what has recently occurred in the north of New Zealand—that it was wise to make a virtue of necessity, and at Waikanaë endeavour to close the fatal Wairau breach without delay.

The natives about Cook's Straits soon discovered with satisfaction that they were no longer in danger of hostilities, and their ordinary occupations were forthwith resumed; while the settlers proceeded as usual in clearing and cultivating their allotments.

As it is now known that several thousand men would have joined Rauparaha and Ranghiaiaia had there been any attempt to apprehend them, and that a general attack would have been made on the southern settlements, which must inevitably have fallen, being defenceless and indefensible,—a gentleman at Wellington, one of the company's settlers,† was right in asserting,‡ that the colonists at that place were "living on a volcano"; yet how little did he and others then know of the really formidable character of the New Zealand warrior.

The New Zealand Company's purchase of land about Wellington was next completed (except the upper part of the Hutt Valley) and then the commissioner of land claims proceeded along the west coast towards New Plymouth, to endeavour to effect a settlement of the disputed purchases at Porirua, Manawatu, Wanganui and Taranaki. H. M. S. North Star

* Their pāhs are soon constructed in a woody country. In a day, or from a day to a month, according to their size and strength.

† Mr. Hanson.

‡ In a letter to Colonel Godfrey.

sailed to Sydney, and the governor returned to Auckland, in the colonial brig *Victoria*.

About the end of February Auckland was near being the scene of a serious collision, which might have precipitated the two races into hostilities. A native prisoner was rescued from the sheriff's custody in the court house; the military went in pursuit heedlessly: a friendly chief living very near the town was insulted in his own village, and his own son was carried off as a hostage for the rescued prisoner. Most happily as no blood was shed, although shots were fired, the chief protector of the aborigines had influence enough to effect a peaceable adjustment of the matter, and a voluntary return of the prisoner to his confinement.

Had a native life been lost, an attack on Auckland would have been made, to meet which there were about seventy young soldiers, fifty bad muskets, which would have been in awkward hands, and a few fowling pieces. There was no defensible position. The scattered wooden town might have been burned like dry grass, and then what would have been the fate of its inhabitants? Government house, the public offices, the gaol and court house (mere weather-boarded wooden structures) would probably have been the first in flames, and with them must have perished all the public documents of every description.

At the governor's return in March, a meeting of chiefs was assembled by him to discuss the subject of this rescue from the hands of justice; but though fair promises were made by them, and their behaviour was satisfactory, it was plain that our mode of apprehending an alleged offender, with a view to his being tried, did not at all comport with their ideas of justice, or their habits, and if persevered in, would—sooner or later—bring on serious difficulties.

During March and April large bodies of natives were successively visiting Auckland, to see the new governor and talk over affairs. These visits, however interesting and useful in themselves, were tediously prolonged, and occupied much time; but there was no alternative: each tribe thought its own visit the most important, and would have been seriously offended by a brief or cold reception. The largest room at government house was often filled with natives during the most valuable hours of the day: but as these people had travelled a long distance, they could not be uncivilly received, although their presence always put a stop to ordinary business, and caused other annoyances.

Preparations had been many months in progress for a great native feast, about three miles from Auckland, at which some

thousands of the natives were to be present. This gathering, so near the town, was anticipated with some anxiety. It took place early in May, and passed off happily; but reflecting persons saw these thousands of well armed and well disciplined warriors paraded before the settlers within an hour's journey of their chief settlement, with considerable uneasiness. An accidental quarrel, a mere chance medley, might have involved the whole in hostilities. Besides which, such a gathering, though peaceable at that time, might be repeated on a future occasion, as an easy method of collecting large forces, without causing suspicion. For instance, on one day more than two hundred chiefs were assembled in government house, above a thousand of their followers were in the town, and not less than two thousand in the neighbourhood, within an hour's journey; and at that moment the settlement was entirely in their power.

After a few months' observation and reflection the governor became more and more convinced of the absolute necessity of acting so as to make a large majority of the natives really friendly towards the government, and disposed, of their own free will, to support his authority. By the small physical force in the colony, it was plain he could then do nothing against such numerous opponents as any hostilities would raise; but by reason,—by strict justice,—and real impartiality,—supported by the influence of the religious bodies, he might have hopes of success, until adequately strengthened from home.

It is well known that the object of the British government was to promote peace and improvement in New Zealand,—not to excite hostilities, or encourage warfare. Of this correct and legitimate object, every Briton may feel proud; and failure in so good a cause, however much to be regretted, cannot be imputed to the intention of government. Experience has shown errors, and those errors have been more visible in the colony than at home. It is almost impossible for persons who have never been in that country to realise in their minds its true character and peculiarities.

It is now evident that the just and humane views of the British government might have been carried out better by an authority possessing some real power, supported by adequate military and naval force, and by fortified settlements, secure against musketry and sudden surprise. Too much reliance has been placed on the friendly disposition of the natives, too much confidence has been encouraged in their religious feelings, and in the influence of religion over their wild and covetous nature. The authorities at home, dreading that the

presence of physical power might encourage aggression against the natives,—called on continually for military aid in numerous parts of the world, and finding it as difficult as expensive to comply with even the most urgent calls, were naturally unwilling that a large force should be placed in New Zealand. Repeated denials given to reiterated applications of successive governors of New Zealand for more effective support to their position, obliged them to have recourse to a system of forbearance and conciliation, which,—in the nature of things,—could not long continue, and which encouraged encroachments, as well as injurious trials of strength, on the part of both races. In the colony an extreme of forbearance,—arising out of utter inability to carry out the law efficiently, rather than from real leniency, bordered on inhumanity towards the settlers, and placed the local authorities in a most painful and humiliating position. However kind and conciliatory the executive might be, there should always have been an imposing force in the back-ground to ensure respect and acquiescence.

The conciliatory arrangements which were made about that time respecting the sale of land by natives, were measures of bare justice, to which, and to the kind general conduct of the local government, the fidelity and co-operation of any of the aborigines in late hostilities is to be attributed.

Directly the concourse of natives dispersed from about Auckland, the legislative council assembled, and continued to sit regularly * till July. The governor had been anxious to obtain the assistance of a member from Nelson, as well as from Wellington; but succeeded only with the latter. The almost insuperable difficulty was the fact of there being no persons in so new a colony who could afford to leave their residence and occupation for two or three months in the year.† It may well be supposed that there is only a very limited number of persons qualified for a seat in the council, and that each of those few has his time fully occupied by his own affairs; hence, in so small a community, the difficulty of filling that position properly has been keenly felt by the executive.

As the legislative council had not been assembled during

* The difficulty of moving about a new and straggling settlement without hard footpaths or lights after dark, prevented the council from meeting in the evening, and the necessity of printing each days' proceedings, made it impracticable to sit oftener than on alternate days.

† One month for the voyage to and from Auckland; another month, at least, attending the council.

Mr. Shortland's administration of the government, there was much to be done for the rapidly growing wants of young settlements placed in immediate contact with such dangerous neighbours. One may observe here that persons in England do not appear to appreciate comprehensively the daily dilemmas and risks that are attendant upon the continual intercourse of two races, as little acquainted with each others habits and ideas, as they are, generally speaking, with each other's language. This mutual ignorance is a source of constant difficulty, and complicates every transaction, besides giving rise to quarrels that would not take place if each party understood and could make due allowance for the other. The lower orders among our own countrymen, such as rough labourers, or artisans, or seafaring people, are particularly apt to be obstinate and overbearing in their dealings with the natives,—caring for nothing but the object immediately in their view, and regardless of consequences to others, or even to themselves.

The native language is so capable of misapprehension, and ironical expressions are so often used, that those settlers who know a little of it, and believe they know much, are frequently led into absurd mistakes. Many years of familiar intercourse with the New Zealanders are absolutely necessary in order to acquire a trustworthy knowledge of their figurative and oriental modes of expression.

As a remarkable instance of this difficulty, it may be mentioned that the native speakers at the large meeting held at Waimate, on account of Heke's proceedings, were but occasionally intelligible to the bishop and many of the missionaries then present, who had been but a few years in the country. Only two or three of the earliest residents and best linguists, could understand and interpret the allusions, the ironical expressions, and the oriental exaggerations which prevailed in every animated speech from the oldest chiefs.

Such being the case, one cannot be surprised at the apparent fabrications which abound among the settlers, who are continually circulating rumours of the natives' intentions, or erroneous reports of their conversations, or mistaken explanations of their motives.

Very few persons have been long enough in the country to be trusted as correct interpreters. Not only is an accurate knowledge of native usages, as well as of both languages required, but a certain quickness of apprehension, and general knowledge, not commonly possessed.

CHAPTER IV.

1844.

. The subject requiring the primary attention of the legislative council was finance. At the beginning of this year (1844) the local government was twenty-four thousand pounds in debt: the revenue being then estimated at about twenty thousand pounds. All salaries and ordinary current payments were several months in arrear: there was no prospect of the revenue amounting even to two-thirds of the estimated indispensable expenditure: the establishment was reduced to that which was authorised by the Secretary of State in a despatch received just at the close of the previous year (1843): the governor was strictly prohibited from drawing on the British treasury: and no loan could be raised.*

By reducing the establishment of government to an extreme much below what was absolutely necessary for carrying on the daily public business, a less expenditure might have been ensured, but, not only at a loss of efficiency, almost to the disabling of the local government, but to the extreme distress of many official persons who had been induced to leave their public situations elsewhere to form part of the establishment at New Zealand, where they had been obliged to build houses and settle their families, at no small expense.†

In order to carry on the government until assistance and directions could be received from England: to relieve the creditors of government from distress: and to keep numerous families from extreme privation, some from actually starving: it was decided to issue notes, or debentures, bearing five per cent. interest after the expiration of one year; and as these debentures were at first refused by several speculators, and therefore seemed likely to be much depreciated, they were

* This prohibition against drawing bills being known publicly, none could be negotiated: and the credit of government being destroyed, no loan could be raised.

† Materials and labour being then extremely dear.

made a legal tender. It should be noticed that this paper currency was not intended to be permanent; it was intended to serve instead of coin, during a very limited period, not exceeding two years,—before which it was probable that some arrangement would be made by the home government for their withdrawal from circulation. These debentures enabled the government to carry on its functions, and saved an extremity of disorder and distress which can hardly be appreciated by persons in an old country. Their principle has been much condemned by some theorists, (who reason about a young struggling colony without capital, as if it were really circumstanced like any portion of the parent state—supported by banks and capitalists); but since their beneficial effects were practically felt, and fully appreciated by those who might have been actually starved without them, the objections of theorists may be less regarded. As there were then no exports—the colony was drained of its small stock of specie by payments for goods and the usual necessities of life: and scarcely any circulating medium remained except notes of the Union Bank of Australia.

But as the issue of paper money was in direct contravention of the governor's instructions; of course he was prepared to bear the consequences. There have been many occasions, it will not be denied, on which deviations from instructions have been productive of public benefit, however indefensible according to a general rule which must be maintained. Whether this was one of such occasions, the wretched state of the colonists in New Zealand may shew. Impending ruin, and actual starvation, threatened the greater number of the working classes, and many others, at Auckland, who depended on the government expenditure. No assistance from England could be expected in less than a year.—No money could be obtained by the government, in the Colony, or from Sydney, because no person would accept bills drawn by the governor without the express sanction of the Secretary of State.

The practical effect of these debentures was not only the removal of all actual want, but the promotion of much industry, and general improvement. Instead of a complete stagnation, as at the beginning of 1844, activity and abundant employment soon prevailed. Auckland and its vicinity improved rapidly, and an export trade began.

The necessity under which the principal holders of debentures lay to employ them in the colony, and as speedily as possible, lest there should be any deterioration of value, induced those persons to buy up gum, flax, timber, or copper, or other native produce—to be exported as remittances to

their correspondents instead of money. Some built small vessels; others improved their landed property by fences and better buildings. The results were conspicuously beneficial.*

How to raise additional revenue amidst such general poverty and distress, was most perplexing; various methods were suggested, but strongly opposed by the non-official members of council; who wished to reduce the expenditure to the revenue actually raised, however small that sum might be. At last an increase of the customs' duties was decided on,—not as a good measure, but as the only one that seemed practicable.

The governor deemed it to be his duty to endeavour to raise a revenue adequate to maintain the establishment ordered by the home government, and necessary for the public affairs of the colony. The non-official members of council considered the establishment and expenditure too large, and tried to effect such reductions as would, if made, have prevented the local government from executing the duties demanded from it, not only by the wants of the colony, but for the information of the home government, which requires numerous and voluminous documents to be prepared and transmitted in duplicate. In an old country there are so many ways of raising revenue that a selection can be made. In New Zealand, a young colony, there are very few, and it is a great object to adopt such methods as may be least open to evasion, while executed with the smallest expense. Land, if taxed, yields but little, as so little is cultivated, and the tenure of wild land has been too uncertain to admit of its being taxed. Houses, animals, imports, exports, sales, licenses, deeds, and the individual members of the community, were the only objects available for taxation.

As much censure has been cast on the propositions of the governor to tax houses, cattle, and dogs, it may not be irrelevant here to remind the reader that there were no "rates" of any kind in New Zealand, such as are paid for houses in

* It may be fairly doubted whether a metallic currency is indispensable for a young country. Some authorities think it not only unnecessary but prejudicial. A convenient medium of exchange that cannot be sent out of the country, appears to be practically sufficient for such a condition of society. Gold and silver, if required for exportation, may be bought or sold like any other property of which money is merely the representative.

other countries:—that a house is an object easily rated or taxed, without the possibility of any evasion: and that the number of rooms in it may form an easy scale for taxing.* To say, as has been asserted, that such a tax would induce people to alter the construction of houses,—when it was only to be levied for a temporary purpose, during two years at most,—was obviously incorrect.

It was proposed to levy an impost on imported cattle, because a large importation was expected, which could not be smuggled. Their number, it was considered, would not be affected by a moderate duty. Besides which, at that time the importers of cattle could afford to pay a tax better than most people. They were chiefly persons living in New South Wales. The tax on dogs (also much blamed) was intended solely as a means of diminishing their number, which had become a nuisance. It has been said that this tax would affect sheep-feeders. There were not then half-a-dozen shepherds' dogs in New Zealand; but had there been more, it would not have signified, because the proposed tax was to affect those dogs only which were found in or about the towns: dogs used in the country being specially exempted.

Very incorrect accounts of proceedings in that legislative council appeared in newspapers, and possibly they may have been thought true, however strange, by persons accustomed to the correct reporting of public proceedings in England. They were, however, very incorrect, being the results of notes in common writing (not short hand) taken by the editors or composers of the Auckland newspapers, who trusted much to memory, and frequently colored their statements so as to suit the taste of their readers. One of these editors who used to write and publish a notoriously virulent paper, called "The Auckland Times," was an unhappy man, whose existence was lately brought to an untimely close by hard drinking. That such a man, utterly regardless of truth or character, should have been countenanced, was a lamentable proof of a very low tone of moral feeling in the colony.

Indeed, one of the most melancholy features of the growing society in New Zealand is a disregard for honorable and virtuous conduct. Truthfulness and sincerity are not cherished. The very few persons who are not (to use the current expression) "colonial" in their ideas and conduct, are neither under-

* In a young country where property is very fluctuating, and valuation is difficult.

stood, nor estimated as they deserve to be, and as they would be in old countries.

The business of the council was just finished, at the beginning of July, when intelligence arrived that very serious disturbances had taken place at New Plymouth, where the land commissioner's premature promulgation of his decision against the natives, in favor of the New Zealand Company, had caused such great excitement and alarm among the settlers, that hostilities seemed inevitable. Almost at the same time information was received that the chief Heke had cut down the flag-staff at Russell, (Kororareka), in the Bay of Islands, and that his followers had insulted and provoked the settlers in a manner that could not be passed over by the government without serious notice. It was necessary to check this chief without delay, as his object was known to be resistance to British authority at that place; but the means of doing so effectually were neither at hand, nor to be expected within many months. Application was forthwith made to the Governor* of New South Wales for troops, and a small detachment from Auckland was sent to Russell.†

Meanwhile H. M. S. Hazard, which had just arrived in New Zealand, conveyed the governor to New Plymouth, where he was met by the bishop, who had travelled overland from Auckland in only seven days,‡ to assist in quieting the disturbances.

It appeared so clear to the governor that the view taken by the land commissioner could not be adopted by the government without causing bloodshed, and the probable ruin of the settlement,—because the injustice of awarding land to the New Zealand Company, which was well known not to have been purchased by them, was apparent to every native,—that information was made known publicly at a large meeting of the settlers and natives, that the commissioner's award would not be confirmed by the governor.

Arrangements were then commenced for securing the actual settlers in quiet possession of sufficient land; the natives being desirous that they should not quit the place, but determined not to sell them certain favourite localities. The substance of the case was this: the New Zealand Company's agents had endeavoured to buy a large tract of land from a few persons who owned about a thirtieth part of it, the great majority of the proprietors being then absent. When the

* Sir George Gipps. † Thirty men.

‡ The usual time being a fortnight.

absentees returned to their own places, after a few years, they found white men settled there and cultivating. Of course the few (about forty)* who professed to sell to the Company's agents could not dispose of that which belonged to the absentees (many hundreds in number), therefore their land was forthwith demanded by them. However much this case may have been complicated or mystified by appeals to other laws than those of the New Zealanders themselves, the above will be found the simple fact. It may be asked what Englishman would give up his land under analogous circumstances, if sold without his authority during his absence. But, say some persons, these natives who returned to claim land occupied by settlers, were or had been slaves, and therefore they had no right to this land. Strange doctrine this to be held by Englishmen! These men had been made prisoners of war,—captives rather than slaves,—by the Waikato tribe, who, at the instigation of Christian teachers, gave them their liberty—and permission to return to their own land.

Would an Englishman, after some years confinement in a French prison, or being enslaved by Africans, admit that he had forfeited his estate in England? But even the New Zealand usages, which in this case are more to the purpose, do NOT prevent a man who has been captured (or a slave) from owning and retaining land.

Before losing sight of New Plymouth it may be remarked here that if disappointment and sorrow were caused by the first sight of such ill chosen sites for large settlements as Port Nicholson and Blind Bay, what must have been the feelings excited by finding New Plymouth in a position that almost debars it from free communication with other places, either by land or water. The grievous error of landing a large body of very respectable settlers at a place, however fertile and pleasing, without a port, without even a safe roadstead for shipping, and so far from any other settlement that land carriage is at present and must long be impracticable,—is self evident, but now almost irremediable.

The manner in which the New Plymouth district was supposed to have been purchased was not a little remarkable, and merits attention.

Certain persons† went in a vessel to the roadstead off New

* This number forty, is inclusive of women and children who signed the deed of conveyance, or in whose names marks were made.

† Messrs. Wakefield and Dorset.

Plymouth, and landed an illiterate whaling master, who had a mere smattering of the native language, to negotiate the purchase of the whole adjoining district.

With about forty men, women and children, an arrangement was made, and goods were given to them, in exchange for the whole district—as the Company's agents said; but in exchange for those natives' lands, or parts of them only, in the nearest district alone—as the natives understood. The interpreter was incapable of explaining correctly what the natives meant. They were asked the names of places where they had lands, and the names of all the principal points and hills then in sight; these were written down, as the places purchased for the New Zealand Company: the deed, a document quite unintelligible to the natives, was signed by them because they were told to do so before they could receive the goods, and thus, on a small rocky islet,* or on board a vessel,† was a nominal purchase of more than sixty thousand acres of land assumed to have been made in a few days.

Leaving New Plymouth perfectly quiet, the governor and the bishop went to Wellington and thence sailed to Auckland.

Being very anxious to reach the Bay of Islands in time to meet the troops then daily expected from Sydney, the governor hastened on from Auckland as soon as the necessary arrangements were made. One hundred and fifty men‡ had arrived, and disembarked at Russell; fifty were added from the detachment at Auckland, and H. M. S. Hazard had fifty seamen and marines ready to land,—making the force but two hundred and fifty in all; yet at that time,—(so much undervalued were the natives)—most of the officers and men thought themselves fully able to give Heke and his followers a severe chastisement, even at his own stronghold in the interior.

The governor, the officer commanding the troops,§ and the engineer officer|| thought differently; and the former relied on assistance from many natives well affected to the government.

Previous to making a decided movement from Russell towards Kaikohe (Heke's place) several meetings with other natives were held by the governor in various parts of the Bay of Islands; and it was then so obvious that the main cause of their discontent was the deserted state of the port—owing to

* Outer Sugar Loaf.

† “Guide” Brig.

‡ H. M's. 99th Regiment.

§ Lieut. Col. Hulme, 96th Regiment.

|| Captain Bennett.

the obnoxious customs' regulations—and that they had indeed reason to complain with justice of their ruined trade, that the governor determined to remove this root of evil, and forthwith took on himself the responsibility of closing the custom house. This was the commencement of a measure which he had always thought advisable for New Zealand, and had already brought under the notice of the legislative council, and the secretary of state for the colonies, with the hope of proposing it formally at a suitable period. This seemed to him a moment when such a change would be very beneficial, and he did not shrink from the decision: although unauthorised.

It was probable that such an alteration would be earnestly sought for by the chiefs, (urged on by white men) and he could not avoid foreseeing the facility with which the collection of customs' duties might be evaded, or openly resisted. It was on all accounts advisable not to risk coming to a trial of strength during the then powerless state of the local government.

The governor thought it right as well as expedient, to do that as a matter of justice and good feeling which he conscientiously believed ought to be done, and which, if not done spontaneously, might be extorted by force at a subsequent and not distant time. He had then no hopes of any support from England that would enable him to carry out English law efficiently among the natives.

As Heke remained at a distance, and evinced no wish to atone for his outrages, the troops were moved to the Kerikeri river, and preparations were made for marching inland towards Kaikohe, when the chief protector of Aborigines* arrived from Waimate, (where a large concourse of chiefs had assembled in consultation with the missionaries) to make known to the governor the general and anxious desire of a large majority of the principal men that the troops should not be landed at Kerikeri, but that those chiefs themselves should make acknowledgment of Heke's† delinquency, and undertake to prevent any farther outrage in future. Further, the chiefs expressed great anxiety to confer with the governor on various subjects, chiefly concerning their land, about which they were in much doubt and difficulty.

Knowing his real weakness, and the impossibility of acting efficiently against the turbulent natives without having the

* Mr. Clarke.

† Heke being their relative and much their inferior in rank and influence.

support of those who were well disposed,—the governor acceded to the chiefs' wishes and directed the ships to return to Russell, while he went, with the senior military and naval officers,* to the missionary station at Waimate, where were assembled the bishop, several of the clergy and missionaries, the chief protector, and a large concourse of natives.

A formal meeting was held, opinions and intentions were freely expressed in public by all parties; and the result was a general decision on the part of the chiefs that the flag staff at Kororareka should be replaced, and should not be again cut down; that they themselves should be responsible for its security—for the tranquillity of the settlement at the Bay of Islands,—and for Heke's future conduct. As an acknowledgment of his delinquency, they offered to give up land, or property, to the government; but the governor would accept only a few muskets, and even those he returned to show that there was no desire to punish the well disposed for the faults of their relative, or even to deprive them of their weapons. In consequence of these arrangements the governor promised to withdraw the troops, and make trial of the chiefs' will and power to act up to their strong and public professions.

Subsequent events have shown how happily that affair was terminated by this arrangement. Had the wishes of the principal chiefs been slighted at that time, and had that handful of soldiers been employed hostilely against Heke, it is now almost certain that not one would have returned from Kaikohe, and that the consequences would have been most disastrous to the colony.†

It happened that several of the oldest missionaries in the land were then assembled at Waimate on important business, and the governor had therefore an opportunity of availing himself of the opinions of those persons who knew most of the natives, and were very capable of forming a correct judgment as to their real feelings and intentions. The bishop, though not so long a resident in New Zealand, might be as able as any man in the country to form judicious conclusions from the statements of others; but in extent of intimate and general knowledge of the natives, the chief protector of aborigines, who had been twenty-three years in the island, was the best authority. All these however were of one opinion: and with that opinion the governor and his officers fully concurred.

* Lieut. Col. Hulme, and Commander Robertson.

† Captain Bennett, the engineer officer, considered the country between Waimate and Kaikohe impracticable for the troops then in New Zealand.

Early in September the governor returned to Auckland, having thus succeeded in successively averting hostilities which had threatened each of the settlements: but anticipating greater difficulties in a short period, as his dispatches of September and October 1844 fully shew.

The legislative council assembled and unanimously agreed to pass a local ordinance establishing free trade throughout the colony, and substituting a method of direct taxation instead of raising a revenue by means of customs duties. The council was also unanimous in opinion that this change, however great, should take place as soon as possible in the following month,* the governor being willing to take on himself the grave responsibility of assenting to these steps, without waiting for the sanction of the home government; because he believed that not only the welfare, but the actual safety of the colony, demanded such a measure. Without any real power, though surrounded by a turbulent white population, and numerous tribes of almost savage natives on the eve of open resistance to his authority, the only prudent course was this painful one of temporising.

At this time the prevailing opinion in New Zealand was strongly in favor of free trade and direct taxation, instead of customs' duties. It was considered that in such a woody country, intersected by rivers and creeks, with a coast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, and abounding in harbours, smuggling might be carried on with impunity; while jealousies between native tribes, on account of ports of entry,†—and irritation caused by interference with their vessels or canoes,‡ would tend to embroil the local government. The expense of collecting the customs duties amounted to nearly one-third of the gross amount; while the interference with shipping, required by the regulations, operated so vexatiously as to deter the greater number of whalers from seeking their supplies and refreshments in New Zealand,—inducing them rather to go among more dangerous islands in the Pacific where there was no custom house.

As a means of raising revenue better adapted to the circumstances of the country, it was thought that a tax on income and property, taken together, would prove adequate to the wants of the colony, in the course of two years, if not sooner. But a practical trial has since proved that direct taxation cannot yet be carried into effect, under the peculiar circum-

* On the 10th of October.

† Vessels usually frequent ports of entry solely.

‡ A serious source of disagreement.

stances of New Zealand,—the local impediments being insuperable,—without employing more expensive machinery for collection than even that of the customs. The plan failed in the southern settlements, although it answered expectation in the north,—and after a trial it was abandoned; a return to the custom house system having become imperative,—partly owing to the failure just described,—but chiefly because of the altered state of the colony.*

Early in October the decisive step was taken of allowing natives to sell land direct to settlers, without any concurrent fee to government, (except an almost nominal one to cover the expenses of legal documents): and perhaps no measure emanating from the government, since it was established, gave so much real satisfaction to the native people.

Under the existing circumstances of New Zealand, it is desirable that all the land in the vicinity of settlements, excepting native reserves, should pass into the hands of settlers. Many sources of quarrel may be thus removed, and the natives themselves kept farther from continual temptation.

Much sensation has been caused in the colony by thus allowing natives to sell land to private persons; some residents fearing that it will lose much of its value, others dreading that the total deprivation of the natives may be caused: but in reply to these it may be stated that the more land becomes the valid and available property of settlers, the sooner will all land rise in value. Doubtful neighbours now prevent much that is claimed by settlers from being valuable. Neither the mission property, nor any other lands in the interior now surrounded by native possessions, will be worth anything considerable until they have civilised and industrious neighbours. The natives are not disposed to sell land which they really want for themselves, though they do not usually regard their children's interest. The sooner all disposable districts, near our settlements, are sold,—the sooner will the natives apply themselves to industrious pursuits on other lands.†

The Cotter system, although deprecated by modern theorists, appears to be much suited to this country, if encouraged on a large scale, in the more thinly peopled districts. Working men may make their way and thrive on a few acres of land.

* More ships of war, and military force; concentration of settlers, and fewer settlements.

† While the natives have anything to sell which costs them no labour, they will not become industrious. When their land is nearly all sold, they will betake themselves less

New Zealand is not yet, and cannot be for many years, a country suitable for those who require the convenience and comforts which are found in many other parts of the world*; but to the hardy labouring man, who uses his tools himself with steady industry, it is even now a place in which a large family can be well maintained: partly upon the produce of a few acres of land: partly by keeping cattle and sheep, which increase and thrive greatly. Those who have no cattle, or means of buying any, usually keep the stock of some neighbour, on condition of receiving a proportion of the increase; and in this manner soon obtain a few animals of their own. The more any tract of land is frequented by cattle, the more it improves; and as there is "bush"† feeding all the year round, the means of maintaining a family, brought up to work in the fields for their living, are certain and sufficient.

In November the governor again visited New Plymouth, completed an amicable adjustment of the land question sufficient for the resident settlers, and left them, as well as their neighbouring natives, peaceable and contented.‡

These repeated voyages to other settlements caused serious interruption to the progress of public business at the seat of government, especially correspondence, but they were indispensable duties. The usual passage to or from Cook's Strait is nearly a fortnight; to visit each settlement in succession requires about a month, in a man-of-war. Quicker passages are frequently made; but, on the other hand, sometimes three weeks are spent in going from Wellington to Auckland.

unsteadily to raising produce on the remainder, and to working for wages. They are an acquisitive race, and will seek the means of obtaining those foreign articles which are now become necessities: such as clothing, seeds, tools, arms, ammunition, tobacco, &c.

* In New Holland the country is open and accessible. Horses may be used almost anywhere, and there are few districts inaccessible to strong wheel carriages.

In New Zealand, the colonists generally travel on foot, wheel carriages are useless except near the settlements, where there are a few very bad roads. Strong bullock drays are employed in some parts, but they require powerful teams of oxen.

† Browsing and pasturage combined, in the woods, or swamps.

‡ At his first visit to New Plymouth, the governor could only direct preparations to be made for the settlement which he effected at his second visit.

CHAPTER V.

1844-5.

During December and January further disturbances occurred at the Bay of Islands, or in its vicinity, and it became evident that the object was to bring about a collision with the government, which might have the effect of freeing that part of New Zealand from any British interference.

The repeated refusals of government to sanction a larger force of military in the colony, all which were well known to designing men in that country, through the public newspapers, encouraged certain persons to prompt the natives to acts which, of their own accord, they would not have attempted without much more provocation. Passages in English newspapers, read to such men as Heke, with insidious comments by the translator, acted like poison, and totally overthrew all that could be urged by really truthful advisers. The natives believe so implicitly what they are shewn in print, if translated by a person whom they trust, that they are easily worked upon; and unfortunately there are those in New Zealand who have thus perverted their minds. The resolutions of a Committee of the House of Commons on the state of New Zealand, in July 1844, reached that country in December of the same year, and were soon known to most of the residents, with some of whom they did not long remain hidden from the natives.

A number of turbulent young men, encouraged by Heke, carried off horses from the settlers under vague pretences; the real object being to possess the means of rapid movement, with a view to future aggressions. Threats were held out that the obnoxious flag staff should not remain; and early in January, Heke went by night, and cut it down. A party of natives affected to oppose him, but would not fire upon their relation; * therefore of course he succeeded without difficulty. It should be noticed that the flag staff was on a hill above, and

* Heke is a Ngapuhi chief, related to many families of that large tribe.

at a distance from the town. It was not then guarded, except by those natives, who, hearing of Heke's intention, went to oppose him, but could not bring themselves to do so in earnest.* Heke departed unmolested, after sending word to the magistrate at Russell that in two months he would return to destroy the gaol and custom house, and to send away the officers of government.†

From these proceedings it was clear that no measure short of actual hostilities, would prove sufficient to keep Heke and his restless followers in check; therefore Captain Fitz-Roy made urgent applications to the governor of New South Wales and to the commander of the forces, for a military force adequate to protect the settlement, and to punish the aggressors. The vessel which carried this application met with a heavy gale of wind, put back, and was delayed about a fortnight. After she arrived at Sydney delays occurred in obtaining cheap transport for the troops, and not until the 11th of March did they sail.

Early in February the Hazard returned from Cook's Strait, and no time was lost in sending her with a small detachment of troops—all that could be spared—from Auckland, with a musket proof block-house to be erected at the flag staff. H. M. S. Hazard, and fifty men of the 96th Regiment with two officers, were then thought to be quite sufficient to prevent Heke's threatened attack; or, if he should attempt it, to beat him off easily, and perhaps capture or disable himself. The settlers were armed and drilled, though very reluctantly on their part; a strong stockade was erected, as a place of safety for the women and children; and some light guns were mounted. No anxiety as to the result of any attack was entertained; but, on the contrary, there was rather over confidence, and far too low an opinion of native enterprize and valour.

During the first days of March, armed natives collected in the neighbourhood of Russell, to the number of several hun-

* They would not be the first to shed blood on account of a piece of wood.

† These proceedings drew attention to the "kara," (the colour, or flag,) throughout the country. Native chiefs well disposed to the government, asked eagerly for flags to denote their loyalty; but others shewed much doubt, of rather a superstitious kind, as to the real import and consequences of the mysterious symbol.

dred, and some audacious attempts were made by them to carry off more horses, and destroy property.* An armed boat was sent to demand the restitution of the horses,—the boat could not overtake the plunderers, but was fired upon by the natives. These were the first shots. They were returned by the boat from her carronade, but to no purpose, as the horse-stealers were among woods overlooking the narrow space of water in which the boat was.† Another attempt to take horses from a place close to Russell was prevented by a few shots from the Hazard's party. These annoyances prepared the officers to expect more trouble, but they did not give the natives credit for any well concerted and determined attack, such as they made at day-break on the 11th of March, when Kororareka was taken—sacked—and burned.

This result astounded every one. The natives were as much astonished at their own success, as the whole colony was at so unthought-of a disaster. That Heke should make a bold attack and should suffer for his temerity, was rather expected, but that the settlement should be destroyed entered no man's mind. The details of this singularly unfortunate affair have been so recently published, that it would be superfluous to repeat them here: but its effects on New Zealand are less generally known, and demand notice among these remarks.

For the first time, since the establishment of the colony, our troops had been engaged with the natives—and had failed. Their imagined superiority was gone. The daring and self-

* Heke seemed to desire an undeniable cause for war, without being himself the first to shed blood. Without a sufficient "take" (root) or "casus belli," the natives are very reluctant to commence actual hostilities. Remarkable instances of forbearance have been witnessed. Among others, the following may be quoted. Previous to an engagement between the Ngapuhi and the Rarawa tribes in 1842, Mr. Clarke, the chief protector of aborigines, saw two contending parties striving to force each other into being the first to shed blood. They were drawn up on opposite sides of a small stream with their muskets loaded. The encroaching tribe endeavoured to cross the stream. Their opponents pushed them back with the butt ends of their muskets, but would not fire. At last an act of Heke himself brought a fire upon his party, which caused loss of life. He subsequently shot three men with his own gun, and gained much reputation by his conduct in this affair.

† Near the Kawakawa river.

confidence of the native was raised. He now went to the other extreme, and despised the soldiers,—saying that all he had heard about British troops was false. The immediate consequence of this feeling was an imperative necessity for greatly augmenting the military, there being no doubt that without their accustomed prestige, ordinary (perhaps raw*) troops would find formidable opponents in the natives, even on open ground. The company of the 96th, divided between Auckland and Russell, was composed chiefly of very young men, who had seen no service: these were not soldiers fit to cope with hardy New Zealand warriors,—strong, active, and brave,—inured to hardship,—patient under extreme privation, and tried in several fights.

Throughout the country great anxiety prevailed among the white population immediately, and for some time after the fall of Kororareka,—owing to indefinite dread of the native population uniting against the white, under the excitement of the time, and plundering indiscriminately. However not only was no such union attempted, but the conduct of the natives, even of those who took Kororareka, was such as raised them much in our estimation. Nevertheless the time was naturally one of the greatest anxiety, because all the settlements were in the power of the natives, and Heke threatened soon to make a visit with his forces at Auckland, which he might have reached in four days' journey from his own pah.

The legislative council was sitting at Auckland, when three large ships, supposed to be bringing troops from Sydney, or perhaps from England, were seen in the offing. But soon the joy which their appearance caused was changed into deep gloom and melancholy foreboding, when it was known the following night, that they were the Hazard, the United States frigate St. Louis, and an English whaler,—all three crowded with fugitives from the Bay of Islands: the Hazard bringing many wounded men, besides her gallant commander, whose recovery was then very doubtful.

Every exertion was made to prepare proper quarters for the wounded, † and to find means of providing for the destitute refugees, about four hundred in number. Subscriptions were liberally made; and so large a quantity of clothing was collected by the ladies of Auckland that all the most necessitous

* Those at Kororareka were men who had never been under fire.

† There was no hospital in Auckland.

were placed in comparative comfort before they had been two days in the town.

About this time a brisk trade in gum was beginning, and no person willing to work wanted the means of earning a livelihood. The militia also gave occupation to many who would otherwise have been idlers, so that little distress, and scarcely any lasting inconvenience, beyond the presence of some very bad characters, was caused by this sudden and unexpected influx of strangers.

At the next meeting of the council great anxiety was manifested to know what help might be expected from Sydney or England, and what preparations for defence would be made. To allay these anxieties in some measure, the Governor read extracts from various despatches earnestly soliciting efficient aid from the home government, as well as from Sydney: he showed that troops from Sydney had been expected every day for the last three weeks: that it was known they were coming: that every preparation for the defence of Auckland which could be effected would be forwarded with all haste: and that arms for the militia might be expected with the troops from Sydney. This information quieted the alarm of many persons, but others still entertained great apprehensions; among whom not a few packed up their most valuable property and hastened away from the country by the first opportunities.*

In September 1844, the legislative council had deferred the enactment of a militia ordinance because such a measure was then highly objectionable, in their opinion, on the following grounds:—

First. Any general arming and training of the settlers would have roused the jealousy of the native population throughout the island, and would have caused even the most friendly tribes to be suspicious.

Second. Such a measure would have been most inconvenient to the widely scattered settlers, who would not only have had to go to a distance from their houses and helpless families for the purpose of being trained to arms, at times when their bread depended on their day's labour; but, in the event of an alarm, must have chosen between the protection of their own wives and children, or obedience to orders which might have directed them to repair forthwith to some distant rendezvous.

Third. Such a militia force as could have been raised, under any circumstances, could not have done more than assist in

* Most of these people returned to Auckland in the course of a few months.

defending a town, as a last resource, and under such an exigency their slight drill practice would have availed but little.

Fourth. All the force that could have been raised would not have equalled one quarter of the force of natives that might probably be brought against them:—therefore it was thought prudent to abstain from any measure likely to rouse jealousy, or provoke any trial of strength.

Fifth. There were not four hundred stand of serviceable arms in the whole colony, (at Auckland there were not fifty) and there was very little ammunition.*

Sixth. The local government had not the means of buying arms, or ammunition, or clothes, or accoutrements, or even of paying adjutants, or drill-sergeants.

These and other considerations had made the council unanimous in postponing the militia bill laid before them in 1844:—but in March of the following year, when one settlement had been destroyed, and the attack of others was threatened, there was ample reason for making every practicable preparation for defence, and there was no longer the risk of arousing any suspicion of our intentions being aggressive. The case was totally changed, and the urgency of the occasion made additional expenditure (even in debentures) imperative. Yet—be it fully remarked—that so objectionable to the community, and so very expensive to the colony was the arming and training of even a fourth part of the enrolled militia found to be, that in only a few months they were entirely disbanded.

The presence of increased military force was certainly one reason for disbanding the militia; but the principal cause was the heavy expence, which could not then be borne by the colony.

The American frigate “St. Louis,” was in the Bay of Islands during the attack on Kororareka, and sent her boats, unarmed, to bring off the women and children. Her captain (in this instance, as well as in carrying them to Auckland) thus behaved with kindness and humanity. The frigate sailed in two days for her previous destination, South America, visiting the Bay of Islands again by the way.†

The sudden demand for Kauri gum, in which the northern

* There was no artillery; neither were there any ordnance stores in the colony.

† Heke had been led to expect that the Americans would assist him, and appeared to be much disappointed when the captain of this ship obliged him to haul down the United States’ ensign, then flying in his canoe. This ensign had been given to him by a person who was acting as vice-consul of the United

part of this island abounds,* happened providentially at the particular time when the attention of the natives was most required to be drawn off from thoughts of Heke's valour, and the plunder that he had acquired; while it also gave immediate and profitable employment to numbers of suffering settlers, who must otherwise have been dependent on their compassionate neighbours. (This trade was afterwards checked by an over-supply having been sent to market). Yet this good was not unmingled with evil. The natives obtained large supplies of ammunition and guns in exchange for their gum: and although loyal natives were usually the direct traders, no doubt much found its way, through their relatives, to the rebels.

The propriety of prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition to the natives has often been urged; and it has been repeatedly asked why the local government did not put a stop to the traffic. Neither the governments of Captain Hobson, nor of his immediate successors, interfered with the sale of arms; and it may be presumed that their inducements for so acting were not very dissimilar. The reasons why Captain Fitz-Roy, while governor, did not interfere, were these:—

Since the earliest intercourse of traders with New Zealand, the objects most desired by the natives, have been the white man's weapons. By trade, and as presents, the New Zealanders have been gradually acquiring fire-arms and ammunition in such quantities as to have made many tribes independent of further supply for two or three years.†

No native freeman who knows the use Honghi made of King George's present‡ of fire-arms (and what New Zealander is ignorant of it!) will consent to be without a gun.—Indeed many have several guns. They most prize double barrelled percussion pieces, and they take great care of them.§ The consequence of this general adoption of fire-arms is, as it has been everywhere, that their battles are now, each side being armed alike, less bloody and less savage than they were

States. At the same time, the consul who had left this deputy, was on his way to New Zealand with a large cargo of arms and ammunition. He was wrecked near the East Cape, where much of the cargo was totally lost with the vessel—"The Falco."

* It is found near the surface of the ground; particularly in swamps.

† Their casks of gunpowder are deposited in dry caves, or in the forks of trees.

‡ In 1822.

§ As yet they have not used the bayonet.

formerly; and that the native weapons, the lance, the hani, the patupatu or mere, and the tomahawk, are reserved for close quarters,* and are gradually falling into disuse.

As the New Zealanders will arm themselves, either with their own native weapons, or with others; and as the employment of fire-arms has certainly tended to render warfare less destructive, it appeared at least questionable whether an endeavour to prevent the supply would be advisable.

But, even if advisable, the attempt to do so by a weak government might have caused an effectual resistance to its authority. Traders would smuggle and sell in a manner that might prevent the government from acting against them, without also acting against their customers, the natives,—which would tend to bring on hostilities; while the general feeling caused among the natives would be, that the object of the government was to disarm them gradually, so that they might become mere slaves, incapable of opposition.

Any attempt even thus indirectly to disarm a warlike and high spirited nation, composed of tribes always jealous of their neighbours, and hitherto accustomed to exterminating feuds, must be attended with great hazard, if unsupported by adequate power; therefore Captain Fitz-Roy would not risk bringing the possible consequences on the colony.

But, it may be urged, would not the lives of our brave soldiers and seamen have been spared, had the New Zealanders been destitute of fire-arms? Would they not then have refrained from attacking Kororareka. No doubt they would. But the natives† were as well supplied with fire-arms and ammunition in 1840 as they were in 1844 or 1845. We must deal with the actual, not an imaginary state of things.

Had Governor Hobson intimated the probability of fire-arms and ammunition being prohibited by the government, he might have sent the treaty of Waitangi about the islands in vain. That very treaty guaranteed to the natives, their rights, their freedom, and their accustomed privileges. How could these be maintained between numerous rival tribes in such a country without arms, unless indeed the local government could deal by force with all of them—and protect the weak or quiet against the strong or turbulent,—a matter hitherto physically impossible.

At the sitting of the legislative council in March 1845, the

* To which they now seldom come till the contest is nearly decided.

† About the Bay of Islands.

governor proposed farther reductions in the estimated annual expenditure, which were adopted. The estimated expenditure for 1845-6 was £26,000. The estimate for 1844-5 had been £36,000; that for 1842, in Governor Hobson's time, was no less than £56,000.

These reductions were partly consequent on the termination of an expensive land claims commission: partly effected by reducing salaries: and partly by a much altered establishment for the collection of customs. Very painfully and hardly these reductions bore upon officers who had been induced, by promises and flattering prospects, to leave permanent official situations in Sydney, or other colonies; and now found themselves either much reduced or entirely out of employment; and this after having been persuaded to buy land, in the town, at a high price, and having laid out more than they could well afford in building dwellings for their families.

The destruction of Kororareka, and consequent stoppage of trade in the Bay of Islands by the natives' own act, gave a different aspect to the question of raising a revenue by direct taxation, or by a custom house establishment. It then became more than probable that the other small settlements, such as Hokianga, Wanganui (or Petre), Akaroa, and perhaps Taranaki, (New Plymouth) would diminish rapidly, owing to their extreme insecurity, and that the white population would become concentrated about Auckland and Wellington; in which case the collection of customs duties would become easy, and there could not be so much evasion. In consequence of additional military and naval force being expected, it would be desirable to check the sale of spirits; and the presence of ships of war would be an efficient hindrance to wholesale smuggling. In addition to which, the attempt to raise a revenue by direct taxation had failed in the southern settlements, where an evasion was almost general on the plea that until the settlers obtained legal titles to their lands, they could not be considered to have either property or income. To enforce the payment of their just rates or taxes, it would have been necessary for the government to enter into legal proceedings against half the landholders at New Plymouth, and against nearly all those at Wellington and Nelson.

Taking then into consideration the altered state of the colony with respect to the facility with which customs duties might be levied, and the failure of the attempt to raise a revenue by direct taxation, the governor and legislative council decided to re-establish the custom houses and their officers, but on a much reduced scale of expenditure, not exceeding one half of their expense in 1843. This change took place in April, throughout the colony.

CHAPTER VI.

1845.

Immediately after the destruction of Kororareka, the colonial brig was sent to the southern settlements with information and instructions. The bishop took the opportunity of hastening to Waikanaë, where it seemed probable that his influence with Rauparaha might tend much to prevent disturbance in the south, and thence the brig was sent to Hobarton for troops.

On the 22nd of March H. M. S. North Star arrived from Sydney, with 200 of the 58th regiment on board; and the following day 50 more of the same corps arrived in a small transport.

An attack on Auckland being threatened, 200 men were landed and encamped, or quartered in the town, and 50 were sent immediately to Wellington, where hostilities with the natives were likewise apprehended.

Rumours were numerous at this time of general anxiety, and among those more generally believed was a report that Auckland would be attacked by Heke with about two thousand men, at the next full moon.*

This report was given on the best authority, and preparations for defence were made speedily; but a native war broke out† at the Bay of Islands, and altogether changed the aspect of affairs. But for this diversion, and another caused by the brisk trade in Kauri gum collected by the natives, a formidable attack would probably have been made on Auckland; partly from motives of a political nature, partly for revenge, though chiefly for the sake of plunder. This warfare, between parties of natives themselves, occupied those who sought to attack the government, and to seek revenge for their losses at Kororareka, while the profitable gathering of Kauri gum fully employed all other natives, who would otherwise have been in arms for plunder.

This war between parties of the same large tribe of natives, the Ngapuhi, (companions of Honghi) was said by some to have been caused by the death of a half-caste child, killed by Heke's party at Kororareka. This child was nearly related to Nene (Thomas Walker Nene, the excellent chief now so

* April 22nd.

† Early in April.

well known), but Nene himself always denied having taken up arms on that account. He asserted from the first, that he made war against Heke and Kawiti, because he promised the governor, at Waimate, to fight for and defend the flag staff (meaning the flag, or the government).* With Nene several principal chiefs, namely Taonui, Tawhai, Paratene, Repa, and others, united to attack Heke and Kawiti, who were thus not only deterred from advancing towards Auckland, but obliged to defend themselves on their own ground.

These hostilities between the natives were in no way encouraged by the government, until a subsequent period, when Nene was very hard pressed by his opponents: but on the contrary, when application was made to the governor for his sanction to these natives making an aggressive and retaliatory warfare against Heke, he invariably refused, believing that such a war, without the control of government, would degenerate into interminable hostilities between various tribes, and speedily ruin what the missionaries had effected during a long course of years. It was, however, soon afterwards discovered that to the assistance of the loyal natives we owed so much that our troops could not act without their constant presence; and that, as the less of two evils, they must be engaged to co-operate with the troops.

Towards the end of April the chief Paratene went to Auckland, on behalf of Nene and his adherents, to urge the governor to send a force against Heke as soon as possible, lest Nene should be unable to cope with him and keep him in check until the expedition arrived which government was preparing. Finding the case to be very urgent, admitting of no delay, the governor dispatched all the force he could muster to the Bay of Islands,† with discretionary instructions to attack Kawiti, or Heke, in conjunction with Nene's native force, in the event of a fair opportunity occurring.

The sequel is well known by the published accounts; but the fidelity of the natives, and their courage, have hardly been enough noticed. The daring of Kawiti and his party could scarcely have been exceeded. The bayonet alone overcame them.‡

* Nene, the principal chief of Hokianga, with his brother Patuone, took the most decided part in advocating and signing the treaty of Waitangi.

† Under Lieut. Col. Hulme, and Captain Sir J. Everard Home.

‡ Bayonets have not yet been used by the natives, except on poles, or lances.

The result of this expedition—however unsatisfactory to those engaged, who expected to carry all before them, almost unopposed, was the complete dispersion, for the time, of the rebel force, and the loss of some of their most desperate chiefs.*

* In England, where the peculiar circumstances of New Zealand had been so little known, it has been asked why the governor was not at the defence of Kororareka. Perhaps it has been also asked why he was not with the force under Colonel Hulme, and afterwards with Colonel Despard; therefore it may not be superfluous to say, that the following are some of Captain Fitz-Roy's reasons for remaining at Auckland on those occasions.

An attack on Kororareka was not expected to be of much consequence, neither was the time at all certain. The place was supposed to be so well defended that no doubt existed as to the result of any collision, an event which was rather hoped for as a means of punishing Heke by the reception he would meet with. It would have been lowering the governor's station, in the estimation of the natives, had he waited at Kororareka till it pleased so inferior a chief as Heke to make an attack. It was not thought necessary even for Colonel Hulme to be there.

The regular annual meeting of the legislative council took place on the 4th of March (Kororareka was burned on the 11th), and the governor's presence at Auckland was indispensable, unless a stop were put to all the ordinary public business, during his absence for a very indefinite time. Troops were expected hourly from Sydney,—and, until they arrived, Auckland was in so precarious a condition, that the governor would not have felt justified in leaving that principal place, where all the public documents and offices were exposed to destruction in case of any accidental quarrel. The personal character of individuals in command on such occasions was of the utmost consequence; a hasty or prejudiced man might have provoked a collision, where another might have allayed the ferment. But there was a reason of more importance, in the governor's estimation, than even these. It was his opinion, that, as the principal civil authority to whom the natives were to look as an impartial person, he ought never to take part personally in hostilities against them, except in self defence. To have become the personal enemy of any chief or tribe in New Zealand, must have placed the

But scarcely had the ships and troops returned to Auckland, when information was received that Heke was again collecting men, and was actively engaged in building a new pah, which would be stronger than any yet constructed in New Zealand. It was evident therefore that the principal rebel was not humbled, and that farther exertions would be necessary before British authority could be firmly established at the Bay of Islands and its vicinity, without reference to other parts of New Zealand, the condition of which would depend on the state of affairs in the north.

Reinforcements continued to arrive from Sydney, where Sir George Gipps and the commander of the forces* were making every exertion in their power to assist the local government of New Zealand. It was of the utmost importance to prevent the rebels from making head and collecting the disaffected from other parts of the island; therefore, without delay, another expedition was prepared, on a larger scale, and better provided, having received some light guns and a supply of ordnance stores from Sydney and Hobarton.

In June this second expedition† left Auckland; but the rebels' strength was again undervalued, and, although successful in the main, a lamentable loss of life was incurred by our gallant soldiers and seamen.

After destroying this strong pah and several inferior ones,‡ the troops took up winter quarters at Waimate, to remain there until the weather would admit of further operations in

governor of that colony in a false position with respect to that portion of the people under his jurisdiction.

The governor's expedition to the Bay of Islands in August 1844, was not expected to end in hostilities. It was intended to be merely a demonstration. Not so the operations executed by Colonel Hulme and Colonel Despard. Hostilities, perhaps prolonged for several months, were then anticipated. The governor could not have taken part in them, or have been even at the Bay of Islands, without delaying and interrupting the public business of the other settlements, and his correspondence with England (already inevitably in arrear) to an unwarrantable degree. He therefore remained at what he considered to be his proper station.

* Sir Maurice O'Connell, K.C.B.

† Under Colonel Despard and Sir Everard Home.

‡ Belonging to Haratua and other adherents of Heke and Kawiti.

the field, and additional force should have arrived from Sydney or England.

Meanwhile Kawiti was fortifying a very strong pah in a position supposed to be impregnable, where Heke, (then recovering from a severe wound*) was to join him, if attacked by our forces.

In September the troops moved from Waimate to Russell, to be in readiness for advancing towards Kawiti's new pah, and to be in a more commanding position, better for general communication under any possible circumstances.

About this time reports reached the colony that the governor was recalled, and that his successor would soon arrive. Rumour said that the governor had been too considerate and lenient with the natives, and that his successor would treat them differently. This rumour had an injurious effect among a jealous people, indisposed to have any authority at all over them; and they shewed much feeling on the subject.†

Official intimation of the governor's recall arrived at the beginning of October:—in the middle of November his successor, Captain Grey, arrived; and on the 18th he was duly installed.

Governor Grey brought money and additional forces, both military and naval. He soon repaired to the Bay of Islands, and there offered the rebels terms: his overtures were refused, and an attack on Kawiti's pah determined on. Preparations were forthwith commenced, and on the 11th of January that strong hold (called Ruapekapeka) was taken. Pardon and peace were then proclaimed, and the greater part of the forces were withdrawn.‡ Early in February the new governor sailed for Wellington, with the whole disposable force, intending, it was said, to settle the land question in the Hutt valley.§

It is very remarkable that during the hostilities which took

* Received in attacking Nene's pah, June 11.

† Many letters were written to the governor from chiefs in different quarters of the island.

‡ At this affair there were about 1000 troops, besides a detachment of seamen and marines from H. M. Ships *Castor*, *North Star*, *Racehorse*, *Calliope*, and E. I. C. Ship *Elphinstone*.

§ For further information on these and other preceding subjects reference may be made to the series of despatches from Governor Fitz-Roy, published in the Parliamentary proceedings of 1845, and 1846.

place in New Zealand in 1845, only four acts of savage barbarity are said to have been committed by the natives; and not one instance of retaliation upon unarmed persons, not engaged in hostilities, was known. Yet only a few years have passed since these people were habitually cannibals under their notorious leader Honghi, who was said to have "ate his way" into the middle of the island. (Alluding to the numbers killed and devoured in his murderous excursions towards the south.)

As the four acts above mentioned have been much exaggerated, it may be right to state explicitly that two dead bodies were partly mutilated by heathen natives, portions of flesh having been cut from the back part of the thighs, and that the scalp was taken off another. It is asserted by the natives that these were for offerings to their Atua or deity. The fourth was indeed barbarous cruelty. A soldier was caught straggling, he was taking provisions from the enemy's ground close to the pah. His cries were dreadful; they were heard distinctly in the camp, and there is no doubt that he was tortured before being put to death. His body was afterwards found, seared by a hot iron. These atrocious acts, perpetrated by a few heathen natives, occasioned so much dissension among the rebels, that many left them. One should not look at these barbarities without reflecting on the change that has taken place since every native was a bloodthirsty cannibal.*

It is a very singular fact, and one which will hardly be credited by those who hold the popular opinion of these aborigines, that during the continual intercourse kept up with their chiefs by the governor during 1844 and 1845, not only verbally, but by very frequent correspondence,† not one deviation from truth—not one instance of deception occurred. During the general excitement caused by Heke's attack on Kororareka and the possible consequences, nearly all the principal chiefs (excepting those implicated with the rebels) wrote to or visited the governor to assure him of their fidelity.‡ Not one failed to act up to his professions: not even Parore, Heke's nearest relation,—nor Tirarau, a connection and ally of the chief Kawiti, whose position between the Bay of

* Within the last few years Archdeacon Brown saw thirty native ovens in one row, all filled with human flesh.

† This correspondence occupied at least two persons constantly, in translating and copying for the governor.

‡ Te Whero Whero, and others of the Waikato tribes, told the governor that they would die for the British flag.

Islands and Auckland made his allegiance of the utmost importance. But these influential chiefs, who still retained a considerable hold over their clansmen, wrote freely to the governor respecting their conduct in the event of the government violating its professions. Parore, a quiet sensible man, of superior intellect, wrote to the governor—referring to the rumour of his recall,—saying, that he himself would remain loyal, as long as the government continued to act justly; but if an attempt should be made to take away their lands by force, and degrade the natives, he and they would all rise and fight.*

Among the principal chiefs a regard for truth, and a sense of honour prevail to a degree which one can hardly believe to be compatible with the dirty habits and uninformed condition in which they live. Moreover they are not treacherous:† on the contrary, they give notice of their intentions, and do not, in ordinary warfare, make attacks by night. They are as sagacious and enterprising as they are hardy and courageous. During former years when they had no fire-arms, the flash and report of a musket may have had a mysterious character which caused a superstitious alarm; but now, well accustomed even to rifles and double-barrelled percussion guns, their natural bravery is displayed. Of late years superstition has had only diminished effects on their minds, which has rendered them less liable to be influenced by any sudden panic. They are extremely clever in expedients and stratagems: particularly in war.‡

Between our forces, particularly the seamen, and the natives in arms against Heke, there was uninterrupted cordiality; a state of things that could hardly have been expected, considering the dissimilar elements that were hastily brought

* Some of these letters were highly poetical, even Ossianic.

† Unless treated treacherously themselves, in which case they will go to any length in retaliation.

‡ A member of the House of Commons, who had been in Canada, asserted in his place in parliament, that one North American Indian was equal to nine New Zealanders: but the officers of the United States Frigate St. Louis, who witnessed the fighting at Kororareka, and Lieutenant Henry Eardley Wilmot, R. A., who particularly distinguished himself at Ohaeawae and Ruapekapeka, and had served some years in Canada, expressed opinions nearly the reverse of that above mentioned.

together.* But this intimate acquaintance with our habits, and the knowledge thus acquired of the soldiers' unfitness for warfare in their almost impracticable country, may be turned greatly to their advantage against our forces, should the course of events be unhappily such as to alienate their friendship.†

The greatest difficulty under which officers—especially commanding officers—labour in New Zealand must not be overlooked: namely, the want of information, and the means of communicating with the natives.

Faithful and able interpreters are required continually; but they are very few in number, and those few have not been sufficiently appreciated.‡

Residents in the country are naturally reluctant to compromise their families by taking part in hostilities; yet such persons, especially those who have lived long in the land, are alone competent and trustworthy.

Much natural talent, as well as a readiness to turn the natives' sagacity to account, and a kindly treatment of them, are required in an officer acting against New Zealanders. He will find them accustomed to select the best military positions, to choose the best lines of march, to deceive the enemy by a variety of stratagems. They fortify their pahs scientifically with double or treble stockades, ditches and flanking positions. They are not unacquainted with a method of approaching by parallel trenches, having used it long ago in their own wars, before they had intercourse with Europeans. They know how to avoid shot and shells by underground excavations, and they are accustomed to disperse entirely, when necessary, and

* The presence of native females at the camp was not discouraged by their relatives,—a lamentable feature in the New Zealander's character, against which the missionaries have striven almost in vain. It is a sad fact that they seem to entertain so low an opinion of women, that their illicit intercourse with strangers is not prevented, if attended with advantage to their relations. Of course while the women were thus encouraged to frequent the camp, it would have been very difficult for the officers to prevent their visits, but they were dangerous as spies, while prejudicial to strict discipline.

† The drill and habits of regular troops are unsuited to guerrilla warfare in such a country, however superior in open ground.

‡ Good guides are always wanted, but they are scarcely to be obtained without a liberal use of money.

re-assemble again, at a given time and place, with astonishing rapidity and facility.

Much misapprehension has arisen from calling all their stockades, or palisades (some merely slight single palings) pahs, by which the mere "kainga," or place of abode, has been confounded with the well fortified stronghold called "pa."

While Nene and his adherents were before Ruapekapeka, they erected a temporary musket proof pah, for their own use, in ten hours. Heke's pah at Ohacowae was completed in a month. Kawiti's stronghold at Ruapekapeka occupied his tribe, about six hundred men and women, nearly two months. The timbers (they could not be called palisades, or even posts) of these two pahs, were as large as those of a frigate. Six pound shot lodged in those at Ohacowae, which were of tough puridi-wood, equal to oak.

The late Captain Bennett, of the engineers, sent plans, sections, and descriptions of some strong pahs to the inspector general of fortifications as early as the beginning of the year 1843. With those plans, he sent his ideas respecting the best mode of attacking them, and he made an official demand for howitzers, shells, and rockets. No public effect was caused by his application, sent carefully through the proper channel, (to the knowledge of the colonial authorities in New Zealand) and the apparent indifference to this and other applications for military aid, caused bad effects in the colony,—where loyalty is not so influential a feeling as at home.*

* Besides the refusals given to verbal applications made to authorities at home—the published correspondence with successive governors of New Zealand (between 1839 and 1846), will prove that there was no prospect of adequate military support until last year, after Kororareka was destroyed.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS.

1846.

After reviewing the past occurrences, one is naturally led to consider what errors may be corrected,—what future alterations may be beneficial to New Zealand.

The main question, the foundation indeed on which every consideration must be based, for half a century to come, is—the relative situation and disposition of the two races.

New Zealand is not a country in which the natives can retreat as the white man advances. Having no extensive back country, as in America; and the habits, even the existence of many tribes being dependent on free access to the sea shore, they cannot be considered in the same light as the aborigines of continents. (On this point, as well as on the tenacious tenure of land, I insisted particularly, in my evidence before a committee of the House of Lords—in 1838).

The native question, as it may be called, being supposed the principal, as well as the primary subject to be kept in view, it seems advisable that matters of temporary importance (such as fiscal or police arrangements) should be so managed as not to cause irritation or jealousy. Much, very much, may be effected by rigid justice;—the natives having the practical as well as theoretical privileges of British subjects, when those privileges are favourable to them; but being allowed the full consideration due to ignorance and their peculiar habits when brought under the arm of English law. This may sound too much like undue partiality: it is in strict accordance, however, with the treaty of Waitangi, and—it may be added—with truly equitable conduct.

Perhaps there is not in any part of the world, a race of men, who, taken as a body, have a keener sense of injustice, imposition, or personal indignity.

An old tattooed chief, though smeared with red ochre, wrapped in a dirty blanket, and with feathers stuck in his head, like Rauparaha, Ranghiaiaata, Kawiti, Teraia, or Heuheu, will

be found as keen a lawyer (in native usages and common sense) and as proud a democrat as may be met within the precincts of Westminster. You may reason with these men, and may convince them, if you have justice as well as truth on your side; and further, you may move them out of their intended course, if not against their self-interest; but, to drive—to coerce them—will be most difficult.

Witness old Kawiti, who argued thus: Before my children were killed by the soldiers, I fought for them; now they are all gone, I am no longer of any use while living; therefore I must fight till I die.*

To govern New Zealand according to the pre-conceived theory of legislators who could have known but very little of that country, still less of its aboriginal inhabitants,—is found to be impossible, without destroying numbers of its population; which God forbid. The endeavour to fit to New Zealand a theory so generalised as to suit scarcely any country exactly, is as unpromising an attempt as was that of Procrustes. Whether urged forward by private speculation, or by the disinterested motives of the British government, such a plan must fail in practice. I allude particularly to the theory of colonising New Zealand according to what is usually called the Wakefield system;—and to all the ruinous delusions which have arisen out of a continued endeavour to force that system into practice in a country unfit for its adoption.

This injudicious attempt led to the formation of the New Zealand Company; and the proceedings of that company obliged the government to interfere, and to try to carry out a legalised system,—similar in principle, though differing essentially in practice. In the proceedings of the government there has been no wilful deception, there has been no breach of faith, there has been no moral error. The home government has acted on the highest and purest principles; but it would be unreasonable to suppose that in arrangements for so peculiar a country as New Zealand, unlike any other, there should not have been misapprehensions, if not serious practical errors. The actual consequences are that the colonisation of New Zealand is stopped: that the company is unable to continue its operations with the least prospect of success as a commercial body: and that the British government has a problem to solve which will require more time, more trouble, more men, and more money, than most people are willing to believe.

All the difficulties of the New Zealand question are greatly

* He has since made peace. Will it be lasting?

increased by the distance from England, as well as by its total dissimilarity to any other colony. Some of the difficulties which were felt by Spain, in governing her colonial empire, are now pressing on the British government with respect to the colonies; although the integrity of personal character, and the freedom of the press, prevent those greater evils which became so notorious in Spanish America, notwithstanding the unremitting exertions of that excellent tribunal, the council of the Indies. But the effects of distance are being lessened yearly by improved means of communication: and, if the home government will but listen as readily to the opinions of respectable residents in the colonies, as they naturally attend to the voices of those who join in parliamentary debates, it will be impossible that misapprehensions of much consequence can exist long, or that difficulties should arise, which perseverance and talent will not find means of overcoming. After objecting so decidedly to a particular system of colonisation, it may be expected that some other plan should be suggested as preferable. I am fully aware how well the Wakefield system has appeared to succeed in South Australia, how numerous and influential are its advocates, and how carefully a committee of the House of Commons considered all the details of the Land Sales Act of 1842.* Nevertheless, I will venture to submit that the present circumstances of New Zealand require a less artificial,—a more natural mode of proceeding. Money capital will not be employed for many years in the interior of the island; but there are thousands of active men, accustomed to labour, whose means of maintenance would be very much improved by having each a few acres of that land, to which they might be allowed to raise a valid claim merely by cultivation. Such men would soon raise surplus produce, and become enabled to consume manufactures. It may appear that the more natural method is, to let those buy from the natives who can, provided they are actual settlers, and will conform to certain conditions necessary for the public welfare. Proof of fair purchase, conformity to regulations, and undisturbed possession, after surveying the boundaries,† should be followed by a grant from the Crown.

Lands now belonging to the Crown, or rather to the public,

* Our settlements are so multiplied, that emigrants of the labouring class cannot now be confined to the place for which their labor was intended on leaving England.

† This is the surest test of a valid and undisputed purchase of land.

which are yet unsaleable because of their remoteness or critical situation, might be granted, in small lots, to actual settlers on such allotments, after they had gained the good will of the natives in their neighbourhood sufficiently to warrant their erecting cottages, and cultivating ground.* In this way the hardier labouring men might become pioneers of civilization in the interior. Their example would have its effect gradually, while the natives would not be jealous of their superiority, or their numbers—during the infancy of the colony.

But these men must, for many years to come, be beyond the reach of efficient physical protection from government; in which, however, they would not differ from hundreds of our countrymen who have been and are still living among the natives, actually under their laws,—however favoured or exempted from many penalties or punishments in consequence of their being white men, and therefore ignorant of native usages.†

There will be such difficulty in effecting the sale of Crown lands in New Zealand for many years to come; and there will be so much reluctance to emigrate there from Great Britain, that a regular supply of immigrants may rather be expected from the adjacent Australian colonies, whence adventurous young men are continually moving.

Every additional white settler, located and cultivating in New Zealand, is not only a productive member of the community, (and therefore beneficial to the parent state as well as the colony, by his demand for manufactured articles for which he gives produce of the soil)—but he adds to the strength and influence of the colony: he sets an example to the native: and he pioneers the way for future colonisation on a larger scale, very inferior certainly, but still analogous to that which is progressing so wonderfully in North America.

I have said that there are now some hundreds of white men living entirely among the natives of New Zealand, under their law. These men are more or less settled: many have native wives: some have large families. They speak the language, and have no uneasiness as to their security. They are effecting a silent but perceptible alteration in the native character. In the Waikato district, where there are many of these men, cultivation is much on the increase among the natives;‡ their newer huts, are higher and better: their habits are im-

* Being proofs of undisputed tenure.

† Rather a lesson to ourselves.

‡ It is estimated that above one hundred thousand acres of land are now cultivated by natives, throughout the islands.

proving; they have even a few water mills to grind their corn,* which they are growing in such abundance that if peace be not interrupted, the traders will be able to buy up good wheat from them at little more than two shillings a bushel.† Now if there were at this present time, some thousands of such hardy adventurers scattered over the country, not living together, but dispersed so as to be everywhere dependent on the natives themselves for protection, (which would ensure their quiet conduct,) the gradual change effected by their means might be general; but this is only a supposition, mentioned merely to illustrate the idea, that New Zealand requires a generation or two of pioneers whose industrious labours will not only maintain themselves and their families in that productive country, (without perhaps seeing money for months together),—but will prepare the face of the land for a much more numerous multitude than it has yet borne in its most populous time. In short (strange or even absurd as it may seem to supporters of the Wakefield theory), I would suggest that land should there be made as cheap, and as easy of attainment as possible.

There is another material consideration in connection with this subject. Emigrants now prefer taking their money with them and buying land which they have seen, rather than trust to other persons, or to a lottery, and after a long passage find themselves in a strange country where they cannot discover their expected property; or, if discovered, are not allowed to occupy it: but are obliged to return home; or work for others as common labourers.

These questions with respect to New Zealand are now become so complicated, that it will be far better, in every point of view, for the government to meet the whole case of that colony comprehensively rather than to temporize in detail. The New Zealand Company might have a place in history by the side of the South Sea Company;‡ and money should not be spared in rendering at least a considerable part of that country safe and habitable for colonists, who while benefitting themselves and the mother country, would also improve the condition of the aboriginal natives.

By means of money employed judiciously; and solely by the government; this entangled question—this problem may be solved: and the two races may yet live amicably. But while

* Steel hand mills are in much demand.

† Sixteen shillings a quarter.

‡ Of 1725. Among many points of resemblance, each company employed lotteries and great exaggerations.

there is an irresponsible commercial body, whose object is selfish and local, operating either as a middle-man between the government and the colony, or as an officious helper of the government, for the sake of its own advantage, there can be no peace or confidence.

Money is urgently required for building defensive forts and walls; for military and naval forces; for the civil government; and for the natives. Hitherto government has erected no hospital,—has established no school,—has constructed no place of shelter,*—has contributed towards the erection of no church for the aboriginal population.†

When a native chief asks what benefits the British Sovereign has conferred on his race, what reply can be given to him? The advantages really derived from the presence of a settled civilized government, the natives themselves do not appreciate fully, because they find that it is neither strong enough, nor sufficiently prompt to deal out the summary justice to which they have been accustomed; while it is some check upon their taking the law into their own hands.‡ This may appear advantageous to their general well-being; but in reality it generates discontent, promotes disorder and licence, and has gone far towards great disorganization among the rising generation.

The gross misconduct of some white men,—not only escaped convicts, but traders on the coast, and even young men who were educated respectably,—has often irritated the natives, and has operated unfavourably for the government, which could not punish such offences for want of legal proofs, and witnesses who could not or would not appear. Fraud was often practised—promised payment evaded altogether—women were enticed away, and perhaps deserted—the hospitality of chiefs was abused by idle young men living at their pahs,—and small vessels were promised but not given in return for cargoes of produce. Of three stipulated cargoes perhaps two would be taken in advance; but the vessel never returned, and nothing more was heard of her, or their payment, by the natives. Such cases as these occurring frequently, naturally induce the wish for a more efficient executive power than the slow and technical English law, which in so many respects is unsuited to the present state of New Zealand.

* Excepting one small building at Nelson.

† As the Aborigines contribute materially towards the revenue,—by their consumption of manufactured articles, it may be truly said that they have a just claim to more advantages from the government than they have yet received.

‡ Which they would prefer.

In 1610, Sir Francis Bacon advised martial law to be enforced in Virginia, and the colony prospered under it, from 1611 to 1619, in a surprising manner; so much so that the settlers believed their establishment secure, and scattered themselves over the country.*

Money employed for the native population might be divided between objects tending directly to the bodily as well as the mental welfare of the natives,†—and objects of a political nature affecting both races, such as salaries to native chiefs‡ acting as keepers of the peace and agents of government, payment to natives acting with our troops; pay, clothing, and arms for a native corps, also for presents and for subsidies.

Expensive as this may sound, it would be a less extravagant process than attempting to reduce New Zealanders to submission by the sword,—a lamentable alternative to which we seem now to be fast approaching. Unless it is made evidently and strongly their interest to become British subjects in reality, as well as in name, no force will make them submissive while they retain life, amidst the fastnesses of an almost impracticable country, whence they can attack their opponents at any time.

The great object to be kept in view being, the peaceable intercourse of both races, without which no material progress can be made by the settler, no improvement in the condition of the native; and as the state of New Zealand for generations may depend on the conduct of Great Britain during the next few years, let me entreat those who take a real interest in that country to exert themselves speedily, and in earnest.

Few persons accustomed to consider the New Zealand Company in the light which the list of their directors ought to warrant, can bring themselves to believe that they cannot continue their operations as a commercial body undertaking to carry on colonisation in New Zealand. Under all the force of censure which may be the consequence of my presuming to give a decided opinion on such a subject, I now venture to assert that the continuance of their operations in New Zealand, however assisted by the government, must be attended

* Yet even then the Indians were planning their destruction, and four years afterwards, a general attack took place, in all quarters—at one time.

† But not lavished like the thousands of pounds formerly expended annually in Canada.

‡ In Spanish America the caciques received salaries for similar purposes.

with disadvantages and pecuniary loss; and that the sooner they cease to act, the better it will be for themselves,—for the settlers, and for the natives. My reasons are these, the company commenced operations upon the principle of obtaining land cheaply in large quantities, and selling it at a very large profit (more than nineteen hundred per cent.) Land cannot be obtained in the northern island of New Zealand in sufficient quantity, and at a price sufficiently low to enable the company to realise a profit that will even cover their expenses. To take land by force from the natives, or without the full consent of all its numerous owners, would involve in hostilities, not only the takers, but those who attempted to settle there, and their local government. Were a person in England to endeavour to enclose a common, without taking cognizance of all the claims to right thereon, in what litigation would he not involve himself! yet the company have attempted an infinitely greater and more complicated encroachment in New Zealand, where the natives resort to muskets and tomahawks, instead of attorneys and barristers.

I believe that the majority of the directors and shareholders of the New Zealand Company are to this day under a delusion, are still mystified about that country, and that the time will come when they will feel thankful that the local government took such a course in 1841-2-3-4 and 5, as saved the settlers whom they sent out to the Antipodes from still greater distress, if not from extermination.

Let not people now say: “why did you not tell us this sooner?”—Local knowledge cannot be acquired in a few weeks. Time for enquiry, for inspection, for calm comparison, and for reflection, are necessary before fixed opinions of any value can be formed. The only persons who could give the New Zealand Company accurate information previous to 1840 were the missionaries and their correspondents. They did give it, openly, in print, as well as privately in conversation. Their opinions were controverted, slighted, or despised. Now their truth has been manifested,—but how painfully—by what an amount of misery!

As one among the many who hoped that the company might work beneficially for all parties interested, I left England in 1843, prepared to co-operate with them cordially; but on arriving at Sydney, and more in New Zealand, my eyes were opened. The Wairau proceedings, as detailed by the Wellington and Nelson newspapers, which I received from Colonel Wakefield at Sydney, not only convinced me of the settlers' erroneous views, but of the injurious manner in which the operations of the company had been practically car-

ried out by their agents, and by the colonists over whom they had influence.

A very momentous question is now frequently asked, to this effect: What will be the state of New Zealand for the next few years? My answer to such a question would be: Unless Providence avert the impending evils in a manner which we now cannot foresee, there is too much reason to fear that it will be distracted by warfare, not only between the natives themselves, but between the white and coloured races.

Religion has lost much of the limited influence which was acquired previous to 1840. Roman catholics have entered the field which was exclusively protestant till 1838. Elements of distrust and discord have been spread over the whole island; and there is now no influence to control or unite the population. Unsettled and jealous feelings have been roused by the recent hostilities, by the arrival of troops and ships of war, and by false reports of the intentions of government. Appearances are very threatening, and I much doubt the propriety of adding to the excitement by any attempt to take land* by force. A little time, and a few hundred sovereigns, might save many thousands of pounds, and hundreds of lives.

The expedition to Port Nicholson, to which I referred in the preceding chapter, may be apparently successful: the intruding natives may fall back for a time: but it will hardly be safe to cultivate that land,† and a dangerous effect will be caused among all the aborigines of New Zealand.

An alteration was made by the executive in the early part of this year, which I cannot but regard with the deepest anxiety. The vitally important office of protector of the natives was abolished; the chief protector was offered an inferior occupation as native secretary in the colonial secretary's office, and the subordinates in the protectorate department were dismissed, or offered employment as clerks or interpreters, as future vacancies might occur.

I cannot think of this measure without the keenest feelings of regret, and the most earnest concern for the consequences.

Unfortunately, some influential members of the House of Commons have said: "Let New Zealand have more protectors of Englishmen, and fewer protectors of natives." Those members could not have been aware of the paramount importance to the colony, of the officers who, though called

* At the Hutt Valley for instance.

† In the valley of the Hutt (Heretaonga.)

protectors of the natives, have hitherto been more efficient protectors of their own countrymen.

The knowledge of native usages and language, which the protectors must possess, and their own personal influence among the aborigines, enabled them to allay many a fast increasing feeling of vindictive anger,—to prevent many a serious quarrel. They were the eyes and ears of the executive authorities at each of the settlements, with reference to the aboriginal people; and how those authorities will contrive to carry on their duties efficiently without such assistance, I am unable to conceive. To deprive the governor, or the superintendent at Wellington, or the police magistrate at New Plymouth, of the assistance of a resident protector of aborigines, seems to me like taking away the confidential dragoman and his assistants from an embassy at Constantinople, pending intricate negotiations involving immediate hostilities.

That the British government will confirm so important a change in their conduct and arrangements with regard to the aborigines of New Zealand, as to annihilate the protectorate department, I cannot bring myself to believe.

Even the Spanish government always maintained protectors of the Indians; and not only so, but by hospitals, and salaries to caciques, and by repeated instructions to successive viceroys, the council of the Indies did more on behalf of the American Indians than, after all our professions, we of Great Britain have yet done for the New Zealanders.

If the government should be so ill advised as to change its policy materially towards New Zealand, to the extent of falsifying what the missionaries, the bishop, and successive governors have solemnly asserted to be the fixed intentions of Great Britain,—the consequences will be fatal.

How those men, of unimpeached character among the natives (however slandered by some of their own countrymen), were pained while reading the debates of 1845 in the House of Commons, I cannot adequately describe.

CHAPTER VIII.

COMMERCIAL RESOURCES.

1846.

Political occurrences and local sketches have chiefly occupied the preceding pages. I will now, in conclusion, touch lightly on a few of the present and promising resources of New Zealand in a mercantile point of view, and on their probable consequence in connection with its geographical position. I will refrain from details, not only because they would require too much space for admission into this limited paper, but because I believe that they have been already published by others whose authority is preferable to mine.

The natural resources of New Zealand hitherto discovered, are now well known to be great; but they are not of a kind to demand merely slight exertions, in order to make them available. Industry, temperance, integrity and discretion, are indispensably required by those who would derive much advantage from the natural resources of that country. Capital alone will not yet do much; safe channels for its employment are wanting.

A very healthy climate, favourable in a high degree to old as well as young people, but particularly to children; a rapid vegetation, which continues throughout the year, excepting a few weeks; and an equable moderate temperature, are permanent advantages of the first class,—but the excess of wind and abundance of rain, in some particular localities, must not be overlooked. There are many good harbours on the north east coast of the Northern Island (though in other habitable districts they are by no means numerous, or easy of access) and inland communication by boats or canoes, is extensive. Thus the healthiness and accessibility of the country add to the value of its natural productions, the principal of which are: timber (of many qualities, from the hardest and toughest to the lightest or most pliable), flax, gum, bark, dye-wood, copper, sulphur, manganese, iron, china clay, fuller's earth, coal, limestone, lead, silver, alum, ochre, pumice stone, and volcanic earths.

As cultivation extends and cattle increase, corn, European flax, potatoes, hides, and wool of excellent quality, will be

produced in greater abundance. Even in the rough "bush," as it is called, cattle, horses, sheep, and goats thrive greatly; but as pastures improve, animals will likewise become proportionally better in their respective qualities. The wool of New Zealand is already known as long in staple, and uniform in strength of fibre,—(effects of equable moderate temperature, and continuance of nourishing food throughout the year). It is probable that wool, hides, tallow, and salt provisions will become staple articles of export, especially from the middle island (called New Munster) where there are so few natives that the progress of colonization would not be impeded materially.

Very little is yet known of the mineral treasures even in the northern districts, and nothing at all of the contents of the central and southern parts of the islands. Volcanic action has been remarkably intense in the northern island, and slight earthquakes have been felt; but there is no evidence of any damage to buildings hitherto erected, neither have the natives any distinct account of serious convulsions having occurred for some generations.*

Copper is said to be very abundant, and easy of access. Coal is plentiful in several places, but has yet been worked near Nelson only. There is an extensive coal field near the Waikato River belonging to Whero-Whero; and there is said to be excellent coal remarkably convenient for shipping in Preservation Harbour, at the south end of the Middle Island. Tin also, and other minerals of value have been found, although search for them has been only recently made, and not by persons fully conversant with mineralogy.

As a coasting trade is growing fast, and there are great facilities for building small vessels, it will not be necessary for over-sea traders to visit inferior harbours; their cargoes can be collected at the principal ports. The violent winds that are frequent, and the iron-bound character of much of the coast, make it advisable for ships of burthen to avoid exposure on the western or south-eastern shores, where high seas prevail and where few harbours exist.

Some of the coasting vessels are owned, and almost entirely manned by natives; but owners of English vessels and their masters, usually prefer white men, although more expensive—on account of the difficulty of dealing with natives in their own country, without a good knowledge of their language and

* Nevertheless it is a country in which earthquakes may be expected, therefore buildings should be planned accordingly, extended in width, rather than height.

usages. Native seamen are found by masters of vessels (as native women are by husbands), so completely under the influence of their families and a variety of native usages, that they sometimes become exceedingly troublesome, to say the least;—and on this account, as well as others, natives are not preferred on board English vessels, although whalers and over-sea voyagers in the Pacific take some occasionally. They make active and hardy seamen.

The geographical position of these islands is generally acknowledged to be very important—politically as well as commercially considered. Their situation immediately opposite to the principal Australian colonies; the nature of their productions; the facility with which ships may sail from New Zealand to South America, the Islands of the Pacific, China, or India,—and from each back again, in about equal times;—show that the future importance of the colony will be great, however slow may be its progress for many years, and whatever difficulties and disasters may unhappily befall the present generation of settlers. Perhaps no colony is better suited to British habits and constitutions: or would be better adapted to British enterprise, were it not peopled by an aboriginal race, whose strength and numbers have hitherto been so little appreciated that a threatening state of affairs has been brought about, which at present checks progress.

There are some—perhaps many persons—who look on the New Zealanders themselves as impediments to the prosperity of British settlers in that country. To such persons I would say: the best customers of the settlers in New Zealand are the natives. They are purchasers of a large amount of blankets, clothing, hardware, tobacco, soap, paper, prints, arms, ammunition, boats, small vessels, canvas, and other articles, for which they pay in ready money, in native produce, (such as flax, pigs, fish, potatoes, corn, &c.) in land, or by their own labour. The amount of native produce consumed by the settlers is really surprising; and a similar practice will continue, while peace prevails, because the native is heedless of the value of time, and can sell his produce at prices considerably lower than those which can be afforded by the settlers.

In conclusion, it is my deliberate conviction, that the prosperity of colonists in New Zealand will depend on the prevalence of amicable relations with the aboriginal race.

